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Art. 1.—THE TROJAN WAR.

1. *Troy, a Study in Homeric Geography.* By Walter Leaf. Macmillan, 1912.
2. *Homer and History.* By Walter Leaf. Macmillan, 1915.

THOSE who first read their Homer and learned Greek history more than forty years ago will remember how exclusively literary and philological the questions connected with Homer then appeared to be. The Trojan War was regarded as much on the same footing as the legends of Heracles and the Argonauts. Agamemnon and Achilles were at best as real as Lear and Cymbeline; at worst they were degraded deities. Homer's picture of political and social life possessed indeed historical value, but it was supposed to reflect the conditions of his own time, not earlier than the ninth or possibly the tenth century B.C. But the purely philological phase of Homeric criticism, which was inaugurated by Wolf's memorable 'Prolegomena' in 1795 and lasted for about eighty years, came to an end when archæology at last appeared on the scene of debate.

The excavations of Dr Schliemann opened a new period in the investigation of the Homeric poems and prehistoric Greece. The new facts which he revealed in swift succession at Troy, Mycenæ, Orchomenus, and Tiryns placed Homer in a new light and raised unexpected problems. It was established that a prehistoric civilisation existed on the Greek mainland which corresponded in general to the Homeric background. But there were certain differences; and the question which immediately

attracted most attention was the exact relation between the Mycenæan and the Homeric civilisations. It may be said that, so far as the background was concerned, Homer's truth received a remarkable confirmation; but the results of Schliemann's excavations at Troy itself were calculated to encourage the scepticism which had generally prevailed as to the reality of the Trojan War. He discovered an important brick fortress at Hissarlik, the traditional site of Troy, with unmistakable marks that it had been destroyed by fire; but it belonged to a period long previous to the Mycenæan. Above its ruins he found the traces of four prehistoric settlements, but all, so far as his excavations told him, quite insignificant. It seemed that there was no Homeric Troy, and therefore there could have been no Trojan War, unless indeed tradition were wholly wrong, and the city of Priam was to be sought at some other place, at Bally Dagh, for instance, as some held. But Schliemann was not long in his grave when new excavations at Hissarlik, carried out by Dr Dörpfeld, justified his faith by revealing that the latest of the prehistoric settlements (the sixth in order) was a great castle with a larger circuit than any of its predecessors, and with walls architecturally superior to those of Tiryns and Mycenæ but belonging to the same age. Little was found in it; it had been thoroughly ransacked by those who razed it to the ground; but its massive circuit of fortifications attested the might and wealth of its lords. Here at last was Homeric Troy. Tradition had so far been vindicated; and the Trojan War was well within the realm of probability. For it was reasonable to argue thus: the destruction of the mighty fortress is an archæological fact for which we have to account; and the only evidence bearing on the matter is the Homeric epic and the consistent tradition of the Greeks that Troy was destroyed by an expedition from the Greek mainland. Accept the main fact of the Trojan War, and it explains both the archæological problem and the origin of the Homeric tale.

The existence of Homeric Troy and its bearings had not been fully digested when, at the close of the last century, the sensational discoveries of Sir Arthur Evans at Cnossus diverted attention to larger issues. The wonderful remains uncovered in Crete widened the

problem of Mycenaean into the problem of 'Ægean' civilisation. But they were a new proof that Greek tradition could not be lightly set aside as devoid of historical foundation. Thucydides, in his brief and masterly survey of early Greek history, had spoken of a Cretan thalassocracy as a well-known fact. The Cretan discoveries showed that he was right.

Thus the work of archæologists corroborated in three capital points the tradition of the Greeks. The Argolid—Mycenæ and Tiryns—had been the seat of a strong and rich civilisation in prehistoric times; contemporaneously there had been a great fortress at Troy; and the ancient sea-power of Crete was not a mere legend. Moreover, successive explorations in various parts of Greece were accumulating evidence that the range of Mycenaean civilisation closely corresponded to the extent of the Greek world as it was represented in the Homeric poems. Further, the prehistoric chronology which it was possible to construct, partly with the help of objects which had been imported from Egypt to the Ægean, indicated that Mycenæ and Mycenaean Troy flourished at a time which could not be very far from the dates which Greek chronologists had assigned to the Trojan War.

It is much to know that Troy existed and that Troy was razed to the ground; but a problem which interests the historian as much as the literary student now imposes itself with more insistency than before. Are there reasons for supposing that Homer's general picture of the war rested on genuine tradition? May it not be that, although a historical fact—the destruction of Troy in a war with the Achæans—was the *motif* of the epic, yet all the circumstances were imaginary, the creation partly of the mythopœic instinct of the Greeks, partly of the genius of the poet? Is it a tenable view that the fundamental groundwork of the story was myth, and that legends about gods had been woven round the bare fact of a war for Troy, when the causes and circumstances of the war had long been entirely forgotten? Or can we prove that the groundwork was history, and that, however embellished by myth and transformed by the art of minstrels, there is in the epic story a real core of fact which we may reasonably endeavour to discover? Mr Leaf has addressed himself to the solution of this problem,

which is as fascinating as it is important, and in two brilliant volumes he has, in our opinion, successfully vindicated the view that the theme of the *Iliad* had its basis in history and not in myth.

There is one available test of what may be called the actuality of a poem like the *Iliad*. Does it conform to the fixed facts of nature? Is the poet generally accurate in his topography and geography? If we find that the natural features of the Trojan plain and the geography of the Troad correspond with remarkable completeness to the details of the poet's picture, this affords a strong presumption that he was concerned with things, not with fancies. Had his story been a purely imaginative invention or an artistic combination of baseless legends, we should have to assume that, in order to create an illusion of realism, he made a special and careful study of the scene. That is such an improbable hypothesis that it can hardly be entertained. The alternative is that the local circumstances came down to Homer implicit in a story of events.

Mr Leaf has systematically applied this test as it never was applied before. The results of his careful exploration of the Troad from the *Ægean* to the river *Æsepus*, from the Hellespont to the Gulf of *Adramyttium*, have established triumphantly the veracity of Homer, so far as the scene of the war and its neighbourhood are concerned. The landscape viewed from the hillock of *Hissarlik* is in its general features identical with the landscape in Homer.

'Over the low range of hills fringing the sea to the west rises the conical peak of *Tenedos* "notissima fama." The "broad Hellespont" flows to the north. *Samothrace* and *Ida*, farther away, display themselves as seats worthy of gods' ('*Troy*,' p. 28).

The distance of *Hissarlik* from the sea, about three miles, is that required by the conditions Homer contemplates. The lesser place which the *Simois* holds in the *Iliad* compared with the *Scamander* corresponds to reality. The *Scamander* flows from south to north through the plain and

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'is a considerable stream throughout the year; in winter it often brings down heavy floods which overflow the whole plain, and leave it covered with silt and tree trunks. The description of the fight between Achilles and the River in Iliad XXI, is a magnificent picture, transfigured by the highest art, of such a flood; the very trees and shrubs so minutely named in it are those which line the course of the Menderes to-day. Here at least we feel we are in the very presence of the poet' (*Ib.* pp. 30, 31).

The Simois, now the Dümbrek-su, which flows down a valley north of Hissarlik, is only a small brook which runs dry in summer; 'but it marks one of the natural limits of the battle-field, and it is as such that it is generally named.'

To satisfy completely the conditions of the Iliad, we shall have indeed to suppose that three thousand years ago the course of the Scamander was somewhat different and lay farther east than it lies to-day. It is clear from the Homeric descriptions that the scene of fighting was entirely to the east of the river, and that the combatants were not compelled to cross by the ford. But, however this may be, the general features of the landscape were conceived by the poet with wonderful faithfulness. The rise in the ground (*θρωσμός πεδίου*) to the north of the city can be identified; and to the south-west a spring has been discovered which suits the position required by the springs that are mentioned as a landmark in the description of Hector's flight round the walls. The tomb of Ilos near the Scamander ford must have long since been washed away, but some broken columns may possibly mean that a Roman shrine 'continued the old tradition of the tomb of a hero.' Characteristic flora of the plain to-day are not unnoticed in Homer. When Hephaistos sends fire to stay the onrush of the river god, elms and willows and tamarisks are consumed. 'To-day the river channel through the plain is marked by the line of low willows and elm bushes . . . and the tamarisks spread from the banks in thick copses, making with their young shoots at the end of April conspicuous patches of dull crimson.' It is to be observed that these features are mentioned incidentally by the poet and assumed to be well known. There is just one conspicuous case of discrepancy with fact. There is no trace in the Trojan

plain of a hot and a cold spring close together, such as are described in *Iliad* XXII; and the evidence seems to show that it is highly unlikely that there ever was such a double fountain in the neighbourhood of the fortress. We have to go to the top of many-fountained Ida to find a pair of springs which might have suggested the picture. But Mr Leaf well points out that this case of discrepancy is just the one case in which, contrary to his wont, the poet furnishes an elaborate description; and we have no doubt that he is right in concluding that the sources of different temperatures were a poetical invention. A cold spring, as we have already said, exists in the place where we should look for them.

When we turn from the scenery to the ruins of the fortress, the conclusion that the *Iliad* was based on intimate local knowledge is remarkably confirmed. The wall was built 'of squared blocks of masonry of such excellent workmanship that it was difficult at first to attribute it to so early an age as the Mycenæan.' But the work is not equal in all parts. It is excellent on the east; it is still better on the south; but on the west side

'the masonry is altogether inferior: the wall is built of very imperfectly worked stones, their gaping joints being only roughly filled with splinters and clay. The wall itself is thinner, too: it shows a thickness of only 10 feet as compared with 15½ feet, the average on the eastern side' (*Ib.* p. 88).

This inequality is doubtless to be explained by supposing that the western portion was built first and the southern last; but the remarkable thing is that the comparative weakness on the western side is noticed in the *Iliad*. When Andromache (in Book VI) beseeches Hector not to go forth, she says, 'Stay thy folk beside the fig-tree, where best the city may be scaled and the wall is assailable.' The fig-tree was near the Scaean Gate in the western wall. A legend known to Homer said that the walls had been built by Poseidon and Apollo, assisted by Æacus, and the participation of a mortal explained the vulnerability of one section. But the truth to fact in the location of this weaker part is a convincing proof that the material on which the poet of the *Iliad* worked was derived from the knowledge of eye-witnesses.

It is unfortunate that the Scaean gate and tower,

which play such a prominent part in the siege, should not have been discovered. The excavations have revealed three gates, situated on the east, south-east, and south-west; and the last of these was blocked up. It is highly improbable that all the gates lay on the southern side of a line drawn from east to south-west. We may assume with virtual certainty that there was at least one other gate, and we may confidently place it on the north-west, where the evidence of the poem would lead us to locate the Scæan Gate. Over the spot where it is reasonable to look for it 'stand great mounds of débris, the spoil of Schliemann's earlier excavations; and until these are removed no certainty can be attained.'

It is an interesting question whether any other gate is indicated by Homer. In three passages* we read of 'the Dardanian Gates'; and the meaning was discussed in antiquity. Aristarchus contended that this was only another name for the 'Scæan Gates.' It does not appear why this gate should have been called Dardanian, even supposing that it had an alternative name. Another view is that Dardanian simply means Trojan, and that the phrase means all or any of the gates. This would suit the sense, but is rightly rejected by Mr Leaf, for Dardanian is never equivalent to Trojan in Homer. Dr Dörpfeld holds that the south-eastern gate is meant, as that which led to Dardania. This interpretation, which is obviously in itself satisfactory, suits one of the passages admirably. When Hera says, 'So long as Achilles came forth to war, the Trojans never ventured even outside the Dardanian Gates,' a reference to the issue which lay furthest from the side of the Greek camp would clearly give most point to her rhetoric. But the other passages are not so easily amenable to this interpretation. When we read that, so often as Hector 'set himself to dart under the well-built walls under the Dardanian Gates, if haply from above they might succour him with darts, so oft will Achilles gain upon him and turn him towards the plain,' Mr Leaf thinks that the meaning 'imperatively required' is 'any of the gates.' But on his own showing Dardanian cannot mean this; therefore, unless we make the unlikely assumption that

* Iliad, v, 189; xxii, 194 and 413.

the word is corrupt, the poet thought otherwise and designated one particular gate. Now Hector's flight began at the Scaean Gate. He ran southward, then eastward; and the first gate he came to, where he could seek shelter, was the south-eastern, as the south-western had been blocked up. Would it not be natural enough for the poet, with a vivid picture of Hector's course in his mind, to select this gate for his description? In the third passage Priam, when he hears of Hector's death, is described as eager to go forth from the Dardanian Gates to seek Achilles at the ships. Why not the Scaean? asks Mr Leaf. Why should he propose to go from the south-eastern gate 'on the other side of the fortress and leading directly away from the sea?' It is true that, issuing by this gate, he would have some three hundred yards farther to drive. But there is another consideration. The Scaean Gate was used when the troops went forth to fight, but it must have been usual during the siege for those who had to go forth for non-combatant purposes to use the south-eastern gate away from the danger side. That is implied in the words of Hera quoted above. It would, therefore, be perfectly natural for the poet to think, and make Priam think, of this gate, just because his errand was not battle. Nor does this suggestion seem to be overruled by the fact that Priam had previously used the Scaean Gate when he went forth to conclude an armistice. On the whole we are inclined to believe that Dr Dörpfeld's theory is right, and that these passages taken together are another indication of the general accuracy of Homer's conception of Troy.

The royal Palace has not been discovered. It was probably situated in the centre of the castle on ground which has been entirely levelled. It is possible that the site of the temple of Athene has been found. While the houses are built on the same plan, with *megaron* and *prodomos*, there is one which is distinguished by the singular feature of a line of three columns down the centre, an arrangement which existed in a Greek temple at neighbouring Neandria. If this was a temple, as has been conjectured, it may have been that on which Hecuba and the Trojan women laid their *peploi* on the knees of Athene in the sixth Book of the Iliad. Mr Leaf does not commit himself very clearly, but he seems to imply his

belief that the worship of Athene was Trojan. For of course it might be maintained that this is a Homeric anachronism, and that Athene was first worshipped at Troy by the inhabitants of the succeeding settlement, who 'may have been Greek.'

This is an important point and we ought to be clear about it. The curious story of the Locrian tribute, to which Mr Leaf has devoted some instructive pages, seems sufficient to establish the cult of Athene in the city of Priam. The crime of the Locrian Aias, who violated Cassandra, the priestess of Athene, tearing her from the sanctuary, is familiar. Plague and famine broke out in Locris; and the people were told that the visitation was due to the wrath of the goddess, and that they must send two maidens every year for a thousand years to serve in her temple at Troy in order to propitiate her. 'So far,' says Mr Leaf, 'is legend only;' but the hundred noble families of Locris actually sent two maidens chosen by lot every year, and this practice was still maintained at the end of the fourth century B.C., as is proved by an inscription. Mr Leaf shows that the practice had begun not later than 800 B.C. He assumes that Greek settlers on this site (in the later period of the Seventh City) felt it necessary to make atonement to the deities whose shrines had been made desolate by Greeks; and 'nothing is more likely than that Delphi should make reparation for the legendary sin an obligation on any colony in Troy itself.' This seems to assume that Athene was worshipped in Mycenæan Troy; but we are inclined to be more conservative than Mr Leaf, who regards the tale of Aias as unhistorical. Why should such a legend be invented? If the incident is true, it explains the Locrian tribute and it also explains itself. If it was an invention, its only imaginable motive was to explain the Locrian tribute. But in that case the true origin of the Locrian tribute remains unexplained. If we believe, like Mr Leaf, in the Trojan War and the Achæan capture of Troy, there is no reason for refusing to believe that the incident actually occurred. Unfortunately for Cassandra, it was one of the things which were likely to happen in the sacking of the city. If this argument is reasonable, it supports the conclusion, which otherwise seems probable, that Athene had a temple in the Troy of Priam.

When he comes to examine the Homeric geography of the Troad and Asia Minor, Mr Leaf is led by logical steps to a theory which forms his most original and striking contribution to the elucidation of the Trojan problem. His main text is the Catalogue of the Trojan forces in the Second Book. He is able to show that the geography of the Catalogue is in accordance with the rest of the Iliad, and that it implies conditions completely different from those which prevailed when the Iliad assumed its present form. These conditions suggest an hypothesis which enables him to account both for the rise of the Trojan power and for the outbreak of the Trojan War.

The overlordship of Priam seems to have extended over the Troad itself, westward to the river *Æsepus*, beyond which was the country of the Mysians, and southwards to the Gulf of *Adramyttium*. Here Mr Leaf has done much to clear up the geography of the southern Troad, which he shows convincingly to have been a Pelasgian confederacy, to which the worship of *Apollo Smintheus* was common. He reconstructs from various passages in the Iliad the great foray of Achilles which was directed against the cities of this confederacy. This raid, in which *Chryseis* and *Briseis* were captured, was the immediate prologue to the action of the Iliad. The allies beyond the Troad who are enumerated in the Catalogue fall into four groups—the *Pæonians* and *Thracians* in the north; the *Paphlagonians* in the far east; the *Phrygians* and *Mysians* in the near east; the *Mæonians*, *Carians*, and *Lycians* in the south. Here, says Mr Leaf, we have four radial lines which represent four trade routes leading 'straight to what were the chief centres of trade in the early days of Greek colonisation, to *Miletus*, *Amphipolis*, *Cyzicus*, *Sinope*.' The inference is that Troy was a great commercial centre, and the question arises why? For no spot would seem less marked out by nature for commercial prosperity than the plain of *Hissarlik*. With its marshes and malaria, it was a poor place compared with other plains in the Troad. Moreover

'there is no natural harbour in the district. Troy cannot therefore have thriven upon her over-sea commerce, or its

close relation, piracy. Troy has indeed two roadsteads, one to the north of the Hellespont, the other, Besika Bay, to the west; but both of them are exposed anchorages, offering no safe shelter in gales.'

How then did a strong and wealthy power arise in such an unattractive situation, suitable neither for production nor for commerce nor for plunder? The secret, according to Mr Leaf, is to be found in the conformation of the Hellespont and the prevalence of certain winds in the eastern Mediterranean.

'It is easy to see that the condition which is needed in order that Troy may be an important centre of commerce is that the Hellespont should be closed to the ships of the *Ægean* Sea. When this is the case, the Trojan plain becomes of necessity the natural meeting place for the trade of the *Ægean* and the *Euxine*. . . . The passage of the Hellespont is easily closed against sailing ships by those who hold the land. The dominant factor in the navigation of all the eastern Mediterranean is the prevalence throughout the summer of the *Etesian* winds, blowing from N.W., N., or N.E., often with great violence for many days together. Any sailor making for the *Propontis* must perforce reckon on a delay at the mouth of the Hellespont, almost certainly for some days, perhaps for a fortnight or so. In early times, and indeed so long as galvanised iron tanks remained unknown, the water supply was a vital question for all navigation. Only a poor supply could be carried in the heavy earthenware jars on which the Greeks depended; and so it was that a delay of even two or three days wind-bound on a coast where the water supply was in hostile hands, was a matter of life and death. . . . The natural supply of water for ships making the passage of the Straits is of course from the *Scamander* itself. This is easily defended; there is no other permanent stream for several miles. . . . There is also good water to be had at Besika Bay, a fact which has on more than one occasion proved serviceable to the British fleet. But Troy is so placed that it can easily command this also. A garrison in the castle could easily keep watch over both sources by stationing at them detachments sufficient to oppose any unauthorised landing by the crew of a merchant ship' ('Troy,' pp. 261-2).

Thus the lord of the Trojan plain had it in his power to exclude from the *Euxine* the merchants of the *Ægean*,

whether Greeks or Lycians or Carians, and compel them to trade with the Euxine merchants at Troy, under conditions imposed by himself. He could grow rich by exacting heavy tolls. The Hellespont was also in early times the natural outlet for Thracian trade, so that, if a market at Troy were established, it would naturally be a rendezvous for merchants from the Balkan countries. Mr Leaf sketches an imaginary picture of the annual summer fair, after which 'Priam and his retainers sat down to feast through the winter months on the toll they had taken' from the traders who had gathered under their walls. Troy thus appears in a new and unfavourable light. We have to think of her as a parasite; and no power is more offensive than one which, contributing nothing to the work of the world, exploits and feeds on the labours of others. To the Achæans the barrier which the watchmen of the Hellespont set up against free trade with the Euxine became intolerable, and the Trojan War was the inevitable result. The Lycian merchants were indeed in the same position as the Achæans, in regard to Black Sea traffic, yet they were the principal and the closest allies of the Trojans in the war. But their power too was threatened by the Achæans, who were already in possession of Rhodes, and they had therefore a good reason for making common cause with Priam.

Mr Leaf has made out a strong case for his hypothesis:

'Given the known data—the Hellespont an essential economic necessity to Greece, but blocked by a strong fort, and the expansion of Greece to the Euxine at the beginning of the historical period—there must have been a point at which that fort was taken by the Greeks. And it must have been taken much in the way which Homer describes, by a process of wearing down. A war of Troy therefore is a necessary deduction from purely geographical conditions; and the account of it in Homer agrees with all the probabilities of the case.'

The theory obviously involves divination, but it is arrived at by logical inferences, it accounts for the principal data, and it may well contain an important part of the truth.

Under Mr Leaf's analysis the Trojan Catalogue assumes a significance which would not easily have been

predicted. It preserves a tradition of the peoples with whom the Achæans did business at the fair of Troy; it was 'essentially a contemporaneous document,' and 'has survived in something very like its original form.' It certainly contains a record which could not have been invented after the twelfth century. Thus it seems to supply a strong ground for the view, probable on other and more general grounds, that the material of the *Iliad* was derived from the poems of Achæan minstrels who sang to the generations immediately succeeding the fall of Troy. There is indeed one feature of the Catalogue on which Mr Leaf has not touched and which seems to detract from its realism. We mean the names of the leaders. It is obvious that the chief of the Pæonians, for instance, could not have been called Pyraichmes, or the chief of the Paphlagonians Pylaïmenes. Contrast these and others with the name of the Lycian Sarpedon, which obviously rests on genuine tradition. Were they inventions of Homer or of an old Achæan singer?

In his second work Mr Leaf undertakes to do for the geography of Greece what he has done in his first for that of Troy and her confederacy. In the interval between the appearance of the two books he seems to have revised his views about the Achæans, though he does not expressly say so. In 'Troy' he represented them as the original makers of Greece, who, descending from the north towards the beginning of the second millennium, occupied the peninsula, at that time entirely in the hands of the non-Hellenic Pelasgians. In 'Homer and History,' on the contrary, he sees that they are later comers; they find a Greek-speaking race already in Greece, partly dominated by rulers who had come over from Crete and introduced Minoan civilisation. They were 'part of the flood of incomers from the north, whose first wave had overwhelmed Greece and passed on to Knossos' about B.C. 1400, and from that time were the ruling tribe in Greece, though they did not occupy all the country. Thus we have four instead of two peoples on the scene—the Pelasgians,* the pre-Achæan Greeks,

* As to the Pelasgians Mr Leaf propounds an ingenious theory which does not commend itself to us. Until we have some decisive proof to the contrary we must regard Pelasgoi as a distinctly non-Greek name.

the Minoan rulers, and the Achæans. This view is unquestionably nearer to the truth, but we think that Mr Leaf is still inclined to place the conquests of the Achæans too early. We have not sufficient data to enable us to say who were the destroyers of Cnossus. The Achæans were probably pressing forward in Northern Greece in the fourteenth century, but for the date of the conquest of the Peloponnesus our sole evidence points to the thirteenth. For, according to the tradition upon which Mr Leaf himself builds, Pelops, who gave his name to the peninsula, was its conqueror, and Pelops was the grandfather of Agamemnon; so that, if we place the Trojan War at the beginning of the twelfth century, we cannot date his reign before the first half of the thirteenth. In any case we can agree that, two generations before the war, the Achæans were the ruling power in Greece, as we find them represented in Homer. Mr Leaf conceives them as a small military caste, 'perhaps only a few thousands all told'; and he works out an interesting parallel between their position and that of the Normans in South Italy. He might have found another illustration, still nearer, in the conquest of Greece itself by the Franks, Lombards, and Venetians after the Fourth Crusade.

In examining Homer's view of the geography of Achæan Greece the essential thing is to determine the value of the Catalogue of the Achæan ships. Mr Leaf has submitted it to a merciless analysis, and it may safely be said that the combined forces of the unitarians will never rehabilitate the Catalogue as a document of significance for the Mycenæan age. It was composed by a Bœotian in the interests of Bœotia, which had taken no part in the Trojan War. Probably it was a work of the Hesiodic period and need not be later than 800 B.C., for Mr Allen has recently * brought forward very forcible arguments for assigning to Hesiod a date a hundred years prior to that which is usually accepted. When we sweep away the Catalogue, we obtain from the rest of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* a consistent political map for 1200 B.C. Agamemnon was the head of an Achæan empire which embraced not only the Peloponnesus but

* In the 'Journal of Hellenic Studies,' vol. xxxv, pp. 85, *sqq.* (1915).

a large part of northern Greece and the western islands. Thucydides was right in conceiving him as much more than the temporary leader of a confederacy formed for the special purpose of the war. He was over-lord of Peleus, whose kingdom embraced Phthia and Hellas, and of Odysseus, who ruled over the Ionian islands with the exception of Corfu. Mr Leaf has shown with admirable lucidity how overwhelming are the arguments in favour of Dr Dörpfeld's identification of Homeric Ithaca with Leucas (Santa Maura). The four islands under the sway of Odysseus were Zacynthus, Dulichion, Same, and Ithaca. Zacynthus preserved its name; Dulichion is Cephallenia; Same is Thiaki, the Ithaca of historical Greece; Ithaca is Leucas. These identifications render the geography of the Odyssey completely intelligible and coherent; on the old theory we are involved in a series of insuperable difficulties. Our attitude to tradition is largely a matter of temperament; and there will probably always be some who will prefer to impose on the poet any number of inconsistencies and incongruities rather than sacrifice the tradition of the identity of the Homeric with the later Ithaca. It has been conjectured that in post-Homeric days northern invaders seized Leucas, when the Ithacans were driven across to Same and carried their name with them. This may be the explanation. Calabria, which was once the name of the heel of Italy, is now the name of the toe. We know when the change happened, in the seventh century A.D., and why. If the early history of the Middle Ages were as blank to us as the dark period of Greece, we should find it far more puzzling to account for the migration of the Calabrian name than it is to discover a probable reason for the new nomenclature of the Ionian islands.

Mr Leaf has established on a firm basis the value of Homer, within certain wide limits, as a historical source. He has shown that the geographical and topographical details of the Homeric picture conform to fact so far as they can be controlled, and otherwise are self-consistent. Archaeological discoveries have proved that in their picture of civilisation the poems are also true to fact, apart from some inevitable anachronisms. Such truth could not have been achieved if a poet of the tenth

century had constructed his epic from pieces of floating tradition. The existence of a body of earlier minstrelsy, coming down from the Achæan period itself, is the only hypothesis which will reasonably explain the data. Moreover the Trojan War must now take its place as an indubitable historical event; and it must have been waged in much the same way as Homer conceived it, 'by a process of wearing down.' The grip of Homeric tradition on reality comes out in the rôle of Lemnos. This island is the natural basis of an army from overseas acting at the mouth of the Hellespont, whether in 1185 B.C. or in 1915 A.D.; and as such it appears in Homer. But, beyond the general setting and conditions, can we hope to discover in Homer anything of the nature of a true story? An epic poem is not a chronicle. In a work in which Clio and Calliope have collaborated, it may seem a hopeless problem to discriminate their contributions. And a full solution would have to determine both the poetical liberties with fact taken by the old minstrels, and the later inventions wrought by the art of Homer into the woof which they bequeathed to him. To penetrate so far into the secrets of the epic is perhaps beyond human powers of analysis, but it may not be impossible to disengage some leading facts.

Probability must indeed be our guide. But arguments of probability which consider what is likely to have happened may profitably be distinguished from those which consider what is likely to have been handed down. It may be argued, for instance, that a war lasting ten years is a poetical fiction, because it appears highly improbable that Agamemnon could have kept together his various contingents far from their homes for so many summers and winters. But this consideration is far from being decisive; there may have been factors in the situation of which we are totally ignorant. The argument for accepting the tradition that an immediate cause of the war was the abduction of an Achæan queen by a Trojan prince is also based on probability, but it is of a different order. The episode is obviously a fundamental part of the original story, as told by the Achæan poets; and it is almost inconceivable that these bards, singing at the courts of the sons and grandsons of the heroes of the war, should have made the whole tale hang on an

incident which was a pure fiction. In the first case the argument for rejecting the tradition depends on our view of what was likely to happen in circumstances with which we are only partly acquainted. In the second case the argument is that the simplest and most satisfactory explanation of the tradition is that it is based on truth. It may be pointed out that to accept the rape of Helen as immediately leading to the expedition against Troy is not inconsistent with the conclusion that the deeper causes of the war were economic; we may compare it with the affair of Epidamnos or with the murder of Serajevo.

In applying the test of probability we have one objective guide, the analogy of other epics which grew up under similar conditions, and for which we have some data to control their treatment of historical facts. Useful hints might be gained from a comparison of the cycle of Merovingian poetry, not preserved indeed in its original form, but copiously used by Fredegarius and the author of the '*Gesta Francorum*.' Mr Leaf has made frequent use of Prof. Chadwick's instructive work, '*The Heroic Age*,' in which the Greek and Teutonic epics are studied and compared. The results of comparisons of this kind point irresistibly to the conclusion that the leading Achæan heroes were not creatures of fiction but men of flesh and blood. The court minstrels of the twelfth century sang of their deeds to descendants who had not forgotten their names. Mr Leaf is assuredly right in asserting the reality of Agamemnon and Menelaus, Nestor and Achilles, Diomedes and the Ajaxes. Nor can we logically hesitate to accept as historical the names of their fathers Atreus, Peleus, and the rest. At the point where the poet's knowledge of their ancestry ended, he often introduced a god or an eponymous hero. But, if we go so far, we must go farther. The argument which Mr Leaf applies to the Achæans must also be applied to the principal Trojan heroes. Priam and his father Laomedon, Hector and Paris, Æneas chief of the Dardanians, must have been real people.

The Troes are commonly stated to have been a branch of the Phrygians. It may be doubted whether this is true. In Homer there is no trace of a closer relationship of the Trojans with the Phrygians than with the Lycians;

and it is well to remember that, in the Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite, the Phrygian language is assumed to be unintelligible to a Trojan. It is with the Dardanians that the Trojans seem to have a nearer affinity; and, as the Dardanians must be derived from the central regions of the Balkan Peninsula which retained in later history the Dardanian name, there might seem to be more reason for connecting the Troes with the Illyrians than with the Thraco-Phrygians. However this may be, the Troes were doubtless early immigrants from the Balkan Peninsula. How comes it that their rulers have Greek names? The name of Priam himself is not indeed obviously Greek, but, with its Æolic form Πέρριμος, it may well be so; and Priam's father was Laomedon. 'Hector' is as Greek as 'Nestor,' and was in later times the name of a prince of Chios. Paris has the second name of Alexandros; and the natural assumption is that 'Paris' was a Phrygian name given to him by his Phrygian mother, Hecuba. The names of other children of Priam who come into the story—Cassandra, Helenus, Deiphobus, etc.—are Greek. We have to choose between two inferences. Either the bards deliberately substituted Greek for foreign names, or the rulers of the Troad were Greeks. The second alternative, startling as it may appear, seems to us to accord with other evidence and to afford the most satisfactory explanation of the data of the Iliad. If there had been any deep or radical distinctions between the Achæan and Trojan civilisations, it is difficult to see how these could have been completely ignored or successfully concealed by poets who gave such a faithful representation of the topography and evidently were fully acquainted with the character and resources of the enemy. But the strongest argument is the pre-eminent place which the worship of Athene held at Troy. If that fortress had been under the protection of Apollo or Thracian Ares or Indo-Germanic Zeus, the fact might have little significance; but that a non-Greek people should have adopted such a specifically Greek deity as Pallas Athene for their special patroness is almost incredible. Is there any good reason to resist the simplest and most logical conclusion that Greeks had conquered the Troes and settled in the Troad, and that Mycenæan Troy was a Greek outpost?

According to this view the Trojan War would not lose the significance which Mr Leaf attributes to it, but the historical perspective is somewhat altered. In the first place, Greek enterprise had succeeded in winning possession of the approaches to the Black Sea at a far earlier period than is generally supposed; and this is a new glory in the history of Greek achievement. Nor is it surprising. Mr Leaf has laid stress on the necessity of Euxine commerce to Greece. This was a question which must have been no less insistent in pre-Achæan days; and the Hellespontine regions might well have attracted the ambitions of brave men before Agamemnon. In the second place, the conquest of Troy, apart from its purpose to open up free communication between the Ægean and the Euxine, is seen to be a supplement to the Achæan conquest of Greece. The Achæans have reduced the great Greek states of the peninsula; in attacking Troy they go on to reduce a great Greek state which had established itself in Asia Minor.

Can we conjecture whence the Greek founders of Troy came? Was it possibly from Attica? This would explain the appearance of the Attic Poseidon, Erichthonius, in the genealogy of the Trojan kings, and render it unnecessary to have recourse to the expedient of supposing that the passage where he is mentioned in the *Iliad* is an interpolation made, in the interest of the Athenians, to give them a sort of title to Sigeum. It would explain too the legend, otherwise curious, that Poseidon aided in building the walls of Troy. It is worth while to notice that Strabo mentions a 'modern' theory that there was some ancient connexion between Troy and Attica.

We may conclude by asking whether the leading motive of the *Iliad*—defeat suffered by the Achæans in consequence of a quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilles—may have been based on history. Defeat is more inspiring than victory; it makes a deeper impression on the imagination; and the Muse is not satisfied till she has explained it or glorified it. The appearance of Theodoric the Ostrogoth, as Dietrich of Bern, in Burgundian legend, may be taken as an illustration of the powerful influence of defeat. Mr Leaf, who refers to Dietrich more than once, adopts the usual view

that the legend associated him with 'Bern' because Theodoric may have occasionally resided at Verona. But if he was to be called after his residence, surely he should have been known as Dietrich of Raben, for his permanent residence was in the palace of Ravenna. No, it was the great defeat which he inflicted at Verona upon Odovacar that associated him for ever with that city in the imagination of the Burgundians, who were allies of Odovacar and had marched into Italy to his aid. Many instances might be adduced to illustrate the remark of a French writer, '*la défaite, c'est la Muse épique par excellence.*' That the Iliad, which was, we may be sure, the highest achievement of the Trojan epic, should be inspired by defeat, is only what we might expect. And, if we regard the discomfiture of the Achæans in battle as a real episode of the war, there is some reason for thinking that it may have been due to such a quarrel among the kings as Homer describes. For Mr Leaf has shown that the raid of Achilles on the southern Troad, which led up to the quarrel, was an enterprise which would almost inevitably have been undertaken by the assailants of Troy.

Mr Leaf has wisely refrained from assuming in these volumes the validity of his own views, expressed elsewhere, as to the literary history of the Iliad. He has not compromised his arguments by any debatable theory, so that they should appeal with equal force to those who believe in the unity of the poem and those who hold that it was a compilation or a growth. His results indeed will inevitably influence Homeric controversy in the future. In the meantime he has definitely restored the Trojan War to history, and we can now ask questions which some years ago most critics would have dismissed as unpardonably naïve.

J. B. BURY.

Art. 2.—EAST AND WEST.

‘East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet.’

THE want of sympathy at times displayed by Europeans towards Easterns constitutes a fertile theme for the dissertations of a certain school of English politicians, whose intentions are generally excellent, whose acquaintance with Eastern affairs is usually superficial, who often fail to recognise both the true nature and the width of the gulf which separates the East from the West, and who, therefore, are prone to advocate changes which, although occasionally sound in principle, are apt to be disappointing inasmuch as they rarely yield the results anticipated from their adoption. None the less, there is some foundation for this charge of want of sympathy. I could mention many instances within my own experience where an inconsiderate or thoughtless act, or the use of harsh and tactless language, on the part of individual Englishmen, has done an amount of harm altogether incommensurate with its real importance, and has to a limited extent tended to nullify the laborious efforts of statesmen to harmonise Eastern and Western interests and affinities. No thinking man, and certainly no experienced politician, will be inclined to underrate the importance of that touch of nature which makes the whole world kin, and on which moralists from Aristotle* downwards, and poets at least from the days of Euripides† to those of Shakespeare, have never ceased to dwell. Even, however, where the desire to sympathise exists to the fullest extent, the effective exercise of sympathy must always be difficult unless it be preceded and accompanied by complete and mutual comprehension.

The East and the West unfortunately often fail to understand each other. It is very natural that they should do so. Indeed, the general impression left on my mind after thirty-five years' experience of Eastern affairs, is not one of despondency because Easterns and Westerns understand each other so little, but rather one of surprise and congratulation that the misunderstandings are not more complete and profound than is actually the case.

* ‘Ethics,’ ix, 11, 2.

† ‘Orestes,’ 805, 806.

Consider conditions of climate and natural surroundings. Look at all the most potent influences which bind communities of men together, such as language, religion, identity of race, and social customs. Compare Eastern and Western processes of ratiocination. In every field of thought or action it will be found that the utmost dissimilarity prevails. Amongst the various causes which tend to prevent concord, colour antipathy is perhaps the most important. In a short work which I published in 1910, entitled 'Ancient and Modern Imperialism,' I adduced evidence tending to prove that this antipathy existed to a relatively less extent than at present in the ancient world; and I hazarded the conjecture, which found favour in the eyes of others of greater erudition than myself, that its growth had been stimulated by the world discoveries of the 15th and 16th centuries and the consequent enslavement of some of the coloured races. I cannot think, if the feeling against the inter-marriage of white and coloured races had been so strong in England three or four centuries ago as it is now, that Shakespeare would have placed Desdemona and Othello on the stage. Yet inter-marriage and all the close social relations which would almost necessarily accompany it can alone serve to remove or seriously mitigate colour antipathy. Amongst the Teutonic races, and perhaps especially amongst Anglo-Saxons, this cause of disunion exists in a very high degree, nor does it appear likely that it will diminish. It is wholly uninfluenced by political changes or considerations. Amongst the Latin races, especially the Spaniards and Portuguese, on the other hand, there is a tendency to eliminate this cause of difference. Inter-marriage is frequent. It is probable that in another generation or two the greater part of the population of South America will be half-castes.

That very close and competent political observer, Sir George Cornewall Lewis, thus differentiated Oriental and European political institutions and social customs: *

Oriental.

1. Despotism.
2. Government by dependencies.

European.

1. Free Government.
2. Direct Government.

* 'On the methods of observation and reasoning in politics,' 1852.

*Oriental.**European.*

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| 3. Rude system of international law. | 3. Intricate system of international law. |
| 4. Religious Code. | 4. Civil Code. |
| 5. Polygamy. | 5. Monogamy. |
| 6. Seclusion of women. | 6. Freedom of women. |
| 7. Slavery. | 7. Civil freedom of the entire community. |
| 8. Cruelty in the infliction of bodily pain. | 8. Comparative mildness in the infliction of pain. |
| 9. Loose dress. | 9. Dress closely fitting the body. |
| 10. Intricate alphabet. | 10. Simple alphabet. |
| 11. Poetry and mystical prose. | 11. Argumentative prose. |

Every European who has lived for long in the East will, I think, bear me out when I say that in the most trivial acts of life the Eastern somehow or other manages always to do and to say exactly the opposite to what would be done or said by the Western. I was one day looking out of the window of the Viceroy's house at Barrackpore and noticed that a native policeman was walking up and down the terrace. His attention was attracted by a piece of paper which fluttered to his feet. He stopped and eyed it intently. I conceive that under similar circumstances a policeman of any Western nation, even if he had been barefooted and his toes had not, from the constant use of boots, lost their prehensile qualities, would, had he wished to possess himself of that bit of paper, have stooped down to pick it up. The Bengali policeman did nothing of the kind. He kicked off the wooden shoe from his right foot, seized the bit of paper between his two toes, brought up his foot to the level of the knee, and, without stooping, conveyed the paper from his toes to his fingers behind his back. A friend of mine, who was a very acute observer of Eastern ways, told me that on one occasion, in order to test the intelligence of an Egyptian, he asked him to indicate his left ear. The most uneducated member of an European nation, supposing he understood the difference between right and left, would certainly have seized the lobe of his left ear with his left hand. The Egyptian, however, passed his right hand over the top of his

head and, with that hand, took hold of the top of his left ear.*

Why, in the East, that is to say, in that portion of the real East which is as yet only slightly tainted by connexion with Europe, should the men wear flowing robes and the women trousers? Why should a Western, if he folds up a wet umbrella, always put it against the wall or in a rack with the point downwards, whereas the Eastern, with much greater reason, will always put it point upwards against the wall with the handle on the floor? Why should a Western fasten his dress with buttons and an Eastern with strings? Is it not singular that an Egyptian signalman should think that the best way of being warned when a train was about to pass was to go to sleep with his head on the rail? Yet it has happened that an Egyptian signalman has adopted this course, with the inevitable result that his head was cut off. Why does an Eastern mount his horse on the off side, whereas a European mounts on the near side? Is there any particular reason why a Christian should be summoned to prayer by the sound of a bell and a Moslem by the call of a man's voice? Again, why should an Eastern always sit cross-legged on a divan or on the floor, whereas a Western always sits on a chair? Why should a drover in the Highlands follow his flock of sheep and a herdsman in the Deccan walk in front of them? Why should a European, when he wishes to write, put the paper on which he is writing on the table before him, whereas an Eastern rather prefers to hold the paper in one hand and to write with the other? Why should a European sign his name and an Eastern prefer to use a seal? Why should the Western write from left to right and the Eastern from right to left? Why should one smoke a long pipe and the other a short one? Why should a European, if he wishes to wash his hands, always pour water into a basin first and then wash them, whereas an Oriental will prefer to have the water poured over his hands? Is it not strange that

* This, as also one or two others of the anecdotes and reflections contained in this article, were given, in somewhat different language, in my 'Modern Egypt,' but I trust that those who did me the honour of reading that work will consider that they will bear repetition.

all Moslems shave their heads except one lock in the middle, whereas the only Europeans who shave their heads at all are Roman Catholic priests, and they only shave that particular portion which the Moslem leaves unshaved? Why is it that, if an Oriental wishes anybody to approach him, he will throw his hand away from his body, whereas a European will extend his arm and draw his hand towards his body? How does it come about that, if in reply to a question an Oriental shakes his head, he means an affirmative answer to be inferred, whilst a similar gesture on the part of a European implies a negative? An Oriental, if he wishes to indicate a negative by gesture, will throw up his chin.*

The first impulse of a European, if he feels cold, is to cover his feet and throat; the Oriental, on the other hand, will, in the first instance, cover his ears. Is it not strange to our ideas that an Eastern will occasionally sow first and then plough his field afterwards? If two barges on the Thames quarrel, they will at times curse each other vigorously. A Nile boatman will never do this. But he will thunder across the river the most uncomplimentary expressions as regards the relatives, particularly those of the female sex, of any other boatman with whom he happens to have a difference of opinion. Why should a dead Mahomedan be wrapped up in a shroud and buried in a sitting posture, whereas Europeans are always placed in the coffin in a recumbent posture? Again, it is singular that an Oriental will amuse himself by seeing others dance, whereas a European will join in the dance himself. Moreover, Oriental dress is loose, except for infants, who are wrapped in swaddling clothes, whereas European dress is tight, except for infants, who are dressed in loose, flowing robes. Why, again, should an Oriental, if he wears a sword, which is generally curved, place it at his right side, whereas a European, whose sword will generally be straight or very nearly so, always puts it at his left side? So, also, as regards the use of metaphor, why should an Englishman say 'from top to bottom,' whereas a Turk will always say 'from bottom to top' (*altından ustuna*)

* The Oriental gesture is, however, common to the inhabitants of the South of Europe.

kadar)? Why should a Turk or a Persian speak of beginning his affairs 'from a new head' (*yeni bashdan*, or *ez ser-i-nev*), whereas an Englishman would talk of placing them 'on a new footing'? I cannot answer any of these questions any more than I can say why an Egyptian screw always turns from right to left, whereas a screw in Europe turns from left to right.

The contrast between the mentality of Easterns and Westerns is quite as striking, and is certainly far more important, than that which prevails in respect to the petty incidents of social life. The intellectual standard attainable in the East is assuredly in no sense inferior, and is sometimes, indeed, superior to that which is reached in the West. But the Oriental and the Occidental minds move in different grooves. It has very often happened to a European that, when he has imagined that he has found a common ground for discussion on some subject with an intelligent Eastern, the latter will suddenly advance some theory or make some remark which, to the amazement of the European, will reveal to him that their minds are, in reality, as the poles asunder, and that arguments which appear to carry conviction to the Western mind exercise no influence whatever on that of the Oriental. On one occasion I was discussing with an intelligent and educated Egyptian official the question of the levy of a tax on the professional classes. I pointed out that in a country where the main revenue was derived from the land it was perfectly right and just that some special taxation should be imposed on the professional classes, such as doctors, engineers, etc. But in Ismail Pasha's time, when this discussion took place, the professional tax had been allowed to become a poll tax and was levied on every one indiscriminately. I asked the Egyptian official whether he did not think it rather anomalous and unjust that a man should pay a tax for the exercise of a profession which he did not follow. The Egyptian expressed the greatest surprise that I should advance any such plea. He pointed out that the Government did not impose any veto upon a man exercising any profession in which he wished to engage, but that it would be extremely unfair on those who were engaged in professional work that those who were not similarly employed should escape from

taxation merely because, although they were at liberty to exercise some profession, they failed to do so. An argument of this sort completely disconcerts the Western mind. A European cannot put himself in the position of one who will advance what to him appears such an absolutely untenable theory.

Naturally, amongst the uneducated classes the differences of mentality become even more striking. I remember that on one occasion the English doctor who was employed by the Egyptian railway administration was summoned to a station in the Delta to see the station-master, who was said to be very ill. On being admitted to the man's room, the doctor found that he was in the presence of a raving maniac, who instantly attacked him and, being a very powerful man, threw him on the ground and endeavoured to strangle him. A furious struggle ensued, until at last the doctor was able to gasp out to two policemen who had been passive spectators of the whole scene an order that they were to pull the station-master off him. They at once replied with the Arabic equivalent of 'Aye, aye, Sir!' and acted accordingly. Their non-interference was in no way due to cowardice or to any reluctance to take action. It was simply owing to the fact that it never occurred to them that it was either necessary or desirable to stop a furious struggle between a maniac and a sane person. Or, possibly, they may have thought that the doctor was adopting some strange and, to them, unknown European method for dealing with maniacs.

It might perhaps be thought by a superficial observer that Europeans resident in the East would be specially attracted by such Easterns as have been more or less Europeanised and, therefore, in some respects resemble themselves. The very contrary is the case. I have invariably noticed that Englishmen, at all events, are much more attracted towards the pure Oriental untainted by any European alloy than towards the semi-Europeanised type of Eastern. The former class is becoming every day more and more rare. I can, however, cite one typical case within my own experience.

A venerable Sheikh, who is now dead but who used to reside at Cairo, was a very remarkable character. I never met him, as he was very chary of mixing with

Europeans, but he often used to send me very friendly messages and, indeed, on one occasion, paid me the compliment, in connexion with certain judicial reforms which I was then advocating, of letting me know that he thought my ideas were much more in conformity with the religion and practices of Islam than those advocated by the semi-Europeanised Moslems, whom he cordially despised and detested. He was very devout, and when he went out used to put wax into his ears in order to prevent him from hearing any blasphemous or indecent words in the street. In Surah xxvii of the Koran it is stated that Solomon visited the Valley of Ants, and that one ant said to the others: 'Oh, ye ants, enter your dwellings, lest Solomon and his army crush you and know it not.' The question was raised by certain Ulema of Aleppo, whether the ant who made this remark was of the male or female sex. It was referred for decision to the Sheikh at Cairo. He pronounced decisively in favour of the male sex on the ground, which would be strongly resented by all suffragists, that only the most superior kind of ant would have dared to speak in the presence of Solomon, and that the superiority of the male over the female ant was manifest. The matter was then referred to various learned Moslems in different cities, even to those resident so far off as remote Samarkand. At last the discussion, especially between the Cairo Sheikh and a Tunisian Pundit, who threw himself whole-heartedly into the cause of the female ant, waxed so warm that common friends had to interfere to stop it. On another occasion, the Sheikh was asked to dine with a few friends. The *pièce de resistance* of the dinner was a roast turkey. Just as it was placed on the table a beggar happened to pass by in the street who invoked charity. The Sheikh instantly took the whole of the turkey and, the room being on the ground floor, passed it out of the window to the beggar with the remark: 'All Moslems are brothers.' The hungry guests were somewhat amazed, but they were shortly afterwards deeply interested by a discussion which arose as to whether, in the next world, the credit for the disposal of the turkey would accrue to the man who gave it to the beggar or to the host who had paid for it.

Ismail Pasha, the Khedive of Egypt, was a very curious example of a man who remained a thorough Oriental, albeit his Orientalism was covered by a thin veneer of Occidentalism. He was illiterate. He probably never read a book of any kind. He wholly misunderstood European politics and the motives which guide the actions of all high-class Europeans. His Europeanisation hailed from the Stock Exchange; and, although he would squander money in the most reckless manner, he would haggle with all the persistence of a practised broker over the difference of $\frac{1}{16}$ th or $\frac{1}{32}$ nd per cent. of profit or commission in any financial transaction in which he was engaged. He was surrounded by people who habitually robbed and deceived him, and he took a great delight in deceiving them. On one occasion, when he was engaged in the familiar process of issuing a loan which was to fund his outstanding Treasury Bills, he had an interview with a foreign capitalist who was negotiating the matter. The door of the room in which this interview took place was open, but a *portière*, which did not reach quite to the ground, hung over the opening. In the course of the conversation Ismail Pasha, looking under the *portière*, noticed a pair of brown trousers which he recognised as belonging to one of his staff. He said to the loan contractor in a loud voice that he agreed to his conditions and that, if the contract were brought to him the next day, he would sign it. The brown trousers at once disappeared. On the following day, when the contract was submitted to him, he made objections, said he had not fully understood the matter and refused to sign. At that time the most furious speculation was going on in Egyptian stocks. Scarcely had the loan contractor left the room when the wearer of the brown trousers rushed in in a great state of excitement and protested violently on the ground that he had heard Ismail himself say the day before that he agreed to the terms. Ismail choked with laughter and said: 'Mon cher, j'ai reconnu vos pantalons bruns. Vous avez acheté; vous auriez dû vendre.'

In this episode the education in European trickery came into play. In the following, the purely Oriental habit of thought was prominent. It once happened that Ismail was suffering from toothache. He sent for a European dentist who told him he ought to have the

tooth out. Ismail said that he was afraid it would be very painful. He was informed in reply that if laughing gas was administered to him he would feel nothing. He still doubted, but told the dentist to bring his apparatus to the palace and he would then discuss the question. It was accordingly brought and the process explained to him. Ismail then summoned an attendant and told him to send up the sentry who was at his door. The man was then ordered to sit down in a chair and the dentist was requested to take out a tooth on either side of his jaw. He was then asked whether he had felt anything, and replied in the negative. Ismail, however, was not yet satisfied. He said that the sentry was a young, strong man and that he would like to see the experiment tried on somebody of weaker physique. Accordingly, a slave girl was summoned from the harem and a couple of her teeth were extracted. He then consented to have his own tooth out. It is related, though possibly this portion of the story is apocryphal, that the dentist then received an order on the Egyptian Treasury for 1000*l.*, and that when the draft was presented it was not honoured, though it was presumably, with many other claims of a similar nature, eventually funded in the Unified Debt.

Ismail, like many other spendthrifts, was niggardly in some small matters. He was very chary of giving away a good cigar. Whenever I called upon him I always knew his disposition towards me because, ordinarily speaking, the attendant would bring me a cigarette. If he wished to be a little more civil he would take a cigar from his breast-pocket; but, if he wished to be out-of-the-way polite, generally as a prelude to asking me to adopt some view of his own to which I was opposed, he would put his hand into an inner envelope in his breast-pocket which contained cigars worth half a crown each. He fully understood the character he generally held in public estimation. I remember on one occasion calling upon him after a fire had taken place in his palace and expressing my regret at the misfortune. He interrupted me at once and said: '*Vous savez que je ne suis pas assuré.*' He said the same to other visitors. The first idea which arose in his mind was that everyone would think that he had first insured his palace and then set fire to it himself in order to pocket the insurance

money. It was natural that Ismail Pasha should have disbelieved in the existence of honesty or probity, for until nearly the end of his career he rarely had to do with any honest man. His general estimate of human character may be judged from the following incident. He once granted an interview to a representative of a leading English newspaper. When the account of the interview was published, he expressed annoyance that certain remarks which he had made and to which he attached a special degree of importance had been omitted. On enquiry it appeared that Ismail had himself told the reporter that these observations were of a strictly confidential nature and were on no account to be published. He subsequently explained that he made this condition as he thought it was the most certain method for ensuring their publication.

Now and again, in dealing with Eastern affairs, some event occurs, or some trait is revealed in the character of an Oriental who appears thoroughly to have imbibed the spirit of Western civilisation, which suddenly brings back to the mind that the East, though perhaps not so entirely 'unchanging' as is often supposed, still possesses much of its old leaven. Thirteen years ago, the Western world heard with a shock of the savage murder of King Alexander and Queen Draga at Belgrade. Europe then awoke to the fact that a revival of Byzantinism in its worst form was still possible in this enlightened 20th century. I remember that, when my very highly esteemed friend, Mustapha Pasha Fehmy, then Prime Minister of Egypt, was seriously ill, an offer was made to him that the Khedive's special astrologer should visit him and cast his horoscope. Without doubt, the Pasha thought that the feelings of the astrologer towards himself would be as hostile as those of his employer, but he did not reject his services on the ground that he disbelieved in astrology. He replied that two astrologers of his own choice had already told him of all that could be learnt from a study of the stars and that, therefore, no further astrological help was required. I need hardly add that belief in the 'Evil Eye' still flourishes in the East. The ex-Sultan, Abdul Hamid, is believed to have kept Mukhtar Pasha for a long time in Egypt because the latter was held to be a *jettatore*. Whilst on the

subject of Mustapha Pasha Fehmy, I may mention that during his illness he firmly believed that an attempt would be made to poison him. For some days, he refused to take any food unless it had been prepared by my French cook and sent to his house in sealed packets or bottles.

No incidents excite greater interest in the unregenerated East than those cases of patriarchal and capricious justice on the part of despots of which history records so many examples. There is no more characteristically Oriental episode related in the Bible than the story of the judgment of Solomon. Creasy tells us* that a poor woman once complained to Bajazet I that a man in his employment had stolen some milk which belonged to her and had just drunk it. That dreaded Sultan had sworn a mighty oath that justice should be dealt out 'indiscriminately to every man or woman within his dominions.' He accordingly directed that the stomach of the accused man should be cut open to see if the milk was there. The woman's story turned out to be true. If this convincing proof of the presence of the milk had not been adduced she would herself have been killed. As it was the Sultan dismissed her with the words: 'Thou hadst just cause of complaint, now go thy way, for the injury done thee has been punished.' The curious part of these incidents is that, whether in the case of Bajazet or others, a large number of Easterns would probably be more struck by the acuteness of the method adopted for arriving at the truth than by its injustice and cruelty.

The stories about Abbas I are very numerous. On one occasion he told a European adventurer, named Bravet, upon whose career M. Alphonse Daudet's work entitled 'Le Nabob' is founded, to procure for him a service of solid silver plate which he wished to give to the Sherif of Mecca. The plate was purchased in Italy and paid for at the price of solid silver. Abbas, however, was so pleased with it that, instead of sending it to the Sherif, he kept it for himself. Shortly afterwards,

* 'The Ottoman Turks,' p. 42. A similar process was adopted by Defherdar Mohammed Bey, who, in Mehemet Ali's time, governed the Soudan. (Curzon's 'Monasteries in the Levant,' ch. vi.)

one of the branches of a chandelier was broken, and it then appeared that the plate was not solid silver but electro-plate. Abbas was furious, and sent for M. Bravet. The latter, having an inkling of what was about to happen, went straight up to the indignant Khedive and said: 'Eh bien! Votre Altesse m'a trompé.' How could this be? asked Abbas. M. Bravet then explained that, of course, if the Khedive had told him that he wanted a service of plate for himself he would have got solid silver, but that he thought electro-plate was good enough for the Sherif of Mecca. Abbas was so pleased with the ingenuity of the defence that he let the matter drop. M. Bravet himself, after amassing a fortune of about a million sterling, eventually died without leaving enough money to pay his funeral expenses.

The Oriental method of administering justice has this advantage, that it occasionally enables a matter to be settled summarily which would puzzle the most acute judicial authorities in the West. I once had to pay a matter of 10*l.* for the hire of some tents which had been pitched in my garden on the occasion of my giving a ball. I gave the money to my butler, who was a Madrassi, and told him to hand it on to the Egyptian to whom it was due. Shortly afterwards, I noticed a man hanging about the door of my house and asked him what he wanted. He said he had come to receive his 10*l.* I told him that I had already paid it. He denied ever having received it. I then confronted him with the Madrassi. The one said that the money had been paid; the other stoutly denied that it had been received. I had not the least idea which was telling the truth, so I asked the Egyptian Governor, who had a wider experience than myself in dealing with such matters, to enquire into the subject and let me know the result. Shortly afterwards he informed me that he had 'made a thorough enquiry' and that the Madrassi had really paid the money. I subsequently learned what was the nature of the proceedings at the 'thorough enquiry.' The Governor summoned the two men concerned. He asked the Madrassi whether he had paid the money, to which the reply was 'Yes.' He then asked the Egyptian whether he had received it, and the reply was 'No.' The Governor then said to the Egyptian: 'You're a liar; go away and get it,' an order

which was at once obeyed. I am inclined to think that in this case what is generally called 'substantial justice,' which is often no justice at all, was done, but I am not at all sure.

In spite of the apparent advance of civilisation in Egypt, many dark deeds are sometimes performed, or at all events until recently were performed, in the recesses of the harem. I give one instance that came within my personal experience. In 1885, an English lady, whom I will call Mrs X., and who was an ardent politician and fervent humanitarian, invoked my aid on behalf of a Circassian slave girl who was in the harem of a near relative of the Khedive (Tewfik Pasha) and was said to be grossly maltreated. I was at the time rather unwilling to take up the slavery question seriously as the whole Egyptian administration was in a state of chaos. The Soudan crisis, which culminated in the death of General Gordon, was at its height. I was overwhelmed with work, and I should have been rather glad to postpone dealing with the slavery question until other and more pressing matters had been settled. However, I recognised that, if I did nothing, I should be told that my inaction was due to unwillingness to come into collision with a member of the Khedivial family, and that, therefore, it was clear that, in spite of the presence of the English in Egypt, there was one law for the rich and another for the poor. I accordingly called on the Khedive and requested that the slave girl who was alleged to have been illtreated should be sent to my house. This was accordingly done. She arrived between 9 and 10 o'clock one evening, accompanied by an eunuch and an older woman. The moment was rather inopportune, for a few hours previously the news had arrived of the fall of Khartoum and Gordon's death. I was giving a fancy ball that night, which, on purely political grounds, I did not think it desirable to put off by reason of the tragic event which had just happened, though I should have greatly preferred to do so. I saw the girl without the presence of those who had accompanied her and asked if she was illtreated. She replied with a decided negative. I strongly suspected that she was not telling the truth, and I told her that if she would speak out then I would see that no harm came to her, but that, if once she returned to the harem, I

would not be responsible for what happened. She replied that she fully understood, but that she wished to go back to the harem, and that she was quite unaware why she had been brought to my house.

Not content, however, with this enquiry, I sent her to the house of the Consul and at the same time sent a message to Mrs X. asking her to come and see me. On that lady's arrival I told her what had happened and I begged her to ascertain whether there were any marks of ill-usage upon the woman's body. She returned in a short time somewhat crestfallen and told me that she was convinced that the woman had undergone no ill-treatment and that she had therefore allowed her to go back to the harem. She had not examined her body, and I expressed my regret that she had not done so. On the following day, I saw the Khedive, and he triumphantly remarked that I had been apparently misinformed. Shortly afterwards, I left Egypt for England. On my return a few months later, Mrs X. paid me a visit and burst into tears. 'I am responsible,' she said, 'for the death of that poor girl.' She then told me that nothing had been done until I had left the country, and that then the girl had been beaten to death. I believe this story was quite true. It appears that the girl had been promised 500*l.* if she would conceal the truth from me, and that what was most feared in the harem was that I should wish to ascertain whether her body showed any marks of violence. It was, however, thought that I should never dare to conduct the enquiry myself, and it appears not to have occurred to those concerned that I should adopt the simple expedient of asking some woman to act as my deputy.

Individual slavery cases often gave me a great deal of trouble when I was in Egypt. I give one amongst many other instances that remain in my memory. A Circassian girl escaped from the harem of the Minister of Justice and went to a Home which had been instituted for released slaves. Its functions were to keep them for a short time until they could obtain employment or be otherwise settled in life. The next day the matron of the institution took the girl to the Governor's office in order to get her manumission papers, to which, under a Convention with the British Government, she

was entitled. Whilst she was there, a closed carriage drove up. The eunuch on the box got down, seized the girl, hustled her into the carriage and drove off with her to the house of her late master. I called on him upon the following morning and requested that the girl should be given up to me again. He replied that this was quite impossible. I rejoined that unless the girl was delivered at my house within twenty-four hours he could no longer remain Minister of Justice. Accordingly, the following morning the girl came, accompanied by an older woman. By that time I spoke Turkish fairly well and was able to cross-examine her without the intervention of an interpreter. I asked her whether she wished to go back to the harem. She asked, in reply, whether, if she went to the Home, she would be obliged to stay there. I told her, of course, that she was at perfect liberty to do anything she pleased. She then expressed a wish to go to the Home. I then called in the woman who had accompanied her and made her repeat what she had said to me. The older woman was in a furious rage and reproached her with having promised to return to the harem. The girl replied that she had done so in order to make her escape easier, but that she had no sort of intention of fulfilling her promise. She was then taken in my carriage to the Home. She disappeared in a few days, and I do not doubt that some admirer was lurking in the background to receive her.

I have occasionally heard it stated in connexion with some European whom it was proposed to employ in the East that the appointment would be singularly suitable because the individual in question was 'so like an Eastern himself.' There cannot be a greater mistake. The European who endeavours to meet Eastern intrigue with counter-intrigue is doomed to failure. The qualities most required for dealing successfully with Eastern affairs are absolute honesty and straightforwardness, great patience, a careful abstention from the extremes either of effusive friendship on the one hand or want of courtesy on the other, and occasionally careful attention to small points of detail which often loom larger in the eyes of Easterns than in those of Westerns. As regards the latter point, I may mention one or two instances within my own

experience where very trifling actions produced results out of proportion to their intrinsic importance.

When the question arose of a Firman being issued for the Khedive Abbas Hilmi, strong suspicions were entertained that the then reigning Sultan would introduce changes of a very objectionable nature. He promised, however, that the text of the Firman should be communicated to the British Embassy at Constantinople before it was promulgated. A special emissary was despatched from Constantinople with the Firman. He arrived at Alexandria one morning and almost simultaneously I received a telegram from the Constantinople Embassy giving the text of the Firman. My worst suspicions were confirmed. The Sultan had taken the opportunity to include in Turkish territory a large slice of the Sinai Peninsula. In fact, Turkish rule would have extended to the Canal immediately opposite Suez. It was quite out of the question that this proposal should be accepted. All the preparations had been made for reading the Firman. The square in front of the Abdin Palace, where the ceremony was to take place, was decorated with flags, the troops had been ordered out and all the important functionaries of the State had been summoned. Immediately I received the telegram I caused all the orders to be cancelled and intimated that until the Firman was changed it could not be promulgated. Cairo was seething with excitement. Everyone asked what was going to happen. My very able secretary, Mr (now Sir Arthur) Hardinge, then suggested to me that I should put on a white suit of flannels and ostentatiously play a game of tennis in the most public place I could find. I acted on the advice, with the result that, inasmuch as my proceedings were at once reported everywhere, public opinion was much calmed. On the following morning, a telegram arrived from Constantinople cancelling the objectionable portions of the Firman.

On another occasion, when my relations with the Khedive (Abbas Hilmi) were a good deal strained, information reached me that there was to be a grand demonstration at the theatre in favour of the Khedive, which would take a turn very hostile to the British. I put on the star and ribbon of the Medjidieh and attended the theatre myself. When the Khedive entered, the

Khedivial hymn was played and I stood up conspicuously in front of my box. No demonstration ensued.

I may perhaps close this somewhat discursive article by mentioning one or two curious incidents connected with diplomatic action in the East. When, in 1884, the British Government decided to enforce the withdrawal of the Egyptian troops from the Soudan, the ministry of Cherif Pasha resigned. The course proposed was eminently judicious but was extremely unpopular in Egypt. I had received instructions to avoid by all possible means the appointment of British Ministers, and I do not doubt that the Egyptians themselves had some inkling of the reluctance of the British Government of the day to adopt so heroic a remedy. I felt convinced that the best way to carry out my instructions was not to give any hint that British Ministers would not be appointed, but, on the contrary, to intimate the extreme probability of their appointment. There was reason to suppose that I should be told that no Egyptians would undertake the responsibility of office in order to carry out the Soudan policy of the British Government. It was thought that it would, therefore, be necessary to recall Cherif Pasha to power. At the height of the crisis, Mr Moberly Bell, who was then Correspondent of the 'Times,' called upon me and informed me that he had been to the Palace to see the Khedive, Tewfik Pasha, and that the intention was as I have already mentioned. He asked me what I should then do. I replied that I should have no hesitation whatever as to how I should act; that I should go down to the Ministry and carry on the Government myself with the help of a few English officials whom I should appoint. I did not ask Mr Moberly Bell either to repeat what I had stated or to maintain silence. The result, however, was that in a few hours I got a message to say that the Khedive entirely shared the views of the British Government on the subject of the Soudan policy, and that Nubar Pasha had consented to take office. The next day I asked Cherif Pasha, for whom I had a great personal regard, to dinner, and we parted the best of friends.

Here is another episode in the domain of that internationalism run mad which was at one time the curse of the Egyptian Government. When I arrived at Cairo

in 1883, international interference was increasing in every direction. Constant meetings of the Diplomatic Corps took place with a view to settling what were really purely Egyptian questions. I had no wish whatever to encourage internationalism. However, I consented to attend a meeting which had been summoned to consider the question of the Port dues levied at Alexandria. All the representatives of the Powers were evidently animated by a spirit of hostility to the British Government, and stated their views at some length. There were occasional long pauses in the discussion in order to give me an opportunity of stating what I had to say. I maintained absolute silence, but, after smoking a great many cigarettes, got up at the end of more than an hour and said that we had had a very interesting discussion, and that it was now time to go to luncheon. No more meetings of this kind took place.

To sum up, it is the contrast between East and West rather than their similarity which constitutes the great attraction of Eastern politics. No European can really deal effectively with Eastern affairs unless he has sufficient powers of observation to notice these contrasts in small things as well as in great, and sufficient imagination to realise their consequences. The display of sympathy in dealing with Easterns is certainly a very necessary quality; so also is the extension of indulgence to what in Western eyes appear at times defects. The power of appreciating the humorous side of Eastern affairs is also not amiss. A dismissed Egyptian official, who was apparently possessed with a desire to express his views in highly idiomatic English, once wrote to me: 'Oh, Hell! Lordship's face grow red if he know quite beastly behaviour of Public Works Department towards his humble servant.' The extent to which the East will be improved by being occidentalised to a greater extent than at present may be a matter of opinion, but it is quite certain that the further this process is carried the less interesting will Eastern affairs become.

CROMER.

Art. 3.—THE LAST DAYS OF POMPEIUS.

1. *The Tragedy of Pompey the Great*. By John Masefield. Sidgwick and Jackson, 1910.
2. *Les Sources de Lucain*. By René Pichon. Paris : Leroux, 1912.
3. *Lucanus de Bello Civili*; Tertium edidit C. Hosius. Leipzig : Teubner, 1913.

THE fickleness of an all-controlling Fortune was ever present to the ancients; and there was nothing in all Rome's chequered history that impressed it so deeply on the Roman mind as the piteous death and downfall of the puissant soldier upon whom, as the peer of Alexander of Macedon, the partial judgment of his countrymen had bestowed the name of 'Great.' To this not only Juvenal in the well-known passage (Satire x, 283 foll.), but Propertius, Pliny, Seneca and others make frequent and impressive reference. Nor has it lost its interest now. Of this the popularity of Mr Masefield's drama, now we believe in its third edition, is evidence enough.

Mr Masefield's title is chosen well. The end of Pompey may be rightly called a 'tragedy,' not in the ignoble sense of current usage, which would apply it to the fate of some defaulting financier who cuts his throat and leaves his family to pay the price of his sin, but as the expression of a catastrophe that might fitly have engaged the genius of an Æschylus, a Sophocles or a Shakespeare—the fall of an Agamemnon, an Œdipus or a Lear. And be it here observed that in tragedy pure and simple, the character of the victim is something in the main indifferent. He must not indeed be despicable, but he need be neither virtuous nor capable. The impious vain-glory of Agamemnon, the blind self-will of Œdipus, the sheer fatuity of Lear, seem in truth temptations to Providence. And when the bard of Alexander's Feast sings 'Darius, great and good, . . . Fallen from his high estate,' his aim is avowedly a different one. He seeks 'soft pity to infuse.' Virgil, it has long been noted, in an arresting passage (*Æneid*, II, 557 foll.) had the end of our Roman conqueror before him when he pictured the Trojan monarch stretched headless on the sand. But the Priam of tradition is but a lay figure of a man; and

Pompey, for all his titles, was in strictness neither great nor good. But—and herein lies the fitness of the comparison and the very depth of the tragedy—both fell as no others had fallen of all that had ‘held the gorgeous East in fee.’

There was no need, then, for Mr Masefield to step into the twentieth century and make appeal in his hero to the vaporous sentiment and irresponsible idealism which with our contemporaries so often passes for thought. Selfish, vain and callous, Pompey knew no ideals, whether vague or formulated. Delusions indeed he cherished—‘slovenly delusions’ as Mr Heitland in his ‘Roman Republic’ justly calls them, which ultimately proved his ruin. But, for him, all was well with the Roman ship if he, or at least none greater, was the pilot at the helm.

Mr Masefield has paid some attention to details; and in this respect he has the advantage of predecessors who have taken contemporaries of Pompey as the subjects of their dramas. But, in life and verity, and whether as man or Roman, the Pompey of Mr Masefield falls far below the Julius Cæsar of Shakespeare, and hardly reaches the level of the Cato of Addison. One further criticism. To those who look in a Roman drama for something of the massiveness and dignity of the Roman style the fragments of speech into which Mr Masefield has chosen to chop his dialogue will be a perpetual irritation. Verse we know and prose we know; but what is this?

‘POMPEY. Ah! Cornelia. You make death hard. But it would be sweet to die so for you. To die. To join that senate of the old Romans; the wise ones. To bring them news of Rome there. In the shadows.

CORNELIA. Saying that you come crowned. Having played the Roman. “Having obeyed their laws.”

POMPEY. Ah! Like the Spartans. Ringed in with spears. There in the rocks.’—(ACT I.)

Enough of the modern presentation. Let us turn to the ancient sources.

Through the ravages of time which, not to speak of minor losses, have taken from us entirely the ‘*Historiae*’ of C. Asinius Pollio, the statesman, orator and friend of Virgil, and left us of Livy but the bare ‘*Contents*’ of the

later books, on the scale, may be, of a word or less to a chapter, the 'Commentaries' of Cæsar on the Civil War constitute the sole continuous contemporary narrative of the last days of the Roman Commonwealth. Cæsar being what he was, and human nature being what it is, it is not unnatural or unreasonable that we should go outside for evidence to control and supplement his testimony. For this purpose the Correspondence of Cicero is of inestimable value; and the Roman biographies of the late Greek writer Plutarch give us much that has not been preserved elsewhere. But this material, after all, is scanty; and hence it is that the 'Civil War' of Lucan, an historical epic written little more than a century after the events which it professes to describe, when the sources now lost to us were still accessible, is invested with a more than literary interest. It has been the aim of more than one painstaking and learned investigator to enquire what materials Lucan had before him, how he dealt with them, and how much he altered or added from his own invention. The method, though attractive, is not without drawbacks of its own; its results are not positive but inferential and presumptive. It has, in fact, some of the uncertainty which would attend a restoration of a dialogue on the telephone from what was heard at one end only. Notwithstanding this, there is general agreement that, embedded in the poem of Lucan, are precious fragments of history which have not been preserved to us elsewhere; and that the author on whom he drew (if not exclusively, as has been supposed by some, at least in the main) for all that was not due to his own imagination, was the great historian of Padua. Such, for example, is the view of M. Pichon, in his recent monograph on 'The Sources of Lucan,' in which, despite some partiality towards his author, the subject on the whole is handled with fairness and discretion.

There is good reason for thinking that the influence of Livy upon Lucan was particularly marked in the two books of the 'Civil War' which take the career of Pompey to its close. On the appreciative character of Livy's references to Pompey we have the clearest testimony from outside. Tacitus (*Annals*, IV, 34) reports the words of a speaker in the Senate who said that 'Titus Livius, a writer in the first rank for style and honesty, extolled

Gnaeus Pompeius so highly that Augustus called him a "Pompeian." In his seventh and eighth books, and especially in the latter, Lucan is frankly and enthusiastically 'Pompeian'; and, while from the nature of the case much evidence of specific borrowing from the historian cannot be expected, there is still explicit testimony that more than one passage and incident were so derived.

There is something more; but to appreciate it properly we must have regard to the difference in the subjects of the books. The two together make up the Pompeian tragedy, but their aspects are not the same. The seventh shows us the fall of the leader and his cause; its interest in the main is military and political. But the eighth directs our eyes towards a lonely figure on a darkening stage; and the interest is acutely personal and human, until the curtain falls. There, then, we should expect the Livian influence to be strongest and the contrast with the ordinary Lucanian manner most marked. A writer's style, it has been said, is himself; and of all the Roman writers there were none whose individualities were more distinct and more different than those we are considering. They have both of them, it is true, that rhetorical character which marks the Augustan and still more the post-Augustan literature; but the rhetoric of Lucan is not the rhetoric of Livy. They lie as far apart as the period and the epigram. The natural propensity of Lucan's genius was never better given than in the anonymous epitaph:

'Cordova bare me, Nero slew. My lyre
The duel sung of son-in-law and sire.
Not mine the long-drawn period's delays
Of crawling verses; mine the short, sharp phrase.
If thou would'st shine, dart with the lightning's flight;
A style is striking only if it smite.'

To the poetical quality of Livy's prose it is impossible to be blind. But whether Lucan was in truth a poet even his admirers could not agree.* At all events, for much that lies nearest to the hearts of poets he cared but little. One of the most magnificent passages of Classical Literature is the Homeric description of the untroubled

* Quintilian, x, 1, 90; Martial, xiv, 194.

and unsullied serenity of Olympus, the home of the Gods, in the 'Odyssey' (6, 42 *sqq.*). Its beauty has stirred many poets to noble imitation, as, for example, Lucretius, Swinburne, and Tennyson, who takes from it:

'The island valley of Avilion
Where falls not hail or rain or any snow,
Nor ever wind blows loudly.'

But see what our Corduban makes of it (VII, 478-480):

'tunc aethera tendit
extremique fragor conuexa inrumpit Olympi
unde procul nubes, quo nulla tonitrua durant.' *

In the last line we have the reduction of poetry to its lowest terms. In the phrase of an American humourist, it is 'as succinct as an invoice.'

In Lucan, again, who, we must in fairness remember, was cut off before his genius had begun to ripen and ere he had learned the lessons of life, we miss for the most part the touches of sympathy that enlist human interest and redeem even horrors from repulsiveness. Let a single illustration suffice. An unhappy combatant in one of the scenes of carnage in which the constant sight of gladiatorial exhibitions made the Roman take a callous enjoyment has been torn in sunder (III, 635 *fol.*); and this is Lucan's comment on the death, 'nullius uita perempti | est tanta dimissa uia' ('Never had life passed by so broad a road'). To put the matter briefly, in this narrative of the final scenes of Pompey's life not only are the characteristic faults of the narrator—exaggerated emphasis, unnatural antithesis, twisted expression and so forth—less obtrusive than usual; but we are also aware of touches of subtle appeal to our emotions, and thrilling, if vague, suggestions of pathos and romance. And in these, or at least a portion of them, it seems natural to see the influence of the sympathetic imagination of the greatest historical artist of Rome.†

* 'The roar of battle mounted to the skies and broke in on the remote Olympian vault, from which clouds are far, whither no thunders reach.'

† In another respect, which may seem to some a trifle, though I do not think it is, these two books, and particularly the eighth book, are marked off from the rest. This is their sparse employment of simile. For the remaining eight, Lucan's average is one simile in every 86 lines. In Books VII-VIII, he has 6 in 1744 (in VIII 1 in 872 lines)—the figures for Books

Great, however, as were Lucan's obligations to Livy and potent as was the influence exerted upon him in this part of the 'Civil War,' it would be a grave mistake to suppose that his account is a faithful reproduction of his predecessor's. Livy's work was a history; Lucan's was not, but a poem and pamphlet in one, whose object was to glorify the cause which had been lost at Pharsalia. And accordingly it is not permissible to take a presentment of Lucan's without more ado as historical. We have first to enquire whether it has been coloured by some external motive, whether artistic or political. I have considered this question at some length in the Historical Introduction to my edition of Book VII (pp. ix-xii); and I shall therefore here content myself with adhering to the principles which were there set forth and including in my narrative of events anything from Lucan which there is no good reason to disbelieve.*

The personal note is struck and the impending fate foreshadowed at the very beginning of Book VII (7-27). The day of Pharsalia breaks dull and dim; and it follows upon a night of feverish unrest for Pompey. The singular dream of which Lucan has given us a description conceived in his noblest style was no invention of his own. Plutarch and Appian both refer to it; and we can hardly doubt that it was in Livy. I offer no apology for giving it in an English dress:

'That night, to Pompey last of happy life,
With phantom show beguiled his troubled sleep.
In his own theatre's seats he saw appear
Th' innumerable multitude of Rome,
And heard his own name lifted to the skies
On the glad shouts of all the vying tiers.
So looked, so cheered the people, when a youth
In his first triumph time, o'ercome the tribes
That swirling Ebro compasses and all
The fleeing fightings of Sertorius,
The West now tranquil, as revered in white
As in the hues that decked his victor's car,

ix and x are 10 in 1108 and 4 in 546 lines respectively. I take these statistics from Mr Heitland's Introduction to Haskins' Edition of Lucan.

* The text of Lucan which I have used for quotation and translation is based on the Teubner standard edition of Dr C. Hosius.

While rose the cheering senators, he sate
 Plain Roman knight as yet. Ah, did his dream,
 Fearing the future, lost the happy past,
 Fly back to brighter days, or, prophet-like,
 Masking its sense in contraries to the sight,
 Bear presage of a people wailing loud?
 Or did the Fortune who denied his eyes
 Their fatherland thus give him Rome again?
 Break not his slumber, watchmen of the camp!
 Let ne'er a trumpet beat upon his ears!
 Ghastly to-morrow's sleep which, imaging
 The woeful day, will on his vision crowd
 Death and lost battles, fought and fought again.'

In much of Book VII there was little scope for the vein of personal sentiment. The dispositions for battle, the orations attributed to the generals as they marshalled their troops, the details of the fighting and the carnage—all this the vain young rhetorician could be trusted to work up in his own way. We have signs enough that here his mind was free and inventive. There is the unhistorical figment that it was Cicero who urged the unwilling Pompey to declare for battle; there is the still wilder fiction that Brutus disguised himself as a common soldier to find an opportunity of killing Cæsar;* there is the grisly inventory of wounds and deaths; the unsparing catalogue of the beasts and birds that fed upon the slain. But, when the battle is over and the hero a forlorn and beaten figure, we catch the personal note again. The touching incident of the fidelity of the Larisæans to the vanquished leader and his counsel to them to transfer their allegiance to the conqueror (712 *sqq.*) is no invention of Lucan's, for it is found with close verbal coincidences in Valerius Maximus (IV, 5, 5), who wrote before Lucan was born, and of whose two main sources Livy is known to have been one.

When the manœuvre by which Pompey had designed

* The excuse for such inventions is their rhetorical effectiveness. Lucan can hardly have reckoned on their being taken for granted or have expected to find readers as credulous as is Baron Stoffel: 'lorsqu'il [Lucan] ne s'agit que de rapporter des faits (nous ne disons: quand il s'agit de les juger), le poète de Cordoue se montre un historien des plus véridiques' (Histoire de Jules César; Guerre Civile, II, p. 251).

to win the battle of Pharsalia had been foiled by the counter-stroke of Cæsar, he rode at once from the field. He entered his camp by the prætorian gate and, after giving an order to the centurions on duty, shut himself in his general's quarters, where he awaited in silence the issue of which he now despaired. He had not to wait long. In spite of a gallant resistance by the cohorts left in garrison and the barbarian auxiliaries, the devoted veterans of Cæsar soon forced an entry, and the whole population of the camp, the centurions and military tribunes leading, fled helter-skelter to the top of the neighbouring heights. With the bitter cry 'The camp also!' their general himself, stripping off the last vestiges of an emperor, sprang upon a horse, dashed out of the decuman gate, and with only four companions galloped at full speed to Larisa. He did not deem it safe to accept that city's proffer of hospitality; Cæsar, in fact, was in Larisa on the following day. But he stayed there long enough to be joined by a sprinkling of his followers, and with a small band of thirty horsemen he pursued his flight towards the coast. The haste and the heat proved too much for his steed's endurance; and Pompey had to labour through much of the forest of Tempe, athirst and afoot, having ample time for the saddening reflexions upon his past and his present which Lucan (VIII, 18 *sqq.*) and Plutarch ('Pompeius,' c. 73) have placed upon record. He reached the mouth of the Peneus late at night and found refuge in a poor fisherman's hut. At daybreak he dismissed all but the freemen in his company, and, entering one of the small river-boats, rowed up and down the shore. Here he was espied by a merchantman, commanded by a Roman citizen named Peticius, who, we are told, had had a dream about him the night before. The vessel responded to his signals and took him aboard, together with certain of his companions, including the two Lentuli* and later the old king Deiotarus, tetrarch of Galatia.

On board this vessel Pompey proceeded to Amphipolis, where he issued a proclamation summoning all the Greeks and Roman citizens in Macedonia who were of

* L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus, Consul in 49, and P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther, Consul in 57.

military age to assemble in that place. Cæsar suspected that the proclamation was a feint; for Pompey only dropped anchor at Amphipolis, and the next day set sail for Mitylene in Lesbos, where his wife Cornelia had been placed for safety at the beginning of the war.* The voyage to Mitylene took but a few days; and, as soon as his vessel was in port, Pompey despatched a messenger to his wife, who had heard nothing since his successes at Dyrrachium, to apprise her of his arrival and to break the news of his defeat. Cornelia fainted with the shock, but presently recovered herself and hastened with her handmaids to the shore. The touching meeting of husband and wife is described by Plutarch (c. 74) and Lucan (55 *sqq.*), both drawing from Livy as their source. To Cornelia's self-upbraidings Pompey replied in a strain which has been stigmatised as callous by some who have not kept in mind the difference between the Roman and the modern feeling, or realised the motive of Pompey's chidings. Cornelia had to be saved from again collapsing; and for this there was nothing so effective as a sharp reminder of what she owed to duty and her noble birth. His wife regained, Pompey had no reason for delay in Lesbos; and even the friendly entreaties of the people of Mitylene could not prevail upon him to remain beyond the two days during which the winds were contrary.

The news of Pharsalia had spread like wildfire; and nowhere could Pompey count on the welcome of a friend. Plutarch tells us that he only stopped where necessary to take in water or provisions. But Lucan adds a number of details, some of them no doubt invented, but others probably emanating from his source. The wind was blowing fresh off the coast of Asia; and the sun was about to set when they reached the point where an ancient mariner would turn, between the island of Chios and the Cænussæ islets, if his destination were the south. The sharp change in the vessel's course from W. to S. is marked by a precise description of the shifting of the sail and the altered sound of the water, and is accentuated by the only simile in the book.

By a natural, if invented, touch Pompey had been

* Had we only Lucan's account (35 foll.) we might suppose that Pompey crossed to Lesbos in the river-boat.

shown in converse with the skipper, seeking thus to divert his mind from the cares that wearied him and the oppressive task of deciding what should be his future course. The questions which the poet represents him as putting to the steersman are not the idle ones of a passenger merely curious about navigation. They are prompted by the alternative plans between which his choice was wavering and now for the first time indicated. Should he appeal for help in his hour of need to the free communities which had treaty rights with Rome, such as the rich and powerful state of Rhodes? Or to one of the monarchs with whom he had had relations or upon whom he had claims—the kings of Parthia, Numidia and Egypt? As to Rhodes, his hopes were presently to be rudely shattered. For the Rhodians bluntly refused to the two Lentuli, and even to Pompey himself, all admittance to their city and harbour; so that it is not without significance that Lucan, in giving his itinerary, says that he ‘avoided’ Rhodes (‘relinquit Rhodon,’ 247). At one of the places where he touched he was joined by his son Sextus and a number of senators and others who had escaped from Pharsalia. Here (perhaps near Ephesus, which was friendly) King Deiotarus left him to return to his tetrarchy of Galatia. Lucan (209 foll.) covers up the defection by representing the king as sent on a mission to the king of Parthia, of which we hear no more.

Passing Icaria and Samos, Cos, Cnidos and Rhodes, and striking thence across the sea to the Lycian coast, Pompey made his first stopping-place Phaselis on the borders of Lycia according to Lucan, or Attalia in Pamphylia according to Plutarch. On the Pamphylian seaboard he remained some time, collecting ships, troops and treasure. Cæsar, however, was now in Asia, and something must be done. The little force was moved to Syhedra, a small and obscure seaport not far from Selinus (Selindi) in Cilicia. Here was held the fateful council to which the narrative of Lucan gives the prominence it deserves; and, allowing for some rhetorical colour and ornament, his account may be accepted as substantially correct. Of the four possible courses three alone remained, and these the speech of Pompey takes in their obvious order. It was natural to think of Egypt

first; but the idea is at once dismissed (281 *sqq.*). Its prince could not be trusted at such a crisis:

'The youth of Egypt's monarch bids me fear;
For manhood's force the steeps of duty call.'

Numidia is allowed a little longer argument (283-288). But Juba, it is urged, comes of the treacherous race of Africa; in his veins runs the blood of Hannibal, the arch enemy of Rome; * and he is puffed up by the humiliation of Varus and the lowering of the place of Rome, 'supplice Varo | intumuit, uiditque loco Romana secundo.' Parthia alone is left; and no art is spared to recommend a proposal so repellent to Roman patriotism and pride. The Roman world, Pompey had said to Deiotarus (211), was already Cæsar's; but there was still the great empire of the East:

'So up, friends, haste we to the Eastern climes!
Vast spreads a world beyond Euphrates' flood;
Tracts measureless from the Caspian Gates recede.
A new pole turns Assyria's nights and days.
Sundered from ours their sea, its hue diverse,
Its ocean separate. War's their sole disport,
Taller their charging steed, stouter their bow,
Nor boy nor greybeard slack to draw the string,
Sure death in every shaft' (289-297).

After allusion to the Parthian's defeat of the great Seleucid power and the terror of their poisoned arrows, the ancient 'explosive bullet,' the speaker passed on to more personal considerations and urged the importance of his own successes and prestige in the East. In conclusion he declared it was no unpatriotic policy to involve the Parthians in the civil troubles of Rome:

'When Media shocks with Cæsar in the fight,
Me, or the Crassi, Fortune *must* avenge' (325-327).

The speech was received with murmurs; and the ex-consul Lentulus Spinther was 'foremost in uttering the general indignation.'† In a long and vehement speech

* The historical foundation for this statement is unknown.

† Lentulus, if present, must have spoken on this occasion, just as, in the gathering of Republican Senators described at the beginning of Book v, he proposed the formal appointment of Pompey to the command. Lucan has, however, put in his mouth arguments which, according to Plutarch,

he tears Pompey's pleading to pieces. An alliance with Parthia will be dishonour both to Pompey and Rome. Their warlike prowess is a myth; they have the oriental's courage and no more; nor will they venture to face a Cæsar flushed with victory. In committing himself into their hands Pompey at worst risks death; but what will be the fate of his wife Cornelia, the widow of a Crassus, in the harem of a barbarous king? * No treaty or truce with Parthians is possible till the disaster and disgrace of Carrhæ are avenged. If Juba and Numidia inspire no trust, let Pompey turn to Egypt, a land of great resources, with a monarch upon whose gratitude he has every claim :

“The boy of Egypt owes his crown to thee;
 'Twas in thy wardship, Pompey. Shadows, names—
 Shall these affright us? Youth is innocence.
 Of right, of honour and the fear of God
 Within the palace of the old despair!
 The veteran sceptre-wielder knows no shame.
 Mildest that kingdom's lot whose king is young.”
 He said no more, but swayed them to his mind.
 How large the freedom Fate's last hope allows!
 Pompey was pleader; but the cause was lost' (440-455).

The conclave broke up, and Pompey proceeded to Paphos in Cyprus. Here he received the intelligence that the Syrian capital, Antioch, through which would lie his obvious route to Parthia, had issued a proclamation forbidding his party to approach it under peril of their lives. Here, then, he finally relinquished a project which a later historian, Dio Cassius, would not believe that he had ever entertained. So the little fleet set sail for Egypt. It seems to have consisted of some four or five triremes, together with transports, and it conveyed 2000 soldiers and a considerable military chest. It followed the coast of Cyprus as far as the promontory of Curias and then struck south across the open sea. Its objective was Alexandria; but a westerly gale was blowing, and, when Pompey made the Egyptian coast,

c. 76, were advanced by Theophanes of Lesbos, Pompey's constant companion and domestic historian.

* This was the argument that, according to report, weighed most of all with Pompey (Plutarch, c. 76).

he found himself at Pelusium on the easternmost arm of the Nile. Egypt was itself in the throes of a civil war. The settlement by which the son and daughter of Ptolemy Auletes were to mate and rule together had been set aside. The ministers of the young Ptolemy had procured the expulsion of his sister, the famous Cleopatra, from the kingdom. She had levied forces to regain her rights; and the two armies were facing each other on Mount Casius somewhat to the east of Pelusium.

It was still afternoon when Pompey cast anchor off Pelusium; and a mounted scout of the king's rode rapidly along the shore with the tidings of the unwelcome arrival. Soon envoys from Pompey followed, to plead the cause of their chief before the Court and to ask the shelter and assistance which it was claimed were his due. Unfortunately for him, their zeal outran their discretion; and some attempts they made to enlist the sympathies of his ancient comrades, of whom a number had been left by Gabinus in Egypt and were now in the service of Ptolemy, gave colour to the insinuation that he wished to tamper with the allegiance of the royal troops. A council of state was summoned; among those who were present were the eunuch Pothinus, Ptolemy's tutor and prime minister; Achilles, the commander of his army; Acoreus, the aged high-priest of Memphis; and Theodotus, a Greek rhetorician and professor from Chios, whose charge was the education of the king. Acoreus, by right of years, spoke first, and urged the duty which the young king owed to his father's memory and to his 'guardian' Pompey.* But his efforts were vain. Pothinus, Achilles and Theodotus were on the other side. In the account of Plutarch it is the Greek professor who advises the killing of the fugitive, winding up with the cynical apophthegm that 'the dead do not bite.' In Lucan this part is given to Pothinus for reasons that are easy to divine. Whosoever the counsel, it must not be supposed to have been offered out of sheer wantonness. The arrival of Pompey was a grave embarrassment, fraught with serious complications for the Egyptian Government;

* In what sense Ptolemy was a ward of Pompey, a statement in which Lucan and Livy (contents of Book 112) agree, is not entirely clear; but we know from Cæsar that one copy of the will of Ptolemy Auletes which settled the Egyptian succession had been placed for safe custody with Pompey.

and a dagger was the surest and handiest instrument for cutting the knot. The shameless cynicism of the speech assigned by Lucan to Pothinus (484-535) cannot but revolt us; but we must recognise the address with which it handles the essential facts of the situation and the power which it evinces of 'reading a tyrant's heart.'

'Out of the palace ye that would be good!
Virtue and sovran power mate not together.
For aye they fear whom cruelties revolt' (493-6).

Then, apostrophising Pompey (523-535):

'Canst doubt that I must harm thee when I may?
What is this fond reliance on our realms
That drives thee here, unhappy? See'st thou not
Our folk unwarlike, scarce with strength to turn
The sodden champaign whence their Nile has fled.
We all should know our kingdoms, own our powers.
Thou, Ptolemy, wilt thou prop great Pompey's fall
That crushes Rome? Rouse Thessaly's buried dead
And to thine own realm summon war? Shall we
That till Pharsalia leagued with neither host
Now follow Pompey whom the whole world leaves?
Now brave the victor's might and obvious star?
"Base to desert misfortune!" Yes, if we
Have followed fortune. But the top of honour
Ne'er chose the merely wretched for a friend.'

The council determined that Pompey must die; and Achilles was appointed to carry out the sentence. The Pompeian vessels were now at anchor off the promontory of Casius. The Egyptian troops were lining the sandy and surf-beaten strand, the king in royal purple conspicuous in their midst. A small fishing boat put off from shore, making for the commander's galley. Besides the general and the necessary rowers and attendants, three or four at most, it had on board only two Roman officers from the Egyptian army, and these specially chosen to avert suspicions, Salvius and Septimius, of whom Septimius had been a centurion of Pompey in the war against the Pirates. When the boat came alongside, Septimius greeted his old commander with the highest title that a Roman soldier knew—'Haue imperator'; and Achilles, with all expressions of respect, invited him to descend into the boat, for whose smallness he offered the

apology that landing from larger vessels was not possible in those shallow waters. The explanation was not such as altogether to reassure. Pompey's wife and the friends who had collected on his trireme, uneasy at the character of his reception, had besought him, while still possible, to retreat. Nor was he himself wholly free from misgivings. But he was sick of the suspense and perhaps apprehensive of the consequences which might ensue if he were suspected of distrust. He noticed too with anxiety that some of the king's ships were even now being got ready for sea. Accordingly he bade adieu to his wife and son, and, preceded by two of his own centurions, by Philippus, his freedman, and a servant called Scythes, he stepped into the boat. As he did so, he repeated a couplet of Sophocles, which has been thus translated :

'He that once enters at a tyrant's door
Becomes a slave, though he were free before.'

It was some distance to land; but Achilles and his centurions maintained a stony silence. Pompey addressed Septimius: 'Surely I am right in thinking you were once a comrade of mine?' Septimius nodded but vouchsafed no further reply. So Pompey turned to read the notes of the speech which he had composed in Greek to deliver before the king. They presently neared the shore; and the anxious watchers on the trireme's deck observed a great company ready to receive them. Pompey took the hand of Philippus to help him to rise, when Septimius stabbed him in the back, and Salvius first and then Achilles plunged their swords in his side. A shriek of horror burst from the trireme, and Cornelia fainted. But Pompey died without a cry, with no attempt at resistance, covering his eyes as he fell.

The thoughts of one thus struck out of existence it is beyond man's power to divine. We may believe only that their succession in the last few moments of consciousness is incredibly rapid and intense.* But Lucan assuredly never intended his readers to take the utterance of the reflexions which he has ascribed to the dying

* See a remarkable description of the end by hanging of a civilian in the American Civil War in Ambrose Bierce's 'In the Midst of Life' (1892), pp. 31 *sqq.*

Pompey as any real soliloquy. With the ancients a speech was a recognised literary form for conveying the import and lessons of a situation rather than for rendering with literal or psychological exactness what was actually thought or said. With every shape of violent and compulsory death, sudden or protracted, the Romans of the Early Empire had become familiar. The illustrious victims, who starved or bled themselves to death under the tyrannies of a Seianus, a Caligula or a Nero, were careful so to order their last hours that they should furnish monition and example to posterity. The same motives and spirit are to be sought in the verses of Lucan, though they may, not unnaturally, seem stiff and theatrical to a generation whose artificialities have been those of levity rather than of gravity. The lines (622-635) begin with the reflection that future ages are watching to see if Pompey, after all his felicity, can bear misfortunes worthily. He must not fret that he falls to an ignoble hand, but deem that he owes his death to Cæsar. Nor must he grieve if worse indignities await him :

“ Yea, let them hack and scatter. Still, ye powers,
I'm happy. This no god can take away.
'Tis life shifts fortune ; death makes wretched none.
Cornelia, Sextus see this murder done.
So patient, pain, and close lock up thy moan.
Wife, son will love if they revere the slain.”
Such strait watch Pompey kept upon his thoughts,
So held his dying spirit in control ' (629-636).

The butchers' work was not finished yet ; a trophy must be secured. So Septimius tore the covering from the face, hacked the head from the trunk and flung the body on the shoals. The poet continues (679-686) :

‘ That a base boy might look on Pompey's face,
The shaggy fell of hair which kings revered,
The high brow's ornament, was rudely grasped ;
And, life still quick in all the lineaments,
While sobbing breath shook murmurs from the lips
And stiffened yet the eyes' uncurtained stare,
On Pharian lance-point was the head impaled
That never spake for war and there was peace,
'Fore which bowed laws, Rostra and Field of Mars.
Wherein Rome's Fortune saw herself and smiled.’

The head was carried to the king, and subsequently embalmed, for an object that will presently appear.

The tragedy of Pompey the Great was over and actors and spectators quitted the scene. His fleet had long ago plucked up anchors and fled;* and darkness was falling on the deserted shore. This is the moment chosen by the poet for grave reflexions, whose impressiveness is best rendered by prose:

‘With the same punctiliousness with which Fortune perfected the prosperity of Pompey did she strike him to death from the pinnacle of power, and on a single merciless day exact in payment all the miseries from which she had given him so many years exempt. Thus Pompey had never both joys and sorrows mingled in his cup—happy with no god to trouble him, wretched with none to spare him. Fortune long held her stroke and struck but once. He is tossed on the sands, torn by the rocks; the waves pour through his wounds; the sea makes him its sport; and, as no shape is left him, the one sign that he is Pompey the Great is the neck from which the head has been torn’ (701-711.)

It is night and the moon is dim;† but another figure may be descried upon the shore. This is Cordus, who, according to Lucan, the earliest, perhaps the only witness to the statement, played a part which others, as Plutarch (c. 80), assigned to Pompey’s freedman Philippus, but in which it is probable that both were associated, since Plutarch speaks of an old Roman who had served with Pompey as taking part in the burial. Cordus, we are told, had been the quæstor of Pompey in his earlier days. The relation of a quæstor to his chief, as we know from Cicero, was all but a filial one; and thus Cordus seemed designated to perform the last pious offices to the body now tossing on the shoals (721-728):

‘All faint, sad Cynthia glimmered thro’ the cloud;
But ’mid the grey surf darkly showed the trunk.
Round the dead chief enlacing arms he wound,
Baulking the robber seas. Then, spent with toil,

* The vessel on which were Cornelia and Sextus escaped; most, if not all, of the rest were captured and those they carried killed.

† The moon is an embellishment of the poet’s. Our astronomer royal assures me that on the night of the murder she would not rise till nearly dawn.

Waited the waves; and, dry land won at last,
Bending above and weeping o'er each wound
Thus spake to heaven and the darkling stars.'

His appeal to the ruthless powers is in substance this. The favourite of Fortune sues not now for the pomp and pageant of the public funeral that is his meed; he asks no more than the meagre rites accorded to the lowest of the low. It is penalty enough that his wife can pay none of the last tributes to her husband, so near and yet so far away.

The burning of the body is then described (743-775). The account contains nothing incredible, and one of its incidents the confirmation of other writers proves to have been historical.

'So spake the warrior when afar he spied
A small death-fire that burned a friendless corse,
Unwatched. Thence snatched he flame and from the limbs
The charred logs drawing, "Poor unknown," he said,
"Though slighted and forgot of all thy friends,
Yet happier thou than Pompey, pardon if
Thy ordered pile a stranger hand invade.
If death leaves aught of feeling, then unasked
Thou'lt quit the pyre and gladly bear this loss,
Ashamed to burn by Pompey's graveless corse."
So said, his arms with burning faggots filled,
He flies back to the trunk, which on the marge
Swayed, all but now recovered by the waves.
He parts the top sand, hastily from far
Gathers the breakage of a shattered hull
And in the slight trench lays it. But no wood
Upheld the noble limbs, no builded pyre,
And near, not under Pompey stole the flames.
Then seated by the fire, "Great Chief," he cried,
"Sole sovran splendour of Hesperia's race,
If more than tossing seas or earth denied
This pyre mislike thee, ghost and potent wraith
Turn thou from these poor offices away.
'Tis Fate's wrongdoing makes them rightly done.
And lest sea-monster, beast or bird of prey,
Or spite of cruel Cæsar outrage dare,
Take all thou may'st, this fire. A Roman's hand
Enkindles thee. If to Hesperia's shores
My fortune grant return, these holy ashes

Shall bide no longer in this resting place.
 Cornelia, Pompey, shall receive them home
 And from my arms shall pour them in the urn.
 With a small stone meanwhile I'll mark the shore
 To show the grave to whoso shall design
 T' appease the slain, death's tributes rendering
 Without abridgement, that his quest may find
 The ashes of the trunk and know the strand
 Whither with Pompey's head he must repair.'

All night the body burns, nor is it ashes when the first rays of light give warning to the watchers that their task must end. The smouldering remains are hurriedly quenched with water taken from the sea and buried under a little heap of earth. A stone is placed above to keep it in position. On the stone the brief inscription *HIC SITVS EST MAGNVS* (Here lies Great Pompey) is scored with a half-burnt faggot. This done, Cordus departed; but Philippus, it would appear, remained. For Plutarch tells us that Lucius Lentulus, who had left Cyprus after Pompey and was sailing along the coast in ignorance of the catastrophe, descrying the funeral pile and the freedman who stood beside it, exclaimed before he knew the truth, 'Who, I wonder, is this unfortunate that has paid the debt of fate?' and again after a pause and with a sigh, 'What if it be *you*, Great Pompey?' Before long he landed, when he was at once arrested and put to death in prison.

Pompey was murdered on Sept. 28, B.C. 48;* on the following day—the anniversary of his great triumph over Mithridates and the Pirates—he would have completed his 58th year. His head, whose features were hardly recognisable, together with his signet ring, a lion grasping a sword, was reserved as an offering to the victor, who reached Alexandria towards the beginning of October. Caesar, with an emotion which the Pompeian poet insinuates was assumed, but which may well have been sincere, turned away from the grisly spectacle and ordered the head an honourable burial. It was not interred with the remains of the trunk, but placed in a

* That is, according to the unreformed Roman Calendar; the real date was July 25. The confusion has misled Lucan, who makes Pompey's arrival in Egypt coincide with the autumnal equinox (VIII, 467-469).

small shrine on a plot of ground outside the city, thence known as the Enclosure of Nemesis. This was destroyed (so Appian tells us) by the Jews in their great revolt in the last year of the Emperor Trajan, 117 A.D.; but the association of Pompey with the Egyptian capital lived on, as it would appear, and attached itself to the great obelisk now known as 'Pompey's Pillar,' but really erected to commemorate the siege of the city by Diocletian.

At some time or other, according to Plutarch (c. 80 fin.), Cornelia was permitted to remove her husband's remains to Italy and reinter them on his estate near Alba. The specific statement may conceivably be true; but it can hardly be questioned that for the world at large his ashes continued to rest in the hostile soil where the humble grave, with bronze figures of the dead placed around it by his kinsfolk, was one of the sights of Egypt, until it was buried under the drifting sand. This was its condition when the Emperor Hadrian in A.D. 130 paid a visit to the spot and had the grave restored and the images, which had been maltreated and removed to the neighbouring shrine of Jupiter Casius, renovated and replaced. Lucan, too, must have shared the popular belief. Otherwise there is little meaning in the magnificent funeral oration (such in fact it is) which he pronounces over the grave of his hero, and the closing lines of which (865-872) may fitly conclude this article:

'The hour shall come when loss of during tomb
And marbles labouring high shall be thy gain,
Ere time be agèd much, this scanty heap
Of dust be scattered, fallen lie the stone,
And all the arguments of thy death be dead.
A brighter age shall dawn, our sons refuse
All credence to the guides that show the grave,
And Egypt, maybe, deem as arrantly
For Pompey's grave to lie as Crete for Jove's.'

J. P. POSTGATE

Art. 4.—HENRY JAMES.

THE life that an artist lives within the borders of his art, the adventure of his imagination, has never been more fully set forth than it is in the work of Henry James. He has left, in the long and unbroken succession of his books, what is surely the most complete of all statements of the 'literary case,' as he might have called it himself. It is a statement, in the first place, by a man intensely—among masters of our own tongue, at any rate, one may as well say uniquely—aware of the nature of his task, a critic who took up the most haphazard of literary forms and turned it into the most ordered and finished; a statement, moreover, even in an age of ready writers, lavishly detailed and voluminous. A fastidiously critical gift is supposed to mean sterility in production; most kinds of fluency can only cover the ground by neglecting many scruples. Henry James not only neglected none, but he cultivated them, as some thought, beyond the limit of fanaticism. Yet his work is no slender growth, checked and hampered in its movement by so much care, but a broad and gathering stream, flowing steadily year by year and in full view, as unlike as possible to the rare and curious possession bequeathed to an enlightened few.

This very amplitude of his work, coupled with the fact of its increasing closeness of texture, is enough to prove that Henry James, in his search for perfection of form, faced towards the open, absorbing, for his peculiar use, an ever stronger and deeper impression of humanity. He was immensely fastidious, but his detestation of what was obvious or stale was as far as could be from making him shy of the touch of life. He rather exposed himself to it, with appreciative deliberation, more and more; and there was no one to whom every moment of experience appeared so thickly populous. All who knew him must recall the splendid freedom with which he would throw open his imagination to receive the lightest appeal. This freedom, it is true, was in no way casual or promiscuous; nothing about him was ever that. Anything that might be offered him, sight or suggestion or play of thought, which was without character, without style, futile, insignificant, he swept from him in scorn. But for whatever had substance and reality, or was marked with the

distinction of life, his welcome was instant and royal; it would be recreated in the crucible of his mind and given out again with rich profusion. There is not indeed a single aspect of his art which can be rightly apprehended except in the light of his genial, generous passion for the world and its fulness. He has described how from the beginning he saw in himself a spectator of life, one born to watch and brood over the part he would leave others to play. But to think of him as anywhere save at the heart of things, engaged in unnumbered relations and prodigal of his power, cannot be possible for a moment to those who possess the memory of his look and speech. The difference between this impartial onlooker and ordinary folk was that he, more than they all, refused to hoard the capacity of giving and taking, dealt bounteously in the interchange of human currency, set standards of liberality and comprehension by every thought and act. For such a man there could be no danger that his art would withdraw into itself, losing touch with the world. His whole life, rather, would be lived in his art, his art would fill his life. So it was; and so it happens that his work, in its rounded completion, is his portrait.

A critical account of his fiction, within the space of a few pages, is out of the question; moreover, he wrote it himself, by no means in a few pages, in the prefaces to the collected edition of his novels. That wonderful commentary awaits and entices a critic, though apparently so far in vain. In a brief sketch it is only possible to indicate the barest outline of an achievement so strange and new, not attempting to appraise its final value, but simply following through certain phases the development of the most original novelist of our time.

Of his earliest work there was very little that he allowed in the end to survive; most of the tales of his youth—and many of later years—were ruthlessly excluded from the edition in which, a few years ago, he arrayed and revised so much of his fiction as could pass his scrutiny. When we remember the kind of criticism he would bend, out of the ripeness of his experience, on the unsuspecting novelist who came his way, it is easy to understand that his own far-away beginnings may

have seemed to him somewhat thin. No doubt they were; in contrast, indeed, with the rich and aureate harvest of his maturity, their pallor is only too striking. Yet there was one respect in which the slightest of his early anecdotes and sketches of character were always remarkable, and doubly so as the production of a very young man. Surprising, certainly, is the self-command with which their author selects just those few light handfuls of life he could be sure of accounting for, and refrains from embarrassing himself with another blade or fibre; but this, perhaps, was not their most promising feature, and it might have been supposed that such circumspection was too precocious to be fruitful. Rarer and a great deal more significant was the perfectly sure instinct with which the youthful writer was able, as he surveyed his world, to distinguish good quality, native excellence—the 'finer grain,' in his own phrase—from the mass of inferiority in which it is always entangled, devoting his skill to whatever would take the stamp of art most sensitively and refusing to squander it upon the rest. This gift, more than all the demure and finished composure of those days, was to become the heart round which there clustered the fruition of later years.

It is, in fact, by this sharp sense for life at its most alert, intelligence at its highest lucidity, feeling at its most exquisitely timed vibration, that the novel of Henry James is ultimately directed. Every one of his later developments was controlled by the single desire to make the very most of the very best. He had large ideas, as we know, about the very most that could be made of a thing; the cry sometimes went up that they spread beyond the limits of breathable air. But it is not through either wonder or dismay, whichever it may be, that the mere difficulties of his final form are likely to be solved. They were not arbitrary, nor were they the result of a failing control of his purpose. They were entirely natural, and the clue is surely to be found in his imperious demand, on behalf of art, for an utterly satisfying task. Nothing could be too good for art; and the seeing eye discerns in life particular shining threads which offer to art the occasion for the fullest display of its power. Henry James sought patiently, consistently, and passionately for these. However critical he might be of the

manner in which the picture was drawn, he was not less exacting in his choice of the matter to be represented; and this because neither matter nor manner, except at their most perfect, could fitly cooperate with the other. As fine material awaits the deft hand, deft hand seeks fine material; both are wasted until they meet. Henry James is too often regarded as the devotee of curious workmanship, the novelist who lost sight of the end in the means. Certainly he always gave his subject as much expansion as it could possibly bear; that was a point of honour with him. But it was only as his theme grew deeper and denser that the more mazy ramifications of his fancy were allowed to flourish. The degree to which they finally budded and branched shows the force of the straining, exuberant, insistent life that he found in the images he chose to represent. He would touch no others.

The population of his novels, first and last, ranging as they do over two shores of an ocean, some the freshest offshoots of a new and untried society, others toned and polished by centuries of tradition, the lightest, the weightiest, the most scarred and ravaged of his characters—all are alike in this, that they can all be trusted to respond at once and freely to the pressure of experience. The sight of Roderick Hudson, radiant in the spring of his genius, raised a whole chapter of his friend's existence to the acutest pitch; if Roderick had been able to support the burden of his gift and to become the greatest sculptor of the world, he could never have been a sharper event than he was, for his brief flash, in the quick consciousness of Rowland Mallet. Christopher Newman, faced in his provincial blankness by the romance of the distinguished old portals of the Faubourg St Germain, stood in most pictorial contrast with the life inside them; but his story is much more than the mere account of what happened to him; it is in his own long ruminating gaze, as it penetrated the ancient precincts and finally turned away with a loftier pride than their own. An event or an incident, in Henry James's view, even of the kind usually considered most stirring, is in itself of no moment. All depends upon the quality of the life which it affects; if it hurls itself against a dull surface it can have no history. Isabel Archer, in 'The Portrait of a Lady,' her charm,

her candour, her cleverness, her capacity for seeing and feeling and learning—not only is the story of her youth seen through these, but in a perfectly natural sense they *are* that story. Whatever happens to Isabel happens to her power of recognising it; the men and women around her, and the things they do, are the men, women, things, that she is able to perceive in them. Her life is no mere chronicle, pieced together by an impersonal observer. It is an enacting of the play of experience within the theatre of herself.

A vivid mind and a train of circumstance apt to kindle it; a difficult issue, a delicate relation, or simply an attuned and favouring atmosphere, with an imagination, at hand or in the forefront, ready to abound and create—these would spring to meet each other on a chance word or a momentary glimpse, and so the drama would be started. As time went on, Henry James tended more and more to surrender the action of his novels to the care of the remarkable people he chose to write about; he left it to them, that is, and to their crystal-edged insight, to show that they could raise what befell them into a region of dignity and beauty. Whether they always succeeded is another question. At least he uncompromisingly required them to put forward their best efforts, and gave them no trite or pointless matters to handle. They had an easier time, no doubt, in the days when he allowed them to move in the common world and to share it with their fellow-men. Afterwards, when he kept his elect souls more closely to their task, he had his own good reason for doing so; but this was not until he had taken full stock of the various life he happened to have mixed in. Though he finally lavished all his art on the problem of reproducing the whole reverberation, without losing the faintest echo, of some doubt or difficulty or triumph through a receptive and retentive mind, he had long been held by the world of characters and classes, of manners and customs, and had written many books in which its display was fully faced. In this part of his work he was greatly favoured by the chances of his own time.

An American of his quality and opportunities was certain to be cosmopolitan. Europe drew him and kept him fast, but a man of less insatiable imagination might

have found that he had lost his own country without discovering another. Even as it was, there were years in which Henry James evidently felt that he must be careful where he trod. Daisy Miller was a very graceful little apparition; and her good faith, which might have seemed rather futile, was saved by the pretty, fugitive tints it assumed against the *patina* of corrupt and experienced old Europe. But Daisy Miller, even if she was not, as her creator was afterwards inclined to admit, a figment of pure romance, was at most a slender resource; and, when Francie Dosson and Pandora and a few other sister maidens had joined her, the tale of the 'slip of a girl' from America was undoubtedly complete. Isabel Archer was of course a different matter; she had vistas of tradition behind her and infinite development to come, while Daisy had nothing whatever except the bubble of transatlantic buoyancy on which she floated. The one fully organised and purely American activity was not social but commercial; and that crowded volume, much to his regret, was closely sealed to his observation. Thus, even while his name and fame were being made by the lightness of hand with which he placed America against the scene of Europe, it appears that he himself was strongly conscious of the tenuity of his material in this direction. There was profusion elsewhere, however. He had been inoculated with the 'virus of Europe,' as he called it, at a tender age; and the stuff had so worked in him that when (at five and twenty) he settled in Europe for good, he was prepared to feast, with the loss of never another minute, on the fruitage of an ancient civilisation. The only danger was that it might be impossible to concentrate in the midst of so great plenty.

He avoided this danger, the lure of the cosmopolitan, because it chanced that he knew exactly what he wanted and was under no temptation to trifle with anything else. Most analytic of observers, he yet deliberately circumscribed his curiosity and never allowed it to wander vaguely. Just as he never wrote a line of verse or listened, one would gather, to a note of music, so there were whole tracts of thought, speculative, scientific, scholastic, which he passed without a glance. His one preoccupation was the criticism, for his own purpose, of the art of life; and to this his matchless power of

discrimination was singly devoted. Life in its first rawness was of small account to him; what he desired was life moulded and shaped, life toned by the sun and rain of years of history. This is the world which tells in every feature what it is and what it has been; the layers of association lie closely on it, revealing all it has achieved and endured. Henry James followed the track of this manner of life with untiring patience. 'The brooding analyst,' he called himself; he was absorbed by the spirit of haunted places and old time-weathered societies. He explored their drama, in Rome, in Paris, in London; and in scores of studies, longer and shorter, he recorded their charm. The 'international light' was that in which he most naturally seized it at first, but it was the deep soft background that was really the chief factor in the scene. It played its part through many pages in which sundrenched Italian hills, the silver-blue clarity of French streets and squares, or the dense rumour of our own sonorous city—to name these out of a hundred such effects—are so imagined that they appear, not described, but aroused and inspired to action.

The international light, however, as he gradually perceived, was romantic. It was the glow of his more or less ingenuous delight in Europe, a charming fancy properly indulged until it had yielded its full measure of happy effects. His strong and restless mind could not be satisfied with it for long. Embedded in the mellow picturesqueness of Europe was something richer than romance; and it can hardly be straining a point to note that, as his surrender to the old world became confirmed, so he was drawn away from the places of traditional enchantment to the more soberly tinted climate in which he presently made his home. England and London at any rate possessed him at last; and there was nothing fanciful in the spell by which they achieved it. We can be under no delusion concerning the attraction to which, through so many years of his mature and best work, Henry James was constantly faithful. We know how many 'poor sensitive gentlemen,' in his phrase, he set to confront the solid and ruthless assault of English life; with what awful assurance it ignored their scruples; how clearly it showed its intention of dealing as it chose with all such refinements and hesitations. In the two volumes

which he called 'Terminations' and 'Embarrassments' the theme is taken up at point after point; the calamity of those who fall out of the race, who are less robust than their neighbours, who desire to linger and watch, or who have simply and weakly died—if this is the drama of London, the author of 'Broken Wings,' 'The Great Good Place,' 'The Altar of the Dead,' and a score of other packed impressions, is its master dramatist. At the same time, if it attracted him, there must have been more in it than the mere purposeless triumph of will and vigour.

There was in it precisely what he sought and what he celebrated wherever he found it—there was style. In 'The Spoils of Poynton' the terrible Mrs Gereth, with her wondrous passion for a few fine sticks of old furniture, has style in such intensity that she becomes historic. If the gestures of her character and her resolution had been a thought less free, less supple, or less perfectly timed, she and her furniture and her fixed idea would all have been uninteresting together. As it is, by the clean finish of everything she does and says and thinks, her whole wrong-headed business is lifted into distinction. So, too, Kate Croy in 'The Wings of the Dove,' and Charlotte in 'The Golden Bowl,' are handsome and wonderful; their friends knew it well and have no meaner words to describe them with. Yet it was only the brilliant ease with which they took their predatory way that made them into matter for such enormous argument. To people so infinitely intelligent and yet so free from mental or moral embarrassment, so composed in their acceptance of questionable means and yet so lucid in apprehending them, so hard and fine in their armature and yet so alert to the least flicker of grace—to such people the tribute at least must be paid of recognising that they give, wherever they go, direction and significance to the life around them. They need no advantages beyond the fact of being handsome and wonderful; they may even be so placed that the grand step before them, if they are to impose their will, is something that sounds as little heroic as to cheat a friend for money. Still less do they need to be vulgarly successful. Kate fails in the end, as Charlotte fails; there is a power they have not reckoned with. But both have succeeded magnificently in this, that they have created and sustained and realised a

drama. It was the success that their author demanded of them.

To say that these singular women represented a strain which Henry James found to be peculiarly English—this is to raise a good many questions, no doubt. It must be enough to answer that, added to their native vigour, they have the effectiveness which is the result of a considerable experience of the world. They know very well how to look after themselves, as we say. But this fearless activity, in a seasoned race that has long lost the good faith of mere ignorance, may take its most exquisite colour when it is displayed, not mercilessly, but by eager and beneficent youth. Before Kate and Charlotte were heard of, Nanda and Maisie had shown what they could do. Not London only might have bred these enchanting creatures, and elsewhere, too, their blossom might perhaps have been as rudely exposed; but possibly that responsible bravery, that deft and reasonable tenderness, in meeting and dealing with situations so incongruous, may be claimed as belonging to the soil. The point need not be laboured; the main thing is, after all, that in 'The Awkward Age' and 'What Maisie knew' there are two of the freshest flowers of maidenhood to be found in books. Nanda appears in the midst of a society which manages to combine a queer sort of preciosity with a very practical pursuit of amusement—a most credible picture of modern manners. She who, descending from the schoolroom to the drawing-room, might have been expected to embarrass the wisdom of her elders by her young curiosity, does indeed put them to discomfiture, but by the clear-sighted instinct with which she perceives them, bends the grace of her understanding on them, and goes her way. And Maisie—if Nanda is rare, Maisie is unique. Her crystalline imagination and her wild-flower purity, in the dawning and gathering daylight of experience—this is unmatched elsewhere, except in life. She is bestowed upon parents who have the gift, if ever man and woman had, of touching nothing in the world but to make it vulgar. She is at the mercy of their loud high brilliance as well as of the lavish arts of their meanness; she is used by them, capriciously fondled or neglected, as the instrument of their mutual spite. Surrounded by this tawdry rubbish, her simplicity might have bloomed

pathetically; but Maisie is far above mere pathos. She lives and grows, not helpless, but alert with a flame of candour and good will; and at the end of her childhood her atrocious world has been able to do nothing but to make her sweetness more perfect.

All the life that went to the making of these books had a substance on which the art of fiction, as Henry James understood it, could fasten firmly. It would support the most penetrating 'treatment'—the word he always kept for that manner of telling a story which would entirely reveal its dramatic or pictorial value. To 'treat,' in this sense, a figure or scene or motive, had long meant to him a great deal more than to describe it. It was useless, he said, for a writer to offer us his 'mere poor word of honour' that things happened so or appeared thus; he must represent them, and let us see for ourselves. He accordingly became, of all novelists, the one who most completely adjusted the method of drama to the form of narrative; who finally never 'told' a story at all, but rendered it, point by point and scene by scene, in a succession of visual images. The reader sits like a spectator as they pass, receiving from each a single thread until at last the full skein is in his hand.

There is no new secret in this, of course; that a thing enacted is more vivid than a thing described is the oldest axiom in the book of the novelist. But Henry James applied it far beyond them all; he applied it, indeed, in his later work always and everywhere. This was very new—so much so that few, it seems, would venture near it. A book like 'The Awkward Age' created, by its author's account, an unpeopled desert around it in a world of novel-readers. Yet the strangeness of that finished episode lies simply in the fact that the characters are shown, their words recorded, their accent noted, consistently from without, no other access being ever granted to their inner intention. In other words, the reader is required to do what he does every day of his life, in all his dealings with mankind—he has to judge by appearances. 'Attention of perusal I do indeed everywhere postulate,' said Henry James; but we none of us meet this demand very often in the day, least of all when we read a novel. And even the manner of 'The Awkward Age' was familiar compared with that which

he used when he dramatised, not the actions of people, but the drift of thought within a mind. For here again he would not *narrate*; he exhibited the shapes as they appeared. The great transitions from scene to scene, so characteristic of his latest work, are all examples of this. Kate, Milly, and Densher in 'The Wings of the Dove,' Strether in 'The Ambassadors,' the Prince, Adam Verver, and the Princess in 'The Golden Bowl'—each in turn is brooded over and watched; association, memory, premonition, are pictured as they pass across the depths of thought; except for the tell-tale tremor of the surface, not a hint is given of the stir underneath. But gradually the mood lapses and the outlook shifts. A fresh view opens, new possibilities emerge; it is time to be shown the outward expression, in word and act, of what must follow.

[The structure of these novels, if that is what they are to be called, is extremely simple] The scene is prepared, displayed, gathered up and prepared afresh. A score of examples might be chosen to show how dialogue is kept waiting until the atmosphere is ready for it, so that when talk begins, its lightest tone may freely sound out. The rule is still economy—never to use a heavy stroke when, by careful forethought, a finer may be made to yield the needed effect; and the reason is still in the enhanced and deepened beauty of the impression so suggested. How Susan Stringham, on a day of autumn wind and rain in Venice, visited Densher and made her despairing appeal to him—as a detached episode this is nothing. The occasion is to both of them a climax of bewildered distress, yet it is almost true to say that not a phrase passes which might not have dropped in any casual encounter. As it is and where it is, with the thought of Milly, silent and stricken and exquisite, in her huge painted palace hard by, with the echo of Kate's fearless determination and the memory of her presence, with these and so many other admonitions diffused in the air, brimming the small darkened room and rounded by the first wild sea-storm that ends the Venetian summer—the briefest syllable has the force of a passionate and tragical outburst.

Still more ominously charged with unspoken language are the culminating scenes of 'The Golden Bowl.'

Maggie, it will be remembered, has taken upon herself the task of dissolving the intrigue between her husband and her father's wife, and of doing so, in the strength of her entire devotion, without a single protesting or accusing word. The book is simply the record of a changing atmosphere; it begins with the light sunshine of a spring morning in London, it reaches its climax in the heavy blaze of a Kentish August. The whole situation turns upon itself, yet by gradations so fine that from moment to moment they are imperceptible. Maggie alone, sustained and borne forward by an inspiration of courage and faith, accomplishes all. She never lapses from the standard she has decreed for herself, never breaks out, never disturbs the soundless beauty of the setting of her life. Her achievement is the triumph of an entirely selfless and intelligent passion; and even at its height, when she and Charlotte are at last face to face over their common knowledge of her victory, she will not make one least movement to claim it openly. At such a point one possibly sees why Henry James more and more insisted that his own and his reader's view should never stray from the central matter in hand, till his small group of people seemed alone in an otherwise uninhabited universe. They had to distil the quintessence of a single situation; and the more securely he could isolate that situation against space, the more luminous in its intensity would be the result. In 'The Ambassadors' the field of vision is larger, covering the whole wide spring-charm of his wonderful Paris. True to his law, he gathers it in, not by loosening his method, but rather by a still stricter application of it. Strether, with the mirror of his attention triply burnished, comprehends all the scene; and it is revealed through his eyes alone.

Strether, like the earlier American, gazes on Paris, but to very different purpose. Newman had come to wonder and had stayed to suffer disillusion; his was a simple case. Strether had travelled far beyond simplicity, in spite of the ingenuous nature of his errand. He arrives in Europe as the ambassador of an imperious New England dame, who has required him, if he loves her, to rescue her son from the ensnarement of the old world. He stays to be caught himself, and finally to watch with

dismay while the young man coolly achieves his own liberation and elects, of his own accord, to relapse into the commonplace out of which Paris had lifted him. This looks a trifle conventional; Europe, then, is still the Circean enchantress, bewitching in eternal romance; for a moment Strether seems to be back in the old days, recapturing the legendary delight of the first American in the gardens of the Tuileries. Not for long, however; the full measure of his responsibility is soon perceived. Henry James accounted 'The Ambassadors' as on the whole his happiest work; and perhaps this was more than an artistic approval. For 'The Ambassadors' was the full and final expression of all that Europe had meant to himself, of all that in half a life-time, and more, it had poured into that great and noble imagination. More splendid homage has never been paid to the excellence and goodliness of life. Europe might be the symbol, but he was now not only celebrating the charm of a time or a place; he was professing a faith. He believed in the world, held it to be worth every effort a man could make, and declared that to deny or reject it was the height of treason as well as the depth of folly. The undercurrent of his tale is indeed a rueful confession of something like failure, in the tone of one who has made, discovering it too late, the great refusal. Where, in a man capable of so profound an appreciation of the gift of life, there is to be recognised any sign of failure or of divorce from life's reality, it would be hard to say. To be insensible to no fine moment of experience, to endow each one with the richness of a broad and liberal genius—this is certainly a more substantial enjoyment of the world than is given to most. But his sense, with it all, of having failed to enter into full possession may only the more accentuate the high pride, the entire freedom from the touch of bitterness, with which he proclaimed his belief in the value, the beauty, the supremacy, of generous life.

In our age and race it seems a paradox that a man should be strongly and stoutly aware of responsibility without being a moralist; yet the contradiction was reconciled clearly enough in Henry James. His judgment was far too massively based to be content with the distinctions we habitually draw between things all alike

essential to seemly being. The fabric, moral, intellectual, æsthetic, of a traditional civilisation was, to him, one and indivisible, a princely possession to be guarded against crude violence and maintained with deliberate care. To the end of his life he showed the strength of one who was enough of a stranger, wherever he dwelt, to recognise, with a sense undulled, the gifts and the privileges which are mostly accepted without a thought by those who inherit them. Indeed, the more closely he was held by the claims and interests he found on this side of the Atlantic, the more intensely he became an American; and the slightest sketch of him, if it is to be characteristic, should emphasise this suggestion. 'The American Scene,' of ten years ago, was entirely misleading if, by its long-drawn irony or its serenely indulgent accents, it seemed to show that Henry James felt himself severed in the end from the land of his birth. It was not as an alien that he spread over the land, from Massachusetts to Palm Beach, that wonderful web, woven without seam, of description and fancy, nor as a detached critic that he vocalised its life, whether in the architecture of Fifth Avenue or in the blessed mildness—'ever so amiably, weak'—of the charm of Florida. It could not have engaged him through so many hundred pages except by virtue of a binding and unforgotten tie. And what the tie really was, in its abiding power, became clear, a few years later, in the two successive volumes which he devoted to his recollections of his own childhood. That atmosphere of desultory freedom, mental and spiritual, flashed through with high enthusiasm, that leisurely life, peopled by gay and easy youth, was all recalled in a golden light of truth and poetry, and given a lovingly perfected form, which told the whole tale of what he owed to those memorable times.

Here these notes might have ended if they had fallen to be written two years ago; his work, it might have been thought, was achieved, his great gifts of heart and mind well known to the wide and still widening circle of those who honoured and loved him. It could, indeed, surprise none who knew him that he should have risen with a blaze of magnanimous passion to meet the issue which at last confronted his world. If any had thought of him

as removed, in his old age, above the struggle between the real life and the false, the creative impulse and the destructive, or as surveying the chances of men from an untroubled height, they much misunderstood the nature of his mellow wisdom. And yet even those who knew him best may hardly have been prepared for the unaging vigour and vehemence of his response to the challenge. Though at first almost physically suffocated, as it seemed, by the sudden horror of darkness, he showed neither bewilderment nor hesitation; he arose—it was impossible to miss the impression—like a prophet of old. All his love and admiration for France, which had been the country of his training and was endeared to him, first and last, by innumerable associations, was shed into his sympathy with the great vital insurgence of the French people. He taxed his strength, as he no longer could with impunity, to relieve where he might the distress of the refugees from Belgium—the smoke of their home so little below the sea-line of his own Rye. Of his feeling for England we may hardly speak; let us remember the phrase—‘this decent and dauntless people’—which he used a short while before he affirmed, by more than words, his sense that his lot was cast with ours. Many of his fellow-citizens, proud of the title, must have looked forward in the hope that he would be with us to celebrate, as only he could have celebrated, victory and peace. So much is denied us; but it is in the knowledge of his own confident expectation of the day that our valediction now goes out to him—rare artist, profound genius, great heart.

PERCY LUBBOCK.

Art. 5.—A VOYAGE OF DISCOVERY IN NORTHERN GERMANY.*—I.

(1) THE GERMAN ADMIRALTY.

'We are not going to take any chances with our fleet.' How often I heard that statement during the months I spent in Germany in 1915! You may listen to all the eulogies, promises, prophecies about 'Unsere wunderbare Flotte,' but you had better refrain from asking any questions about it. It may cost you your liberty if you do. Suppose you ask a German an imprudent question about the Navy, if you are lucky he will refer you to the German Admiralty; if you are unlucky, you will probably be the guest of the Government the next day, if not sooner. If you take his advice and go to the Admiralty, they usually see you coming. Oh! the many, many hours I have spent trying to reach the vitals of that palatial edifice, so symbolic of the organisation it directs. It is spick and span and brand-new, no old ramshackle building, with partitioned rooms in all sorts of corners and corridors, such as I found in the War Office on the Leipziger Strasse. The German Admiralty is a model building. On entering, you find yourself in a square marble-columned *atrium* which reminds one of the drawings and paintings of the portals of the old Roman baths. There are a number of waiting-rooms on both sides; and that is as far as 99 out of 100 people ever get. To advance beyond the doors leading into the 'holy of holies' is a labour that takes time, influence, and brains.

I shall not describe the devious ways and means which have to be employed in order to obtain admission to the temple of the German would-be Neptune. Suffice it to say that, after having secured an introduction to Captain Löhlein, who at the time was—and I think still is—a high official at the Admiralty, being something like their Advertising Manager, I finally passed through the inner portals of the sacred edifice.

One of the most fascinating departments of the 'Marineamt' (Admiralty) in Berlin, is 'Abteilung XVI,' where maps, plans, sketches, etc., are collected and kept.

* This article was in type before the Battle of Jutland was fought on May 31.—[EDITOR.]

I spent an interesting morning there, in room 177, and feasted my eyes on many excellently drawn and photographed maps. It was there that I saw (for the first time) a six inch to the mile map of Rosyth Harbour; large-scale maps of Plymouth, Portsmouth, Dover, the mouth of the Thames, the entrance of the Mersey, the Liverpool Docks, the Portsmouth Dockyards, and various sea-ports; also a map of England, with the places marked where hostile landings had been made. I doubt whether there are many yards of Great Britain's coast that were not carefully mapped out there.

But it is not of the British maps I wish to tell you. I was far more interested in the minute drawings and maps of Wilhelmshaven, Kiel, the Kiel Canal, Heligoland, the North Sea coast and its defences, etc. I was naturally most anxious to 'borrow' them for a little while. But that was easier wished than executed. Maps from eight to ten feet long, fastened on rollers, are not quite the things to 'borrow' clandestinely. Nevertheless I succeeded in obtaining a number of copies, much smaller, it is true, but exact replicas all the same, of those interesting and instructive German drawings. The maps accompanying these articles, viz. the general map, including the Kiel Canal; those of the German coast defences on the North Sea and Heligoland; the large-scale plan of Wilhelmshaven, and the map of Kiel Harbour and its anchorages, have all been drawn from those facsimiles. I doubt not that the German Admiralty would very much like to know how I obtained those copies. But I am not going to tell!

But to return to Captain Löhlein. He was a very pleasant suave gentleman, but unfortunately they were not doing any advertising just then in the Navy. In answer to my enquiries whether I might pay a visit to Kiel, Wilhelmshaven, the Canal, Emden, or Heligoland, I received a pointblank refusal. 'Impossible; absolutely impossible,' was the answer. In short, to use the well-worn phrase, 'Es ist verboten.'

I knew then how British sailors must feel, when cruising and searching the North Sea, eager for a sight of the German pennant. So near and yet so far! Here I was in the heart of the enemy's country, and, what's more, at large, hardly the toss of a ship's biscuit from

those pioneers of Germany's future, and yet unable to feast my eyes on them. Saddened and disappointed, I turned my back on Berlin and the inhospitable officials of the Admiralty, and moved to the Free City of Hamburg on the Elbe. Here, after a while, fortune favoured me, and my career of 'crime' began. Through friends and acquaintances and other mediums, I had several chances of visiting the principal defences of Germany on the North Sea. Short clandestine trips to the coast; interesting, if brief, voyages on all sorts of quaint old vessels; railway and automobile journeys to various parts of the German North Sea coast—in short, a veritable banquet of German Navy delicacies, with, as *pièce de resistance*, a trip through the Kiel Canal. And this is what I have now to tell you about.

(2) GERMANY'S COAST DEFENCES.

From what I gathered during those trips, I believe there is not another defence system in the world that can be compared with Germany's 200-mile coast-line on the North Sea (see Map). In this I have marked the forts and batteries which I know are there; and I realise that I have by no means discovered them all. Germany possesses on her North Sea border the natural advantages of shallow waters and a sandy, flat coast, which in themselves afford a valuable safeguard against offensive operations. The tide rises about ten feet on the Elbe and from six to seven on the Frisian coast. In peace the various sandbanks and dangerous places are marked by beacons and lights, but of course, since the beginning of the war, everything that might facilitate navigation has been removed. The harbours are limited to those on the Elbe, the Weser, the Jade, and the Ems. They are approached by three narrow and tortuous channels, impossible to navigate without a pilot or expert knowledge of the charts. That is what Nature has done for Germany. Science and Art have done still more.

The German coast-defence system is divided into two parts, the North Sea and the Baltic Divisions, each under command of a Vice-Admiral, with head-quarters respectively at Wilhelmshaven and Kiel. It is generally understood that the entire system is controlled by the

Navy. That is not quite correct. There is no organisation in Germany, not even the Navy, in which the German Army does not play some part. A case in point we find in the Island of Borkum, the most western of the Frisian Islands and practically in sight of Holland. It guards the channels leading to Emden Harbour and to some minor ports on the Frisian coast. Although one of the most important units of the North Sea fortifications, it is a military base and under control of the War Office. It is garrisoned and commanded by soldiers. On the other hand, the Island of Wangeroog, which is, so to speak, on the right flank of the Frisian Islands, and guards the entrance to Wilhelmshaven and the Weser Mouth, is entirely controlled and manned by the Navy. Other coast-defence stations which have remained under control of the Army are the fortifications at Neufahrwasser in the Baltic, protecting the mouth of the Vistula, the forts at Pillau at the entrance of the Frische Haff, the approach to the fortress of Königsberg, and finally Swinemünde, guarding the entrance of the Stettiner Haff, the mouth of the Oder and the Vulcan shipbuilding yards. Every unit of the entire system, i.e. every harbour, dockyard, fort, battery, nay, I believe almost every single large gun, is connected with the others by a strategical railroad and, in a smaller degree, by a system of canals. Thus Emden, on the extreme west, is connected with Memel, in the east, almost in sight of Russia. The heart and brains of this great web are at Kiel.

A great many improvements are being made at Emden. It is the object of the German Admiralty to make this port another strong naval base. The channel leading past the Island of Borkum towards Emden has recently been deepened to forty feet. Borkum is strongly fortified. It has two batteries of 10 and 11-inch guns, and a 15 or 16-inch howitzer battery. (A heavy German Battery consists of four pieces.) Emden is connected with Wilhelmshaven by the Ems-Jade Canal, so that the smaller units of the Navy can pass from one harbour to the other without having to go outside. The main submarine stations on the North Sea are at Wilhelmshaven and Heligoland, with sub-stations at Emden, Cuxhaven, and one or two other points.

'The German coast-defence system,' so everyone will

assure you, 'is first of all an offensive defence, effected through submarines and torpedo-boats, using the coast fortifications as a base.' Furthermore, if I am to believe some of my informants, those people who think that the German fleet lies inactive in the Kiel Canal are entirely wrong. It is continually on the watch, and its ships are day and night in the North Sea, often as far out as a hundred miles. It is guarding Germany's coast, and here follows the description of how it is done. Draw a circle, with Heligoland as its centre, the circumference passing through the Island of Sylt off the Schleswig-Holstein coast and Borkum off that of Friesland. The outer semi-circle, having a radius of about 60 miles, is patrolled by torpedo-boats which are on guard, day and night; and they will report at once any enemy war-ships that may venture near. Behind this line of patrols comes a cordon of fast cruisers, to give the 'thin black line' a firm background. Finally a third line of defence is formed by armoured cruisers, which act as a reserve and a support for the cruisers and torpedo-boats. The object of these three lines of defence is to engage and hold back any attacking enemy, until the Grand Battle-fleet—which naturally must remain safely in harbour, protected from submarine attacks—has had time to appear on the scene. In addition to these offensive lines of defence, every channel leading to the various harbours is protected by mines and submarines.

We may next examine the immobile and less elusive lines of German defence, viz. its coast batteries and forts. The Jade Bay, with Wilhelmshaven, is protected by 13 or 14 almost impregnable forts, apart from that on Wangeroog, at the mouth of the Ems-Jade Canal. The surrounding country is flat and marshy, and no attempt has been made in most cases to mask the forts. A strategical railroad encircles the bay, starting at Eckwarden and terminating at the Frederick lock opposite the island of Spiekeroog. Wilhelmshaven is a veritable fortress in itself, surrounded by smaller forts and supporting batteries. Across the bay the four guns of the battery at Eckwarden show their heavy muzzles, while still further east, in the very centre of the mouth of the Weser, lie the twin forts, Langlütjen 1 and 2. Bremerhaven, again, is a large fortress, supported by the

batteries of Forts Geestemünde and Lehe, and several forts along the channel. There are a number of forts from Lehe along the coast as far as Cuxhaven, which is another important defensive centre. At this point the Elbe fortifications begin; and, as is the case at Jade, both sides of the bay are dotted with batteries and forts, from Cuxhaven to Stade, and from Glückstadt to Plattenbronne. Brunsbüttel, about $1\frac{1}{2}$ mile west of the Kiel Canal entrance, is a separate and strongly armed fort.

The ordnance of Germany's coast-defence system consists of the heaviest Krupp armament, as well as lighter guns, the calibres ranging from 17 inch to 4.7. At Wilhelmshaven, at Forts 1 and 2 Langlütjen, at Cuxhaven, and, I believe but am not certain, at Wangeroog as well, the 17-inch howitzers predominate. The calibres most in use are 10 and 11 inch. Many of these guns are mounted on movable platforms, placed in the centre of heavy steel railroad trucks, strong enough, it seemed to me, to carry a whole house. The guns themselves are protected by a sort of cupola of 'Gruson plate.' When not in use they are stationed in special garages. Now I knew the purpose of all these short lines and connecting railroads. If a concerted attack on any point of the coast should be undertaken, these railway batteries can be moved rapidly to the place where they are most needed.

The 'Gruson plate' protected cupolas and turrets are a formidable and interesting feature of Germany's coast-defence system. Experiments with this armour-plate have shown that it is practically impervious to gun-fire. At the Krupps' offices in Berlin there are certain official reports from the Italian Government concerning the tests to which Gruson plates have been submitted. A plate, weighing nearly 200,000 pounds and intended for an Italian coastal battery, was fired upon at pointblank range by a 100-ton Armstrong gun, using Krupp steel shells. Three shots were fired at it, each projectile weighing 2200 pounds and requiring a powder charge of nearly 800 pounds. It stood the test faultlessly, and the only damage inflicted on it were four or five small cracks, varying from 2 to 4 inches in length. The steel shells that struck the plate splintered in hundreds of bits, which were so hot that they set fire to the surrounding wood-work. I have seen those Italian reports, and I have no

reason to doubt their authenticity. If an Armstrong gun of such calibre, firing steel shells at pointblank range, is unable to destroy that armour plate, there seems small chance that a shell, whatever its size, fired from a necessarily considerable distance by a ship's gun, will make any impression at all. The batteries of every fort of any importance both on the Baltic and the North Sea are protected by this armour-plate.

The cupolas contain mostly 8·2-inch guns, and the turrets the 10, 11 and larger calibres. In naval and other well-informed German circles they are convinced that there is no British Admiral living who would risk his ships against such batteries.

I was in Germany when the first attempt to force the Dardanelles was made. Naturally, the whole plan was dismissed as incapable of execution. Every naval or military officer, with whom I talked, was convinced that the Narrows could never be forced by a naval attack. I was told that, shortly after Turkey entered the war, one of the first things Germany saw to was that the batteries of the Narrows forts were strengthened and protected by Gruson armour-plates. Whether this assertion is true or not I have not been able to ascertain; but, if true, it partly explains the comparatively small damage caused by the bombarding fleets. The average German naval officer is an ardent admirer and student of the late Admiral Mahan's doctrines. His writings are frequently quoted, especially when the possibilities of a British attack on the German North Sea coast are discussed. On the strength of his conclusions they insist that no ship has any chance against a modern fort.

As an illustration of the advantages possessed by coast batteries over ships, I was shown a copy of an official report from the French Admiralty, concerning certain experiments made in 1914. For three days a number of French battleships, using their heaviest guns, fired on several shore batteries placed at different elevations. The result of the trial proved that, even under the most adverse conditions, only about 50 per cent. of the personnel serving the shore batteries would have been injured, while hardly 30 per cent. of the guns could have been placed out of action. 'And,' my informants added, 'the French have no armour-plate that can compare with

our Gruson.' Inquiries as to why they did not use this kind of armour-plate to protect their ships brought forth the information that it is too heavy for that purpose.

At a luncheon given at the Hotel Esplanade in Berlin by an American acquaintance of mine, I met Herr Crass, Krupps' General Representative in Berlin. Herr Crass, who has his palatial offices in the Voss Strasse, occupies one of the most important posts in the Krupp organisation. He is the official intermediary between his firm and the German War Office. I had several long conversations with him, and found him one of the most pleasant and interesting Germans I met. Shortly after our meeting I dropped in at his office and found him much incensed over a report, published in some of the Allied papers, stating that a Krupp gun, sold to the Argentine Government, had burst. 'It is a falsehood of the first order,' he protested. 'Never in all the years that we have been building guns, has there been a case of a burst Krupp cannon. If the proper charges of explosives are used it is simply impossible.'

One of his chief arguments against the possibility of a burst Krupp gun seemed to be that the barrel is made of one solid piece of 'Crucible nickel steel.' 'Compare this with the British Woolwich-built guns,' he continued, 'The barrels of these guns consist of several parts. First there is the rifling, which is fitted in an inner tube. Over this comes a wire covering, consisting of steel sheet ribbon wound round the inner tube at a very high pressure. Finally there comes the outer tube which covers the whole. Our guns of 12, 14 and 15-inch calibres have a life more than three times longer than the equivalent guns of the British Navy. These guns can deliver close on two hundred and thirty rounds, while British-built guns are hardly good for more than sixty rounds for the 12 and 13½-inch calibre, and eighty rounds for their 15-inch.'

The proviso of 'proper explosives' brought us to discuss the comparative merits of the powders used by Germany and England. Here too Herr Crass claimed superiority for the German product. The British powder, so he said, contained ingredients which are very hard on the guns, tending to destroy the rifling. The German powder, containing 25 per cent. nitro-glycerin (for their

heavy calibres), is supposed to be far preferable to the British cordite charges. 'Their powder (meaning the British) is in a large degree responsible for the comparatively short life of their big guns. Apart from the damage it does to the rifling, it causes cracks and abrasions in both the inner and the outer tubes, long before the allowed maximum is reached. Naturally this causes great inaccuracy of fire.' I thought of the 'inaccuracy' of the British guns in the Falkland Islands battle, the Doggerbank affair, and other occasions when there was an opportunity of testing them, but I merely asked why, if the British powder had all those bad qualities, did the British stick to it? Ah! there were several reasons. In the first place it seems (according to my informant) less expensive to renew the guns than it would be to change all the British powder factories; in the second place the British powder is the safest and keeps best of any in the world; and finally, England, being firstly a Naval Power, calculates on quick results in a pitched battle. In other words, a decision would be reached long before the big guns had fired their maximum number of rounds. It is characteristic of every German to-day to place financial considerations always nearest to the British heart.

I was treated to some interesting details regarding the efficiency of the German naval gunner. At a recent gun-practice of the 'Helgoland' (a battleship of 23,000 tons, mounting twelve 12-inch guns) one of these guns, firing a projectile of 981 lbs., struck a moving target, six miles distant, six times in 58 seconds! She also delivered six broadsides (eight guns) in one minute at a moving target some eight miles off and hardly visible with the naked eye. More than two-thirds (over 5,000 lbs.) of each broadside hit the target. Those amongst my readers who are not *au courant* with the many accomplishments of a 12-inch gun should ask one of their naval friends, and then they will learn what wonders these German gunners are. It is usually understood that two, perhaps at the utmost three shots a minute from a 12-inch gun is the limit. Another record is said to be held by this ship. I was told that at a competition held in March 1915 she coaled 756 tons in one hour. But of course Germany is a surprising country!

I also learned of some marvellous performances of the coast-battery personnel. I noticed, at various points along the coast, fairly high observation towers, and managed to pay a visit to one of them. In each of them are stationed two naval officers, who, armed with powerful telescopes and with numerous charts and maps, watch day after day for any enemy vessels that may have eluded the three-fold line of guard-ships. As soon as an enemy ship is discovered, the observing officer, by means of his chart, ruled into many squares and angles, immediately calculates its position and the angle of fire for the respective batteries he serves. The result of the calculation is at once telephoned to the different commanders in charge; and, although the men at the guns are unable to see their target, they open fire. Gun-practices held with this system of indirect fire showed that a target nine miles out at sea was struck seven times out of ten. Now we know—as they do in Germany—why the British fleet keeps at a safe distance from these gunnery experts!

(3) HELIGOLAND.

The subject of Heligoland is one that to-day is very near to the heart of every German, but especially of those who in any way are connected with the Navy. The mere mention of the name will bring delight to his face. More likely than not, he'll slap you on the back and, with a grin of satisfaction and a confidential, knowing air—as if he were personally responsible for the fact that the island is German now—will assure you that 'We certainly scored a point on old England that time.'

The transaction (1890) between the British and German Governments, through which the latter obtained Heligoland in exchange for Zanzibar, was by no means always as popular with the Germans as it is to-day. Heligoland appeared but a small compensation for what they abandoned in East Africa. But times and sentiments have changed very much since those early days. Heligoland has become the very apple of their eye, and I am certain the Germans would sooner return Alsace and Lorraine to-morrow, than give up that mile-long piece of rock. 'Heligoland *must and shall* always remain

German soil'—so everybody in Germany will assure you. All the money in the world, I believe, could not buy back Heligoland. As a prominent German naval authority expressed himself: 'If Heligoland belonged to England to-day, we should be like rats in a trap.'

Heligoland forms, with Wilhelmshaven and Kiel, the nucleus of the German coast-defence system. It is situated about forty miles from the main-land and equidistant from the Weser and Elbe mouths. It consists of two islands, the larger about a mile in length, with an upper and lower ('Ober-' and 'Unterland'), and the unimportant and much smaller one (half a mile east), named Sand Island. At the beginning of hostilities, every inhabitant, man, woman and child, not in some way connected with the Navy and the defence of the Island, was packed off. Most of them were sent to Hamburg, where I met several of them. It is interesting to note that several native Heligolanders are interned as British aliens, yet none of them have ever set foot in England. They are the men who, after the cession in 1890, chose to retain their British nationality. Among the two thousand odd inhabitants were a large number of women who had never left the Island since they were born. There were many sad scenes on that Monday, Aug. 3, the day before England declared war. Very few of them—so several Heligolanders told me personally—ever expected to see their homes again. They doubt not, for one moment, that sooner or later the British will blow up the whole island.

It is futile to try to get anywhere near Heligoland. None but accredited German naval ships are allowed nearer than about ten miles. The nearest I got to Heligoland (in 1915) was about two miles—by air, about the only way, I think, to get that far. From the high altitude we were at, the little triangular piece of land seemed hardly more than a large rock. It was a clear day. The rays of the sun, thrown against the steep reddish cliffs, were reflected in the water and seemed to form a kind of halo along the south-western side of the island. It was a most fascinating sight.

It is curious that the only two occasions when I have set eyes on Heligoland are recorded in my mind as colour-schemes of a harmonious and picturesque kind. The

first occurred some sixteen years ago, shortly after the opening of the Kiel Canal. During the summer months, excursion steamers, making the round trip to Heligoland in one day, sail several times a week from different points on the coast. On approaching the island, especially from the south-eastern coast, the effect of the steep red cliffs, hollowed by the sea into all kinds of fantastic figures and columns, is very striking. The Oberland is mostly covered with meadows. The colour-scheme of three distinct hues is, I think, one of the strangest natural formations I have ever seen. The red cliffs are fringed above by the grassy slopes of the 'Oberland,' and below, by the white sand of the beaches of the 'Unterland.' On the boat, a native Heligolander, who was standing near and evidently read the admiration in my eyes, explained to me that those three colours represent the flag of the island. He cited and wrote down for me the following Frisian verse :

'Grön is dat Land,
Rood is de Kant,
Witt is de Sand—
Dat is de Flag vun't Halligē Land.'

Immediately after taking possession of the island, the Germans proceeded to make it the Gibraltar of the North Sea. Its armaments, its defences, positions, etc., are secrets which have been most jealously and, I am convinced, most successfully guarded. Although, as I said above, I was unable to satisfy my thirst for knowledge by a personal visit, I managed to obtain some interesting and first-hand descriptions of the place, which is more than most 'travellers' and 'students' have gained; and, although I was unable to obtain a photographic copy of the official large-scale map of Heligoland, I have had plenty of opportunities of studying the lay of the land.

While the importance of Heligoland as a protective harbour or refuge for German warships is of course slight as compared to the safety of the Kiel Canal, its value as a coaling station and a submarine and torpedo-boat base is incalculable. During the last four or five years, over 30,000,000 marks (1,500,000*l.*) have been expended on the construction of large moles, harbours, sea-walls, etc., in

order to protect the island from the ravages of the storms and at the same time offer some shelter to ships. On the south-eastern side two moles have been built, one of nearly 2000 feet and another of 1300 feet in length. In this way something over seventy acres of land have been reclaimed. The new harbour surface extends to over eighty acres, and is divided into the North and the South Harbours. The former is the smallest. The latter has a large number of short piers for submarines and torpedo-boats. Their depth is about 23 feet.

The armament of Heligoland consists of five batteries (4 guns each), divided into two direct-fire batteries of 12-inch calibre and three howitzer batteries with ordnance of from 11 to 17 inch. Owing to the advantageous positions of these batteries, placed on the upper level at heights of from 180 to 220 feet above the sea, they are able to fire in all directions, which—so it is claimed—excludes any possibility of an attack on the entrances of the Elbe and Weser mouths, or the Kiel Canal, and also makes a close blockade of those harbours impossible. The plunging fire, which the elevation of these batteries makes it possible to direct, would prove destructive to even the heaviest type of armour-plate. Lord (Charles) Beresford is frequently quoted, in connexion with Heligoland's defences, as having said that no commander would dare to expose his ships to a fire of this kind. Even if, by some miracle, an enemy ship should succeed in reaching the island, it would be a practical impossibility to carry it by storm, owing to the almost perpendicular steepness of the cliffs.

From the outside not a gun is visible. Every gun is protected by Gruson turrets or cupolas, all built on the disappearing principle. The emplacements have been cut into solid rocks, and so have the ammunition depôts and bomb-proof shelters. Krupp anti-aircraft guns are stationed at points of vantage, and it is claimed that they are able to fire close on three miles (15,000 feet) high. Provisions and ammunitions of all kinds are stored in the various depôts, enough to last a year, while an ample number of sailors, calculated 'for all eventualities,' as the official phrase runs, are garrisoned in the fortress. The lighthouse, situated near the south-west corner of the island, is the highest on the North Sea coast (266 feet).

Its apex, well over 460 feet above the sea level, serves as an excellent observation point. The lighthouse guards have surrendered their station to Naval officers. An elaborate wireless system, one of the most powerful of its kind, is continually in touch with the other stations on the North Sea and any ships which may be outside.

Interesting arguments by German and alien naval authorities are recorded in certain confidential reports about the fortifications and the general aspects of Heligoland. It has been maintained by some that the fortress would become untenable if subjected to a heavy bombardment. They argue that the modern H.E. shells would blow the sand-stone rocks to bits, dislodge the batteries, and make them useless. It is claimed that a prolonged fire of the batteries themselves would have serious effects on their positions. But against those arguments were placed the reports of experiments made by German experts, in which it was stated that no vital part of the island had been affected by many consecutive concussions of even the heaviest ordnance of the cliff batteries, nor by any explosions caused by direct fire against the outside rocks. At present I think Heligoland is only vulnerable by an air attack. A fleet of aeroplanes could do an immense amount of damage on that strip of land—a mile long, and from a quarter to a third of a mile wide. From the map I have seen (partly reproduced here), it seems that there are few spots in which a bomb could fall without doing considerable damage.

(4) PROTECTION OF THE KIEL CANAL.

A week or so after my arrival in Hamburg I learned that Admiral Von Koester was to give a lecture at the University of Kiel. Of course I could not afford to miss such an interesting and instructive event. Consequently I persuaded a German naval acquaintance to be my companion on a little voyage of discovery, which—incidentally of course—would include a visit to Kiel. A naval uniform is a passport anywhere in Germany; and my passport was much in need of both moral and physical support. This was my first visit to Kiel. On the second occasion, when I passed through the Canal

(as described below), being without such an escort, and since Kiel is an unhealthy place for any foreigner in these days, I left it without delay.

I believe that it would be simpler for a soldier to pass in khaki through Belgium and Brussels than for a spy to get within sight of the Kiel Canal. There is hardly a yard of land or water, along the Canal or near its approaches, that is not guarded night and day. Near the Canal everything is 'Verboten.' You must not enter the zone—one mile on either side of the Canal—without a special permit. Even if you have a pass, you are not allowed to enter the zone without being accompanied by a soldier. From every village and town which lies in the proximity of the Canal, every foreigner, whether naturalised or not, has been expelled. Even Germans whose reputations were not spotless had to go too.

At the various bridges—either railroad or highway—the ferries and every other kind of crossing, whole platoons of soldiers are stationed. Parcels that could be carried across are thoroughly examined; civilians are not allowed to cross the Canal unless chaperoned by a soldier. Motor-cars, carriages, waggons, in short, vehicles of every kind and description, must be escorted by a soldier in order to reach the other side. Everybody must be in possession of a special pass, issued by the Mayor and countersigned by two prominent citizens of the town or village where he lives; his business must be stated thereon; whether he enjoys a good reputation, and numerous other details. The pass is only valid for the particular station of the Canal for which it is issued. It must be applied for at least a week beforehand, so that the local authorities have ample time to despatch a list of the passes issued to the Canal Authorities. The passenger cannot change his route. If he should present himself at any other station, his name would be unknown there and he would be arrested at once. The formalities at the railroad stations giving access to the four railroad bridges are the severest of all. On reaching the last station before the Canal, all the passengers must alight. After your pass has been examined and not found wanting, your luggage thoroughly overhauled, your pockets searched, you may return to your seat in the train. You

might think that they would trust you now, but no, 'we cannot take any chances.' Some fifty soldiers with fixed bayonets and loaded rifles enter the train and are posted either in the vestibules of the carriages or—as is usually the case—one in each compartment. The blinds must be drawn, and the doors are locked on the outside. Sentries near the bridges have stringent instructions to fire, without warning, at any one seen prowling round. The anti-aircraft guns on the locks, bridges, and other points along the Canal are manned day and night.

Everything possible is done to discourage unnecessary travelling in the Canal Zone. 'It is better,' so they argue, 'to suspect and inconvenience a thousand innocent travellers, than that one guilty person should slip through.'

'My dear Sir, do you think we are fools?' exclaimed a German officer whom I chaffed about these precautionary measures. 'What do you think it would be worth to the British to have our Canal put out of business, even if only temporarily? Millions, my dear Sir, millions. In these times, and certainly so far as our Canal is concerned, we suspect everybody, and will consider him "not guilty"—for the time being only—when he has reached the other side, without accidents to the Canal.'

'The reports from the different stations in the Zone would make interesting reading, especially for the British. We have caught very strange fish here, and big ones too. A special court-martial is continually sitting at Kiel, charged only with the investigation of Canal cases, and I can assure you that justice is meted out there, quick and drastic. Death is practically the only verdict.'

According to stories heard in Hamburg and Kiel, many attempts have been and are still being made to bribe native Germans. Several neutrals have tried their hand at earning a quick, but not an easy, penny. 'Ugh!' said an officer, whom I met in Kiel, contemptuously, 'the English are no good in secret-service work. Why? Because they lack the one great essential—the fanatical spirit of patriotism, which is born in us, and is instilled into us from the cradle. If the English had a canal half as important to them as this is to us, it would have been wrecked long ago.' I was shown, in Hamburg, by a young and communicative naval officer (it was after one

of those convivial dinners of the Vaterland, concluding with French Cognac and 'Deutschland über Alles') a set of most interesting photographs. They showed wrecks and 'accidents' in the Canal since the beginning of the war. One Swedish freighter, loaded with lumber, was seen almost blocking the channel. As my friend the enemy explained, several tugs arrived only just in time to drag the steamer sufficiently to one side, so as not to obstruct the water-way entirely. The 'accident' occurred in October 1914. What happened to the Swedish captain and his crew I could not ascertain, but I was assured, with an ominous wink of the eye, that that skipper would never pass through the Canal again.

(5) FROM EMDEN TO WILHELMSHAVEN.

At the outbreak of hostilities the following proclamation concerning the operation of the Kiel Canal in time of war was issued by the German Government:

'The war operations of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal have begun. The Canal Zone is closed at present for merchant vessels. Exceptions thereto require in every instance the permission of the Chief of the Naval Station of the Baltic Sea at Kiel.'

The 'exceptions' are practically confined to such neutral ships as carry provisions for the Army or Navy, or are supplying Germany with foodstuffs. But in all cases the captains of these neutral ships must be personally known to the German authorities, and a large bond must be put up for them either by their employers or by themselves. Until the middle of this year (1915) only Dutch, Danish, Swedish or Norwegian steamers had obtained permits to pass through the Canal. From what I have seen of the inconveniences, the trouble, the red tape, that these men have to put up with every time they make the trip to or from Germany, I can assure you that, whatever their emoluments may be, they earn every penny of them.

With great difficulty I managed to get a passage on one of these neutral steamers. For all intents and purposes my nationality was the same as that of the vessel on which I sailed. I speak German quite fluently,

which was of course of great additional assistance. I joined the little 600-ton steamer at Emden, Germany's most western port. We proceeded on the inside, i.e. through the Ems-Jade Canal, to Wilhelmshaven, and thence by Cuxhaven through the Kiel Canal to Kiel. Although the actual distance we travelled is well under 200 miles, it took us the best part of five days. It was not what you might call a joy-ride, but nevertheless I would not have missed it for a great deal, for I learned more about the German fleet in those five days than I had in all the weeks I spent in Germany.

Through the Ems-Jade Canal, bordered on both sides by flat marshy country, the trip was uneventful; but, when we got within sight of Wilhelmshaven, the fun began. About three miles from our day's destination an officer and eight sailors came on board and, after having carefully examined our ship's papers, proceeded on a search of ship and crew as systematic and thorough as I have ever seen. But then, of course, I had never before attempted to enter Germany's most important naval base. It is quite true that she takes no chances with her fleet. The search, checking of papers, reports, messages to Wilhelmshaven, and numerous other formalities, took the better part of four hours. When finally our permits arrived, four sailors and a petty officer came on board, and under their guidance we finished the three miles that separated us from the famous naval base. Through a system of locks, we reached the 'Coal Harbour,' which is part of the New Harbour of Wilhelmshaven. By devious methods and devices I had been able to time our arrival so that it would be too late to go out into the bay that same afternoon. We were told to make fast and prepare to stay the night. That was exactly what I had schemed for.

Through the courtesy of one of the harbour officials I was enabled to send a messenger to a naval surgeon, whom I had known in New York, and to whom I had been able to render a not inconsiderable service. The doctor proved a friend in need, and, to begin with, invited me to dinner at the 'Casino' (officers' mess), situated in the Park, a few hundred yards from the Imperial Docks. Being vouched for by an 'Oberstabs-Arzt' (Chief Staff Surgeon) I was made most welcome

by some sixty odd naval officers. Among those whom I met, I recall Grand-Admiral Von Koester, Rear-Admiral Gädeke, Admiral Von Igennohl, Rear-Admiral Hipper, and many others. It was on this occasion, too, that I made the acquaintance of the notorious Captain-Lieutenant Hersing, the (then embryo) 'Lusitania Hero.' I had a talk with him on submarine matters, to which I shall return later.

On entering the 'Casino' I was at once struck by the large number of drawings, paintings and caricatures, depicting the Navy and its work, which almost covered the walls in every room and hall. Most of the caricatures of course played on England. Some of them were amusing. There was a picture of two Mermen at the bottom of the sea, enjoying the many good things the 'Emden' is throwing them, which is a very popular poster. A large copy of it, set in a magnificent frame of mahogany and old gold, hangs in the Casino, between the portraits of the Kaiser and the Kaiserin. It is surrounded by photographs of Captain Müller, Captain Mücke, who with a remnant of the crew escaped into Turkey, and other officers of the 'Emden.'

Indeed I shall long remember that dinner at the officers' mess in Wilhelmshaven, but if I could give a full shorthand report of the conversations I listened to that evening, I fear you would think I had dined in a lunatic asylum instead of an officers' mess. One or two examples will suffice.

The talk was all 'shop' and war, of course. That same evening a number of airmen had returned from 'active service on the North Sea,' and the conversation drifted into the subject of 'Aircraft in relation to the invasion of England.' It seems that the idea of invading England with the assistance of the Navy has for the present been shelved. The North Sea? Ah, indeed it was a great protection, a formidable obstacle, but, Sir, remember the old axiom about a chain being only as strong as its weakest link. So with the North Sea. It is only as wide as its narrowest point—i.e. 25 miles. That was the great principle to keep always before one's mind, because, in that figure, England's future doom lay sealed! Calais, not Egypt any more, was England's throat, the key to British World-power. Germany's

motto was no longer 'Our future lies on the water,' but should read henceforth 'On the water—for peace; under the water and in the air—for war.' What could prevent Germany, with its marvellous industrial developments, wonderful inventions, from building, say, 100,000 aeroplanes? After Germany had once taken firm hold of Calais, an army of 200,000 men could be thrown into England within less than half an hour, by aeroplanes!

Of course the invasion would be carried out during the night. They had only figured on two men to each aeroplane, but, considering the negligible distance, which would exclude the necessity of carrying any surplus gasoline, the carrying capacity of the machine might easily be doubled. The landing?

'Ha! my friend, you may be certain that Germany, in an undertaking of this kind, would not risk failure in overlooking the smaller details. When the time comes there will be plenty of friends, in some disguise or other, "British subjects," some born, others naturalised, who will light the way for us. Burning houses, electrical appliances, searchlights, rockets, etc., will serve. Trust the German thoroughness to be prepared for all emergencies, when The Day has arrived. Already to-day, the fear of invasion causes periodical panics in England. But it is most remarkable, even for the shortsighted British, that they never realised until the present war, and then only in a limited degree, the vital importance, nay the deadly menace, aviation is to their country. From the time the air was conquered England ceased to be an island. And they refused to listen to the brothers Wright, who gave them their first chance! British stupidity, British insularity!'

The next subject which was discussed, and of course settled, was the peace terms. Europe was cut up and the pieces handed round like a birthday cake. 'Every country that has joined us will be amply compensated. Those who have gone against us? Well, God help them.' The division of Europe will be about as follows:

'Germany will take the Baltic Provinces, including Petersburg and the whole of Poland. Austria will receive the whole south of Russia, including Kieff and Odessa; Turkey the whole Caucasus, including the Department of Saratow. The Russians must be separated not only from the Baltic,

but from the Black and Caspian seas as well. Sweden gets Finland. Serbia of course will go to Austria. Egypt will be returned to Turkey. If Roumania intervenes in time on the right side, she will get Bessarabia and some minor territories.

'The "embarras de richesses" of colonies will, when the spoils come to be divided, actually become a problem. So far as India and Egypt are concerned, our only wish to-day is to help these nations to liberate themselves from the British yoke. To Algiers, Tunis and Morocco we would also restore their autonomy. With Belgium, we of course take possession of the Congo State. The interests of France in Morocco will cease at once, since she has used its natives to fight against us. Turkey will occupy the Suez Canal. The shares of that company owned at present by England will be declared null and void.

'The economical conditions under which the annexed territories will be incorporated in the German Empire may be of various kinds, but one fundamental principle should never be lost sight of, viz. that electoral rights, i.e. the right to elect Members for the Reichstag, remains a prerogative of the Germans living within the old boundaries of the Empire. The natives of Poland will have their own parliament in Warsaw; those of the Baltic Provinces, in Petersburg. The Belgians of course may retain their parliament in Brussels, while for the annexed provinces of France—Calais, Reims, Belfort, etc.—a separate diet could be established. Poland and Belgium might even remain kingdoms with Prussian Princes on the throne.

'But, though the conquered territories will have no voice in the Imperial legislation, they will of course have to submit to conscription. The young Pole from Warsaw will serve his three years in Hanover, Düsseldorf, or Cologne. The Frenchman from Calais or Reims will be sent to Breslau or Posen. The Russians of the Baltic Provinces, like the young conscripts from Belgium, will enjoy their military training in Bavaria or Saxony. But the great fortresses, such as Calais, Belfort, Warsaw, or Riga, will be garrisoned by none save the old Prussian regiments.'

About their fleet; why did it not come out and fight the British? Why didn't the British fleet come and 'dig them out,' as Churchill threatened to do? Yes, they would come out and fight, but they would choose their own time—not when the British wanted them to. 'So far, our fleet has paid us very well, and will pay us in

future. This war is not going to be over for some time.' Exorbitant naval taxes? 'Why, my friend, take a current copy of our "Statistisches Jahrbuch" and find out how much the German nation is paying for what our enemies describe as our "luxury." About 7 marks a year *per capita* is the average for the last four years. That amounts to $\frac{1}{4}$ of what England demands of her subjects.'

These are a few examples of their conversations and by no means the most extravagant. But they talked well, and I think they quite believed what they said. I knew how utterly useless it would be to try to argue with them. Besides, I wanted to have a look at the harbour and dockyards next morning, so I deemed discretion the better part of valour. One is not in Wilhelmshaven every day, in these times!

Captain-Lieutenant Hersing, whom I mentioned above, had not reached his most dazzling height of fame, when I met him. It was in the pre-Lusitania days. Still he had already earned the Iron Cross, second and first class. With the U 21, one of the smaller submarines, he had sunk what he described as the British 'cruiser' Pathfinder. Besides he had been active for a short spell in the Irish Sea, where he sank the 'Bencruachan' and one or two other ships. The names of all his victims—I refer to the ships—were neatly engraved on a silver cigarette case which he showed me, with the dates behind and a facsimile small Iron Cross in the corner. After sinking the 'Lusitania' he was the most popular naval officer in Germany. His friends declared that he received more love-letters, more proposals, love-parcels, flowers and photographs, than the most popular actor or actress ever dreamt of. Hersing told me there was but one serious risk in his job; that was the British Destroyers:

'Those "beasts of prey" are on you before you can say "knife"! They patrol usually in sixes or twelves and it has become essential for us to show ourselves as little as possible on the surface. Up till now we have carried out this campaign in as much of a sporting spirit as possible, but since several of our U boats have been lost, as a result of their too lenient treatment of the enemy, that is going to be stopped. It's all very well to try to be humane, even in war-time, but not at the price of suicide. The recent destruction of the U 8 and U 12 are cases in point. Our

instructions now are, that on no account must we risk the safety of our boat, to say nothing of our own necks, for the sake of saving the crews of captured ships. Was it not their own Naval Chief, Lord Fisher, who said: "Moderation in war is nonsense." Take the case of Captain Hansen (Commander of the U 16). He refrained from torpedoing a French steamer off the harbour of Cherbourg, because he noticed several women and children on board, and afterwards escaped, by the breadth of a hair, being rammed by that very vessel. Oh, we Germans are too easy, too sentimental, too tender-hearted, and our enemies take advantage of that weakness, every time.'

After dinner a naval officer came in, limping on a stick. He was formally presented to me as one of the survivors of the 'Mainz,' which was sunk in the North Sea early in the war. His experiences had been quite interesting, so I was told. When he regained consciousness, he thought of course that he was a prisoner in England. So he racked his brain for every possible vile English curseword he could think of to throw at his attendants. His English vocabulary was said to be extensive, and he rattled the unflattering epithets off one after another. Strange to say, instead of becoming furious, his attendants all began to laugh, and they 'laughed in German' (Englishmen cannot really laugh properly, they only grin, on account of their eternal pipe!) Oh what joy, when he discovered that he was not in the enemies' hands, but at home, in the dear old Vaterland! He was so overcome that he swooned again. But his cup of happiness was mixed with many bitter tears at the thought of his ship, the poor old 'Mainz,' his 'Iron Home,' now at the bottom of the North Sea! The tears almost welled into his eyes, when he retold the story of this glorious escape.

Then there was the Commander of the old torpedo-boat, U 5. He too was famous. Had not his nutshell of 600 tons earned, in the Dogger bank affair, the great distinction of having drawn the fire of the largest calibre British guns, while trying to save some of the crew of the sinking 'Blücher'? Oh, it was not really as difficult as one would think, to avoid those big fellows. You see, when you saw the water spout up on your left, why you simply turned off to the right, and when you heard or

saw the shell strike the water on your right, well you merely steered to port. He, too, was one of the official eyewitnesses of the sinking of the 'Lion'!

Captain Hansen, who was also present on this occasion, had been living in England till a few days before the outbreak of the war. He related a brilliant bit of German humour. While basking in the sun, on the deck of his large new submarine, somewhere off the English coast, one of his men appeared from the conning tower, carrying a large box. He was about to chuck the thing overboard when he (the Commander) stopped him and asked what was in the box. 'Just a "Liebesgabe" (Love-gift), Herr Capitän.' 'Now what do you think was in that box, and to whom do you imagine it was addressed?' Hansen asked his audience. After everybody had 'given it up,' he continued slowly: 'The box contained the old bones of the previous day's meals, and it was addressed to "Herr Edward Grey, London."' If universal hilarity and applause is any criterion, the joke was hugely appreciated by the Captain's colleagues.

A few days previous to my visit the 'Lützow,' one of the new 28,000 ton super-dreadnoughts [sunk on May 31], had been completed and commissioned. I was told that the eight original 12-inch guns had been supplanted by ordnance of 15-inch calibre. Each projectile of these guns is five feet high and weighs over 1600 pounds. The range of these guns is supposed to be 22 miles. At point-blank range they can pierce a steel armourplate four feet thick. It is claimed that no gun in the British Navy is capable of such a feat.

No wonder that my brain was in a whirl when I left the Casino! It certainly had been a strenuous evening. Nevertheless, I spoke the truth when, on taking leave of my hosts, I assured them that I had spent a most interesting, entertaining and instructive *soirée*.

J. M. DE BEAUFORT.

(To be continued.)

Art. 6.—INDIA UNDER LORD HARDINGE.

In general it is the last two years of a Viceregal term of office in India that give it its character and bring the measures by which it will be remembered. For the first half of his time a Viceroy will usually be occupied in making some acquaintance with the huge country, its varied populations, and their widely differing circumstances, with the mechanism of administration, and with the personality of his subordinates and colleagues. Even, therefore, if the change of Viceroys is to mean any marked change in the policy and spirit of the administration, as it did, for example, when Lord Ripon succeeded Lord Lytton, the country is not likely to feel the shock of the dislocation until much later. It is in his third year of office that the personal proclivities of a Viceroy may be expected to come into the foreground in their practical effect. By that time he will have corroborated or revised the stock of ideas that he brought with him; if he has plans, they will have been put into the hands of the Secretariat and subjected to a preliminary testing by circulation to the Local Governments; the ground will probably have been cleared by the enquiries of Committees or Commissions; and, above all, he will have established touch with the India Office and have learned how far he can count on being supported in his measures by the Imperial Government.

Had things pursued their normal course there is every reason to suppose that the last two years of Lord Hardinge's reign would have seen a rapid and perhaps turbid spate of political change. Two large Royal Commissions had rided through the country, conducting their proceedings on the most 'popular' lines, and creating, as a result, a ferment of eager expectation throughout the educated classes. Even Conservative officials would seem to have become convinced that something must be done in the way of 'concessions' to meet the anticipations produced; and the bent of the late Viceroy towards such questions has been too plainly disclosed to allow it to be doubtful that he would have thrown his own influence into furthering the movement to the utmost. But in August 1914 came the war; and the activities of the

Government of India have been turned into altogether different courses. [Thus it comes about that the administrative record of Lord Hardinge's later years is comparatively speaking a blank; while the most important act of his time falls within a few months of his assumption of office. We refer, of course, to the decision to transfer the capital of India from Calcutta to Delhi.

Wherever the merit or demerit of that decision lies, it cannot be attributed to Lord Hardinge personally. Lord Hardinge reached India towards the end of 1910. The mind of the Government of India must have been made up early in the following summer, for the despatch which asked for the sanction of the Secretary of State not only to the exchange of capitals, but to the abandonment of the lately instituted Province of Eastern Bengal and the creation of another new Province out of Behar and Orissa, was dated Aug. 25, 1911; and it is patent that so big a scheme could not have been worked out in a night. But in August 1911 Lord Hardinge, if he had seen Delhi at all, can only have been there on a flying visit to inspect the ground-breaking for the Royal Durbar. He is, perhaps, the one high official in India who is enthusiastic on the subject of Delhi now, but it is impossible that he should have fallen in love with its unknown perfections then. The adoption of Delhi was only one part of a many-sided scheme which had several purposes; and the Government, in their despatch, frankly stated that an ideal capital would be hard to find. Some of the hopes with which the scheme was adopted have turned out better than expectation; in other respects the results are less satisfactory.

In one respect the good result was complete and permanent. The agitation that had sprung up over Lord Curzon's partition of Bengal had taken the rest of India entirely by surprise. No one had hitherto supposed that the population was sentimentally attached to the idea of being included in one compartment of British administration rather than another; and to find such a rearrangement as that carried out by Lord Curzon giving rise to a great popular grievance was a revelation. In one sense it was satisfactory, and a tribute to British Government, to discover that such a territorial attachment had come to exist. It is certain that no sentiment of the kind

was in existence when we took over Bengal, nor for long afterwards; and in that sense the manifestation was a flattering discovery. Still, a standing agitation was an undesirable feature in Indian public life; and the Government of India, in addressing Lord Crewe, made no secret of the fact that, in proposing their changes, one of their principal motives was to allay the ill-feeling that had been set up by the partition among the Bengali population. From this point of view let it be said the measure was entirely successful. The Bengalis hailed the announcement with delight. Their leaders were naturally exultant at having prevailed after they had practically given up hope; when His Majesty the King visited Calcutta a few weeks after the Durbar, he was received with a rapturous demonstration of loyalty. So carried away were the Bengalis by the turned tide of sentiment that not a murmur was heard against the fresh partition that was introduced hand in hand with the revocation of the old—the separation of Behar and Orissa, and their amalgamation into a new Province at the expense of Bengal.

The framing of the 1911 scheme was thus essentially a vindication of Lord Curzon's policy. No one questions that some breaking-up of Bengal was overdue when he introduced it. A province that had come to contain over 80,000,000 inhabitants had far outrun the managing capacities of a single Provincial administration. Lord Curzon rightly judged that, if the business were not tackled then, it would force itself upon the Government in a few years at latest; and, reluctant as the Government of India must have been in 1911 to launch out on another redistribution, it was obliged to accept his conclusion. The question is whether the new scheme or Lord Curzon's was the better. Few Anglo-Indian officials would hesitate about the answer from the administrative standpoint. The Curzon province of Eastern Bengal and Assam was a country that had obviously a great future before it, and was already beginning to show signs of a vigorous existence under the new arrangements. The possibilities of Behar are in comparison very limited. Socially speaking, it is an old-world Hindu land, with a swarming population of peasants and a handful of great landowners. It has lost the indigo industry and the British planter, and has thrown out, owing to the

scarcity of other openings, an abnormal development of the legal profession. The change, moreover, in addition to the administrative dislocation produced by the abolition of a province that had barely been brought into working order, involved great expense. The half-completed capital at Dacca had to be abandoned and a new one commenced, in a very indifferent locality, at Bankipore, a place that has only survived as a military cantonment because of the necessity of keeping some troops in the neighbourhood of the large Mahomedan city of Patna.

Again, it is not altogether a small matter that all existing statistics and books of reference are rendered worthless—an inconvenience which is felt for years. There is not, we believe, at the present moment, an Atlas of India available to the general public which shows the provinces as they now are. Such considerations may not outweigh the case for change if the other advantages are overwhelming, but, if the balance is rather on the other side, they depress it most effectively. The one counterpoise, in fact, appears to have been the appeasement of Bengal, in which, as said above, it was entirely successful. But it may be doubted whether, in any case, the agitation would have persisted much longer. There is good reason to believe that the Bengalis themselves were getting tired of it; and it is difficult to think that a grievance which touched no man in his status, property or pocket, or any tangible particular, could have been a lasting one. On the other hand, it is fair to notice that the resentment of the Bengalis had one important practical effect. The most vehement of their objections to the original partition were on the ground that it would involve a breaking-up of the Bengal High Court, an institution which seems to grow dearer by its faults. To appease them it was promised, not indeed that there would never be a separate High Court at Dacca, but that such a departure would be postponed to an indefinitely distant date and not adopted without long notice. Under the reconciliation, the High Court of Fort William, which needed division as much as the Executive Government, has been parted in two, and a new High Court set up in Behar without so much as a murmur.

It must be always remembered, however, that the outcry over the Partition grievance proceeded not from

those who were affected by the severance, but from those who remained behind. The principal districts of Lord Curzon's Province were peopled by Mahomedans, who, though forming a vast majority, had been supplanted by the Hindus in the public services, in the Local Government offices, and in the trades and professions. The Mahomedans, mutely irritated by a process that had been going on since the fall of the Nawabs, and which they only dimly took in, were delighted over the partition. Their eyes were speedily opened to the fact that they were now going to count for more; and they bestirred themselves to a notable extent to come into line with the new administration. This basis of popular good-will and support was one of the best auguries for the fortunes of Eastern Bengal. But the Government of India, intent on pacifying Bengal, had marked their satisfaction and were going to turn it to their discomfiture. Eastern Bengal, the despatch says, 'has, no doubt, benefited greatly by the Partition, and the Mahomedans of that Province, who form a large majority of the population, are loyal and contented; but the resentment amongst the Bengalis in both provinces . . . is as strong as ever.' The old policy of 'kick the friend and gratify the enemy' was surely never expressed with more Machiavellian directness. But the result was to extinguish any enthusiasm on the part of the Mahomedan world for the re-adoption of Delhi as the Imperial capital. That step had been counted on confidently to appeal to the imagination of the Mahomedans of Upper India. But it failed conspicuously in this respect; and it is notorious that the Mahomedans of Hindustan proper have not for a generation been in such an attitude of bitterness and alienation as they have exhibited during the years following the Durbar.

But the master reason for the reversal of the Partition of Bengal lies elsewhere. It is indicated plainly enough in the despatch, but anyone might have arrived at it by inference. It was because they had resolved to give up Calcutta as the capital of India that the Government felt themselves under the necessity of undoing Lord Curzon's settlement. The agitation against the Partition might be expiring, but, if the Bengalis of Calcutta found that their city was to be suddenly deprived of her status as the seat of Government, it would be likely to flare up

afresh, perhaps with aggravated violence. To anticipate that possibility it was advisable to present them with a gratification, and one that would be the more acceptable from its wearing the appearance of a victory gained by their own activities. This was unquestionably the ruling consideration that led to the sentence upon Eastern Bengal, involving the drastic severance of the stout and healthy roots which the new unit had already thrown out in the political soil.

The reader will naturally ask at this point what were the overmastering attractions of Delhi, to compel the Government to put itself and the country to all this disturbance? The answer is that there were none, or none that would have counted for anything but for ulterior considerations. Historic renown, imperial associations, nearness to Simla, excellence of railway communications, and so on—these were all makeweights introduced after the decision. The truth is that the Government of India was not in love with Delhi, but it had become convinced that it must break off with Calcutta. For one thing, it had been settled that Bengal, which already had an Executive Council, must have a Governor after the pattern of Madras and Bombay, instead of a Lieutenant-Governor from the Indian service; and it was taken to follow that administrative propriety forbade that a Governor and a Governor-General should live in the same city. If that were the case, the simple remedy would seem to have been to refrain from converting Bengal into a Governorship. The differences between a Governorship in Council and a Lieutenant-Governorship in Council are so subtle that they cannot be put down in black and white; and few people outside the higher official circles could give a satisfactory description of them. Assuming that the advantage lies with the more dignified form of government, it is hard that India generally should be visited with heroic changes, and a heroic bill, merely to give one Province the privilege of being governed by a Prime Minister's nominee rather than by an experienced Civil Servant.]

In justice to the intelligence of the authors of the change, the real reason must be sought elsewhere. It is glanced at in the despatch, in a sentence which says 'public opinion in Calcutta is by no means always the

same as that which obtains elsewhere in India, and it is undesirable that the Government of India should be subject exclusively to its influence.' Objection might be taken to this statement by a precisian, on the score that the Government of India resided in Calcutta for only about four months in each year. But the meaning is plain. It was during these four months that the Legislative Council was in Session at Calcutta. This Council had become a small Parliament of non-official Indian members, with the necessary number of officials to provide against a Government defeat. In addition to the Councillors themselves, the presence of the Government brought to Calcutta every season a certain number of the Indian Chiefs and other notabilities, all of whom would be exposed to the influences of local opinion. But the public opinion most in evidence at Calcutta at the time was one of a decidedly unwholesome type. Seditious propagandists had even been endeavouring to tamper with the loyalty of the Native Regiment stationed there, not without some success. If the leading politicals stood apart from the actual workers of iniquity, the line between them could not be very clearly drawn, inasmuch as the seditionists were only carrying into practice the lessons contained in the doctrines served out to them from press and platform. It was certain that, in such a state of society, every attempt would be made to turn the minds of visitors from other Provinces to the Bengali mood; and the community of ideas that runs through the Indian educated class must have rendered the Legislative Councillors particularly susceptible to such influence. But, if the Legislative Council on its new basis were to rise to a more important place in the system of Government, if the policy of 'amalgamation' were to have a fair chance of success, it was undesirable that its members should remain in surroundings where everything would be done to confirm them in an attitude of hostility towards the Executive Government, and where, as time went on, the debates might have taken the character of tournaments between official and non-official for the amusement of the Bengali public. On these grounds a shift from Calcutta was inevitable, and a return to it is altogether out of the question.

The Delhi Durbar, at which so many great changes,

the well-kept secrets of many months, were suddenly disclosed to the public, was as conspicuous an event as perhaps anything that could be instanced out of the pacific annals of mankind. The most gorgeous processions through the narrow streets of a modern city give a poor idea of the spectacular effects that can be produced in an Eastern country when ample space is obtainable; and the management had made the most of its opportunities. The unanimous opinion of a public well educated in these matters was that the Durbar was magnificent.

‘All was royal;
To the disposing of it nought rebelled.
Order gave each thing view; the office did
Distinctly his full function.’

The ‘office’ was on this occasion Sir John Hewett, the then Lieutenant-Governor of the United Provinces, who was relieved for nearly a year of his Governorship to take entire charge of the preparations, and who carried out his task with the conspicuous capacity that he has shown in the discharge of every duty that has fallen on him. But the impressive splendours of the Coronation ceremony were less notable than the impression that the event produced on the whole country. If ever three hundred millions of human beings can be said to be stirred by one common feeling, it was the people of India throughout the year 1911. During that twelvemonth nothing was thought of but the Durbar. When the early rains failed and it seemed that the whole of Upper India was likely to be in for a severe famine, the calamity was awaited with dread because it would involve the postponement of the Durbar. When, at the eleventh hour, in the middle of August, the rains arrived with a plenteousness that made up for their lateness, the first consideration in the moment of relief was that the Durbar had been saved. By the time that His Majesty landed in Bombay, India, throughout its length and breadth, was in a state of expectancy and delight which had never been witnessed before. The Coronation at Delhi came home to thousands of villages which at this day have the dimmest notions of the current war, and only know of its existence through the medium of

grotesque rumours. For once, perhaps, in the history of the country, the feelings of the masses had an effect on the attitude of those above them. While the King was in the country, all criticism of the measures announced in the royal proclamation was suspended; for many months afterwards, in fact, the lips of criticism were closed by the finger of respect. Later still, other causes supervened to still its voice. At the end of the year 1912 Lord Hardinge, when making a State entry into Delhi, almost fell a victim to a bomb thrown by an Indian nihilist; and during the months of his painful recovery political controversy was waived. In the year following the country was greatly shocked by the sudden death of Lady Hardinge, who was not only popular, but had come to exercise a widely felt social influence. Finally, in the summer of 1914 came the war, which directly, through the Censorship, and indirectly, has almost closed the public discussion of controversial subjects. In a country so little affected by the war there has been little change below the surface; the same forces are at work as before, and the same tendencies that were in evidence three years ago will reassert themselves as soon as the world returns to normal conditions, perhaps the stronger for the temporary check imposed on them.

The despatch of Aug. 25, 1911, already mentioned above, deserves to be carefully noted by any one desirous of understanding the spirit of the times. It is written in a language new for an Indian State Paper. Considerations are openly advanced for this and that line of action which would not have been admitted formerly to influence the Government of India. Political expediency becomes the guiding motive; the playing-off of one section of the public against another, and the advantage of appeasing the noisier one, are openly recognised as motives for the decisions advocated. Needless to say that there has never been a time since the day of Warren Hastings when the Government of India has not taken close thought of the feelings, desires or objections of the people in regard to the measures it has had in view. Its attitude with respect to the abolition of barbarous practices and abuses, to the propagation of Christianity, to the enforcement of vaccination, and a hundred other

matters, has been entirely governed by the consideration of how they would be regarded by the people; but the arguments of the Delhi despatch are on a different plane altogether. This is not to say that a Governor-General-in-Council at the present day can or ought to write his despatches in the style of Lord Wellesley, but the Government of India is still supposed to be the guard and guide of all classes and interests, executing its mission, as nearly as may be, with the impartiality of Providence. For an Englishman accustomed to seeing the Government continually doing everything which he dislikes and disapproves, in a way only made supportable by the hope that he will have a chance of turning it out in a few years' time, it may be difficult to realise the implicit trust which men come to put in the rectitude and high motives of an absolute, irreplaceable Government. In regard to the unofficial Anglo-Indian community, which is still the main support of the country industrially, the righteousness of the Government is all they have to trust to. Their exclusion from the new Council system is, to all intents and purposes, absolute. And it must have been a shock to their faith to find that the Delhi despatch waives aside the objections that may be anticipated from the Calcutta mercantile community, on the same ground as was advanced for the disregard of the wishes of the Mahomedans of Eastern Bengal, namely, that they are too loyal to make their opposition important. After this the Anglo-Indian community must surely conclude that the same calculation has entered into the plans of the Finance Department in the only increases of taxation that have been introduced of recent years, from each of which they have suffered peculiarly.

This spirit of political finesse, which is first avowed in this despatch, is a new development; and it is one that seems already to be on the increase under the influence of the seclusion of Delhi. Delhi, in spite of being the capital of the Empire, is socially for seven months in the year nothing more than any other of the small civil stations dotted about Upper India, one to each administrative district. The early visitor who finds himself sight-seeing there about the 20th of October may or may not come across another European in the course

of his day's round. Ten days later the vanguard of the official world from Simla begins to arrive, and, so far as numbers go, is very easily accommodated by the present site, which is nothing more than that of the old civil station, plus the temporary camps and buildings thrown out on the plain on the other side of the Ridge. Presently this small society is augmented by a certain number of visitors on business and pleasure—there has always been a tourist season at Delhi; and about the end of January appear the non-official Councillors, some thirty in number. Every attempt is made to give them a pleasant time; garden parties and receptions are the order of the day. The Legislative Councillor, thus made much of, generally proves to be a courteous, agreeable person. The best relations are established. There is no Bengali bounce here, but other tendencies make themselves apparent. In this small, sheltered society the debates of the Council assume a tremendous importance. Even if a motion for universal compulsory education, or some modest project of the kind, has been withdrawn, there will be a hum of conversation over the event; if the bold mover has insisted on a division, the thrill of excitement will be intense, even at official dinner tables.

In this little circle there is no room for rough passages. The Indian is intensely sensitive personally, and would look upon the manners of the House of Commons, not to say those of the Hungarian Parliament, as outrageous. Hence, if a member has brought forward some resolution which if adopted would mean financial catastrophe, the Government Minister who replies, while pointing out the regrettable obstacle, never forgets to compliment the mover on the singular ability and force of his speech; and this is often endorsed by His Excellency the President. It may seem to be an uncivil thing to find fault with excessive politeness; but there is no doubt that the effect of this kind of thing in perpetual repetition breeds insincerity. The admission of Indian members into the Executive Councils, Imperial and Provincial, tends in the same direction. These small and select bodies are entrusted with the *arcana* of Government; if they are to work properly, nothing should be hidden from them, nor should the members have any secrets from one another. Officially, no doubt,

we shall be told that the system remains precisely what it was; but one may nevertheless decline to believe that things are as they were, that there can be that full and unreserved communication between the members that the system postulates, when one of their number is looking to a return to the more than free atmosphere of a provincial Bar Library. The result must necessarily be reservations of opinion, withholdings of confidence, smoothings of expression, all helping to undermine the efficiency of the system. The tendency is no doubt acceptable enough to some individual Ministers, who get a freer hand thereby in the management of their own Departments. But these are small views, in comparison with the danger of a degeneration in the character of the Government as a whole; and the snare that besets the Government to-day is that of sinking upon an organised hypocrisy.

Many years ago Mr Nassau Senior, the political economist, said that there was only one Indian question—how to get well away from India. Many people since must have been tempted to come to a similar opinion. The Government of India, on the other hand, is in duty bound to stand to its own permanence; but, to judge by its acts, it seems to be penetrated with the opinion of Mr Senior. Every year, or every few years, one sees concessions granted to the Indian political classes, without heed apparently to any sort of guiding principle, but simply as an embarrassed man pays his creditors a bit here and there on account, to keep them quiet. An expedient in much request in these days is the appointment of a Royal Commission. For Royal Commissions which serve a real object, to collect information and opinions, beyond the reach of Government, upon a special subject, and to review this evidence with the impartial authority of competent men engaged in science or research, there is nothing but good to be said. Of this sort are the recent Commission on the Indian currency system and the Commission just appointed to enquire into the economic resources of India.

Of a totally different character were the Royal Commissions on Decentralisation and the Public Services, two great inquisitions inflicted on the country with hardly a breathing-space between. The prevailing idea in the constitution of these bodies would appear to be that, by

getting together a certain number of persons notorious for strong but different opinions on politico-social questions and tossing them, so to speak, into one sack, you would extract some useful composite conclusion on subjects with which the officials of the administration are perfectly familiar, and far more competent to decide than the Commissioners would be at the end of their proceedings. These Commissions have acted as might have been expected of them. They launch on their enquiries without a rudder, and rudderless they float round the Indian Empire from one province to another. Clouds of witnesses are examined where a single competent one would suffice. The proceedings are held in public before a gallery of spectators—an excellent way of preventing an Indian witness from saying what he really thinks. Presumably it is a common starting-point with the Commissioners that it is expedient that the British rule should be maintained, at any rate, for some indefinite time; yet they daily listen to witnesses whose views would lead up to the speedy disappearance of the British power, and this without their ever being asked whether this is what they have in mind. Nor is the question whether a proposal would make for good Government, i.e. for efficiency, economy, security and justice, often asked. Probably the Commissioners are too much divided on these fundamentals to raise such points; but, if so, what can be expected of the enquiry? The Commission pursues its way, retires to England for the hot weather to think, returns to India again, and eventually rolls ponderously off the stage to compile an oversized report. If this were all, there might not be so much to protest against. But in the meanwhile the Government, impressed by the froth and fluster that its proceedings have set up, has made up its mind that more concessions will be required; and long before the Commissioners have settled on their report the Secretariat will have been set to work to fix what is the least that in decency can be given. Thus is the process of random concession artificially stimulated.

Of the last two years of Lord Hardinge's Viceroyalty—the war period—the time has not come to speak. The military record of the Government of India has certainly

not been a brilliant one. The capitulation at Kut in place of the capture of Baghdad, the deadlock in East Africa until the arrival of General Smuts and the South Africans, the jeopardy of Aden—these are the results that the Indian administration has to show in its own sphere of operations. An account must be demanded of them some day, but in fairness criticism must wait for fuller knowledge. The truly valuable contribution of India was the despatch of the Army Corps which under Sir James Willcocks arrived on the battle front in Flanders just at the moment when the British Commander-in-Chief was most sorely in need of reinforcements. It was a great and striking incident, which is the less reason that its bearings should be obscured by clouds of misplaced superlatives. The British troops in India, up to the very last limit of the indispensable margin, had to go. The urgency of their country made the call for them imperative; and the judge of that urgency was the British Government, not the Government of India. But, when India was being all but denuded of British troops, it would have been clearly impossible to leave the country in sole possession of the Native Army. There was, in fact, no alternative to the plan actually adopted of sending the troops, British and Native together, as they stood in the Army List, by local divisions and brigades. From much that has appeared on the subject, a stranger might be led to suppose that the Native regiments were a body of volunteers, who with magnificent public spirit had placed their services at the disposal of the Empire in the day of peril, rather than regulars whose only business was to obey their orders. Still, everyone must recognise that the Indian regiments, virtually without exception, were proud and eager to go, and were not in the least deterred by the thought that they were going forth to meet the most formidable Army in the world. The sepoy of the line can have had only the faintest idea of the merits of the war with Germany; and, in giving him full credit for his conduct and mettle, let us not forget that which is due to the British officers who have created this military spirit, and to the wise rule which has taught the classes who enter the army that they have a country which is worth fighting for.

The admirers of Lord Hardinge's administration lay great stress upon his personal popularity with the people of the country. It was, they tell us in the phrase of the day, a great 'asset' in the time of trial. It seems to be taking a somewhat low view of Indian loyalty to represent it as a thing that is here to-day and may be gone to-morrow. We prefer to think of it as a feeling whose roots go deeper and rest upon a more permanent basis. There is not the least reason to suppose that at any time during the last quarter of a century, had the call arisen, the response would have been different. The Indian Chiefs and magnates, by whom the tone of the country is mainly judged, did not develop the symptoms of loyalty yesterday; but on the other hand, though the expression of dissent is considerably hampered in time of war, there has been unfortunately ample evidence of the existence of very pronounced disloyalty. From North Punjab to Singapore, and even to the jungle divide between Burma and Siam, we have had conspiracies and mutinies, all more or less failures in the execution, but equally venomous in their aims. With these has come to be coupled a singular development of predatory crimes, gang burglary and murder, committed for the sake of obtaining funds for the support of the campaign of sedition. The Hardingite dismisses these manifestations as the work of an infinitesimal minority, having no more bearing on the general attitude than the crimes of Jack-the-Ripper on the general morality of London. So the same school persisted in minimising the signs of disloyalty in Ireland until it broke out in open rebellion; and even after that event they continue wilfully blind. Few people who have any first-hand information as to the conditions of India can be inclined to take so easy a view of the case. The remarks of Lord Carmichael, Governor of Bengal, to his Legislative Council at their final meeting at the beginning of last April seem to be conclusive. After mentioning that in the course of the year there had been twenty-six 'political' gang robberies in Bengal, four of them accompanied by murder, that eighteen persons had been murdered, five of them being police officers, by these 'political' conspirators, Lord Carmichael went on to say:

'It has been brought to the knowledge of Government in a
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way which Government feels makes it certain that some persons in Bengal have got into touch with and taken pay from, or have tried to get into touch with and take pay from, the enemies of our Emperor and of our Country, I mean with foreign enemies belonging to the countries with whom we are at war ; that other persons in Bengal have been ready to tamper with the loyalty of the King-Emperor's Indian troops, those troops of whose loyalty and of whose bravery Indians and Englishmen alike have every right to be proud ; and that yet other persons in Bengal have been planning, or considering how to plan, crimes which would at any time be hurtful to the public weal but, at a time like this, are doubly hurtful. . . . There are different degrees of guilt. Some men are mere dupes, sometimes perhaps unconscious dupes in the hands of more astute criminals. . . . I am sorry for these dupes, but they are a source of danger, though not so great a source of danger as those who exploit them. It is the duty of Government to use the powers which it possesses against any danger to the State. That, gentlemen, is my duty and the duty of my colleagues, a duty which we are doing our best to fulfil.'

To appreciate the gravity of this statement it may be said that Lord Carmichael is as little likely as the late Chief Secretary to be prematurely sensitive about such proceedings. Bad indeed, we conclude, must be the situation that has wrung such a remonstrance from him. It is hardly necessary to say that the respectable class whom Lord Hardinge has laid himself out to win have no part in the sort of doings gently reprobated by Lord Carmichael. The trouble with them is that, while they might have some power to start a popular agitation, they have absolutely no power to control one. However, it was to these moderates that the late Viceroy specially addressed himself ; and they and the large Press which is behind them repaid him lavishly. Their gratitude was not entirely founded in a sense of favours to come. It appealed to them especially that in Lord Hardinge they had found a Viceroy who would stand up in public as an independent ruler and rate the Government of South Africa face to face for its injustice to Indian subjects, or the House of Lords for venturing to throw out an Indian reform. Visions of what might be in store when a popular Indian Viceroy would put himself at the head of

an Indian movement, against Parliament, against the self-governing Dominions, even against the public service of which he is the official head, sprang up immediately. From the earliest days, the Indian mind has shown itself quick to grasp the possibilities of playing off one authority against another, though in former times its activities took the form of endeavouring to enlist Crown or Parliamentary influence against the Company, or the Directors against the man on the spot. The prospect of a Viceroy championing Indian public opinion, which could be readily worked up to any required pitch, against Lancashire, for instance, or against the Secretary of State, was a much more alluring one, and it was enthusiastically welcomed.

It may be hoped that these precedents will not extend. Lord Hardinge had in Lord Crewe an easy-going chief and a personal friend; if the late Lord Salisbury had been in office, the Viceroy would assuredly have been reminded of the inexpediency of such sallies as his rebuke of the House of Lords for rejecting a measure sent up by the Government of India. The office of Viceroy of India is not a political one; it will not bear extension into a Tribuneship of the people. An administration in opposition at Delhi would be a greatly more serious phenomenon than what we have occasionally seen in the past at Dublin. If India were to force politics upon Britain, she could not expect a continuance of political impartiality here. The inevitable result of untimely assertions of local antagonism to the general lines of policy prescribed by the ruling Power would be to convert the easy hold of Parliament and the Secretary of State into a more forcible one. The fact that Sikhs and Gurkhas (to whom all honour) have fought in Flanders is ludicrously irrelevant as a reason for supposing that the essential basis of the relations between the two countries has been suddenly subverted.

Art. 7.—A NEW LIFE OF WORDSWORTH.

1. *William Wordsworth. His Life, Works and Influence.* By Prof. G. M. Harper. Two vols. Murray, 1916.
2. *The Early Life of William Wordsworth, 1770-1798.* By Emile Legouis. Translated by J. W. Matthews. Dent, 1897.
3. *The Patriotic Poetry of William Wordsworth. A Selection (with Introduction and Notes).* By Right Hon. A. H. D. Acland. Clarendon Press, 1915.
4. *Wordsworth's Tract on the Convention of Cintra, with two Letters of Wordsworth written in the year 1811.* Now republished, with an Introduction by A. V. Dicey. Milford, 1915.

THIS is the first life of Wordsworth which has been written by a man in possession of all the facts and able to use them freely and openly. The poet's nephew wrote his Memoir perhaps from still fuller knowledge, but was inevitably prevented, by relationship and other considerations, from giving all he knew to the public. Frederic Myers's admirable little book is a study, not a biography. M. Emile Legouis's '*Jeunesse de Wordsworth*' is excellent so far as it goes, but it deals with only twenty-eight of the eighty years of the poet's life. The only regular Biography is that by Prof. Knight, which is not well put together, is somewhat inaccurate, and is very far from covering the whole ground.

The field was therefore still open for a final Life of Wordsworth; and it is not much to our credit that it has been left to an American to make the first serious attempt to occupy it: Prof. Harper has had great advantages. He has been allowed by the poet's grandson not only to see but to publish much unprinted material, and has received his advice and assistance. He has also been allowed by Mr Frank Marshall to print a good many new letters of Dorothy Wordsworth, which have the power and charm of everything written by that true woman of genius. The result is a much fuller account than any previous book has given of the generally known facts of Wordsworth's life and character, and a few discoveries of importance, the most surprising of which is the fact, which has amused the profane, that Wordsworth

had a natural daughter by a French woman whom he knew in his Revolutionary days. This long-concealed story has of course given some pleasure to the many people who have been exasperated by the elderly Wordsworth's open and tactless consciousness of his own virtues. But the faithful need have no fears. The story of Annette and her daughter Caroline (of whom, and not of Dorothy, the poet was thinking when he wrote the line:

'Dear child, dear girl, that walkest with me here')

redounds as a whole very greatly to Wordsworth's honour. What is striking in it is not the fact of a young poet in a foreign country, away from all the restraints of home and family, falling into a connexion of this sort, especially as it appears it was not his fault that it did not lead to marriage. It is rather the fact that he never tried to escape, as he so easily could have done, from the responsibility in which it had involved him. He put himself to the pain of revealing the truth to his sister and afterwards to his wife; he and they kept up communications with both mother and daughter, and took an active interest in the latter's marriage; and, when he was fifty and already justly exalted as much by his virtues as by his genius to a peculiar pedestal of honour and even reverence, he took his disciple Crabb Robinson to see both ladies at Paris. So let the cynics and Bohemians, who always hasten to rejoice at any discovery of vice or weakness in better men than themselves, pause before they assume that this story delivers Wordsworth into their hands. It does not. Taken as a whole, it is a story not of vice, but of virtue; not of weakness, but of strength.

This is the most striking novelty in Mr Harper's book. For the rest it tells the familiar story with greater detail and accuracy than it has ever been told before. But yet it cannot be the final Life. The chance of writing that Mr Harper has missed, partly by lack of sympathy and partly by lack of ability. He is in the first place a mediocre writer. His style lacks force and clearness as well as any kind of distinction. It is respectable but never anything more. Or, as that is an epithet which

Mr Harper particularly dislikes and generally misunderstands, let us call it pedestrian; and it is often somewhat shuffling and shambling at that. He uses pronouns, for instance, very loosely, and one is not always sure to whom they refer. He is capable of such perverse pedantries as calling Brunswick 'Braunschweig.' One might as reasonably speak of St John as St Joannes. There is also a lack of lucidity in his arrangement of his material. He is, for instance, much concerned to assert that 'The Prelude,' as we have it, is not the poem as it was originally written; and the point is one of interest and importance. But Mr Harper's method of dealing with it is extraordinary. He repeats the assertion over and over again, to the irritation of the reader who asks for some evidence for it. But he gives no proof, and even in one place implies that he has none to give. 'It is not known,' he says once, 'whether "The Prelude" was not considerably retouched before Wordsworth's death.' Yet all the while he had the proof which he would not give. A letter of Miss Fenwick's written in 1839 speaks of the poet as working for six or seven hours a day at the 'revising of his grand autobiographical poem.' This may not prove all that Mr Harper asserts, but it does show that 'The Prelude,' as we have it, is not precisely the poem read to Coleridge in January 1807; and, if Mr Harper had quoted it at once instead of at the very end of his book, he would have saved himself some trouble and his readers some irritation.

Another reason why this cannot be the definitive Life of Wordsworth is its author's weakness on the side of criticism. No poetry has exercised so much influence on subsequent poets as that of Wordsworth. It is, therefore, in his case more than usually important to understand exactly where his strength and his weakness as a poet lie. How absolutely unfit Mr Harper is for the performance of this difficult task is sufficiently seen by the fact that the two qualities in which he again and again declares Wordsworth to have been preeminent are 'consummate technical skill' and 'versatility,' the exact points in which he stands conspicuously below all our other great poets. Mr Harper positively declares that in all Wordsworth's works both of verse and of prose, with the single exception of 'The Excursion,' he exhibits

'artistic finish' and 'the true artist's instinct for design.' He frequently selects very ordinary poems for high praise, as when he strangely declares that the lines beginning 'Life with yon lambs' are 'one of Wordsworth's best poems'; and he is once at least capable of a serious misinterpretation of a very well-known poem, as when he asserts that 'piety,' in the famous lines from 'The Rainbow' prefixed to the great Ode, is 'used in its original sense of reverence for filial obligation.' To say this is, of course, to miss the whole idea of the poem, one of the central ideas of Wordsworth's philosophy. It is not the piety of the grown man towards the memories of his own childhood which he is only or chiefly thinking of. He is thinking of another and still older piety, that 'natural piety' which makes and has always made the heart of man leap with wonder, joy or fear when he beholds the 'rainbow in the sky'; and it is that sort of piety which he hopes will bind together his youth and age and without which he would prefer to die.

After such blunders as these as in his own special subject, one is not surprised at finding Mr Harper class Milton, Waller, Dryden and Pope together as poets who all wrote in the 'academic manner'; and one merely smiles at such an ineptitude as his calling Crabb Robinson 'the Pepys of that generation.' It is easier to explain his indignation with Wordsworth for alluding to angels in some of his poems and his confident assertion that the 'date of these beings is out'; or even his strange denunciation of the Sonnet 'Retirement' as 'thoroughly immoral, as bad as the work of any Epicurean poet of the Roman decadence.' For anti-religious, as well as religious, intolerance has always blundered over the criticism of poetry which is out of the reach of either. If 'Retirement' is immoral, so is the whole of that very 'decadent and Epicurean' poet Cowper; and, if it was wicked of Wordsworth to talk of angels even in a metaphor, what is to be said of the unorthodox Shelley's 'angels of rain and lightning' and its thousand parallels?

The truth apparently is that the natural bent of Mr Harper's mind is not towards art or poetry at all. It is towards ethics and above all towards politics. Of any disinterested enjoyment of poetry in itself there is

scarcely a hint in all his nine hundred pages. The reason why he likes Wordsworth's reforms in the subjects and language of poetry is that he considers them democratic reforms abolishing the fashionable exclusiveness of previous poetry. The reason why he dislikes the poetry of Wordsworth's middle-age is not that much of it is commonplace, but that none of it is revolutionary. The Wordsworth in whom he is interested is the young man who went to France and threw himself into the Revolutionary cause. No doubt that period is profoundly important in Wordsworth's life. But there does not appear to be any foundation for Mr Harper's notion that without it he would never have been a great poet. On the contrary, the elements which afterwards united and expressed themselves in his poetry—including his profound sympathy with peasants and humble folk generally—were conspicuous in his boyhood; and the permanent and poetic part of them owes far more to Hawkshead than to Paris. He wrote no great poetry in France; indeed he wrote none after his return till the storm of revolutionary excitement had to a large extent settled down. And that storm was neither so violent nor so lasting as Mr Harper constantly asserts. His view is that Wordsworth's 'state of mind' about 'distinctions of high and low' was 'a result of his conversion to the equalitarian creed of the French Revolution.' He imagines the second visit to France and the friendship with Beaupuy to have been the most important events in the poet's life. He pictures Wordsworth as becoming a new man under their influence, a passionate politician of the French revolutionary type, a child of 'The Enlightenment,' living for a creed of social and political abstractions, a doctrinaire in politics, a free-thinker in religion. And he supposes this mood to have lasted more or less for some years after the return to England. He even declares that during all the earlier part of Wordsworth's life, apparently up to Waterloo, his 'chief interest was political.'

Now, a fraction of this is true, of course, but so little that the portrait as a whole is a mere caricature. Mr Harper can be refuted out of his own pages. Wordsworth's letters from France show none of this enthusiasm. They confirm his later statement in 'The Prelude' that he was

often a little bored with Beaupuy's political harangues. In a long letter written in May 1792 and printed by Mr Harper, he shows no political enthusiasm, and congratulates his correspondent on having been born in England, 'a free country where talents are more liberally rewarded than amongst any other nation.' At Orleans, in the autumn, he is more occupied with limestone springs than with politics. And all the while the alleged free-thinker is contemplating taking orders on his return to England!

The truth is that to politics as understood by the French Revolutionists at the time, and by Mr Harper and Radical politicians ever since, Wordsworth never gave the heart of his being at all, and gave what he did give only for a short time. Mr Harper wants us to believe that Wordsworth was in fact much occupied with politics during the great days at Alfoxden. But there is no evidence for this theory; and Coleridge expressly states the contrary. Unfortunately Mr Harper writes throughout in the interest of political, social and religious reform as advocated by the Encyclopædists in France and by their followers, especially Godwin, in England, and insists on treating Wordsworth first as the champion and then as the apostate of this movement. The truth is that the essential Wordsworth never was either the one or the other. (As Mr Knight well says, he never sympathised with the formal or 'rational' system of democratic thought. What he did sympathise with, while in France and after his return, was a different thing, 'the glad uprise of the suppressed instinct of freedom and its outcome,')

'Joy in widest commonalty spread.'

And with this he continued to sympathise with the cooler fervour of middle and old age throughout the rest of his life. Whenever he is a poet, he is neither revolutionary nor reactionary, but something much deeper than either. No doubt his opinions about political measures changed greatly in course of time; but those convictions about the essential qualities of the human spirit which are at the root of all his poetry remained substantially unaltered. What he wrote to Charles Fox

in 1802 was what he felt before he ever saw France and what he still felt in his last years. He was scorned for choosing 'low' subjects. His defence is that he hoped by his poems to 'enlarge our feeling of reverence for our species and our knowledge of human nature by showing that our best qualities are possessed by men whom we are too apt to consider, not with reference to the points in which they resemble us, but to those in which they manifestly differ from us.' That is, that when he wrote of poor men he was not thinking of their poverty, but of their humanity; not of their material privations or political rights, but of the hopes and fears and loves and passions which fill them simply as men.

It is of course quite true that Wordsworth was a Radical in his youth and a Tory in his old age. But the truth is that neither his youthful Radicalism nor his elderly Toryism affected very much more than the outskirts of his mind. The essential Wordsworth, the Wordsworth who wrote great poetry and who lives, was not a great deal affected by either. There is a story of Carlyle speaking of himself and a friend with whom he had been having a discussion as 'except in opinion not disagreeing.' That is the limit of the disagreement between the Wordsworth of 1792 and the Wordsworth of 1832. How small and unessential a part of the man was concerned in the 'opinions' of either period may be seen by the utterances they produced. Where does Mr Harper have to go when he wants to illustrate the extent of Wordsworth's belief in the social, moral and political theories of Godwin? To the pamphlet attacking Bishop Watson, the least original, the least imaginative, the least passionate of Wordsworth's productions. Where does he have to go to prove the extreme Toryism of the poet's age? To querulous letters and dull poems, which might have been written by any other respectable and panic-stricken old gentleman between 1830 and 1840. Neither the one nor the other came from the centre at all. When the real Wordsworth speaks, whether in youth or old age, it is in the language of faith and passion. And in his use of that language, the change between 1792 and 1832 is not so much one of sympathy as one of power.

Of this Wordsworth, of the poet who saw more,

believed more; loved more than other men, it is simply untrue to say, as Mr Harper says, that 'in the second half of his life he cursed what he once blessed and blessed what he once cursed.' The truth of that saying is entirely confined to the contrast between the writer who complacently echoed political theorists in his youth and the writer who ill-temperedly echoed frightened property owners later on. A poet, or indeed any author, may fairly claim to be judged by what is unique and his own, and not by what is commonplace in his writings. Tried by that test, Wordsworth cannot be said to have deserted a cause which he never embraced. What moved him in the French Revolution was not its abstract theories, but its passion of life, its energy of love and hope and faith in the future of man. And never, even in any of his prose, or any of it that counts, did he renounce that sympathy. After all, which of his prose writings do count? Those in which the unique soul of the man is visibly present; those in which that heart, at once so fiery and so tender, that inward eye of spiritual vision which saw, as perhaps no other man ever saw, into the life both of man and of Nature, make themselves plainly heard in passionate and musical language such as no mere opinions ever found for themselves. And that means the Cintra Tract, the Prefaces, the Letter to Wilson, the Essay upon Epitaphs, the Letter to a Friend of Robert Burns. But it does not mean the reply to Bishop Watson, a mere piece of Radical polemics, nor its Tory counterpart, the Address to the Freeholders of Westmoreland. It is the same with the poetry. Whenever Wordsworth is a true poet, whether in age or youth, he rejoices in the free, loving, wise, passionate, spirit of man; and though Nature, as he himself tells us, had 'tamed' him, and led him, as she leads her turbulent streams, down from life's mountains to its quiet meadows, yet he has not forgotten his

'desperate course of tumult and of glee,'

and is still pleased, 'more than a wise man ought to be,' when he reads 'a tale Of two brave vessels matched in deadly fight And fighting to the death.' And, though age cannot be youth, and already at thirty-seven he is turning

from the nightingale's 'fiery heart' and 'tumultuous harmony' to prefer the stockdove's song,

'Slow to begin and never ending;
Of serious faith and inward glee;
That was the song—the song for me!'

yet the 'glee' remained, if now more inward than outward; and so did the poet's faith in the heart of man as a thing possessing a life utterly above and beyond the limitations of wealth or earthly conditions. He could no longer often express it as he had once, and it had become oftener 'serious' and 'pensive' than 'tumultuous' and 'fierce,' but it was still in him. 'The Leech-Gatherer' and 'The Cumberland Beggar' are far greater poems than that about the Old Man and the Robin written in 1846; but the unique Wordsworthian sympathy with the heart of the poor is as plain in this as in its greater predecessors. It is in 1845 that the venerable Tory breaks out in praise of the 'equal rights and simple honesty' of the early Pennsylvanians; and it is in one of the last Fenwick Notes, so constantly, ungratefully, and unjustly belittled by Mr Harper (what would we not give for similar notes by Shelley, even if written by an elderly Shelley who had ceased to believe that all the ills of the world come from the crimes of priests and kings?), that the poet, breaking out, as so often, against the inhumanity of the factory system, cries, 'Oh for the reign of justice, and then the humblest man among us would have more power and dignity in and about him than the highest have now!'

There are one or two partial and transient recognitions in Mr Harper of this essential unity of spirit which lay deep under Wordsworth's superficial changes of opinion. But it did not suit him to give more; and his book loses by its emphasis being laid not on the important but on the unimportant. The fact that Wordsworth was for a very few years a republican cannot justify a man in turning his Life into a book of Radical propaganda, any more than the fact that Mr Gladstone was for a short time a strong Conservative would justify any one who should make his biography a continuous attack upon Victorian Liberalism. But that is substantially what

Mr Harper has done. His book is far fuller of politics than of poetry; and it is not, and never will be, of politics that wise men will chiefly think when they hear the name of Wordsworth.

Yet Wordsworth disputes with Shakespeare and Milton the glory of being the greatest political name in the long line of our poets. There is, perhaps, in Shelley a finer purity of political passion than in any of the three; but Shelley's vision was set on changeless ideas and abstractions and not on those temporary, local, partial and changing embodiments of ideas which are the stuff of politics. The real Europe, the real Greece, Rome, England he could not see, as those others, and notably Wordsworth, could and did. Wordsworth went through a period when, as we have seen, under the influence of the French Revolution he approached politics from this side of abstractions. And it is this moment in his life on which Mr Harper lays all his stress. But what is notable about it is that it produced little or no great poetry dealing with political subjects. That came later, when he had seen the cause of Liberty embodied in the struggle of his own country against the lawless despotism of Napoleon. And, when we speak of him as a political poet, it is necessarily of this period that we chiefly think, because it and it alone produced great poetry. Yet of this poetry Mr Harper scarcely speaks at all. Eight or ten of his nine hundred pages are all that he gives to them. And these contain at least one strange impertinence:

'I attach only the smallest consequence,' says Mr Harper, speaking of 'The Happy Warrior,' 'to the note appended to the poem in the edition of 1807 stating that the death of Lord Nelson "directed the Author's thoughts to the subject," even though it is supported by a long Fenwick Note to the same effect, and by a letter from Southey to Scott, dated February 4, 1806' (II, 119).

Was there ever a more arrogant defiance of unpalatable truth? Mr Harper does not like war or its heroes; he does not wish to admit that Wordsworth paid honour to Nelson; and therefore neither the express, contemporary and public declaration of the poet himself, confirmed though it be by a note dictated in his old age, nor the

equally contemporary evidence of a letter written by Southey to Scott, who, after all, were not only both Wordsworth's friends but poets both, is to be held of any consequence whatever when weighed in the balance against Mr Harper's prejudices!

It may be as well that Mr Harper leaves this side of Wordsworth alone, for his total lack of sympathy with it would have made any chapter he might have written on it a predestined failure. Perhaps the war has opened his eyes, as it has opened the eyes of so many, to the sacred duty laid upon the free to repel the enemies of freedom with all their strength and at the cost, if need be, of their lives. But when he wrote this book he was perfectly blind to all that, and a bitter enemy of the mildest exhibitions of a warlike spirit. In October 1803, when an invasion was expected, Dorothy Wordsworth wrote to Mrs Clarkson that the poet had become a volunteer, and that 'surely there never was a more determined hater of the French, nor one more willing to do his utmost to destroy them if they really do come.' Most lovers of Wordsworth will be proud both of the act and of the feeling which inspired it. But Mr Harper considers it 'odious to see him in a bloodthirsty mood!'

The truth is that Mr Harper, at least when he has a pen in his hand, is a Godwinian rationalist to whom emotion is anathema, to whom any one man is as important as another, for whom 'social virtue consists, not in the love of this or the other individual, but in the love of man.' Wordsworth, on the other hand, was a complete human being, feeling as well as thinking, willingly yielding to local and personal attachments, and making no pretence that his brother was not more to him than another man, or England than France. He said some of the hardest words that have ever been said of England, and he could even rejoice in her defeat when he believed her to be fighting in an unholy cause. But his joy was never that of the abstract and cosmopolitan rationalist. It was a joy mixed with an agony of pain; the joy of a man who goes to the scaffold for his country, or, more nearly, of one who changes his faith, knowing that in doing so he stabs the mother whom he loves to the heart. The misery that Wordsworth suffered between 1793 and 1795 or 1796 was that of a tragic struggle between his heart

and his mind. For the moment, the thoughts mastered the feelings; and with silent despair in his heart he tried to live in the belief that an abstract liberty, equality and fraternity could take for men the place of the old humanities of father, son and brother, friend and lover and fellow-countryman. As he himself tells us in 'The Prelude,' he

'Zealously laboured to cut off [his] heart
From all the sources of her former strength ;'

he believed and hoped that

'future times would surely see
The man to come parted, as by a gulph,
From him who had been.'

That is, at the bidding, as he says, of 'syllogistic words' he gave up all hold on reality and in particular on the two ideas of continuity and locality or nationality which are the very foundation of the art of politics. The heart of man will not endure to be cut off 'from all the sources of her strength'; if it is so cut off, it dies. So Wordsworth found, as he tossed in a sea of insoluble questions, from which he was only rescued, first by devoting his faculty of pure reasoning to its proper sphere—that world of abstract science where 'disturbances of human will and power . . . find no admission'—and then by listening to old influences that had moved his heart from childhood, and above all to his sister Dorothy and to Nature, who led him back

'To those sweet counsels between head and heart'

from which alone grows 'genuine knowledge fraught with peace.'

The story has often been told, never so well, after the poet's own account, as by M. Legouis in his admirable 'Jeunesse de Wordsworth.' There is nothing better in his book than the chapter in which he shows the progress of Wordsworth's deliverance from Godwin's intellectual abstractions, according to which it was absurd to pretend that 'an honest ploughman' could be 'as virtuous as Cato.' Abstract man gradually faded from the poet's mind; and man as he is attracted his interest instead.

And, as he closely watched the poor about him and saw how much inherited customs and memories and affections meant to them, he gradually restored to the real man, as M. Legouis says, 'one by one, the feelings of which ideal man had been stripped by Godwin.' And so, mind and heart consenting together, great poetry came from him. But not yet great political poetry. For in that field mind and heart did not yet consent together. So long as the mind judged that France was fighting for, and England against, the cause of liberty and justice, while the heart remained as intensely English as it always was from his first day to his last, great poetry, which demands the union of mind and heart, could not come from Wordsworth.

The change began to come in 1798, when the French first attacked Switzerland. The next year Napoleon became First Consul. But it was not till 1802 that the great political poetry began. In that year Napoleon became First Consul for life; and France openly ceased to be a free country. In that year Napoleon sent Ney into Switzerland and assumed the attitude of a lord paramount of that country, which was to lead to graver interferences later on. In that year also Wordsworth renewed his interest in politics by visiting France during the peace. When he landed at Calais, he wrote the Sonnet 'Fair Star of Evening,' with which Mr Acland opens his useful and excellently edited little volume of Patriotic Poems. The poet looked across to England:

'There! that dusky spot
Beneath thee, that is England; there she lies.
Blessings be on you both! One hope, one lot,
One life, one glory! I with many a fear
For my dear Country, many heartfelt sighs,
Among men who do not love her, linger here.'

While there, he denounced the crowd of English whom he saw hurrying 'to bend the knee In France, before the new-born Majesty,' and declared that 'truth,' 'sense' and 'liberty' were flown from the new France. A week or two later he was at Dover again. His heart beat high at all he saw; for all was England and all was free. The two loves were now one.

'Here, on our native soil, we breathe once more.
The cock that crows, the smoke that curls, that sound
Of bells; those boys who in yon meadow-ground
In white-sleeved shirts are playing; and the roar
Of the waves breaking on the chalky shore;—
All, all are English. Oft have I looked round
With joy in Kent's green vales; but never found
Myself so satisfied in heart before.
Europe is yet in bonds; but let that pass,
Thought for another moment. Thou art free,
My Country! and 'tis joy enough and pride
For one hour's perfect bliss, to tread the grass
Of England once again, and hear and see,
With such a dear Companion at my side.'

The unity of mind and heart was attained, the choice taken; and now the political poetry could begin.

A few weeks ago, at a conference of the English Association, a bookseller was telling his audience that one of the effects of the war was an increased sale of poetry and especially of the poetry of Wordsworth. There can be no doubt, as indeed he said, that this is partly due to Mr Acland's little book, with its interesting introduction and the excellent historical notes which face the poems on the opposite pages, an arrangement as convenient and pleasant as it is original. But it must also be due to the peculiar nature of Wordsworth's patriotic poetry. It is not too much to say that it reads as if it were written for us to-day. Splendid as are Shakespeare's outbursts in 'Henry the Fifth' and 'King John,' we cannot quite feel *that* of them. The wars he had to deal with were mere duels of nations in which the interest we take is simply a pride in seeing the victory of our own. Except the fighting itself there is nothing great about them, no cause, no idea, nothing of the universal soul of man. But in this war—far more even than in the great struggle with Napoleon—everything great in life seems to be at stake. And it is natural, it is even inevitable that we should go back for comfort and courage in it to the poet who could not sound the trumpet till he could put his faith and vision into the blast it was to give—the poet who cried, as he looked on the narrow waters that lie between England and France:

'Winds blow, and waters roll,
Strength to the brave, and Power, and Deity;
Yet in themselves are nothing! One decree
Spake laws to *them*, and said that by the soul
Only, the Nations shall be great and free.'

These were not mere phrases in Wordsworth's mouth. He meant every syllable of them. It was the very core of his faith that, if we will let her, Nature strengthens and purifies our soul; and that the only kind of greatness worth having is that of the soul. That is the key to his attitude all through these years; and it is what lifts his message far above its immediate occasion. He has nothing to recant. He never changed his view that the original war against the French Republic was a sin against the light. But, when once France had, as he believed, given her soul away, when she had betrayed the cause of freedom and sold her honour to a despot for a blare of victorious trumpets, he had no doubt at all on which side the spiritual hopes of the world lay. He is never a mere patriot, of the 'my country right or wrong' type; he never blinds his eyes to England's faults, about which his Sonnets use harder words than they ever use about her enemy:

'Rapine, avarice, expense,
This is idolatry; and these we adore;
Plain living and high thinking are no more;
The homely beauty of the good old cause
Is gone; our peace, our fearful innocence,
And pure religion breathing household laws.'

Yet, in spite of all,

'It is not to be thought of that the flood
Of British freedom, which to the open sea
Of the world's praise, from dark antiquity,
Hath flowed, with pomp of waters unwithstood—
Roused though it be full often to a mood
Which spurns the check of salutary bands—
That this most famous stream in bogs and sands
Should perish, and to evil and to good
Be lost for ever;'

and, though Englishmen change swords for ledgers, his faith and love are stronger than his fears:

'when I think of thee, and what thou art
Verily, in the bottom of my heart,
Of those unfilial fears I am ashamed.
For dearly must we prize thee ; we who find
In thee a bulwark of the cause of men ;
And I by my affection was beguiled :
What wonder if a Poet now and then,
Among the many movements of his mind,
Felt for thee as a lover or a child !'

It is only because England, and only so far as England, is 'a bulwark of the cause of men,' that he can put his whole self, mind and heart and soul, into the struggle. All through, the appeal of his Sonnets is a spiritual appeal, more than worthy of Milton, whose Sonnets, read to him by his sister in May 1802, were his immediate inspiration. The thing that moved him was what moves the best men to-day—the great issue between a universal despotism, alien, lawless, the mere creature of force, and the liberties of the European nations, whether inherited from the past or to be won from the future. That made the Swiss question, which produced what is perhaps the finest of all the Sonnets, so decisive for him :

'Two Voices are there ; one is of the sea,
One of the mountains ; each a mighty Voice.
In both from age to age thou didst rejoice ;
They were thy chosen music, Liberty !
There came a Tyrant, and with holy glee
Thou fought'st against him, but hast vainly striven ;
Thou from thy Alpine holds at length art driven,
Where not a torrent murmurs heard by thee.
Of one deep bliss thine ear hath been bereft ;
Then cleave, O cleave to that which still is left ;
For, high-souled Maid, what sorrow would it be
That mountain floods should thunder as before,
And Ocean bellow from his rocky shore,
And neither awful Voice be heard by thee !'

And that is what makes the greatness of his pamphlet on the Convention of Cintra. He saw what so few of the statesmen saw, that this alliance with the peoples of Spain and Portugal had a hope in it, because it had a spiritual value in it, which the subsidising treaties with Continental sovereigns could not have. In his view the

Continental alliances might or might not be prudent expedients; the Spanish war was a thing of a higher order altogether, not an expedient but an act of principle; something into which faith and hope could throw themselves with a vision of new life. And the result proved that it was he and not the statesmen who were right. So soon as the Allies began to build on the principle of nationality, the end began to be in sight. What defeated Napoleon was not the resolve of the sovereigns to retain their property, but the resolve of England to be England, of Spain to be Spain, of Germany to be Germany, of Russia to be Russia. And it is scarcely too much to say, as Mr Dicey has lately said, in his interesting Introduction to a reprint of Wordsworth's Tract, that the policy of England has been 'markedly successful so far as it has coincided with the statesmanship of Wordsworth,' whom he calls 'the first of English Nationalists,' and not very successful so far as it has followed other lines.

It is following Wordsworth supremely to-day in what is, we may hope, the final struggle, under the guidance, as it has strangely and fortunately happened, of a Foreign Minister who is well-known to be, what Mr Acland calls him in his dedication, 'a life-long lover of Wordsworth.' Our cause is essentially the same. If we are asked what we are fighting for to-day, no doubt it is partly, now as then, for what Pitt defined in one word, 'security.' But, now as then, that is far from being all. If it were all, we should not have the Allies we have; we should not be watched as we are watched by eager eyes of passionate sympathy in all the countries where freedom is loved throughout the world; we should not be conscious, as Wordsworth was and we also may humbly be, of spiritual forces fighting on our side. We believe, as Wordsworth believed, that our enemy's triumph would be the destruction of men's highest hopes for the political future of the world. We go back to Wordsworth because our position is so like his. And, if our position is so like, we must remember that so also are our duties. What did he insist upon through all those awful years when England stood, often without an ally, against the greatest military genius the world has ever seen? First of all on perseverance. 'We ought not to make peace with France on any account,' he wrote, 'till she is humiliated and her

power brought within reasonable bounds.' That is strong language, but the man who called Carnage 'God's daughter' was no mincer of phrases. He was a poet, and he need not be interpreted as if he were writing a scientific treatise. But he meant, and all that is wisest and strongest in England means to-day, that we ought not to think of resting till our work is done and the liberties of Europe are no longer in danger.

The second thing on which he insisted was hope :

'Hope, the paramount *duty* that Heaven lays,
For its own honour, on man's suffering heart.'

'I began with hope,' he said in 1808, 'and hope has inwardly accompanied me to the end.' And so in the Tract on Cintra :

'There is a spiritual community binding together the living and the dead ; the good, the brave, the wise of all ages. We would not be rejected from this community ; and therefore do we hope. We look forward with erect mind, thinking and feeling ; it is an obligation of duty ; take away the sense of it, and the moral being would die within us' (pp. 187-8).

His is no cheap or easy optimism :

'We know the arduous strife, the eternal laws
To which the triumph of all good is given,
High sacrifice and labour without pause
Even to the death.'

So his Happy Warrior is

'doomed to go in company with Pain,
And Fear, and Bloodshed,'

and the people of England, as he sees them, are ready, without fear or flinching, to be

'left alone,
The last that dare to struggle with the Foe.'

And indeed he and his England had a harder task to face in that duty of hope than we have. Instead of standing alone, as they often did, we have more than half Europe with us. We have seen no mutinies of the Navy, as they saw ; where they saw some of their greatest men

openly sympathising with the enemy, we have had the supreme blessing of a united nation. Those who have been reading the very interesting correspondence of Lord Granville Leveson Gower just given us by Lady Granville will have been struck at once with horror and with a thankful sense of contrast. Then, even so late as 1813, people like Lord Holland were wishing for French victories; to-day not even our obscurest cranks wish success to the Germans. 'In Britain is one breath,' said Wordsworth, seeing the ideal Britain and not the real. But what was not true then is true to-day. After a moment's hesitation the whole nation rallied to the great call; and one of the most distinguished of the Liberals, who had hesitated during the critical days of decision and publicly expressed his hesitation, could write to a friend a fortnight later, after the Belgian crime, and find Wordsworth's 'In Britain is one breath' the inevitable phrase in which to declare his recognition of the war as a war of justice, and the national cause as the cause of liberty and right. He and thousands of others would not have felt as they did and would not have thought of going to Wordsworth to utter what they felt, if they had not seen this war, as Wordsworth saw that of his day, as a struggle with the powers of darkness. Belgium opened their eyes. And the very blankness of her desolation, the utter and visible failure of all material means to avert her ruin, made them turn, like Wordsworth, to a deeper, a more inward consolation, at once a faith, a vision, and a call to arms; made them say to Belgium and to all who had died or were to die for her and for the cause which she sanctified by her martyrdom:

'Thou hast left behind
Powers that will work for thee; air, earth and skies;
There's not a breathing of the common wind
That will forget thee; thou hast great allies:
Thy friends are exultations, agonies,
And love, and man's unconquerable mind.'

JOHN BAILEY.

Art. 8.—SOLDIERS AND SAILORS ON THE LAND.

1. *Part I of the Final Report of the Departmental Committee to consider the Settlement or Employment on the Land in England and Wales of Discharged Soldiers and Sailors.* [Cd. 8182.] Wyman, 1916.
2. *Agriculture after the War.* By A. D. Hall. Murray, 1916.
3. *Farm Work for Discharged Soldiers.* By Harold E. Moore. King, 1916.
4. *The Ex-Soldier, by Himself.* By W. G. Clifford (late R.A.). Black, 1916.

THE Departmental Committee on Land Settlement for soldiers and sailors has reported in favour of a system of cooperative colonies; and, at the time of writing, a Bill is before Parliament to carry their recommendations into effect. The Committee suggests three types of settlement, distinguished by the various branches of the agricultural industry for which they will be respectively organised. One is to be for fruit and market gardening; another for dairying; a third for mixed farming. The first two types have been already tried. But the last-named is really a new and an interesting experiment. If a cooperative colony of small-holders can successfully compete with a well-organised large farm in the cheap production of bread and meat, one reasonable and indeed formidable objection to the extension of the small-holding movement will be removed. But to make the experiment of any value in this direction it must be strictly conducted on business lines. Colonists and tenant-farmers must be working under the same conditions, or the test will be unfair. The Committee very wisely makes a modest beginning. For the establishment of one of each of the three types of colonies 5000 acres of land are required. Those soldiers or sailors who have been already accustomed to agricultural work will be settled at once upon holdings in their own occupation within the colony; those who have had little or no previous experience will be trained by working at weekly wages. Each colony is to be managed by a resident director; and expert advice, guidance, and instruction are provided by agricultural or horticultural instructors.

The Government proposal strongly appeals to public

sympathies. Everyone wishes to recognise the inestimable value of the services which our sailors and soldiers have rendered to the nation. Yet a note of warning must be sounded. The present writer has had considerable experience in the working of small holdings, both on a private estate and as a member of a Committee of a County Council which has been active in putting into force the Act of 1908. In his opinion, the utmost care should be taken to study the serious questions involved in the creation of small-holding colonies, before any wide extension is given to the movement. It ought, for instance, to be decided whether cooperative farms of small-holders can be made such efficient instruments for the production of bread and meat as a large farm of the existing type in individual hands. If that question is decided in the negative, then the extent to which the nation can afford to divert good land from the production of its supply of staple foods must also be considered in the light of the present war. These two instances serve to illustrate the gravity of the problems which have to be solved, and the necessity of approaching them without any of the prejudices which have been engendered by years of political strife. In fact, at this crisis of our national development, the most effective as well as the cheapest land-reform, which human wisdom could devise, would be the exclusion of agriculture from the region of party politics.

These reflections naturally arise from the mention of a subject which has been so fiercely fought as Small Holdings. Practical men know that it is impossible in any direction to generalise to any useful extent on such a subject. But it is precisely through wide generalisations, deduced from insufficient particulars, that politicians and social reformers most often go astray. Because small holdings sometimes, and in some places, succeed, they will not necessarily succeed always and everywhere. If all the land of the country were cut up into small isolated occupations, the gross production of all kinds of food would not be increased; on the contrary, we should have to buy from the foreigner larger quantities of bread and meat. There is no magic in size, great or small. It is economically best to have holdings of all sizes, from the allotment to the large farm; one size is

best for one kind of produce, another for another. Certain qualities of land are adapted to small holdings; other qualities are so inappropriate as to spell the ruin of the small occupier. Even where the land is suitable, it does not follow that, because one man has succeeded, there is room for another to succeed in the same parish.

All small holdings are not well cultivated, nor are all large farms well farmed, and *vice versâ*. The produce per acre raised from the one cannot be fairly compared with the produce raised from the other, unless due allowance is made for the fact that the small holding consists of good or fair land, well-situated, while the large farm always contains a proportion of unproductive land, which can only be worked in conjunction with good land and could not be worked at all as a small holding. The nearest approach that can be made to any general principle is to say that there are certain conditions on which the economic success of the small holder most often depends. The land must be suitable in quality—either good in itself, or easily worked and responsive to fertilisers—and enjoy convenient access to a market; and the prices of the produce raised must be remunerative. Even then the personal element must be taken into account. More important even than the size or situation of the holding is the holder, or, more correctly, the holder and his wife.

Practical considerations like these illustrate the danger, from an agricultural point of view, of generalising about small holdings. Except in a limited range of produce, small holdings in the hands of individuals rarely afford a better livelihood to the occupier than the earnings of an agricultural labourer; and the remuneration is often more uncertain. The converse is also sometimes true. If a man has other sources of income, a small holding is an admirable supplement to his means of living. But, as a rule, a small holding is rather a good crutch than a good leg. Much is made by the politician of the advantages of ownership over tenancy; they bulk largely in rural programmes at the time of an election. The small holder himself is less concerned with the question. What he generally wants is to be secure in his occupation, to pay as little for it as possible, to be

independent, and to call no man master. If he gets these conditions, he is not inclined to bother about the means by which they are attained. If, in order to become an owner, he has to make a heavier annual payment than he has to make as a tenant, he will probably prefer tenancy, provided that his occupation is secure, and that he cannot have his rent raised on his improvements. He is generally more or less impervious to the argument that, as owner, he will have something to leave to his children. He is apt to observe that posterity has done nothing for him, and to ask why should he do anything for posterity. Nor is it, as an agricultural fact, true to say that owners always farm their land better than tenants. Instances for or against the proposition might be quoted by any one familiar with rural England. The magic of property makes some men slovens, as it makes others tigers of industry. One general proposition is, however, certainly true of ninety-nine cases out of a hundred. Small men cannot afford to pay a deposit as a first step to ownership. They need their capital intact, either to put it into the land, or to keep them going till they can sell their first crop. If ownership is to be introduced, it must be on a system which requires no initial outlay on purchase and provides for the payment of the money by easy instalments.

In point of fact, the advantages of small holdings in individual hands are social rather than agricultural. They breed a race of men whose sturdy independence and self-reliance are a valuable asset to the nation. They are a rigorous school in which children are trained to work hard, value thrift, and live simply. They develop initiative and resource in men, who would go through life with those faculties dormant if they only had to obey orders. They are rungs in the social ladder by which men can hope to rise from the ranks of hired labourers. How valuable they already are in this respect, and the extent to which the opportunities they afford have been seized by the men themselves, is often ignored and misrepresented. The following instances—out of many—may be quoted. On one estate, 3 out of 15 tenants were themselves agricultural labourers; and, of the remaining 12, 2 are sons of labourers. These men are now paying rents ranging from 200*l.* to 750*l.* a year. On

another estate under the same management, 10 out of 35 tenants began life as labourers. On two estates managed by another agent similar results are shown. On one of the two properties, 12 out of 22 tenants, and, on the other, 14 out of 36, began life as farm labourers, and are now paying rents ranging from 110% to 400% a year. On an estate of 2932 acres, there are 41 tenants of farms, besides the tenants of accommodation land. Fifteen of the 41 began life as farm labourers. Four estates, from their position typical of average properties in a particular county, show the following results. In (A) 36 per cent. of the tenants holding over 50 acres began as farm labourers; in (B) 37 per cent.; in (C) 28 per cent.; in (D) 14 per cent. Similar instances might be quoted in every part of England and Wales. All the examples given have occurred on private estates; all are independent of the Small Holdings Act; and none are taken from men who have acquired holdings under that legislation. They are mentioned here to show that agricultural labourers enjoy, and in many instances use, opportunities of advancement, which are at least as great as those enjoyed by cotton operatives or other factory workers. The facts illustrate once more the danger of too hasty generalisations. Village life has many drawbacks; it is monotonous and dull; but the attribute of dreary hopelessness, on which politicians so emphatically insist, requires considerable modification.

The social advantages, therefore, of small holdings are incontestable, and are proved by experience. But against those advantages must be set some economic and agricultural disadvantages which are equally undeniable. It is in weighing the one against the other that the politician and the social reformer might be useful, especially if they were willing to take both into consideration. Unfortunately they are prone to fix their attention only on the aspect of the question which seems to favour their preconceived opinions.

The wisdom of the policy of extending the small-holding system ought to be partly measured by the proportion of successes or failures. It must, therefore, be tested over a cycle of years sufficiently long to embrace falling as well as rising markets and adverse as well as

favourable seasons. Small men, in every industry, are the first to suffer by bad years. Men with larger capital are better able to weather storms; and an industry like agriculture is fully exposed, not only to fluctuations in prices, but to the caprice of rain and frost and want of sun. Unfavourable seasons are not the only difficulty, especially in the early years of occupation. When a small holder is starting, any sudden glut of the market on which he depends is enough to cause his ruin. Weak powers of resistance to unfavourable conditions are one of the disadvantages of small holdings and small capital. Another disadvantage is the temptation to work too hard and too long, and to exact from the family the same excess of effort. In the struggle for independence physical strength is apt to be overtaxed. Experience in rural districts shows that this danger of excessive labour is too real to be wholly disregarded.

Apart from the narrow margin on which the small holder works, and the tendency to impose on himself and his dependants an excessive strain, there are economic disadvantages which ought to be carefully considered, before the State decides to devote large sums of money to an artificial increase in the number of small holders. As a general rule, small holders only succeed where they can raise from the land two crops in the year. The range, therefore, of agricultural produce, in the cultivation of which they are likely to make their holdings pay, is limited; and the limitations at once suggest, as has been already stated, a question of national importance. It is not merely that farming operations become cheaper as their scale extends, or that machinery is most profitably used on large areas. No small holder can individually embark with reasonable prospects of success on any forms of productive industry in which the gross returns per acre are small, or in which manual labour does not form a relatively high proportion of the total costs of production. In other words, bread, meat, and the wholesale supply of milk lie outside his range. It therefore becomes a serious question for the country to consider, whether, and to what extent, it can allow the limited land of these islands to be cultivated for crops which are not necessary for the maintenance of the essential food-supplies of the nation. Before a large policy of small

holdings is entered upon, this question must be considered in the light of experience and definitely answered.

Apart from the few men who are able to establish a local milk trade, small holders are practically restricted to the production of vegetables, fruit, and flowers. Even in this direction they are seriously handicapped by the smallness of their capital and the perishable nature of their produce. If they cannot get a market for their garden-stuff at the moment when it is ready for sale, it rapidly deteriorates in value. Corn-growers can afford to wait for a favourable turn in prices, because their produce does not spoil by keeping. Not so the small holder; and unfortunately his capital is too often inadequate to stand the loss. In this connexion it may be useful to consider whether the sale for garden produce, when peace is proclaimed, is likely to be as good as it was before the war. The spending power of the country will be, for many years to come, seriously crippled. People will have to abstain from luxuries. If this is true, then it is an additional reason for caution in the extension of small holdings. Even in the narrow range to which the small holder is limited, though minute and personal attention to details count for much, efficient organisation, combined with effective supervision, counts for more. Occupiers of large holdings are also most likely to command, not only more capital, but more scientific knowledge and greater business capacity, than occupiers of small holdings. They are, therefore, less prone to be timidly conservative, unprogressive and wanting in enterprise. To these advantages the large occupier adds that of economy in cost. In market gardening, as well as in ordinary farming, large production is cheaper than small. If two areas, one of 10 acres, another of 60 acres, stand side by side in a market-garden district where intensive cultivation is practised, it will be generally found that the larger area is better cultivated than the small area, produces more per acre, and yields greater net profits. No one is more keenly alive to these facts than the successful small holder himself. His great ambition is to obtain more land and so reap the advantage of a larger occupancy.

Wherever his personal labour can be brought into effective play, the individual small occupier can hold his

own in the range of produce to which his land is adapted. But obviously, in an important sphere of his operations, the smallness of the quantities in which he deals is a serious handicap to the successful prosecution of his business. As a buyer of fertilisers and feeding-stuffs, he is dependent on local dealers and pays retail prices; he cannot profit by the reductions in prices and railway rates which are given on large quantities. As a seller, the handicap is still more serious. His consignments to the railway are too small to command the lowest freights; his limited output prevents him from properly grading his produce or offering it in uniform bulk; and he has to deal with middle-men, who either refuse his surplus of inferior stuff, or pay for it in postage stamps instead of by cheque. If he tries to work up a local connexion with private customers, he may find the ground already occupied, and only succeed in cutting the throat of a neighbour, if not his own as well.

Economically the small holding is not, in individual hands, a wholly satisfactory unit. In all kinds of business the tendency is to amalgamation, a larger turnover, and the reduction of working expenses. It is difficult to think that in this respect the agricultural industry differs materially from other industries. Whether the inherent disadvantages of the small-holding system can be removed by cooperation is one of the most important questions which have to be solved. From this point of view, the Government experiment is valuable, because it embraces the two sides of the industry, and applies the principle to the small holder both as a cultivator of the soil and as a trader. Cooperation has not as yet been readily adopted by agriculturists. The writer, in dealing with many applicants for small holdings, has found that one objection is very generally taken to its introduction. The most energetic and capable men are opposed to the principle on the ground that it destroys individual enterprise, and makes the best man keep step with the worst. The most successful market-gardeners are those who possess energy and intelligence enough to find out for themselves the best markets. They want, not unnaturally, to profit individually by their own superior capacity. Rightly or wrongly, they regard cooperation as a device to keep weaklings on their

feet, and a cooperative society as a lean-to shelter. This is the difficulty—it may be the prejudice—against which cooperation has to contend in this country.

A cooperative colony of fruit-growers or of market-gardeners, or of dairymen, or of small farmers, completely organised as an industrial unit for the cultivation of the soil as well as for trade, may be able to overcome the economic difficulties which hamper isolated small holdings in the hands of individuals. This is the experiment which the Government scheme contemplates. The land would be cultivated and cropped under the technical guidance of the expert director and the supervision of the skilled instructors. From the *dépôt* each individual occupier would purchase tools, manures, seeds, netting, and other necessities at wholesale prices. Each man would provide the manual labour for his holding. Whatever operations required machinery or horse labour would be undertaken by the Society, and charged to the individual occupier at cost price. All the produce would be collected at the central *dépôt*, graded, packed, and despatched in bulk, at the lowest railway rates, to the most favourable market. To the *dépôt*, on any large colony, would be attached the installations appropriate to the business undertaken. Thus a fruit colony would be equipped with provision for the various processes of pulping, canning, drying, bottling, and jam-making, so that loss from a glut of fresh fruit might be prevented, and inferior produce utilised. A dairy colony would be similarly provided with a cheese-factory or a creamery, and possibly a bacon factory. In these directions the cooperative colony offers prospects of success; and experience has in many details already tested the working value of the principle. Mixed arable and grass farms for the cultivation of staple crops and for the breeding and fattening of stock on the lines of cooperative colonies are more difficult to organise. They have not, so far as we know, yet been tried; experience is therefore wanting. If they can be made to succeed economically, if, that is, they can raise as much bread and meat and as cheaply as large farms under individual management, this will remove the objection that a reduction of our essential food supplies is a consequence of extending the small-holding system.

It must, however, be noticed that under the system of cooperative colonies economic success must be purchased by some sacrifice of the social advantages which are justly claimed for small holdings. The members of the colony are held in leading strings; they are under discipline and obey instructions. They cannot, it is true, become unprogressive and conservative. But they are not trained in those habits of independence, initiative, and self-reliance, which render individual small holders valuable assets to the State; nor do they obtain that freedom from control which is dear to those who desire to call no man master. The cooperative framework will, it is to be hoped, be so constructed as to allow in the future the utmost possible exercise of individualism. In the initial stages of the enterprise, it is all-important that the colony should be started on right lines. Spoon-feeding is necessary. But it may be hoped that eventually the guidance of the expert and the supervision of the instructors may be relaxed, if not dispensed with altogether, when once the members have mastered the principles of their industry, and have learned to work together without the paternal despotism which is inconsistent with true cooperation. If the colony meets the economic difficulty only at the expense of some of the social advantages, it cannot be regarded as anything more than a means to an end, a transitional educational stage in the evolution of the small holder. The virtues of the class are not created in a day; but colonies organised on the proposed lines will be valuable training schools. More than this, if they are more or less completely organised before the settlers are placed upon the land, they will protect inexperienced men from wasting their slender capital on ill-judged outlay, and prevent them from hampering themselves with business connexions from which they will find it difficult to get free. It is often contended that as many isolated small holdings have been formed as are capable of profitable working. Whether this is true or not, it must be admitted that in many instances there would be more prosperity if there were more expert guidance. Cooperative colonies, therefore, seem to offer a useful means of planting a larger population on the land, and of meeting the economic difficulties which, in the

initial stages of their industry, the settlers must expect to encounter.

As to the general policy of small holdings, the position is well summarised by Mr A. D. Hall in his admirable book on 'Agriculture after the War' (pp. 58-59):

'Compared with the industrialised farm, the small-holding colony will be a less efficient and more expensive producer; it is also indifferently adapted to farming for wheat and the other staple crops, and to the breeding and fattening of cattle and sheep. The establishment of a colony of small holders would also require more capital than would be wanted for an industrialised farm of the same area and giving employment to the same number of men, because of the extra cost of buildings, fencing, roads, etc., necessitated by the multiplicity of holdings. Nevertheless, as small holdings are justified by their social advantages, as they respond to certain real if not universal factors in human nature, the State may be expected after the war to continue and extend its former policy of promoting their creation and financing their establishment out of public funds. Having gone so far, and because the security for its loans depends upon the prosperity of the holders, the State should even in its own interest go a stage further and divide up no estate into small holdings without at the same time setting up an organisation for cooperative working, which alone can enable the small farmer to compete with the large producer.'

With these conclusions the present writer substantially agrees. But it is suggested that the lessons of the war have forced upon the nation the advisability of increasing its home-grown supplies of the staple articles of food. Whether this greater degree of self-supporting independence is at the present moment the paramount consideration for this country, or whether it is less urgent than the settlement of a larger population on the land, may perhaps be disputed. It is at all events a matter of serious importance. We cannot extend without limit the cultivation of vegetables, fruit and flowers without trenching upon the resources available for the production of more essential articles. We may emphasise the social advantages of small holdings, and remove or modify their economic disadvantages; but we cannot afford to ignore our everyday need of bread and meat. Unless cooperative societies are found by

experience to be efficient factories of corn and beef, national safety demands that some limit should be placed on the immediate extension of small holdings in this as well as in the isolated form.

One of the strongest arguments that can be urged in favour of small holdings is that, in these democratic days, no industry, in which only a small section of the population is interested, can hope to obtain a proper share of attention or even of justice at the hands of the public or of Parliament. At the present time owners of land, tenant farmers, and agricultural labourers, present a divided front. Even the union of landlords and tenants is less secure than it was; and the class which is numerically the most important is opposed, and often bitterly opposed, to both. The basis of the landed interest must be broadened, or it will crumble to pieces. That broader basis in the national life can be best consolidated by the extension of small holdings. Commercially, they may be unsound; but socially, they make for contentment. The life of the small holder is often hard and grinding; yet the man is a better citizen because of his independence. It probably will take years to make him all that he might be, and ought to be. He will need agricultural education; he will require the help of State capital; he will have to acquire some of the virtues of the French peasant. But, when once he is able to stand on his own feet, whether in this generation or the next, he will prove an invaluable national asset. No better material for the small holders of the future—whether owners or occupiers—can be found than the soldiers and sailors who have already proved their worth on the hardest of all fields.

It is not, therefore, in any spirit of hostility to the movement that a plea for cautious handling is urged. If the Government scheme is to proceed on the lines laid down, it is open to two obvious objections. There must be a considerable displacement of farmers and labourers to make room for the new settlers. A further objection is that the expense is necessarily heavy in proportion to the results obtained. From both these points of view, attention should be paid to the suggestion made by an anonymous correspondent in the 'Times' ('Reclamation of Waste Land,' June 12, 13, 14). He

proposes that the Government should use German prisoners, interned aliens, and conscientious objectors, in the national work of reclaiming cultivable land in Great Britain on scientific principles. At present, work of this kind is not undertaken because it will not pay. It means spending more on labour and fertilisers than the capital value of the land. The principal item in the cost is labour, of which, at the present moment, the Government commands a large and cheap supply. The opportunity is, therefore, unique. Some of the reclaimed land would be rich alluvial soil. The bulk of it would be light or sandy in character, easily worked and capable under scientific treatment of bearing useful crops. If the money, which under the Government scheme is to be spent upon individuals, were put into the reclaimed soil, the land would rapidly improve in value, add to the agricultural wealth of the country, and provide a large vacant area on which the new settlers might be profitably placed. The suggestion at least deserves consideration. In the hands of Mr A. D. Hall, the Development Commissioner, whose reputation for knowledge of the chemistry of the soil and the properties of fertilisers is European, the enterprise of reclamation would have the best possible chance of success.

By whatever means small holders are placed upon the land, the most formidable difficulty for them as well as for all other agriculturists is the weather. No legislative enactment can alter the barometer as it has already altered the clock. Apart from this capricious source both of fortune and of misfortune, market-gardeners suffer most from the competition of foreign producers and from the want either of capital or of cheap credit. On both these points a few words may be said.

First, as to competition. One of the necessary conditions of success for a small holder is a remunerative price for his produce. Probably the multiplication of the number of market-gardeners and the increased competition in the supply of flowers, fruit and vegetables will result in a lower range of prices. The fall may possibly be accentuated by a decline in the purchasing power of the nation when peace is declared. Presumably, supply and demand will be adjusted in the ordinary

way by the industry becoming less overstocked. But the process is severe on individuals; and for this reason, if for no other, the State should be careful not to encourage too many small occupiers to embark in this branch of the agricultural industry. It does not seem probable that any attempt will be made to restrict competition by imposing duties on foreign imports. Taxes on imported food may be considered necessary for the benefit of the country as a whole; but they seem to be the last form in which the principle of tariffs will be acceptable to the nation. As a body, urban wage-earners are opposed to any such taxation, because they believe that it would result in higher prices for food and a consequent reduction in the real value of their wages. They may be open to conviction on a point which is certainly open to argument. But the issue need not be raised here. All parties would certainly agree that foreign producers ought not to be brought into the English market on more favourable terms than home producers obtain. Yet this is what, as English market-gardeners contend, our English railways do for foreigners.

The point is intricate; but to home producers of vegetables, fruit and flowers, some of which are low-priced and perishable and therefore require cheap and quick delivery, it is one of great importance. It is mentioned now, because there is a favourable opportunity to investigate all the circumstances which militate against the prosperity of small holders, and to remove any artificial obstacles to their success. No one suggests that the English Railway Companies are acting illegally; on the contrary, as the law stands and has been interpreted in the courts, their action is justified. It may even be admitted that the policy of the Companies is to the interest, not only of their shareholders, but of the consumer. The grievance is a grievance of home producers. Put shortly, it is this. English market-gardeners, raising their produce for a home retail market, are told by the railways that, in tendering their goods for carriage, they must conform to conditions which are suitable, and indeed necessary, for the foreign producer who grows for a wholesale export trade. If they can, and do, so conform, then they will receive the same favourable treatment as the foreigner; if they cannot, or will not,

then the foreign produce is carried at cheaper rates, and in quicker trains. The result is that the advantages which greater proximity to the market should give to home producers are reversed in favour of the foreigner. Instead of enjoying the natural advantages of time and distance, their produce costs them more to carry, and takes longer in delivery. Fair competition is a useful stimulus. But the unequal competition created by the policy of the English railways is, say the home producers, a crushing handicap.

Foreign produce is admittedly carried over English railways at more favourable rates than English produce. But the answer of the Companies is that the imports arrive at the English ports in concentrated form, great in volume, regular in quantity, and securely packed. If the English produce were tendered under the same or similar conditions, it would be carried at the same favourable rates. As a matter of business management, the answer is reasonable. As a matter of law it is complete. No charge of undue preference can be established against a Railway Company in respect of rates on the carriage of foreign produce, provided that the same rate would be given for 'the same or similar services' in the carriage of home produce. But the hardship is that the two traffics are so inherently different in conditions that the services in respect of them must inevitably be dissimilar. The character of a wholesale export trade is essentially different from that of a retail home trade. The former is necessarily collected, combined, and concentrated on the ship which brings it to the port served by the English railway. Necessarily, also, it is tendered to the Railway Companies for delivery at great centres in large quantities, at regular intervals, and packed so as to stand transshipment. None of these conditions are natural to home produce, raised in small quantities on detached holdings, consigned not only to large but to small consuming centres, and packed for short journeys without transshipment. To compel home producers to pay higher charges for carriage, or to conform to the conditions which obtain cheap rates for the foreign importer, is to handicap the English market-gardener in his competition with his foreign rival. No doubt the packing is often inadequate; and more might be done by combination to tender larger

quantities with greater regularity. But, as has been already pointed out, one secret of success for an individual market-gardener is the discovery of the best market. To combine or cooperate with his neighbour is to betray his secret and to lose the advantage of his superior intelligence or enterprise. It is difficult to suggest any remedy except that of an import duty, especially when both shareholders and consumers benefit by the foreign trade. On the other hand, the severity of foreign competition is undoubtedly increased by the differential rates against home-grown produce. Nor is it a complete answer to say that a great part of the imported produce does not compete with home-grown supplies, because it arrives before the English stuff is on the market. The favourable rates at which the seasonal imports are brought into the country prevent home-growers from creating a competitive home trade by means of forcing under glass. If the number of market-gardeners is to be multiplied, we cannot afford to close by artificial means any possible source of earning a livelihood which is naturally open to the industry.

The second point is that of capital and credit. Not only to small holders but to the whole agricultural community, there could be no more inestimable boon than facilities for obtaining cheap money or cheap credit. At the present moment, when Finance is turned topsyturvy, the point seems inappropriate. But, though the cheap money of to-day would have seemed extravagantly dear two years ago, cheapness is a relative term, while the principle remains the same. In every part of the British Empire, except Great Britain, systems of giving cheap credit to farmers have been established by the State. Every civilised nation in the world, except Great Britain, has a more or less elaborate system of the same kind. The legislatures of other countries are largely occupied in perfecting their existing systems. In 1914, for example, Saxony, Spain, Hungary, Italy, Portugal, the Ottoman Empire, the State of Massachusetts, Argentina, and Costa Rica, framed more or less elaborate statutes regulating or extending their previous provisions for employing State credit on behalf of agriculturists. The persistence with which some form of *crédit foncier* occurs all over the world is a striking proof

of the need for such assistance. The equally remarkable absence of any institution of the kind in Great Britain is a good illustration of the neglect of agriculture in this country, and of the difficulty that an industry, in which only a small proportion of the population is interested, experiences in gaining a proper share of attention from the public or from Parliament. The neglect is the more remarkable because, under the system of the *crédit foncier* which is more or less adopted in the majority of countries, no loss falls upon the State. On the contrary a profit is generally made. The State borrows at the lowest rate of interest which its credit can command, and lends at a rate sufficiently high to defray the costs of administration and provide a margin against loss.

Money must be put into land, before any money can be got out of it; and, owing to the uncertainties of the seasons, agriculturists ought to have capital enough to wait till they can average their returns over a period of years. For years past the land has been bled white of agricultural capital; to-day it is in consequence, starved and anæmic. To this depletion of money various causes have contributed. During the years of depression, it was calculated before the Eversley Commission of 1893-1897 that landlords and tenants had lost 800,000,000*l.*; and that capital has never been replaced. The superior attractions of other investments, the impoverishment of rural landlords, the disappearance of the old country banks, and political disquietude, have helped to increase the drain of money from the land. Cheap credit is essential for the regeneration of rural England—for more intensive cultivation, for drainage, for the break-up of pasture, for rural housing. The State is in the best position to create it, without risking a loss of principal or interest, and with the prospect of great dividends in the improvement of national health, national contentment, national character, and national safety. It seems inconsistent with the present spirit of the People, that the boon should be withheld on account of class hatreds or party prejudices.

Art. 9.—FOUR YEARS OF THE CHINESE REPUBLIC.*

1. *Constitution-building in China.* By Prof. L. R. O. Bevan. 'North China Daily News and Herald,' 1910.
2. *The Japanese Empire and its Economic Conditions.* By Joseph Dautremer. Fisher Unwin, 1910.
3. *Financial and Historical Review of the Chinese Revolution.* 'Far Eastern Review.' Shanghai, April, 1912.
4. *La Chine et le Mouvement constitutionnel (1910-'11).* By Jean Rodés. Paris: Alcan, 1913.

CHINA at the present moment is weaker than at any previous period in her long history, while Japan, already a first-class Power, is steadily increasing her power and enhancing her prestige. This statement of an incontrovertible fact, the relevancy of which will be seen later, will serve to introduce a study of recent events and developments in China, undertaken with the hope that it may bring to light the reasons for the failure of the Chinese people to make effective use of the opportunities for progress and reform presented by the abdication of the Manchu rulers early in 1912.

Political consciousness is not an indigenous growth in China. The system of government that prevailed throughout the Manchu régime was in theory autocratic. With the exception of the Taiping Rebellion, which was ostensibly anti-dynastic, the risings which occurred from time to time were usually protests against unduly heavy taxation. There is no evidence that there was any desire on the part of the bulk of the people to take a personal share in the government of the country. So long as the exactions of the governing classes did not exceed a certain limit, the people were indifferent to the form of government. Had it been possible for China to evade all diplomatic intercourse with Western nations and to interdict the residence of foreigners in China, it is probable that the development of political consciousness among the Chinese would have been long delayed. The political convictions that inspired many of the revolutionaries in 1911-12 were not indigenous. The belief

* This article was written and despatched from China some time before the death of Yuan Shih-kai on June 6 (EDITOR).

that it was the right of the individual to claim some part in determining by whom, or in what manner, he was to be governed was an alien conception. Moreover, the awakening of political consciousness, even in the few, was of slow growth. So late as the beginning of this century many foreigners were inclined to fear that what has been described as the 'decay of China' could be arrested only by placing the Government in commission, or by a partition of the country. A thrill of hope had been felt in 1898, when Kang Yu-wei and other reformers prevailed upon the late Emperor Kwang Hsü to promulgate his famous Reform Edicts; but, when it was seen that the sole result was the virtual dethronement of the Emperor, the decapitation of some of the reformers and the expatriation of others, it was generally felt that there was but little ground for hope of regeneration from within.

This pessimism was not wholly justified. The effect of several decades of gradually extending intercourse with foreigners, though not giving many surface indications, was considerable. Railways, posts and telegraphs, and newspapers were weakening provincial jealousies and aiding in the dissemination of political ideas. The huge size of the field made tillage in preparation for the crop of reform tedious and long, but the work was making such sure progress that the great Empress-Dowager felt compelled to direct the operations which she was powerless to suspend. As she could not prevent the breaking of the ground, she determined that hers should be the choice of the seed to be sown.

A disposition has been evinced in some quarters to throw doubt upon the genuineness of the Empress-Dowager's conversion to constitutionalism, but there seems to be justification for the belief that she really recognised that the nation would be strengthened if constitutionalism were introduced. She was also much too sagacious to suppose that, after the damning exposures of the incompetence of the bureaucracy in 1894-5 and 1900-01, the people would tolerate the perpetuation of a system which had twice broken down badly in the face of a crisis. Moreover, her strongly developed political instinct would teach her that only by the creation of a bond of affection between the Throne

and the Chinese people could the downfall of the dynasty be averted. Is it not reasonable to suppose that patriotism and statecraft combined induced the Empress-Dowager to associate herself with the cause of reform? The remarkable deliberation with which it was proposed that the advance towards representative government should be made was not a proof of insincerity, but an indication of distrust in the political capacity of the 'foolish people'—a distrust, it may be remarked, not unnatural in an Imperial Lady who had enjoyed autocratic power for half a century.

It is probable, indeed almost certain, that the Empress-Dowager intended that the establishment of constitutionalism in China should, as far as possible, proceed on the lines adopted by the statesmen of Japan under the far-sighted and wise leadership of the late Prince Ito. Those who, after the restoration of the Emperor to secular sovereignty, directed national affairs in Japan determined to educate the people politically before giving them, even theoretically, any voice in the government. Administrative reform was first carried out by a bureaucracy responsible only to the sovereign. When the time came for the Emperor to redeem his promise to grant a constitution, the reformed machinery of government was working efficiently, and the people had gained rudimentary political knowledge.

It must be confessed that the Empress-Dowager allowed the superficial resemblances between the position in Japan when the Constitution was granted and that which existed in China to blind her to fundamental differences. In China the first feeble and tentative attempts to secure the adoption of a reform policy had come from below and not from above. Although the Reform Edicts of 1898 were signed by H.I.M. Kwang Hsü, they were the product of the brains of Kang Yu-wei and his disciples. The feudal lords in Japan had co-operated with their Emperor in modernising the system of government. The official class in China, almost to a man, opposed the Emperor's policy, with the result that his well-meant endeavours only resulted in disaster to himself and to the reform party. Nevertheless, granted that the Empress-Dowager did not show her usual perspicacity in failing to recognise the difference of

conditions in Japan and China, the effort made by the Court to direct the reform movement from 1905 until the abdication in 1912 remains a monument to her genius. The programme of reform decided upon by the Court evidenced a keener knowledge of the political limitations of the Chinese people than was shown by the men who were responsible for the drawing up of the Provisional Constitution promulgated in March 1912. The Court proposed to accomplish in nine years much less than these men sought to do in a few weeks. The policy of the Manchu Dynasty was gradually to fit the people to wield political power, and to create a general political consciousness before permitting the exercise of political rights. The mistake of the rabid republicans who secured temporary power in 1912 was the endeavour unwisely to shorten political gestation.

The Empress-Dowager, in September 1906, issued an edict definitely promising the grant of a constitution. In this edict the creation of an Imperial Parliament was foreshadowed, but as a distant goal to which advance was to be made with due deliberation. In the following year Provincial Councils were constituted. Strict limitation was made of the subjects they could discuss; and in particular an interdict was placed upon interference with national, as distinct from provincial, questions. The Empress-Dowager died before these Councils came into existence, but they met in 1909 and continued to perform their functions until abolished in March 1914. They soon showed that they were by no means disposed to limit their discussions to provincial matters, and, in spite of an express command that they should not concern themselves with purely political questions, they inaugurated a campaign for the speedier summoning of the National Assembly, a body that was to function until the convocation of an Imperial Parliament. In this campaign they were successful; and the National Assembly met in 1910, instead of a year later. It is not necessary to follow in detail the endeavour to carry out the Manchu programme; it is sufficient to record that the intention was to bring into existence local councils in cities, towns and villages; to codify the civil, criminal and municipal laws; to submit estimates of revenue and expenditure to the National Assembly; to reform the

system of taxation and the judicial system; and to institute compulsory education. When this nine years' programme had been completed, it was assumed that the people would have become sufficiently educated politically to take a minor part in the government; that is to say, they could be allowed to send a certain number of elected representatives to the Imperial Parliament. The Emperor, however, was to retain sovereign power. Like the Emperor of Japan, he was to be an absolute monarch exercising his absolute rights within the limits of the constitution.

The promise to the Chinese people of a constitution that would, at all events theoretically, leave the absolute sovereignty of the dynasty unimpaired, was regarded by those who were anxious for the institution of representative government and constitutionalism on Western lines as Dead Sea fruit, more especially when the Prince Regent appointed members of the Imperial Clan to most of the high ministerial positions. The possession of a little more imagination, however, would have enabled the malcontents to foresee the inevitable dawn of the day when the dynasty would be compelled by pacific, but irresistible, pressure to surrender even its nominal absolutism into the hands of a people grown capable of governing itself. As they were not so blessed, the revolution of 1911-12 scourged China and left her its legacy of woe. During the revolution, in a last frantic effort to appease the people, the Manchus offered a constitution definitely limiting the sovereign's power, but it was too late. Had the offer been accepted, it is possible that a system of constitutionalism would have been gradually developed in China, and that the year 1916 would have found the people enjoying most of the reforms set out in the Manchu programme.

The abdication of the Manchu sovereign left China in much the position in which a ship would be if a portion of the crew had mutinied against the captain, another section equally strong had espoused his cause, and a deadlock, arising from the inability of either to win success, had been ended by the captain voluntarily agreeing to resign on condition that he was accorded the treatment due to a first-class passenger. The Edicts of

Abdication significantly appointed Yuan Shih-kai, whose conversion to republicanism only preceded the promulgation of the edicts by a few days, as organiser of the provisional Republican Government. The facts that a body styling itself the Provisional National Assembly was sitting at Nanking, and that Dr Sun Yat-sen had been elected President of the 'Provisional Republic of China,' were entirely ignored. The Edicts of Abdication were not couched in terms dictated to a defeated dynasty by successful revolutionaries; they signified an ostensibly voluntary relinquishment of sovereign power by the Empress-Regent. This is clearly stated in one of the edicts in the following terms:

'In order to give effect to Our desire that there should be no further disturbance, but a restoration of peace, We have acquiesced in a new form of government, realising that, if We oppose the desires of the vast majority of the People, hostilities must long continue; in which case the general stability would be undermined and fierce struggles would ensue among the various races, causing distress to Our Ancestors and untold suffering to the People. This We cannot endure, and therefore We have chosen rather to suffer a light affliction than to impose grievous suffering on the People.'

It is important that the language employed should be carefully noted. The words used were evidently selected with the desire to emphasise the fact that the abdication was a voluntary act, inspired by a desire to save the country from a long internecine struggle, the upshot of which would be doubtful. Although not so stated in express terms, the edicts were issued as a result of the counsel given by the responsible advisers of the *de jure* Sovereign. Scrupulous care was taken not to recognise the organs created by the revolutionaries, by naming them in the edicts. Possibly it may be thought that the point in question is not of primary consequence, but in the writer's opinion it is of vital importance that it should be clearly understood that the Republic was, at least ostensibly, a voluntary gift from the Throne, and that the Throne appointed its own principal adviser to carry out its organisation. Although Dr Sun Yat-sen informed Yuan Shih-kai that 'the Republican Government cannot be organised by any authority conferred by the Ching

Emperor,' and although Yuan Shih-kai gave assurance that he did not intend to take advantage of the construction of the edicts, the fact remains that the Republic of China owes its legal existence to the Throne. The Edicts of Abdication were issued by the *de jure* ruler of China; and their scope and intention could not be augmented, diminished nor altered by any subsequent assurances given by Yuan Shih-kai or anyone else. Official recognition of the legal existence of a 'Provisional Republic of China' was not given, even by Yuan Shih-kai himself, until after the edicts had been signed; and the Nanking Government was never in any way recognised by the late dynasty.

The Empress-Regent having handed over the sovereignty 'to be the possession of the whole People,' and having appointed Yuan Shih-kai to organise a Provisional Republican Government, the latter was free to recognise the Provisional Government at Nanking. This he did; Dr Sun Yat-sen resigned; and Yuan Shih-kai was elected Provisional President by the Nanking Assembly. The Government at this time consisted of a Provisional President and a Provisional National Assembly. The President held his office by virtue of appointment by the Throne and of election by a body which he had recognised as a representative organ. The National Assembly was the creation of the revolutionary Governors-General of seventeen provinces. The members of the Assembly were not really representative of the provinces that they were supposed to represent. They had been selected, not elected; and most of them represented only the most radical element of the revolutionary party. A body so constituted was obviously unqualified to draw up an acceptable and broad-based national Constitution; but, unfortunately, it took that responsibility upon its shoulders. On March 10, 1912, the Provisional Constitution framed by it was promulgated. This Provisional Constitution being responsible for China's failure to make any real progress for the past four years, let us examine the validity of the claim that it expressed the political conceptions of the Chinese people.

As already stated, the Nanking Provisional National Assembly was not representative of the people. It was composed of delegates appointed by revolutionary

Governors-General who were, in some instances, young military men whose entire political creed could be summed up in the words of the popular revolutionary motto, 'The Manchus must go.' There is a well-authenticated story of one of these revolutionary generals, and by no means the least distinguished, drawing a foreign newspaper correspondent aside and appealing to him to tell him what manner of thing a republic was. It must not, however, be assumed that this ignorance was general, for many of the revolutionary military leaders had been educated abroad. Among the members of the Nanking Assembly were also many men of brilliant parts, who possessed a sound theoretical knowledge of political science. Nevertheless they represented only a section of the Chinese nation. Some of them had a much profounder knowledge of the history and character of foreign peoples than of the Chinese; and consequently they failed to pay due regard to the fact that political consciousness in China was still confined to the few. Such men, in association with others who knew the real trend of thought of the Chinese, and understood and shared their innate conservatism, would probably have rendered invaluable national service by framing a Constitution which, while making allowance for present lack of political knowledge, would permit the future enjoyment of full political rights. But the course adopted was to exclude from participation in the fabrication of the Constitution any but the members of the extreme radical wing of the revolutionaries. Adopting the word 'South' as implying the radical party and 'North' as signifying the conservative party, with the caution that these terms are intended to suggest a division of political thought rather than a geographical division, it may be said that the North had no opportunity of tempering the instrument fashioned in the fierce and unregulated heat of republican enthusiasm. The North had an undoubted right to co-operate with the South in the fabrication of the Constitution. They were no less powerful than the South, in a military sense, when the Manchus abdicated. The Northern party, moreover, possessed greater experience of administrative matters, and a deeper knowledge of the psychology of the people. In these circumstances undoubtedly the most beneficial course would have been

to entrust the framing of the Constitution to a small commission representative of both North and South.

It is apparent that the chief aim of the framers of the Provisional Constitution was to concentrate power in the hands of the Provisional Parliament. Although the South were fully conscious that the republic could not be successfully inaugurated without the cooperation of Yuan Shih-kai, they determined to allow him only nominal power in his capacity as Provisional President. The intention to endow the Provisional Parliament with autocratic power is shown by provisions that it should itself convoke, conduct and adjourn its meetings; that a two-thirds vote should override the veto of the Provisional President; and that it should have the power to veto Cabinet appointments and to impeach the Provisional President and members of the Cabinet. In the event of a deadlock between the Government and the Parliament, the former had no power to appeal to the country. Care was taken that the elections should result in the return of supporters of the South, by providing that 'the electoral districts and methods of election shall be decided by the localities concerned.' To understand the immense advantage that this provision gave to the South, it must be remembered that there was in existence only one powerful political organisation, the Tungmênhui, a body brought into existence by Dr Sun Yat-sen and General Huang Hsin in 1901 or 1902. Originally the association was a candid believer in terroristic methods, and many of its members were professed anarchists. Against this Southern organisation the North possessed no organisation of any kind; and, as was anticipated, the elections resulted in the return of a block of members of the Tungmênhui, or Kuomintang, as it was afterwards called, sufficiently powerful to block business and prevent the Provisional Parliament from accomplishing much useful work.

It is important to remember that the unremitting efforts of these men to render it impossible for the President and his advisers to carry out a constructive policy prevented the restoration of tranquillity and order. When Yuan Shih-kai took over the reins of government, the situation called for prompt and strong measures. The Treasury was empty; the country was overrun by

disorderly elements who robbed in the name of republicanism; and a large proportion of the people resented the collection of taxes as an infringement of their republican rights. The crisis in the affairs of the nation demanded the exhibition of genuine patriotism and the sinking of partisan and personal issues. The demand was not honoured. The South strove with a zeal and persistency worthy of a better cause to gain partisan triumphs. Even when the National Assembly replaced the Provisional Parliament, matters showed no improvement. The Kuomintang or radicals, while still not possessing a majority in either the Lower or the Upper House, were able, aided it is true by the other parties, to continue successfully the wrecking tactics that they had adopted in the Provisional Parliament.

The last days of the latter body had been signalled by the rejection of several constructive Government proposals, including one for the reform of the Provincial Councils, and another for the formation of a representative Commission for the purpose of drafting a Constitution. When the National Assembly met in April 1913, the Kuomintang intimated that they would not permit the President to open the session. A message of greeting and goodwill that he sent on that occasion was received, but the President's representative was not allowed to read it in the House. Later, when the Presidential election was held, the opportunity was eagerly seized further to humiliate Yuan Shih-kai. General Li Yuan-hung was nominated for the Presidency against his express wish; and it was not until the third ballot that Yuan Shih-kai was elected. Prior to this, a rebellion, headed by Kuomintang extremists, had broken out in the Yang-tsze provinces. It was suppressed in a few weeks, but, notwithstanding this defeat of the military branch of the Kuomintang, the Parliamentary section continued to display hostility to the President. They refused to consider suggestions which the President wished to make to the Constitution Drafting Committee in reference to the amendment of the proposed constitution. As in 1912, the South were determined that by them alone should the constitution be framed. But conditions had changed. The balance of power had passed to the North; and in November 1913 the President summarily

put a period to the intransigency of the National Assembly by unseating the Kuomintang members. This left the Assembly without a quorum, and it consequently became moribund.

The action taken by President Yuan Shih-kai on this occasion has been condemned as unjustified and despotic. That it was despotic may be admitted; that it was unjustified is a matter of opinion. The President believed that it was impossible for the government of the country to be carried on if national policy were to be dictated by the radicals. After the virtual admission by the South that his assistance was essential to the successful inauguration of the new *régime*, he naturally expected that he would have a considerable voice in the future ordering of affairs. In the earlier days of the republic he was, undoubtedly, willing to meet the South half-way in order to arrange a basis for cooperative work. But when, after he had at last yielded to their repeated appeals that he should assist them through their difficulties, he discovered that they intended to treat him rather as an enemy upon parole than an ally, it was scarcely to be wondered at that he felt himself the victim of political sharp practice. For nearly two years—fateful years for a country that had just committed itself to an iconoclastic political experiment—instead of devoting itself whole-heartedly to the work of laying well and truly the foundations of reform and progress, the Parliament persevered in attempts to withhold power from the President, while the President never relaxed his efforts to establish supremacy over the Parliament. What the verdict of posterity will be cannot be foreseen, but the individual belief may be ventured that the major blame must rest upon the South. If the President had withheld his assistance from the South in the hour of their need, it is extremely doubtful whether they could have succeeded in winning the North to their side. Consequently they were, beyond all doubt, in his debt; and gratitude as well as expediency should have counselled deference rather than defiance. On both sides there seems to have been a failure to grasp the larger realities, and to employ the wider vision.

With the Parliament disposed of, President Yuan Shih-kai seemed to have a free hand. But this was so

only in appearance. The rebellion had been crushed largely by the aid of a military satrap, General Chang Hsun, who had a considerable army of rude soldiers whose sole idea of loyalty was fealty to their General. There were other military chiefs who also exercised a personal authority over their men that might easily become dangerous to the State. One of the most crying necessities of the time was to disband numbers of soldiers who were not necessary for defensive purposes, and whose maintenance entailed a heavy drain upon the national resources. This, however, could only have been accomplished with the utmost circumspection, as the disbandment of soldiers in China too often means their transformation into banditti. The military chiefs, moreover, would be inclined to resent the diminution of the forces under their command. In such circumstances the President, even if he had so desired, would have found it perilous to attempt disbandment on a large scale. He did not so desire, since, until his government was so firmly established that its word would run throughout the country, it was absolutely necessary that he should have the support of the army. This, as has been indicated, entailed in some instances securing the loyalty of individual commanders, whose attitude would determine that of their troops. As a result, some appointments were made to high and important positions of men whose fitness to fill them was very questionable.

The Parliament being moribund, the President appointed a Political Council (later succeeded by the Council of State) to assist him in carrying on the administration. Steps were immediately taken to draw up a constitution to replace the Provisional Nanking Constitution. This was also to be provisional, as it was thought right that the permanent constitution should be approved by an elected National Convention. It was obviously undesirable that an election should be held until the bitterness engendered by the struggle between the Executive and the Legislature had passed away; and for this reason the Provisional Constitution, generally known as the Constitution Compact, was promulgated in May 1914. The Committee by which it was prepared had the advantage of the expert advice of Prof. Goodnow and Dr Ariga, two of the advisers to the Government,

though they both disclaim responsibility for the final shape in which it emerged. As might have been expected, the Compact transferred to the President the autocratic power conferred upon the Parliament by the Nanking Provisional Constitution. It is beside the purpose of this article to enter into a detailed examination of constitutions, but it is proper to record that the same incapacity to realise the importance of avoiding extremes that was shown by the framers of the Nanking Provisional Constitution was manifested by the men responsible for the Constitution Compact. National welfare was not to be secured by giving the President undue power any more than by making the Parliament supreme. The fact that cordial cooperation alone could give the country a fair chance of recuperation before it could be launched on the path of progress, was ignored by both South and North. It must, however, in justice to the North, be said that they had more excuse, if not more justification, for going to extremes than the South had had, because the latter was actually in the position of a belligerent who had been defeated and upon whom, therefore, terms could be imposed.

The suspension of the National Assembly marked the beginning of a system that was republican in name, but monarchical in fact. The only organ that could constitutionally restrain the President was the Council of State, which was created, in May 1914, to take the place of the Political Council. The members of the Council of State were appointed by the President; and, in the circumstances, the amount of restraint that they could be expected to exert was negligible. In 1912 it had been declared that the country was unanimously and enthusiastically determined upon the establishment and perpetuation of a system of most advanced republicanism; but it must be recorded that between November 1913 and August 1915, though a system obtained that was monarchical in everything but name, no protest was made, and many republicans gladly accepted office.

In August 1915 a movement was started to abandon the pretence that the system was republican, and to establish a constitutional monarchy. Public propaganda by the monarchists began after Prof. Goodnow had

submitted a memorandum to the President in which he discussed academically the relative merits of the two systems of government, monarchical and republican. Petitions, purporting to be spontaneous, were received by the Council of State from all parts of the country, praying that the monarchy should be restored and that President Yuan Shih-kai should be offered Imperial honours. The Council of State memorialised the President, recommending that the question should be determined by a popular vote. The President expressed the personal opinion that the time was not opportune for a change in the form of government; but the Council of State, in its capacity as acting Legislature, proceeded to create machinery for submitting the question to the people. When these preliminaries were completed, voting began in the provinces. After five provinces had declared for a reversion to monarchy, with President Yuan Shih-kai as Emperor, verbal advice that the monarchy movement should be suspended was tendered to the Chinese Government by three of the Entente Powers upon the initiative of Japan. In this presentation of advice Great Britain, Russia and Japan were associated, and within a few days it was endorsed by France and Italy. The Government of the United States declined to join with the Entente Powers, on the ground that the action contemplated might be held to be an interference with China's domestic affairs.

Until the Powers counselled suspension of the movement, there had been no public indication of any widespread sentiment against the restoration of monarchy. Immediately after the advice was tendered, however, the republican press in the Treaty Ports, and the Kuomintang refugees in Japan and elsewhere, broke out into fierce denunciations of the monarchy movement and of the President. The Government was in a quandary, for the advice, coming as it did after voting had begun, could not be accepted without serious, perhaps fatal, loss of prestige. The voting, therefore, was continued, the Government informing the advising Powers that it had the situation well in hand. The country declared with apparent unanimity for the restoration of monarchy and the proffer of the crown to President Yuan Shih-kai. On Dec. 11, 1915, after going

through the conventional Chinese formality of refusing, the President consented to bear the Imperial burden. Twelve days later the Provincial Government of Yunnan issued a proclamation demanding the immediate cancellation of the monarchy, and, on Dec. 26, no response having been received, announced its independence. Thus was launched the second rebellion against President Yuan Shih-kai. The leaders, in order to justify their action, published what purported to be copies of telegrams that had been sent from Peking to the Military Governors of the provinces, instructing them to take the necessary steps to coerce the people into voting unanimously for the restoration of monarchy.

The opposition to the proposal to revert to the monarchical system had not been confined to ardent republicans. Several men who were staunch friends of the President, and who were not on principle opposed to the monarchical system of government, had expressed tacit disapproval of the movement to place the President upon the Throne by resigning their posts. Among the more prominent men who took this course were Hsu Shih-chang, then Premier, and the present Premier, General Tuan Chi-jui, who was then Minister for War. Dr G. E. Morrison, the Political Adviser to the President, had also recorded his opinion that the movement was inopportune, as it was calculated to cause internal trouble and to increase China's external difficulties. He further urged that it was unwise, while the war was still in progress in Europe, for China to concentrate her energies, not upon constructive work, but upon costly and unproductive preparations for the establishment of an Imperial *régime*. This advice was not heeded; and the cancellation of the monarchy was postponed for so long that, when it was announced, the secessionists regarded it as a confession of weakness and made new and heavier demands.

The first rebellion, in 1913, had failed principally because it gained no support from any section of Chinese society except the extreme radicals and the professional rebels, between whom the line of differentiation is not always clear. With a rallying cry no more inspiring than 'Punish Yuan,' the rebellion had little chance of success. The instigators of the rebellion of 1915-16 were better

equipped in this respect; and 'Maintain the Republic' soon proved itself an effective call to arms. To what extent zeal for the maintenance of the Republic operated in determining them to raise the banner of rebellion is a matter of opinion, but it is certain that many of those who subsequently threw in their lot with the original revoltors were animated by a genuine desire to preserve the form of government that had been adopted in 1912. Their ranks were swelled by personal enemies of the President, including men who had formerly been advocates of a constitutional monarchy, and by the professional rebels who were always prepared to turn their country's misfortunes to their personal advantage.

The Entente Powers, through the Japanese Minister, repeated the advice to suspend the monarchy movement, but again the advice was not followed. By March 1916, however, the provinces of Kweichow and Kwangsi had joined forces with Yunnan; and on March 22 the monarchy was formally abolished. The revoltors, encouraged by their success, then demanded that the President should resign. The abolition of the monarchy did not check the secessionist movement; and the provinces of Kwangtung and Chekiang in turn declared their independence. One immediate result of the abolition was that Hsu Shih-chang returned to office as Premier, and endeavoured to mediate between the President and his enemies. The latter, however, resolutely declined to discuss terms unless, as a preliminary, the President resigned. They declared that in accepting the crown the President had been guilty of high treason, and that his retention of the office of President was illegal. Possibly the contention could be sustained by jurists, but the constitutional point involved was clearly not one that the Southern leaders could be permitted to arrogate to themselves the right arbitrarily to decide. If a majority of the provinces had seceded, the secessionist leaders might have claimed, with some show of reason, the right to force their views upon the country. As a matter of fact, only five provinces had seceded, representing on a population basis about a fifth of the people.

Although the attitude of the Southern leaders was so uncompromising, a further attempt was made to settle matters peacefully. On April 22 the President appointed

a new Cabinet composed mainly of men who had actively or passively opposed the movement to restore the monarchy, promising also to convoke a popularly elected Parliament, to make the Cabinet responsible to the Legislature, to revive the Provincial Assemblies, and, in a word, to divest himself of autocratic power. The new Premier, General Tuan Chi-jui, as he had himself disapproved of the monarchy movement, hoped that he would be able to arrange a compromise with the South. The latter, however, showed no disposition to meet him half-way. They were adamant in their demand that the President should resign. On May 10 they announced that they had formed a military government, with Canton as the provisional capital, and that they regarded the Vice-President, General Li Yuan-hung, as the legal President of the Chinese Republic. A few days earlier the Military Governor of the province of Kiangsu, General Feng Kuo-chang, who is one of the most powerful military leaders in China, sent a telegram to the administrations of the loyal provinces inviting them each to send a delegate to Nanking, where a Conference would be held to arrange a settlement. This plan was regarded with general approval, as likely to provide a means whereby the question of the removal or retention of the President could be decided by a majority vote. The situation had become so complicated that it was difficult to find any course of action that would fulfil constitutional requirements; but General Feng's plan was at least less unconstitutional than the action taken by the South. The Premier sent a telegram to the administrations of the loyal provinces on May 13, in which he recommended them to send delegates to the Conference at Nanking. He also scathingly denounced the Southern leaders for their presumption in arrogating to themselves the right to nominate the President of the Republic, and declared that, as they were traitors, they could not expect to be consulted in regard to the restoration of peace. Down to May 16 no indication had been given that a settlement was in sight, but a truce between the secessionists and the Government troops that had prevailed for six weeks was continued. The financial depression consequent upon the general unrest had seriously affected business; and the Government on May 11 took the extraordinary

course of declaring a moratorium. What result this will have upon China's domestic and foreign affairs remains to be seen.

In the foregoing sketch of China's recent political history, practically only domestic matters have been touched. China's international relationships are of such importance that they should be discussed apart from domestic Chinese problems. It must be remembered that at the present time China's continued existence as an independent state depends not upon herself, but upon others. Her independence and territorial integrity are virtually guaranteed by Great Britain, France, Russia, the United States and Japan. For the first eighteen months of the Republic the Powers which had treaty relations with China withheld recognition from the new Government. This did not, however, prevent the conclusion in 1912 of the Reorganisation Loan of 25,000,000*l.*, in which Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia and Japan participated. The importance of this loan is derived not only from its wide international character, but also from the extension of foreign supervision over China's revenues which it involved. By the terms of the Loan Agreement the Chinese Government engaged to take immediate steps, with the assistance of foreigners, for the reorganisation of the system of collecting the salt revenues of the country. Sir Richard Dane was appointed Co-Director of the Salt Administration; and other foreigners were given posts of less importance. To Sir Richard Dane is chiefly due the credit for carrying out the reorganisation in so effective a manner that the revenue derived from the Salt Administration in the last financial year actually exceeded that obtained from the Chinese Maritime Customs by nearly 1,250,000*l.* This splendid result was attained with the assistance of only thirty-eight foreigners, whereas no fewer than 1750 foreigners are employed in the Customs service. It is proper to mention that the work of reorganising the Salt Administration was greatly facilitated by the loyal and able cooperation of the Chinese officials.

From some points of view, the obligations laid upon the Chinese Government by the terms of the Reorganisation Loan Agreement might be held to be the beginning

of a system by which China's finances generally would eventually pass under foreign control. It is of interest to recall that President Wilson, in declining to extend support to the American banking group which was to participate in the loan, thus causing the withdrawal of the group, said that the Washington Administration considered that the conditions of the loan touched the independence of China, and by acceding to the group's request for support the American Government might, in certain eventualities, be led to the necessity of forcible interference, not only in the financial, but also in the political affairs of China. That his judgment was not far at fault was shown recently when the Japanese member of the international banking group refused to pay over surplus salt revenues to the Chinese Government, after payment had been sanctioned by Sir Richard Dane in the terms of the Loan Agreement, on the ground that the revenue might decrease in the future. The effect of this action was seriously to embarrass the operations of the Government at a most critical time, thus constituting a very real interference with the political affairs of China.

On the outbreak of the war in Europe, China promptly declared her neutrality. Notwithstanding this step she was in a most embarrassing position. Many thousands of belligerents of different nationalities were living in China; and, as they enjoyed extra-territorial rights, the Chinese Government could exercise no control over them. There was an obvious danger that incidents might occur, which China could not prevent, but for which she would be held responsible. The Chinese Government made an unsuccessful appeal to the American and Japanese Governments to use their good offices to prevent the extension of hostilities to the Far East. Having failed in this direction, an endeavour was made to induce the German Government to hand over to China, for the period of the war, control of Kiaochow, the territory leased to Germany in 1898. There was a prospect that an arrangement on this basis would be made, but all hope was dispelled when Japan presented an ultimatum to Germany couched in terms which rendered its rejection certain. The future historian will probably describe the presentation of this ultimatum as the beginning of a readjustment of international values in the Far East.

The expulsion of the Germans from Kiaochou is considered by many Japanese publicists, and by a portion of the Japanese Press, to be a demonstration of Japan's resolve to eliminate non-Asiatic political influence in China. To accomplish this it would be necessary to establish Japan's hegemony in the Far East. The recovery of Kiaochou from Germany, involving, as it was held to do, succession to German rights and interests in the province of Shantung, was a long step in that direction.

Already Japan had established herself firmly in South Manchuria, had secured recognition of her special interests in Fukien, and had gained virtual control of the iron industry centred at Hanyang. The seizure of Kiaochou not only gave her Shantung as a sphere of influence, but rendered possible a further extension of her political influence. In January 1915, two months after Kiaochou fell, Japan presented to China a series of demands, the acceptance of most of which was secured four months later by the presentation of an ultimatum. Certain modifications had been made in the demands in the course of negotiations, but Japan secured many important privileges. The term of the lease of Port Arthur and Dalny, and the terms of the South Manchuria Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway were extended to ninety-nine years; Japanese subjects were given the right to reside, travel and carry on any kind of business in South Manchuria; and Japan was to be given the preference if foreign advisers or instructors in political, military or police matters were to be employed in South Manchuria. Furthermore, if money were required for the construction of railways in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, Japanese capitalists were to be given the preference; and they were also to receive preference if any loan were made on the security of the taxes raised in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. The demand that China should undertake not to cede or lease any portion of her coastline or islands off the coast to any Power other than Japan was vigorously pressed, but the Chinese Government, holding that to concede this demand would be tantamount to placing China under the protection of Japan, resolutely refused to accede to it. As a

compromise China voluntarily issued a proclamation to the effect that she would not alienate any portion of her coastline or islands off the coast to any Power. Among the demands that were rejected by China, on the ground that they were an infringement of her independence, was one that the political, military, and financial advisers of the Chinese Government should be Japanese, and another that Japan should control the munitions industry in China. There were certain aspects of some of the demands that would have aroused general attention, if their presentation had not synchronised with a grave crisis in the military operations then being carried on by the Powers principally concerned. These it is not essential to discuss at the present moment.

Undoubtedly Japan has been enabled, as a result of the opportunities offered by the war, greatly to strengthen her position in the Far East as against other Powers. Though she has not yet been able to secure recognition of her right to take control in China, she has entrenched herself impreguably in South Manchuria, and has succeeded in beginning in Eastern Inner Mongolia, Shantung and Fukien the process which, if no interruption occurs, will eventually bring these regions virtually as much under her control as is South Manchuria to-day. The demands which China rejected in 1915, because their acceptance would have involved an impairment of her independence, have not been withdrawn. In the ultimatum presented to China in May 1915, the Japanese Government stated, in regard to these demands, that it 'will undertake to detach Group V (which included the demands objected to) from the present negotiations and discuss it separately in the future.' There is more than a possibility that the demands will be presented again.

Since 1902 China has remained an independent State because her independence is guaranteed by international agreements to which she is not a party; and she is no better able to-day to maintain her independence by her own unaided efforts than she was when the original Anglo-Japanese Alliance was signed. That was the first undertaking by foreign Powers to assume responsibility for the preservation of China's independence; and it is of interest to note that the last affirmation of this

altruistic resolve was made in the revised Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1911. The expression 'altruistic resolve' should, perhaps, be modified. The Powers which have guaranteed China's independence have to some extent been actuated by altruism, but the main consideration has been the knowledge that there would be terrible potentialities for evil involved in permitting any one Power to gain control in China. The same motives that dictated a policy that permitted the Sick Man of Europe to linger on and by contagion disseminate his disease are operative in regard to China. But conditions may change; and the possibility has to be faced by the Chinese that the nations who have hitherto preserved her independence may decide that their interests would be better served if they relieved themselves of their self-imposed responsibility. Those who voluntarily place a burden of responsibility upon their shoulders have an unquestionable right to throw it off. The course of events during the last two years has shown that the trend of opinion in Japan is towards undertaking in China the work that has been efficiently performed in Korea. The Japanese believe that it is futile to expect that China will reform herself, and that, until she is reformed, her weakness is a constant provocation to adventure on the part of other nations. They believe, therefore, that, in the interests of the whole world, and in the interests of the Chinese themselves, it would be well if the nation received the protection and guidance that Japan is willing to extend.

The question whether Japan should be suffered to take in hand the reformation of China is a problem that calls for consideration at the earliest possible moment by the Powers possessing important political and commercial interests in China. Of these Powers Great Britain is most deeply concerned. It is not too much to say that Great Britain opened China to the world's trade. Her own trade with China at the present moment is greater than that of any of the other Powers, including Japan; and her investments in the country greatly exceed those of any other nation. She has every right to expect that those interests will continue to increase in volume and value if China, as an independent nation, adopts a policy of reform and progress and makes a genuine endeavour to carry it out. Would her interests be as

efficiently protected and as likely to increase if the reformation of China were allowed to pass into the hands of a nation which is a political friend but a commercial rival? Very grave consideration would be necessary before an answer could be returned to the question by Great Britain or by the other commercial Powers. The only thing that would reconcile them to such a course would be a conclusive demonstration by the Chinese people of their unfitness to govern themselves. If it be given, then it is to be feared that, with sincere regret, the Treaty Powers will be compelled to place the destinies of the people of China in the hands either of one of their own number, or of an International Commission. By the time the Peace Conference assembles in Europe, it will be known if China has shown herself worthy to retain the honour and responsibility of nationhood. In any case the Great Powers will have to take her condition into consideration, and to discover a fundamental solution of the Far Eastern problem. This problem, however, though it centres in China, cannot be solved solely by the settlement of the question whether China is to remain independent. A question of much graver importance—from a non-Chinese point of view—is involved.

The record of the past four years is not one in which any patriotic Chinese can feel satisfaction. Domestic politics have largely consisted of futile strife over non-essentials. Little has been done in the direction of reform. In the sphere of foreign relationships China has lost ground instead of gaining it. Although, on the whole, the negotiations with Japan in reference to the demands presented in January 1915 came to a more satisfactory conclusion than seemed likely, the Republic has loosened its grip upon vast areas of the heritage of the Manchus. Chinese who have any real love for their country have now to brace themselves to face the fact that there is imminent danger that China may lose her independence. They must realise that she is in danger of being bereft of that priceless possession because North and South have hitherto shown partisanship when they should have displayed patriotism. Though the sands are rapidly running out, there may be still time for them to unite their forces to save the country.

If the South would abandon the belief that the

traditions and habits of mind sanctioned by centuries can be demolished by a political formula, they would probably be met half-way by the North, who now understand that too abrupt an application of the brake is likely to wreck the state chariot. It has been seen that both North and South have had their day of triumph and their night of defeat. The South, who have tactically triumphed in the last trial of strength, should show that they have profited by their misfortunes by rendering co-operation possible. This can be done by refraining from attempting to impose terms whose acceptance by the North would be an admission of defeat. The fabrication of a constitution that would apportion power to the Executive and the Legislature on the lines adopted by the United States of America should be at once effected. Both political parties should remember that China is standing at the cross-ways of Fate. One path leads to national extinction with, possibly, individual prosperity; the other to national salvation. Into the first she may elect to turn, in which case she will find that the goal is speedily reached in accordance with the immutable law that, with equal momentum and frictional retardation, bodies descend more rapidly than they ascend. The road to national salvation slopes abruptly upward; it is strewn with obstacles; and unfailing patience, perseverance and patriotism are necessary if the goal is to be won. Has China these qualities developed to a degree that will inspire her, if the choice be still open to her, to face fearlessly and hopefully the rough and wearisome journey that must be accomplished before she gains the purer atmosphere breathed by free nations? To the future must be left the answer, but well-wishers of China will fervently hope that the hour of opportunity has not yet passed, and that the world will be spared the mournful spectacle of the loss of nationality by four hundred millions of people.

F. LIONEL PRATT.

Art. 10. — THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF TREITSCHKE.

1. *The Political Thought of Heinrich von Treitschke.* By H. W. C. Davis. London: Constable, 1914.
2. *Politik.* By Heinrich von Treitschke. Translated by Blanche Dugdale and Torben de Bille. Two vols. London: Constable, 1915.

IN order that a book may deserve serious attention, many people suppose that it must possess some intrinsic merit. In respect of books, however, which express opinions and principles, this is by no means the case. Such books may be expositions of abject or flagrant fallacies, and yet deserve, for that very reason, not neglect but attention, if it happens that they are taken seriously by any large number of people, and have any marked effect on their corporate mood and actions. It cannot be said that Treitschke is a mere prophet of fallacies; but his chief claim to the serious attention of Englishmen is to be found in those parts of his writings which embody not truths, but errors; for it is these which, after his death, have made him what he has notoriously become—the leader of everything in the national thought of Germany, by which the Germans have now distinguished themselves from all other civilised nations. In the political teachings of Treitschke, curiously blended with elements of a very different character, is to be found the intellectual apology for every savage doctrine which stains the pages of the German Military Handbook, for the repudiation of treaties as so many scraps of paper, for the sinking of the 'Lusitania,' for the mutilation of children, for the infection of a nation with the temper of an angry animal. An indictment of this kind must be made with proper discrimination, for else it would be a mere reproduction of the temper which it imputes to others. Those special parts of his teaching which represent the present content of the national temper of Germany must be carefully isolated from the rest, and examined on their own merits.

We welcome, therefore, the two works now before us, one of them being a complete translation of the series of political lectures which made Treitschke famous in

Berlin; the other being a selection, accompanied by comments and explanations, of salient passages from these and from other writings of the author—a selection which Mr Davis presents to the English reader, as showing what the peculiar elements in the philosophy of Treitschke are, the acceptance of which in Germany has been associated with such monstrous consequences. Mr Davis has performed his task with the acuteness of a trained thinker; and, allowance being made for a few verbal inaccuracies, the translation of 'Politik' by Mrs Dugdale and M. de Bille is in point of style admirable. It reads like the original composition of an accomplished English author.

This translation derives an additional interest from the brilliant though brief introduction to it contributed by Mr Balfour. The urbane yet penetrating causticity of which, as a critic, Mr Balfour is a master, has never been more apparent than it is in these few pages. One of the happiest examples of this quality is to be found in his comment on Treitschke's extravagant laudation of Germany at the expense of other countries. In seeking to place Germany on a pedestal, his method, says Mr Balfour, 'is to lower his standards of comparison.' It may, he observes, 'be judicious to encourage the too diffident Prussians by assuring them that "they are by their character more reasonable and more free than Frenchmen;"' but, he proceeds, when the Prussian reader discovers that in Treitschke's opinion the French are the most unreasonable and least free people imaginable, the value of the tribute to Prussian excellence is marred. In a similar vein he criticises Treitschke's doctrines as to education and culture. There is no way, Treitschke declares, 'in which intellect and taste can be more successfully developed than by a thorough study of Greek and Latin'; but, after he has laid down this principle with regard to the masses of mankind, we are, says Mr Balfour, presently surprised by finding that, when he comes to deal with the education of a German prince, he declares that classical study is altogether unnecessary. 'He ought to learn French and English. What occasion has he to trouble his head with more?' 'Are then,' says Mr Balfour, 'intellect and taste of no value to a German Prince, or is he privileged without education to acquire

these gifts simply by the Grace of God?' Mr Balfour touches one point after another in the same spirit of light but carefully discriminating irony; but, as he is careful to point out, his own criticisms are intended, not to exhaust the subject, but merely to prepare the reader for the kind of reasoning which he will encounter in the philosopher's own pages. We will, therefore, now pass on to a more systematic examination of them, only observing by way of preface, that the errors of Treitschke's philosophy are even more profound than Mr Balfour's criticism might lead the reader to anticipate.

In reviewing the materials before us, including those put together by Mr Davis, we may set out with observing that everything in the political thought of Treitschke, which is peculiar or which forms a part of any coherent system, has for its end and centre his conception of what he calls The State; and that this conception, though it cannot be called original, is widely different from that of most modern thinkers—even from that which prevailed amongst the thinkers of Germany prior (we may roughly say) to the Franco-Prussian War. If modern political thought be contrasted with ancient and medieval, it will be found to differ from the latter in the fact that, instead of regarding society as created by, and existing for the State, it tends to regard the State as created by, and existing for, society. The forms in which thinkers have expressed this modern view have been various. The earliest of them have been in semblance historical, and have virtually consisted of assertions that at some unspecified period the citizens made a contract with some single or corporate governor, they on their part engaging to submit to his government, and he in return engaging to govern them in such a way that the advantages of so submitting to him shall at all events outweigh the drawbacks. Such assertions, though put forward as history, were at best nothing but allegories.

A great advance on this method of reasoning was made when the Utilitarians, content to take things as they were, represented the business of government as the manufacture of contemporary comfort. An advance more remarkable still, in which the study of the present and the study of the past were united, was made as the

result of those discoveries which illuminated the minds of men with the modern conception of evolution. They were discoveries which seemed at first sight to have nothing to do with politics. They seemed to culminate in the history of the human unit—of man as a species of animal connected with, but distinct from, others, and also as a completed organism, distinct from, but originating in, a single cell and embryo. Considered under both these aspects, man revealed himself as the result of a multiplication and a growing differentiation of parts, which ultimately so cohered as to form one corporate life. But thinkers, when once their attention had been quickened by these discoveries, were not slow to perceive that the history of man as an individual had many striking analogies in the phenomena of all human groups. Here also was an aggregation of parts; here also was a gradual differentiation of functions; here also these separate parts or organs ministered to the life of a corporately individual whole. In other words, to the thought of the modern world, all cohesive groups, no less than individuals, came to present themselves as so many separate organisms.

This view, in the days of Treitschke's early manhood, was no less prevalent in Germany than in England, France and America; and Treitschke's first exploit as a young political thinker was to refute it. The assumption, he said, 'that Society is a living organism, implies that the State is a mere mechanical structure which exists to protect Society; and that, while Society has unbounded claims on the allegiance of the individual, the State is only needed for definite and circumscribed objects, and has only to be obeyed in so far as the interests of Society demand such obedience.' Treitschke, on the contrary, maintained that Society and the State are co-equal, the State being, instead of a mechanical accessory, a something which is fashioned by Society out of the substance of its own life—'out of the legal ideas, the moral ideas, and the economic conditions, of a people.' Of this argument Mr Davis very truly observes that it is virtually a mere repetition of that which it was intended to annihilate; for what are 'the legal and moral ideas of a people,' and what are their 'economic methods,' if they are not what sociologists mean by 'social conditions' or 'Society'? And that the

State is produced by Society is precisely what the sociologists say. The truth of the matter is that, when Treitschke, at the beginning of his career, attacked the sociological thinkers whose school was then in the ascendant, the real difference between his own ideas and theirs was present to him in the form of feeling rather than of clear thought; and the nature of these feelings is to be found in the circumstances of his early life.

Himself a Saxon brought up at the Court of Dresden, the political phenomena which first obtruded themselves on his notice were those presented by a Germany made up of numerous States, many of them open to ridicule on account of their small dimensions, all of them so disunited by petty and parochial jealousies that they could not combine for any great and common purpose with an effect even remotely proportionate to the sum of their respective populations. What, then, he asked himself, was the explanation of this paradox? Each of these States stood somehow for a certain Society; each of these Societies was a group of human beings similar to the rest in point of origin, of language and of racial sympathy. For what reason was their existence, if taken in the mass, so nugatory? And the first answer which shaped itself in his mind was this—that the reason lay, not in the character of these groups as Societies, but in the character which they assumed when they presented themselves to one another as States. Hence the State and Society were obviously different things. The one was not the natural and evolutionary equivalent of the other; and the Societies of Germany at all events—the Societies in which he was primarily interested—must hitherto have conducted their affairs without any true conception of what the nature of a State is, of what are its true functions, and of the means required for the fulfilment of them.

Such being his thought, or mood of thought in its first stage, its farther development began when, turning as he did from a narrow contemplation of Germany to a study of the detailed history of the great civilisations of the world, he elaborated the conclusion that, with certain marked exceptions, the true nature of the State had never been consciously understood, or realised as a fact, anywhere. One element or another, necessary to

its integrity, was wanting. His argument took this form. Every true State must obviously have two characteristics at all events. In the first place, it must be a unity. It must have definite limits, as a circle must be limited by a circumference, or else it would not be a circle. In the second place, since every State presupposes the existence of citizens, and since, unless the citizens support it, it cannot flourish or even persist, it must be something which the citizens recognise as so inseparable from their own interests that all will unite in supporting it, as though for each it was his own life. But let us take two of the most comprehensive examples possible—the ancient Roman Empire, and the so-called States of mediæval and even of more modern Europe. The Roman Empire is commonly supposed to be a masterpiece of the art of state-building, and it doubtless secured for its citizens many civil and private benefits; but, in embracing, as it did, the whole civilised world, it left no other civilised polity between which and itself any line could be drawn. It was formless, like universal space. But a State is like a man; and just as a man cannot realise his own nature except by dealing with other men who are essentially other than himself, so, says Treitschke, 'self-realisation cannot be achieved by a State except through dealings, friendly or hostile, with other States.' Here, then, we see the element which the Roman Empire lacked. The European kingdoms and principalities, which succeeded the Roman Empire, equally fell short of statehood, but for a precisely opposite reason. They were numerous; they had dealings with one another; each was acutely conscious of the 'me' as different from the 'not-me'; but this consciousness was nucleated in the persons of their respective rulers, rather than diffused amongst the populations ruled by them. In other words, they were not so much States as Estates. Countries were like landed properties, each of which, whether lying within a ring-fence or scattered, derived its unity from the fact that it was owned by one proprietor. The inhabitants were tenants or bailiffs; the rulers were like crowned squires, whose ambitions in intermarrying with their distinguished neighbours, or attacking them, centred in the aggrandisement of 'the family' at the Court or Hall. Indeed Louis XIV said bluntly, 'The State is Myself'; and

Treitschke declares that the same idea was rampant in his youth at the minor courts of Germany.

The cases which he cites as exception to the general rule were provided by Judea, by Greece, and by Italy in the days of Machiavelli. The theocratic policy of the Jews, he says, exhibited a unity which was not only rigid beyond that of any other, but was one in which every citizen participated to the same degree. Here, then, he found both the essentials of the thing he was struggling to define—namely, a true State as distinct from a mere Society. But it was a State, he says, which could not last. It was a type which can never be reproduced. In ancient Greece, on the other hand, though its actual polities are extinct, he discovers, under the guidance of Aristotle, a type of State which is valid for all time. He seems to approach the secret which 'the new science of society' must rediscover, and proclaim in a tongue intelligible to the modern world.

The doctrine of Aristotle, as modernised by his German disciple, may be briefly summarised thus. All political thought must start with the following assumptions, the truth of which is axiomatic. Man as an individual has all those faculties latent in him which, when they are developed, we reverence as distinctive of human nature. These appear in the forms of affection, rectitude, knowledge, philosophy and art; but these are latent only, and practically non-existent, except in so far as men live in societies. It is equally obvious that, when men live in societies, they can do so only by conforming to certain rules. Further, these rules, to the observance of which they owe everything, must have some authority at the back of them by which such observance can be guaranteed; and this authority is the State. But, though it emerges from Society, the State is not Society itself, nor does it emerge automatically as the result of an unconscious process, as those evolutionists pretend who see a State in a beehive. 'Bees,' says Treitschke, 'merely reproduce unconsciously what has been from all time.' The human State, on the contrary, though its existence is due to a natural necessity, is in each separate case a deliberate and artificial product. It is to Society what wine is to thirst. Thirst is produced by nature; wine is produced by art. All societies are thirsty, but each society must

manufacture a special wine of its own. The meaning of this contention, which at first sight may seem merely academic, is revealed in one of his earliest criticisms of the doctrine that the State is a natural product of evolution. In that doctrine, he said, we have the philosophy of lethargy, of *laissez-faire* and of impotence. By this he meant that a State is no more evolved unconsciously than the Acropolis of Athens was constructed whilst the Athenians slept. It is the product of a conscious enthusiasm continued from age to age, of the constant efforts which the people make for its maintenance, and of their sacrifice to the supreme authority under whose protection they live.

But, so Treitschke proceeds, behind this fact lies another; and the clearest interpreter of this was not Aristotle, but Machiavelli. Machiavelli saw in the Italy of his own day a number of independent States so pressing against one another that they resembled men in a crowd. If a man in a crowd slips, he is inevitably trodden down. Those alone can live who can keep themselves standing upright. Similarly, if each of the then States of Italy was to be an authority in relation to its own citizens, Machiavelli saw, as a fact under his very eyes, that each had always to be pushing against the others, for else it would lose its equilibrium, and perish beneath their feet. Hence he reached the conclusion, which Treitschke declared to be as true to-day as yesterday, that the essence of the State is Power. And what is Power? To this question, says Treitschke, there can only be one answer. Power is neither more nor less than the brute force of arms. Accordingly, he says, the Aristotelian definition of the State as 'a plurality of families, permanently living together, and legally united' may be reduced to the bald proposition that 'the State is a Society united for offensive or defensive war.'

And now, says Treitschke, this conclusion having been reached, we must brace ourselves to face its consequences, as they present themselves to the moral conscience. When the State has to adjudicate between one of its own citizens and another, the moral situation is simple. The rules by which their conduct must be tested are accurately known beforehand. Nothing is needed but to apply them to the facts of a particular case; and the State, as an

arbiter immeasurably greater than the individual, can both pass an unbiassed sentence, and give instant effect to it. But when one State has to assert itself against another, both these conditions are wanting. Not only does no Power exist to which all States are subject, and by which the just application of law to individual cases can be enforced, but the only law or morality which is conceivably applicable to States differs fundamentally from that which is applicable to the conduct of individual citizens. The moral law for individuals, as understood by the modern world, and as reflected in modern legislation, is based on the ideas of Christianity. Its primary principle is the love of each for all. It accepts as the highest virtue the sacrifice of self for others. But 'the only moral law which can possibly hold good for States' is, in respect of its very foundations, the Christian law inverted. The moral feeling in which the life of the State is rooted is not love for other States, but hate. So true is this, says Treitschke, that for one State to regard another with even an appreciable amity is a sin; whilst for one State to sacrifice any one of its own interests to another State would be the sin for which there is no forgiveness—the sin against the Holy Ghost. Thus everything which any State may do, or demand of its citizens individually, is moral if it does or demands them for the sake of its own aggrandisement; and, when the moral conduct of one State conflicts with that of another, the only way of deciding which is right or wrong is to see by experiment which of them can kill or mutilate the largest number of the men, women and children of the other State.

Here the first Act of Treitschke's argumentative drama ends. It ends with what he admits to be 'a stern and terrible doctrine'; but he rings down the curtain with the announcement that there is a second Act to follow, in which this doctrine will, like a stage villain, be converted, and brought into harmony with the ideal conscience of mankind.

Machiavelli, he says, though his logic so far as it goes is impregnable, was guilty of one great error. This did not consist in pushing his argument too far. It consisted in a failure to push it far enough. The final object of the State, its power being taken for granted, is to secure

for its citizens such social conditions as will best enable them to develop their own humanity, to progress in civilisation, or—to use a word specially dear to Germans—to ennoble themselves by some species of Culture. Machiavelli's defect was that he failed to realise this. He gives us the chalice, but he quite forgets the sacrament; and it is the nature of this sacrament, whether we call it 'Culture,' 'Civilisation' or 'Progress,' which gives a State whatever final value it possesses, and enables us to say that, in respect of its general character, or of any of its particular actions, it is good or bad, moral or sinful, worthy to exist or no. Thus, says Treitschke, at the time of the Franco-Prussian War, it is evident to the conscience of everybody that Prussia employed her power in an ideally moral way, for it was a way which promoted civilisation in the highest sense of the word. Austria, on the other hand, though her power may foster some sort of civilisation in Austria, 'sinned heinously' against the 'Spirit of History' when she imposed her yoke on the northern provinces of Italy, for its effect on Italian Culture was, not to foster, but to crush it. As for Turkey, whatever her power may be, her condition of sin is chronic; for, as her 'miserable architecture' shows, she has no Culture at all, and her very existence is a blot on the map of Europe. In a word, says Treitschke,

'a State is a moral, or else an immoral community; and, in order that its existence may be justified, it is called upon to make positive efforts for the education of the human race; and its final end must be that a people may shape for themselves a real character in it, and by means of it.'

Now, if the political philosophy of Treitschke could be rewritten from the beginning, the first part of it, which culminates in the doctrine that the State is Power, and the second part, which aims at presenting it as a 'moral community,' might both be so revised that the implications of the one would in some rational way agree with those of the second; but, as matters stand, the second part has not only no logical connexion with the first in the way of logical sequence, but absolutely contradicts it, and can find in it no point of attachment. As regards mere formal logic, the doctrine that a State is an absolutely sovereign Power which justifies all it

does by the fact that it elects to do it, hangs together well enough, if we are willing to accept the consequences. But it is impossible to accept this contention, and yet at the same time to mitigate its consequences by contending, as Treitschke attempts to do, that these sovereign Powers are not sovereign at all; but that somewhere there is some standard which is superior to all and each, and can sentence any one of them as a 'sinner' if it uses its sovereign power except in certain limited ways. Not only does Treitschke fail even to suggest in definite terms what this common standard is, but in the first part of his argument he closes every logical loophole which might have left him free to argue that any such standard can exist. In that part he contends that a State is an individual thing with an individual will of its own, but that a Society is merely a name for a number of adjacent individuals, whose sole unity is in the image which they form on our mental retina. To what category, then, does the common standard belong, which he calls indifferently 'Culture,' the 'Spirit of History,' 'Real Character,' and 'Progress'? Has Culture an individual will? Is the 'Spirit of History' anything more than a name? 'Progress' perhaps may suggest a sequence of connected facts; but, as Mr Davis observes, Treitschke himself admits that progress is a movement of whose actual existence 'it is impossible to discover any intellectual proof.' Indeed, his whole doctrine of a moral standard for States, which is anything more than the brute power of each, finally goes to pieces in his own confession that, if it be philosophically analysed, it reduces itself to this proposition—that 'a craving (vague and indefinable) of the individual conscience for individual perfection leads to the conclusion that humanity as a whole experiences the same craving for perfection.'

A philosophy which begins with the bald and uncompromising argument that any acts of a State are for itself moral which tend to increase its power, because each State is 'sovereign' and cannot be subject to any will but its own, and which end with the doctrine that all States are subject to the will of a 'general craving,' or a 'conclusion' that some 'general craving' exists, to which nobody can assign any definite content, is like an image with a body of iron, which, in order to make it

look human, is surmounted by a head of feathers. And this criticism of Treitschke's philosophy is, as we shall see presently, not only that which will be pronounced by the philosophical student, but is that which has been practically pronounced by the whole German people. But, before considering this aspect of the case farther, let us, in view of the fact that Treitschke was no fool, consider how, if his philosophy is really of such a crudely inconsistent kind, it could ever have been regarded and promulgated as a coherent system by himself. The answer is to be found in an observation which has been made already, that the clue to his thought lies in the circumstances of his own life.

Treitschke, says Mr Davis, remained, up to the day of his death, essentially and hopelessly provincial—'as provincial as it is possible for any native of central Europe to be.' The first political impression of which he was vividly conscious was, let it be said once more, that of the weakness of Germany as a cluster of independent States; and from this impression, confirmed by brooding observation, he gradually advanced to two practical conclusions—firstly, that Germany's sole hope for the future lay in some scheme by which these States might be united; and, secondly, that no one of them would renounce its independence voluntarily, out of regard for anything like mere ideas or principles. This led to the further conclusion that, if unity was to be achieved at all, it could only be achieved by force exercised somehow and by somebody, and that ideas must be left to assert themselves and justify the result afterwards.

Hereon followed the question where, within the limits of Germany as it then was, the necessary force was to be found. When Treitschke began to be occupied with these speculations, none of the German States seemed to possess the characteristics necessary for playing so great a part worthily; and none of them did he detest more heartily than he detested Prussia. In those days, though he was by no means an extreme democrat, his theories of domestic government were those of a pronounced liberal; and to place the destinies of Germany in the hands of Prussia would, he declared, be nothing short of 'madness.' 'Prussia,' he said, 'is ruled by a class which has never felt the mighty hand of a new era, but still lives in

a fashion that would be intolerable to any moderately healthy nation.' But gradually this uncompromising attitude began to be modified by the reflection that, if force was necessary for the solution of the great problem, Prussia was the only State in which such force was to be found. Thenceforth 'the most interesting feature of his mental development was,' says Mr Davis, 'the alternation of fits of revolt against the principles of Prussian Junkerdom with other fits of conviction that, even though the Prussian idol had feet of clay, there was no other possible centre of German unity.' In the end this latter conviction, as representing a hard and unalterable fact, prevailed; and he could say in 1864, 'I shall be happy if before my death I see a Prussian Germany.' —

Nevertheless his original antipathy to Prussia, as a brutal repressor of all constitutional liberty, was a sentiment which died hard. It was only extinguished by the results of the Franco-Prussian war; but, when once it had disappeared, its place was rapidly taken by positive sentiments of a new and widely different kind. In the Junkers he came to see a class whose strength of will was invaluable; he came to regard the popular vote as a toy, and the people as fractious children whose tempers were soothed by playing with it; whilst high over all rose the figure of an Imperial Monarch, from whom all power was derived, and in whose person all power was concentrated. The effects of this conversion were manifested in his own career. A few years after the Franco-Prussian war had been ended, the political Ishmael of Saxony was enthroned as Professor of History in the University of Berlin, and was preparing to rewrite his philosophy as a courtier of the House of Hohenzollern. The word 'courtier,' as here applied, involves, however, no suggestion of servility. If Treitschke was servile to anything, he was servile to the logic of events. In this he was consistent with what had always been his own principle—that the philosophy of history must be deduced from the facts of history; and no sooner had he accommodated his mind to an acquiescence in accomplished facts than he felt that these facts must be explained as the results of universal principles which the intellect of all might recognise and the conscience of all approve. In this way only, he felt, could the inner spirit of a people

consecrate and confirm the fact of its outward unity. Here we see the genesis of his matured doctrine of Power; and in the crudity of this doctrine, when once nakedly stated, we see the origin of that nebulous superstructure of ideas by which he sought to modify what he perceived to be its logical consequences, but which merely served to hide them from his own eyes.

These incidents of Treitschke's life, however interesting on their own account, are interesting mainly for a very much wider reason. Treitschke's development, excepting in one respect, is an image in miniature of the development of the thought of Germany. One of his earliest observations with regard to German unity was, as we have seen, that it must first be an accomplished fact, and that the ideas by which the fact is to be justified must be left to follow afterwards. The prophecy which these words suggest, a unified Germany has fulfilled. Having achieved unity through Power, it sought to sanctify Power by erecting it into a general principle, which was not merely an induction from the success of particular acts, but was also a moral premiss possessing universal validity, from which the ideal justice of particular acts might be deduced. And the secret of Treitschke's influence in his own country lies in the fact that, up to a certain point, he provided his countrymen with that precise train of reasoning which they required. But he did so, as has been said already, up to a certain point only. Germany has accepted his Old Testament, it has practically ignored his New. The Germans in acting thus have shown a sound logical instinct. The remarkable fact is, not their rejection of the second half of his doctrine, but the eager unanimity with which they have accepted the first.

Germany is a country identified with the fame of great philosophers, historians, musicians, poets, theologians and theological students, and with religious movements expressive of deep popular piety. It has earned the reputation of being the country in which the things of the spirit are appreciated more widely and more profoundly than in any other. And yet this country, in its character of a great State, has, through the mouths of its statesmen, its University professors, its newspapers, and the masses of its population, deliberately thrown to the winds every principle by which

the modern world has hitherto raised its temper above that of half-naked savages. It is quite unnecessary to insist on any particular enormities in the way of statecraft or violence, which have been, or are said to have been, committed by them in the course of the present war. The peculiarity exhibited by the Germans at the present time lies in the fact, not that this or that particular enormity has been committed by them, but that there is no atrocity within the limits of human performance which, so long as it can be regarded as conducing to national power, is not amply justified beforehand by clauses of the political creed which they have adopted in cold blood; and this creed is merely the logical expansion of that doctrine of which Treitschke is recognised as the logical exponent, and according to which the Power of the State is, as an object of action, supreme over all others.

But if, in the light of its consequences, as shown by the case of Germany, we repudiate this doctrine as false, we are raising a much wider question than any involved in a condemnation of the sinking of the 'Lusitania.' We are implicitly assuming the correctness of a counter-doctrine of some kind; and, whatever this last may be, it must be applicable, not only to Germany, but to ourselves. Such being the case, then, one thing will be evident. This counter-doctrine cannot be an absolute negation of the other; for, if to sacrifice every principle of private conduct to the State (the State being identified with power) makes a nation of savages, the spirit which would sacrifice nothing to it is the negation of all patriotism. There are persons, no doubt, who, animated by what they regard as ultra-popular principles, condemn patriotism as a disease, and would substitute for it what they call an international 'class consciousness'; by which they mean that the majority of the human race has, in every country alike, one enemy only—namely, anybody who in point of efficiency is appreciably superior to the rest. Of this view it is sufficient to say here that it is contradicted by world-wide, and more particularly by contemporary, experience. The patriotism of the French, the Belgian, the Serbian and the Russian masses is a sentiment no less spontaneous than the patriotism of the Roman noble. It is a sentiment which pervades America,

and is not confined to the magnates of Fifth Avenue; and even English trade-unionists, who once professed to scoff at it, have felt its fire in common with the rest of their fellow-countrymen.

What, then, when correctly analysed, is the object of this sentiment which every healthy nation cherishes? Patriotism is commonly described as 'devotion to country'; but what does the word 'country,' when used in this connexion, mean? It cannot mean a mere geographical area. According to Treitschke it means primarily a number of persons who, because they are penned up within certain geographical limits, are enabled and obliged to submit to a common system of laws. But his argument, at the very beginning of it, is much too narrow in its scope. What binds such persons together is not only a unity of laws, but a unification of customs, intimacies, and a mutual understanding which makes intercourse easy; and finally the association of memories, hopes, affections, with some common background of mountain, wood and river, and the smoke from familiar chimneys, so that a local landscape, either seen by the eyes, or (as in the case of great countries) comprehensively visualised by the mind, becomes for all the symbol of life as directly experienced by each. Logically, if not in all cases chronologically, this combination of social and geographical elements as an object of common affection precedes all ideas arising out of the necessity of defending it. Only when this object exists, and already gives rise to the sentiment which we call patriotism, does the task of defending this object, whether by way of resistance or attack, acquire any thinkable meaning.

According to Treitschke's doctrine that the State is Power, this order of things is inverted. War is an end for its own sake; and everything else is subsidiary to it. He thus robs of all meaning what would otherwise be the fruitful argument that war is good because it is a school of valour, by adding, with even greater emphasis, that valour is only valuable in so far as it leads to war. Mr Davis observes that Treitschke, in this connexion, might have profitably remembered the observation of Aristotle, that war was the ruin of the Spartans, because it left them, when not actually fighting, nothing to do with their leisure. Nevertheless the fact remains

that, in the estimation of all countries—of England no less than of Germany—those qualities of valour and self-sacrifice which are honoured with the name of heroism, and which war demands and elicits, occupy a high rank amongst the recognised moral virtues. How, then, can we reconcile this fact with a repudiation of the doctrine that war, as a means to national power, and as an expression of it, does not justify every act which, whether on the part of the nation as a whole, or of the citizens whose services are invoked by it, may conduce to making the power of such a nation prevail?

The proper answer to this question cannot be comprised within the limits of a single formula, but may in outline be briefly set forth thus. In the first place, the peculiar virtues elicited by the exigencies of war, however exalted may be the place which the moral judgment assigns to them, are in practical life not virtues at all unless they exist in combination with others. Courage is a virtue if exercised to protect a woman from a brigand. It is no virtue as exercised by a brigand in the gratification of his appetites or the perpetration of robbery. We call such a man, not a hero, but a desperado; that is to say, if we take men as concrete beings, their moral characters are not mechanical aggregates of so many separate characteristics, any one of which can be judged on its own merits, but are the joint results of their interaction, just as gunpowder is a compound which has qualities different from those of any one of its constituent parts. Now all action, says Aristotle, is necessarily a means to some end. Thus the labour of boat-building has for its end a boat. A boat, however, is not an end in itself. It is but an implement for transporting goods or passengers. Indeed, of all the ends at which human action aims, one only is final; and this, whatever may be its nature, is what men mean by 'happiness.'

But between the intermediate ends and the final end there is one radical difference. The former are definite, and can only be achieved by action which aims directly at their achievement. The latter is indefinite, and eludes direct endeavour; but when, in respect of the proximate ends of action, all the moral faculties harmoniously work together, the final end is reached by not directly seeking

it, and happiness emerges as a by-product, 'like the bloom on the cheek of health.' The case of the virtues which are developed by the translation of patriotism into Power is analogous. It is impossible that States shall in the long run continue to exist unless they have Power at the back of them; and Power is the logical end of those moral virtues and moral actions which make for Power, just as happiness is the logical end of individual action generally. But these particular actions, if they are to possess the quality of virtues, must not aim at Power considered directly and in isolation. Modified by, and in co-operation with others, they must aim at some end of which Power is only one ingredient, and which is not in its totality recognisable as mere brute power at all. Only by not thus aiming at it, but by aiming at something else, will such actions by any State, or on behalf of it, represent Power in any civilised or tolerable form, or acquire that moral character which the apostles of Power claim for them, and which distinguishes heroism and its kindred virtues from barbarism.

In view of the fact that Treitschke regarded Aristotle as the greatest political thinker that the world has ever known, this statement of the case in terms of Aristotelian logic is particularly pertinent here; for it enables us by contrast to realise the futility of Treitschke's own attempts to associate the exercise of mere brute power by a nation with subjection to the moral imperative of some supernational principle. The logic of Aristotle deals with composite facts. In relation to supernational morality, the logic of Treitschke deals with mere abstractions; and these abstractions are absolutely inconsistent with the principles on which his entire reasoning as to concrete facts is based. As we have seen already, in his very definition of a State, he sets out with declaring that no State can exist, unless it is one State co-existing with, and therefore distinct from, others. A 'World-State' embracing all Humanity would, according to him, not be a State at all. But, when he attempts to elaborate some conception of a supreme authority which shall regulate and moralise the conduct of one State towards another, the nearest approach he can make to it is a moral World-State, which, if it is not a 'World-State,' is nothing; and which, as he explicitly says, is an authority

only for the reason that 'all humanity is embraced by it,' and must for that very reason be lacking in that exclusiveness which he himself describes as essential to a State's existence. The only way in which, even metaphorically, such a moral World-State could be said to exist would be as a symbol of certain views with regard to national conduct, in which, as foregone conclusions, all States actually agree. But how could an authority which represents nothing but permanent agreements settle quarrels which arise out of conduct with regard to which States differ, and which are the only questions demanding any settlement at all? In whatever way we look at the matter, Treitschke's arguments with regard to national or supernational ethics are arguments in the air, and they are also arguments in a circle.

But, in condemning both his doctrines—his doctrine of Power as shown to be intolerable by its consequences, and his doctrine of a supernational morality as empty of any power to mitigate them—we must recognise that their mutual antagonism is not due wholly to the fact that both are incorrectly stated by him. However they may be reconstructed, there will always remain an antagonism between the two which cannot be completely harmonised. The practical reason has its antinomies no less than transcendental reason. Evolution, if 'careful of the type,' is careless of the individual. There are paradoxes inherent in human nature itself. This was recognised by Paul, who, in exalting chastity as a virtue, admitted that its universal practice would leave nobody alive to practise it. And here, again, we are brought back to Aristotle, whose philosophy in this respect was the secular counterpart of Paul's. With regard to morality, as applicable to mankind at large, the principle Aristotle formulates is the principle which Paul suggests. It is this—that for mankind at large every practicable virtue is a compromise. It is a mean, or a point which lies somewhere between two extremes, and which, like the apex of a triangle, is at the same time above them. And he bases this principle, not on any appeal to an imaginary moral World-State in the clouds, but on the common experience and the instinctive judgment of mankind. Thus true temperance is recognised by all men when they see it, as a mean between the profligacy

which sacrifices all to pleasure, and the grotesque asceticism of the cynic, who rejects the luxury of a house, and makes his home in a barrel. Everybody recognises the ideal virtue of bravery as a mean between the temper of the bully and that of the cringing coward, who in order to avoid a blow is willing to do anything. And here we have a standard which is applicable to nations or States no less than to individuals. A nation which has no power to use, or is too invertebrate to use what power it has, will decay through its own impotence, and merits no other fate. A State which regards the mere possession of power as justifying any act which mere power is able to perpetrate, is a State which, in the interest of civilisation, deserves to have its power destroyed.

Such, if we except the case of Germany as it is to-day, has always been implicitly the opinion of the whole civilised world; and the fact that the Germans themselves have sought to deny many of the atrocious 'acts of power' ascribed to them, and have expended so much ingenuity in an attempted justification of others, is a sign that even in Germany itself this opinion is not extinct. This fact points the way to one reasonable hope at all events. It has here been observed already that, in the case of Treitschke personally, the philosophy of Power, which gradually increased in ferocity as he himself matured it, was an expression of the concurrent development of German Power as a fact; and that the same thing holds good of the German people in adopting it. German militarism is not the result of this philosophy, but the philosophy is the expression of the accomplished fact of militarism, and of the inordinate ambitions which a consciousness of mere military power has engendered. Whatever may be the immediate consequence of the present struggle otherwise, it may be hoped that by imposing on that Power a consciousness of its own limitations, it may by degrees restore the German people to a philosophy and a temper more consonant with the practical demands of civilisation, and more worthy of their own traditions.

M.

Art. 11.—CONGRESS AND THE WAR.

Congressional Record. Sixty-Fourth Congress, First Session. Vol. LIII, Nos 1 to 86. Government Printing Bureau, Washington, D. C., 1916.

ONLY by a plebiscite could it be determined how the men and women of the United States stand on the war. Small hazard, however, would be incurred in making the statement that ninety or ninety-five per cent. of those who are of American stock, and of English or Scottish ancestry, are whole-hearted in their sympathy with the Allies. Despite this fact it cannot be said that the official reports of proceedings in Congress on questions raised directly or indirectly by the war are pleasant reading for sympathisers with the Allies. In the first part of the first session of the Sixty-Fourth Congress—in the period from Dec. 6, 1915, to the end of March 1916—the questions arising out of the war that had come before the Senate and the House of Representatives were the proposed embargo on the export of munitions, the British blockade, the censorship of mails exercised by the British Government, and Germany's threat of Feb. 10, 1916, that she would treat all armed enemy merchantmen as war vessels, and torpedo them without warning. In the discussion of these questions there were singularly few expressions of sympathy with the Allies; and, as was obvious in the discussions and divisions on the Gore and McLemore resolutions, there were, in both the Senate and the House, large groups of members who readily associated themselves with a movement which, had it succeeded, would unmistakably have been to the advantage of Germany in her submarine warfare, and with two or three other movements that, whatever may have been the domestic reasons for their origin, would greatly have hampered the Allies in equipping their forces, and hindered Great Britain in the blockade of Germany.

President Wilson's neutrality proclamation of Aug. 20, 1914, sufficiently explains the fewness and the guarded character of expressions of sympathy with the Allies in the Senate and the House. The President, it will be recalled, urged that the citizens of the United States, 'drawn from many nations, and chiefly from the nations

now at war,' must be impartial in thought as well as in action; that they must put a curb on their sentiments as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before the other. In the unprecedented conditions of the war, the President's proclamation, so far as the people of the United States are concerned, was a counsel of perfection. After twenty-one months of war, it cannot be asserted, either as regards the press or the platform, that there has ever been anything approaching a general acceptance of the counsel offered to the American people from the White House. Neither sympathisers with the Allies nor pro-Germans have found it possible to follow the President's advice. The German propaganda has been continuous in one form or another since the autumn of 1914. On the other hand, organisations have come into existence in recent months avowedly hostile to Germany. One of these is the American Rights Committee of New York, which advocates the severance of diplomatic relations with Germany. Another, the Citizens' League for America and the Allies, insists that 'our political ideals and our national safety are bound up with the cause of the Allies; that their defeat would mean moral and material disaster to our country'; and adds that 'therefore this league is formed to use all lawful means to put this nation in a position of definite sympathy with the Allies, and in an equally definite position of moral disapprobation of the central Teutonic powers.'* There is, moreover, at least one instance in which a great iron and steel manufacturing company made it a condition in contracts for partly-finished material, that none of this material, and no finished materials made from it, should be exported to any European country except the United Kingdom, France, Italy or Russia, with a further condition that it should not be exported to any countries outside Europe or Canada without written notice of such shipments to the British Consul General at New York.†

Senators and Representatives who sympathise with the Allies in general heeded the President's advice in their utterances in Congress. But there are eight million people of German origin in the United States; and the

* 'Cong. Rec.', March 4, vol. lili, No. 62, p. 4091.

† *Ib.* p. 4092.

pro-German propaganda, at least that part of it which is addressed to German-Americans, has gone on continuously since August 1914. The division of it that was aimed at Americans—the division of which Dr Dernburg was in charge until the 'Lusitania' outrage made an abrupt end to his mission—was much less active after his departure. The other division, which is carried on among German-Americans, increased its activity as the war dragged on; and its leaders were particularly alert in organising petitions to Congress for an embargo on munitions, for the prohibition of travel by American citizens on armed merchant ships, for the prohibition of war-loans in the United States, against the British blockade, and in opposition to any action by Congress with a view to 'preparedness.'

German-Americans are scattered all over the United States. They are most numerous in the states of New York, Illinois, Wisconsin, Iowa, Missouri, Michigan, Ohio, Minnesota, Indiana, New Jersey, California, Nebraska, Kansas, and North and South Dakota. It is asserted by men who are active in the pro-German movement—a movement that has the support of eight hundred daily and weekly newspapers printed in the German language—that in these fifteen states there are 1,860,000 voters of German birth or descent;* and none of the foreign-born citizens of the United States are to-day or ever were as well organised or as closely held together by race, language and interest as the German-Americans. The sympathies of many Swedish-Americans, Irish-Americans and Jewish-Americans are also with Germany. Moreover, there is in the cotton-growing states much irritation at the blockade, which has kept American cotton out of Germany, and curtailed the supplies of fertilisers that are used by the cotton-growers of the South. These conditions account for the fact that in both Houses of Congress, but particularly in the House of Representatives, there are many members who, in discussions on the embargo, on the blockade, and on the German demand that merchantmen shall not be armed, made speeches which, while not openly conflicting with the President's desire for neutrality, were evidently intended to ingratiate

* 'Frank Retort of a pro-German,' 'N.Y. Times,' May 18, 1916.

them with the pro-Germans in their constituencies. Senators and Congressmen were reminded almost daily in the earlier part of the session of the organisation and activity of German-Americans in all parts of the country. Petitions in favour of movements in Congress which, if they had succeeded, would have been to the advantage of Germany, were numerous and largely signed. One petition against the export of munitions, promoted by the Organisation of American Women for Strict Neutrality, was fifteen and a half miles long, and the Senate was assured that it contained over a million signatures.

Only a few petitions, and these only against an embargo on munitions, emanated from sympathisers with the Allies, Americans who were derisively described by a Congressman from Missouri as Tories, the name given to those who remained loyal to Great Britain in the Revolution of 1776. Consideration for the German-American vote was shown in many speeches in the House defending German-Americans from the charge made by President Wilson in a message to Congress, that there were citizens of the United States,

'born under other flags, but welcomed here under our generous naturalisation laws to the full freedom and opportunity of America, who have poured the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries of our national life, who have sought to bring the authority and good name of our government into contempt, to destroy our industries . . . and to debase our politics to the uses of foreign intrigue.'

All this consideration for the German-American vote did not go without condemnation in Congress. Mr J. S. Williams, in the Senate, described the Senator or Representative who was looking behind him at 'some racial vote of some sort,' not only as an unpatriotic American, but as a poor judge of human nature, and even a poor practical politician.* In the House, in the debate on the McLemore resolution, Mr S. Beakes, of Michigan, in whose home-county half the voters are either of German birth or descent, declared that, if the resolution, which not only warned American citizens off belligerent merchant ships but also told the world that the United

* 'Cong. Rec.', vol. lili, p. 3906.

States would not protect American rights on the high seas, 'was not a futile bid for the German vote, then it must have been for the ignoble purpose of securing peace by abdicating in advance American rights on the seas.'*

The first discussion of the proposed embargo on the export of munitions was in the House of Representatives on Jan. 7, 1916, about the time when petitions were beginning to be received from the pacifists and the pro-Germans urging that belligerents should no longer be permitted to obtain munitions in the United States. No bill or resolution had been introduced; but Mr Gardner, a Republican from Massachusetts, obtained leave to address the House on the letter of Mr Lansing, Secretary of State, to the Austrian Government (dated Aug. 12, 1915), in which that Government was informed that

'the principles of International Law, the practice of nations, the national safety of the United States and other nations without great military and naval establishments, the prevention of increased armies and navies, the adoption of peaceful methods for the adjustment of international differences, and finally, neutrality itself, are opposed to the prohibition by a neutral nation of the export of arms, ammunition or other munitions of war to belligerent powers during the progress of a war.'

Mr Gardner, who is one of those Representatives who have never been careful to conceal where their sympathies lie, described Mr Lansing's letter as 'a good stout statement' of the position of the United States Government on the question of an embargo on munitions. He asked whether anything had happened to change the situation on this question in the five months since Mr Lansing's note was communicated to the Austrian Government. 'Yes, indeed,' he answered, 'Congress has assembled, and three groups of men are demanding the enactment of a law to stop the export of war material.' These groups, as described by Mr Gardner, are (1) the German-Americans, who demanded an embargo out of love for their fatherland; (2) the cotton kings, who joined in the chorus out of love for Mammon; and (3) the pacifist

* 'Cong. Rec.', vol. lili, p. 4340.

'who adds his hallelujah out of love for God.' Examining the pleas of each of these groups, Mr Gardner asked where the doctrine of the pacifist was carrying him. 'His hatred of militarism would halt the very arms which are striving to destroy militarism. If he had his way, he would paralyse the only force in the universe which stands between him and the tender mercies of armed autocracy.' Turning to the plea of the cotton king—the plea that the U.S. Government should put an embargo on munitions until Great Britain consents to pass cotton cargoes through the blockade to Germany—Mr Gardner continued:

'It is all the fashion to reprobate Great Britain now that she is fighting for her life; but if you think we were not glad to have her with us in Manila Bay, why, ask Admiral Dewey. However, the Spanish war is a thing of the past, and the cotton king deals strictly with the present and the future. He must have a still higher price for his cotton, even if the cause of democracy is to be sacrificed. Not content with his present splendid profits, he insists on even more. I will do him the justice to say that he does not play the hypocrite about the immorality of the ammunition trade. Give him his German market, and for all he cares you may trade in ammunition for ever. He does not even pretend that the embargo for which he shouts is anything else than a weapon for the enforcement of compliance with his demands.'

From munitions Mr Gardner passed to sea-power and the blockade. He had listened in vain, he told the House, for a clear exposition of the meaning of the German demand for the freedom of the seas. To whom, he asked, in times of peace have the seas been otherwise than free for a hundred years past? It was quite true that Great Britain had been the greatest sea-power throughout that time, but only pirates could justly charge her with using that sea-power to destroy the freedom of the seas. After all, some nation must be the strongest at sea. 'I wonder,' added Mr Gardner, 'whether Germany would prove a more considerate ruler of the waves.'

The women who promoted the great petition presented to the Senate on Jan. 27 based their plea for an embargo on munitions on the ground that it was inhuman to export the 'things which kill,' and on President

Wilson's statement in his neutrality proclamation that American citizens must be neutral in fact as well as in name, and that they must put a curb on every transaction which might give a preference to one party in the struggle. Senator Kenyon, a Republican from Iowa, was in charge of the petition; and he assured his colleagues that the signatories were not pro-British or pro-German. 'They are,' he added, 'pro-American, pro-humanity, and pro-Christianity; and they are actuated only by the highest humanitarian motives.'

Another note was struck when Senator Hitchcock, of Nebraska, addressed the Senate; for he submitted telegrams from four of his constituents in favour of an embargo for other reasons than those advanced by the Organisation of American Women for Strict Neutrality. There was a similarity in wording and in substance between all four telegrams. It will be sufficient to quote one of them.

'Pleasington, Nebr, January 25, 1916.

'To Hon. G. M. Hitchcock, U.S. Senate, Washington, D. C.

'Please work in Congress for an immediate embargo on shipment of war munitions, embargo to remain in force until the accumulated grain is unloaded and released at the seaports. Shortage of grain cars in this territory is becoming alarming and getting worse. The condition of corn demands immediate movement.—D. PHILLIPS.'

In the ordinary course, the petition from the Organisation of American Women for Strict Neutrality—an organisation established in Baltimore, and widely suspected as a pro-German concern—would have gone to the Committee on Foreign Relations. But Senator Hitchcock was desirous that it should go to the Committee on Commerce. His contention was that these letters from Nebraskan grain traders presented a new issue.

'This manufacture of deadly arms and ammunition has become of such absorbing and controlling interest in the East as to require new factories for the manufacture of these munitions, and the enlargement of old factories upon such a scale that the industry is becoming the chief business in the eastern part of the United States to-day; and the arms and ammunition, being thus manufactured for their deadly work in Europe, absorb the cargo space of our ocean-going vessels

that ought to be given to the legitimate business of the United States. If appeals to the sentiment of the country, to the moral sense of the country, to the religious sense of the country, are not sufficient in this body to arouse a responding action, if they are not sufficient in this body to command the attention of Senators, perhaps they will listen to the cry that is coming up from the West, where legitimate business is being paralysed by the absorption of the ocean-carrying vessels of the country in this damnable trade in arms and ammunition' (' Cong. Rec.', vol. liii, pp. 1793-1794).

On the Sunday following the discussion in the Senate a mass-meeting was held in Boston in favour of preparedness for war, and in opposition to the Baltimore movement for an embargo on munitions. It was from this Boston meeting that there was sent to Congress one of the comparatively few petitions against the proposed embargo. The meeting was largely attended by men and women who are interested in the Citizens' League for America and the Allies; and by a vote of 2300 to 3 a series of resolutions was adopted, dealing with the question of neutrality as well as with the proposed embargo on munitions. One resolution declared that neutrality did not forbid Americans, either as individuals or as a nation, from expressing their condemnation of any warfare that 'outrages international treaties, or violates the territory of nations which seek only to maintain their independence and to protect their homes.' Another resolution protested against every effort, 'whether among the people or in the government, to restrict or suppress the export of munitions of war to any belligerent, since such restriction or suppression of commerce must, under the conditions which the war has developed, constitute an evident, if not avowed, act of national partisanship.'

These resolutions were embodied in the petition which Mr Lodge, of Massachusetts, presented to the Senate on Feb. 7. There was included a third resolution, which declared that the petitioners were inflexibly opposed to any policy which might represent that the United States 'dare not protest against wrongs which we condemn, or that we hesitate, at the risk of life, to defend the flag and those who have the right to its protection, or to take our just part in the enforcement of those principles of

humanity without which there can be no peace or justice.'* German-American organisations, as the pages of the Congressional Record abundantly show, made one of their hardest and longest drives against the export of munitions. They had much help from pacifists who do not sympathise with Germany, and some help also in Congress from representatives from southern states aggrieved at the closing by the Allies of the German and Austrian markets for cotton, which in the year before the war absorbed 2,557,000 bales of the American staple. But after Mr Lansing's letter of Aug. 12, 1915, to the Austrian Government, there was never any likelihood of an embargo on the export of munitions; and in the Senate, after the debate of Jan. 27, nothing more was heard of the petition from the Organisation of American Women for Strict Neutrality.

In the autumn of 1915 there was much agitation in the cotton-growing states over the British blockade, which curtailed the market for cotton and prevented the planters from importing their potash from Germany. One result of the agitation was a discussion of the blockade in the Senate in the first week of the session. It was on a resolution proposed by Mr Hoke Smith, a Democrat from Georgia, who stated that the U.S. Government had contested the legality of the Orders-in-Council virtually blockading the neutral ports of Northern Europe, and moved that the Committee on Foreign Affairs should be instructed to investigate the subject and make suggestions. Mr Smith's case for action by the United States was that for a hundred years British courts and British text-books had recognised rules of international law determining the rights of neutrals—rules that Great Britain was recklessly disregarding in the blockade. There could be no pretence, Mr Smith contended, that this action was legal. 'Indeed,' he continued, 'there is no such pretence. It is a bold, reckless disregard of that freedom of the seas, which is the right of neutrals by the customs of nations and rules of international law.'†

Mr Lodge, of Massachusetts, although, as he told the

* 'Cong. Rec.', vol. lili, p. 2477.

† *Ib.* pp. 135-141.

Senate, as anxious as anyone could be to protect American rights in trade, was also anxious that, if the question of the violation of rights were to be taken up by Congress, it should be put not on the lowest ground alone, but on the highest ground as well.

'I think it is of great importance,' he said, 'that we should vindicate our rights as a neutral in trade if those rights have been violated; but I think it is far more important that we should extend protection and assure security to American citizens wherever they rightfully are, for I do not believe that any government can long retain the respect of its own people if it does not give them the protection to which they are entitled. . . . To me American lives are more important than American dollars. The body of an innocent child floating dead on the water, the victim of the destruction of an unarmed vessel, is to me a more poignant and a more tragic spectacle than an unsold bale of cotton.'

'I think, if we are to investigate and enquire with a view to action, such deeds as these should not be omitted. I am not willing to get into a passion over an infringement of our trade, and then allow American citizens to lose their lives and pass it by in frigid silence. I think the United States stands for something higher in the world than mere trade and mere dollars. I do not want to see our citizens wronged in their property, but I think we should also stand, and above all, for morality and humanity in the dealings of nations with each other.'

The resolution proposed by Senator Smith, and amended by Mr Lodge to include the investigation of attacks upon or destruction of the 'Gulflight,' 'Falaba,' 'Lusitania,' 'Arabic,' 'Ancona,' 'Hesperian,' and 'Petro-lite,' and also of the alien conspiracies denounced by President Wilson, was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations; and there was no farther action in the Senate in regard to the blockade until Jan. 28. Then Mr Walsh, a Democrat from Montana, whose speciality in blockade discussions is copper, introduced a bill to interdict commercial intercourse between the United States and any foreign country which should unlawfully interfere with foreign trade of the United States. He also protested against the censorship and the delay of mails, and complained that trade between the United States and neutral countries was conducted only with

such persons on the Continent as the British authorities might graciously permit to engage in it:

'Acquiescence in such a course marks the country submitting to it as a subject nation. . . . The logic of the situation is plain. If the Allies decline to yield to reason, we must cease trading with them. It would be the supremest folly to go to war over the present situation or any that is likely to develop out of it when a remedy, wholly efficacious, that involves no sacrifice of life, is open to us. War would necessarily involve an embargo, since there could be no traffic with an enemy. Our rights as an independent nation are at stake, and we ought not to hesitate at any monetary or other loss necessary to maintain them' ('Cong. Rec.', vol. liii, p. 1864).

Like Mr Smith's resolution, Mr Walsh's bill was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, the most overburdened committee of the Senate, and on Feb. 7 there was also referred to this committee, at the instance of Mr Smith, a communication which was of some significance to the censors in London. It was an article from the 'Daily Trade Record,' of New York, and was based on an article in the 'Newcastle Illustrated Chronicle.' This article showed, according to Mr Hoke Smith, that in Great Britain it is now recognised that cotton is no longer necessary in Germany for the manufacture of powder.

'It is also an English concession that the British Government placed cotton upon a contraband list as the result of popular clamour based upon a misapprehension of the facts. The article is quite short, but the information is valuable, and instead of presenting it in the shape of a discussion on the floor, I should like to have it printed in the Record. I think we will all be interested to have this valuable information' ('Cong. Rec.', vol. liii, p. 2481).

The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives also had its work increased by movements in Congress against the blockade. A resolution similar to that proposed by Mr Hoke Smith in the Senate was moved in the House by Mr Fess, of Ohio, who was anxious that the United States Government should stiffen its backbone, and, to quote Mr Fess, 'not take orders from any country outside our own.' From his reading

of London newspapers, Mr Fess had reached the conclusion that the British Government was being urged, in regard to the blockade, to pursue such policy as would best aid the Allies, regardless of the wishes of the United States :

'You ask me, "What are you going to do about it?" I will tell you what I might be willing to do. We may be driven to it here, not because it is our wish or desire, but as a measure to compel respect for our rights; and that is, if Great Britain will not respect our rights as defined in law, I am about ready to vote now to stop all the munitions of war going to her (applause)' ('Cong. Rec.', vol. liii, p. 944).

A pronouncedly pro-German note was struck in these debates on the blockade on Jan. 25, when Mr Bennet, a Republican from New York, interpreted to the House the view which 'our fellow-citizens of German birth' took as regards the negotiations of the State Department with the Government at Berlin over the 'Lusitania' and other vessels torpedoed by Germany, and the negotiations with Great Britain over the blockade. Taking cognisance of the notes that went to Germany :

'they called upon us to note that as between the Central Powers and ourselves a solution of these problems is being reached which bids fair to be creditable to both sides; but they also note that there is no strict accountability note going to Great Britain; and they demand, as Americans, that we present an American policy and stand by it as against the whole of the world or any portion of it.'

Mr Bennet further expressed himself in agreement with a remark that had been made by Mr Mann, Republican leader of the House, that the United States stands a far better chance, 'with these daily recurring instances of high-handed oppression to our citizens and our commerce, of getting into trouble with Great Britain than with Germany.'

The only movement in Congress that attracted public attention all over the United States—the only movement out of which anything approaching a crisis developed—arose out of Germany's intimation to the neutral powers on Feb. 10, 1916, to the effect that, after Feb. 29, it was

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her intention to treat all armed enemy merchantmen as belligerents, liable to attack by submarines without warning. There had been some discussion in both Houses before Feb. 10 on the question of armed merchantmen; and bills had been introduced suspending the right of American citizens to travel on ships of the belligerent nations. So early as Jan. 5, Mr T. P. Gore, a Democrat of Oklahoma, had introduced two such bills in the Senate. The object of the first was to prevent the issuance of passports for use on belligerent ships. The purpose of the second bill was to withdraw protection from citizens of the United States who persisted in travelling on vessels of the belligerents, to prevent belligerent ships from entering or clearing from ports of the United States if they carried American citizens as passengers, and to prevent American vessels from transporting American citizens as passengers and contraband of war at the same time upon the same vessel.*

In the House of Representatives, Mr Mondell, of Wyoming, had introduced a bill to prohibit citizens carrying United States passports from travelling on armed merchantmen.† These bills had been referred to committees with no likelihood that they would be favourably reported; but their introduction and the discussions on submarine warfare had made it obvious that, in both the House and the Senate, there were large groups of members—Democrats as well as Republicans—who were willing, at the behest of Germany, to surrender the right of citizens of the United States to travel on merchant vessels of the belligerent powers. This was the situation in Congress before Feb. 10, when Germany announced that it was her intention to treat all armed merchantmen as belligerents, liable to attack by submarines without warning. Within a few days the situation was seriously changed by the introduction of what, in the congressional crisis of Feb. 29—March 7, were known as the McLemore and Gore resolutions. The McLemore resolution was introduced in the House on Feb. 17. The Gore resolution was submitted to the Senate on Feb. 25. By the McLemore resolution the House was asked to express the determination of the people and the Government of

* 'Cong. Rec.', vol. llii, p. 571.

† *Ib.* p. 1668.

the United States 'both to uphold all American rights, and to exercise care, consideration and wisdom in avoiding actions which tend to bring American citizens and American interests into the zone of conflict where the passions of war are raging.'* The resolution was at once referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

The Gore resolution was, in the phraseology of Congress, a concurrent resolution. It differed from a joint resolution in that, if it had been carried in both Houses, it would have been only an expression of the opinion of Congress, whereas a joint resolution, when signed by the President, has the force of law. At a later stage during the crisis that developed out of these two resolutions Senator Gore offered an amendment in his resolution. As introduced, the resolution had a preamble of seven clauses, the sixth of which read:

'Whereas the right of American citizens to travel on armed belligerent vessels rather than on unarmed vessels is essential neither to their life, liberty or safety, nor to the independence, dignity or security of the United States.'

The seventh clause insisted that, as Congress is vested with power to declare war, it is under an obligation to 'prevent war by all proper means consistent with the honour and vital interest of the nation.' The resolution read as follows:

'That it is the sense of the Congress, vested as it is with the sole power to declare war, that all persons owing allegiance to the United States should in behalf of their own safety and the vital interest of the United States forbear to exercise the right to travel as passengers upon any armed vessel of any belligerent power, whether such vessel be armed for offensive or defensive purposes; and it is the further sense of the Congress that no passport should be issued or renewed by the Secretary of State, or by anyone acting under him, to be used by any person owing allegiance to the United States for purposes of travel upon any such armed vessel of a belligerent power' ('Cong. Rec.', vol. liii, p. 3556).

As was the case with the McLemore resolution, the Gore resolution was referred without discussion to a committee.

* 'Cong. Rec.', vol. liii, p. 3147.

It went to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Both resolutions might have been 'cushioned' in the respective committees until the end of the session, had it not been for the intervention of the President, who on Feb. 29 made it known to the House Committee on Rules, and to Senator Stone, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, that the introduction of these resolutions had created a false impression abroad; that they were hampering negotiations then proceeding with Germany in regard to submarine warfare; and that it was imperative that they should be disposed of in the Senate and the House without delay. In the House, only the Committee on Rules could expedite matters as desired by President Wilson. Consequently it was to Mr Pou, ranking member of the committee, in the absence of Mr Henry, the chairman, that the President addressed his letter.

'The report that there are divided counsels in Congress in regard to the foreign policy of the Government (wrote the President) is being made industrious use of in foreign capitals. I believe that report to be false; but, so long as it is anywhere credited, it cannot fail to do the greatest harm and expose the country to the most serious risks. I therefore feel justified in asking that your committee will permit me to urge an early vote upon the resolutions with regard to travel on armed merchantmen which have recently been so much talked about in order that there may be afforded an immediate opportunity for full public discussion and action upon them, and that all doubts and conjectures may be swept away, and our foreign relations once more cleared of damaging misunderstandings' ('Cong. Rec.', vol. liii, p. 4406).

President Wilson's first discussion of the resolutions with Senator Stone was at the White House on Monday, Feb. 28. Following this conference there was an exchange of letters between the President and Mr Stone, letters that are of importance in view of the fact that in them the President offered a detailed explanation of his policy in regard to the German intimation of Feb. 10. In a letter to the President dated Feb. 29, Mr Stone stated what he supposed to be Mr Wilson's attitude.

The essential paragraphs in the President's letter in reply to Senator Stone are these:

'You are right in assuming that I shall do everything in my power to keep the United States out of war. I think the country will feel no uneasiness about my course in that respect. Through many anxious months I have striven for that object, amid difficulties more manifold than can have been apparent upon the surface, and so far I have succeeded. I do not doubt that I shall continue to succeed. The course which the Central European powers have announced their intention of following in the future with regard to under-sea warfare seems for the moment to threaten insuperable obstacles; but its apparent meaning is so manifestly inconsistent with explicit assurances recently given us by those powers with regard to their treatment of merchant vessels on the high seas, that I must believe that explanations will presently ensue which will put a different aspect upon it. We have had no reason to question their good faith or their fidelity to their promises in the past, and I for one feel confident that we shall have none in the future.

'But in any event our duty is clear. No nation, no group of nations, has the right, while war is in progress, to alter or disregard the principles which all nations have agreed upon in mitigation of the horrors and sufferings of war; and, if the clear rights of American citizens should very unhappily be abridged or denied by any such action, we should, it seems to me, have in honour no choice as to what our own course should be.

'For my own part, I cannot consent to any abridgment of the rights of American citizens in any respect. The honour and self-respect of the nation is involved. We covet peace, and shall preserve it at any cost but the loss of honour. To forbid our people to exercise their rights for fear we might be called upon to vindicate them would be a deep humiliation indeed. It would be an implicit, all but an explicit, acquiescence in the violation of the rights of mankind everywhere and of whatever nation or allegiance. It would be a deliberate abdication of our hitherto proud position as spokesmen, even amid the turmoil of war, for the law and the right. It would make everything this government has attempted, and everything that it has accomplished, during this terrible struggle of nations meaningless and futile.

'It is important to reflect that, if in this instance we allowed expediency to take the place of principle, the door would inevitably be opened to still further concessions. Once accept a single abatement of right, and many other humiliations would certainly follow, and the whole fine fabric of international law might crumble under our hands piece by

piece. What we are contending for in this matter is of the very essence of the things that have made America a sovereign nation. She cannot yield them without conceding her own impotency as a nation, and making virtual surrender of her independent position among the nations of the world' ('Cong. Rec.', vol. liii, p. 3807).

President Wilson's intervention promptly brought about the action in Congress that he desired. The parliamentary machinery necessary to bring the resolutions from the committees was soon in motion. The Senate responded to the President's request on March 3. The next day the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House reported the McLemore resolution with a recommendation that it be laid on the table; and after an exciting sitting, which was followed with intense interest all over the country, the House, by a vote of 276 to 142, adopted the recommendation of the Committee. In the Senate, Mr Stone moved that the Gore resolution be laid on the table. There can be no discussion on a motion to table; but, before the motion was made, Senator McCumber had proposed a substitute for the Gore resolution, a resolution which would have called on citizens of the United States to refrain from travel on armed merchantmen 'until an arrangement had been reached between this country and the warring nations, to the end that the endeavours of the President may not be jeopardised or halted, or this government forced into hostility with another country because of the unnecessary or reckless attitude of any citizen of the United States.' Senator Gore at this time also offered the amendment to his resolution of Feb. 25. He proposed to leave the preamble as it stood, but to substitute a new resolution which declared that:

'the sinking by a German submarine without notice or warning of an armed merchant vessel of her public enemy, resulting in the death of a citizen of the United States, would constitute a just and sufficient cause of war between the United States and the German Empire' ('Cong. Rec.', vol. liii, p. 3966).

Under the rules no opportunity was afforded at this stage to Mr McCumber to speak to his resolution; and Mr Gore had no opportunity to explain why he desired to make the proposed change. The motion made by Senator Stone to table the original Gore resolution was amended

to cover the substitute and amended resolutions; and on a division it was carried by 68 to 14. Two Democrats, usually supporters of the Wilson Administration, and twelve Republicans were in the minority against tabling the Gore resolution. With the exception of Senator O'Gorman, of New York, and Senator Gallinger, of New Hampshire, all these Senators are from western states, in which there are many German-Americans, and also large numbers of Swedish-Americans who, like many Irish-Americans in the large cities both in the East and the West, are pro-German in their sympathies.

A readiness to start movements which would embarrass the Allies was even more marked among groups in the House of Representatives than in the Senate. Senators since 1911 have been elected by direct popular vote. The term of a Senator is six years; and thirty-two Senators will be elected in November. The term of Representatives is two years; and all the members of the House who are seeking re-election must go before their constituents at the approaching election. This fact, and the organised political activity of the German-Americans, explain these movements in the House, and account for the fact that much more popular interest centred in the fate of the McLemore resolution than in proceedings in the Senate on the Gore and McCumber resolutions. Nearly forty members took part in the debate in the House. They represented every section of the United States—the Atlantic Coast, the South, the West, the Middle West and the Pacific Coast; for the debate was the only full-day debate in the House, from Dec. 7 to the time of the 'Sussex' crisis and President Wilson's note to Germany of May 10, on a question arising out of the war or out of any action either by Germany or the Allies.

Mr McLemore's argument for his resolution was that Germany would not swerve from the policy she had announced on Feb. 10; and that, if the United States insisted on the right of neutrals, it would become involved in the war with the Central Powers. The spirit which actuated him in introducing the resolution can be judged from one paragraph in his speech :

'If anyone seeks evidence of the denial of American rights at sea, let him examine why cotton is contraband; why milk

for starving babies and rubber gloves cannot go to Germany; why not a pound of American produce can move from any Atlantic or Gulf port to any neutral port in the world without the permission of an English consular spy; why hundreds of cargoes have been taken into English ports, confiscated or ruined; why not a single piece of mail can leave America for Europe with the assurance that it will reach its destination; why the American ships "Hocking" and "Genesee" and "Kankakee" are to-day impressed into English service, though they had not even attempted to cross the ocean, but only to sail along the coast of America. Let us learn why a distinguished American woman was stripped of every piece of her clothing by men in the presence of men—English "gentlemen" doubtless—because she talked to a German on a Dutch ship! Let us look upon these matters, and we shall find plenty of stern business to do in the line of protecting the freedom of the seas! ('Cong. Rec.', vol. liii, p. 4326.)

For American sympathisers with the Allies there were two disagreeable surprises in the division on the McLemore resolution. In the House the Democrats number 228; the Republicans 197. In addition there are six Progressives, and four members elected as independents or socialists. The Progressives are of the new party created in 1912, when Mr Roosevelt broke away from the Republicans and was nominated for the presidency in opposition to Mr Taft and Mr Wilson. The first disturbing surprise was that out of 435 members not more than 276 were willing to vote against the McLemore resolution. The second was that Mr Mann, of Illinois, the leader of the Republican party in the House, and 101 other Republicans, as well as five of the Progressives, were in the minority of 142 against the tabling of the resolution.

Twelve Republicans were in the minority of fourteen against the tabling of the Gore and McCumber resolutions in the Senate. The votes of these Republican Senators had made it obvious that Mr Root, who was then one of the prospective candidates for the nomination of the Republican National Convention, was not carrying the congressional leaders with him in the policy that he had announced at the New York State Republican Convention on Feb. 16. Mr Root had asked, in his speech delivered on that occasion, obviously with Germany in mind,

'How can we prevent the same principles of action, the same policy of conduct, the same forces of military power which are exhibited in Europe, from laying hold upon the vast territory and practically undefended wealth of the new world?' He had, moreover, complained that, in regard to the violation of Belgium, the Government at Washington had failed to rise to the demands of the great occasion, and lamented that 'gone were the old love of justice, the old passion for liberty, the old sympathy with the oppressed, the old ideals of an America helping the world towards a better future.'

With the then possibility that the nomination would go either to Mr Root or Mr Roosevelt, and with the certainty that the presidential election in November will turn on questions arising out of the war—and in particular on the attitude of the United States towards Germany—it was surprising to sympathisers with the Allies that there were twelve Republican votes in the Senate against tabling the Gore and McCumber resolutions. It was an even greater surprise that Mr Mann and 101 Republicans and five Progressives were in the minority in the House of Representatives against tabling the McLemore resolution. But Senators and Congressmen—Congressmen in particular—are much better acquainted with the numerical strength of the German-American vote, the Irish-American vote, and the Swedish-American vote in their constituencies than Mr Root or Mr Roosevelt; and their knowledge of the strength and organisation of these electors, and the support that these citizens of foreign origin can command in the German-American press, explain much that at first sight is surprising in the speeches and movements in Congress relating to those aspects of the war in which the interests of Germany, as opposed to the interests of the Allies, are immediately concerned.

EDWARD PORRITT.

Art. 12.—THE SOUND OF BIG GUNS.

FOR a century at least, it has been known that the sound of gun-firing may be heard to great distances. The conditions, especially the direction of the wind at the time, must be favourable; but, granted those conditions, there is no reason why the sound should not be heard more than a hundred miles from its source. The firing at Waterloo, it is reported, was heard in the eastern districts of Kent; and there are no reasons for discrediting the statement, though the distance traversed must be between 130 and 140 miles. There are not, indeed, observations forthcoming from the intermediate area occupied by sea; but the sound of very distant firing possesses a distinctive character of its own, and it is unlikely that, on this particular Sunday morning, heavy firing took place elsewhere than at Waterloo. Again, on another Sunday morning forty-nine years later (June 19, 1864), when the 'Alabama' was sunk by the 'Kearsarge' nine miles off Cherbourg, the sound of the guns was distinctly heard near Exeter (108 miles from Cherbourg) and near Bridgwater (125 miles). Similar observations have been made since the beginning of the present war, for there can be little doubt that the sounds of artillery actions in Flanders have been audible in the south of Holland and the south-eastern counties of England; the paths traversed by the sound-waves in these cases being, roughly, 100 and 120 miles in length. The interest revived by such observations may perhaps justify a more detailed reference to our knowledge of this subject and of the conditions which favour the transmission of sound-waves by the atmosphere.

It is evident that observations so sporadic as these are of little value for our purpose. They must in any case be far more numerous. They must come from places at many different distances and in various directions from the origin. The most distant places at which the sounds are heard should not be widely separated from others. It is not easy to fulfil these conditions unless preparations can be made beforehand; and the opportunities for this are infrequent. Towards the close of the last, and the beginning of the present century, there were, however, three occasions on which it was possible to

collect the desired observations. There was a great naval review at Spithead on June 26, 1897, in celebration of the late Queen Victoria's diamond jubilee. On July 18, 1900, when the French president, M. Loubet, visited Cherbourg, a sham fight was held in his honour. A few months later, on Feb. 1, 1901, when the body of Queen Victoria was brought from the Isle of Wight to Portsmouth, minute-guns were fired from the battle-ships which lined the route of the royal yacht.*

In the naval review of 1897, the fleet consisted of 165 men-of-war of all classes. When the royal yacht entered the lines, the first shot was fired from the flag-ship. The other ships followed in turn, each firing a royal salute of twenty-one guns. The guns used were of various sizes, the heaviest being a 6-inch breech-loading gun firing a blank charge of 7 lbs. They gave rise to a dull crackling noise at a short distance from the lines, but, as ship after ship took up the salute, the firing grew animated and the roll of the guns louder. This lasted for about five minutes, when the report of the last gun died away. At some distance from Spithead, the sound of the firing changed in character. Distinct reports were heard at the beginning and end of the salute as far as Farnham, 34 miles from Spithead. At greater distances, the sound was a dull, continuous roar, with occasional booms from the heavier guns.

At the time of the review, there were light but variable breezes prevailing over the south of England, mainly from the east, almost everywhere between north-east and south-east. The effect of these winds on the propagation of the sound-waves is very marked. To the east, the sound was heard as far as Framfield (57½ miles), to the north-east it was heard at Wimbledon (62 miles), to the north at Bloxham Green near Banbury (88 miles), to the west at Wellington in Somerset (93 miles), and probably at Shebbear near Torrington (135 miles). Thus, though the easterly wind was only light, the sound of the guns was heard about twice as far with the wind as in the opposite direction.

* 'The distance to which the firing of heavy guns is heard': 'Nature,' vol. 62, 1900, pp. 377-379; 'On the audibility of the minute guns fired at Spithead on February 1' [1901]: 'Knowledge,' vol. 24, 1901, pp. 124-125.

On Jan. 22, 1901, Queen Victoria died at Osborne. Ten days later her body was borne from Cowes to Portsmouth, the course of H.M.S. 'Alberta' lying to the south of a line of thirty men-of-war, running from east to west, and ranging from third-class cruisers of about 2000 tons to battleships of 14,900 tons. When the 'Alberta' left Cowes, at 3 p.m., a gun was fired from the 'Alexandra' at the west end of the line. This was followed by minute-guns from the 'Majestic' at the other end of the line, from which the remaining ships took their time, all firing as nearly together as possible. Each ship stopped firing as the funeral procession passed it, so that the reports gradually faded in strength. The guns used were 6-inch guns with blank charges of 7 lbs.; and though all could not be fired simultaneously, many were at times fired practically together. Thus, at a distance, a loud boom was usually heard, due to the nearly simultaneous discharge of several guns, followed by a rumble which sometimes lasted for as much as twenty seconds.

Owing to this peculiar character of the reports, and especially to their regular recurrence at minute-intervals, it was possible to trace them with confidence to great distances from Spithead. From east to north-west, and at distances from sixty to eighty miles, the places where the sound was heard are clustered closely together. Beyond the eighty-mile circle they decrease in number, but several lie between this distance and a hundred miles, and there can be little, if any, doubt that the reports were heard as far as Shelford, near Cambridge (111 miles from Spithead), St Ives in Huntingdonshire (118 miles), Holme, near Peterborough (125 miles), and Alderton, near Woodbridge in Suffolk (139 miles).

The most remarkable fact about the reports, however, is not their audibility at these great distances, but their practical inaudibility close to Spithead. Persons on steamers just outside the line of battleships heard the firing only from the vessels nearest to them. In Portsmouth, the first notice of the approaching procession came from a gun fired from the 'Victory'; and no shots were fired from vessels stationed in the harbour until the 'Alberta' had passed the whole line of battleships. It is expressly stated that not a sound was heard at Yarmouth, I. W. (10 miles), Chichester (15 miles), Fritham

Plain, near Lyndhurst (16 miles), Winchester (20 miles), Midhurst (22 miles), Bournemouth (27 miles), and Newbury (44 miles). Indeed, so far as is known, the nearest place at which any report was heard was Horley in Surrey, distant 50 miles. Thus on land the firing was inaudible for nearly fifty miles. Beyond this distance it was frequently heard. Near Chipping Norton (84 miles) it was so loud that labourers in the fields put down their spades and listened. Towards the north-east reports were clear enough to attract attention at a distance of 139 miles.

There can be little doubt that these curious anomalies are connected with the varying direction of the wind at the time. Close to Spithead it came from the west and was usually light. Near Lyndhurst there was a fresh breeze from the north-west or west-north-west. At Portsmouth the wind came from the shore. Beyond the sixty-mile circle the wind was light and was generally from the south. The effect of the wind is therefore clear. The sound-waves were heard at great distances in the direction towards which the wind was travelling. Against the wind they were totally inaudible only a few miles away.

Before proceeding to the account of the Cherbourg review, I may refer briefly to some further anomalies in the transmission of sound by the atmosphere. These are manifested more clearly in short, sudden explosions of volcanic origin than in the long rolling reports of multitudes of guns. Near the centre of the main island of Japan lies the Asama-yama, one of the most active volcanoes in the empire. The last great eruption occurred in 1783. It was followed, as is usually the case after so violent an outburst, by a prolonged interval of quiescence, which now seems drawing to a close. The last ten or eleven years, and especially those from 1911 onwards, have been marked by numerous explosions, which are no doubt the forerunners of another catastrophe. With the methodical organisation which is as characteristic of Japan as of the great empire with which we are at war, these premonitory symptoms are being carefully studied by Prof. Omori and a numerous band of assistants. Some of his most interesting observations relate to the areas over which the detonations are heard. As a

rule, they diverge from the Asama-yama as apex towards the east and south-east. Towards the south they may extend to the coast, 112 miles away; towards the north-east to a distance of 168 miles;* while towards the west the sound may be inaudible at a distance of only 16 miles. This peculiar extension of the sound-area is evidently connected not so much with the variable surface-winds as with the upper winds, which during most of the year travel almost uniformly towards the east or east-south-east. In two cases the form of the sound-area is still more remarkable. It consists of two entirely detached portions, one including the Asama-yama near its western margin, the other lying to the west and separated by a zone of silence fifty or sixty miles in width.

Another interesting fact recorded by Prof. Omori is that, while the original detonation is single and is heard as one sound for a distance of about 25 miles, there then occurs a zone in which the sound is double. This is followed by another zone, with its nearest margin about 75 miles from the volcano, in which three sounds are heard; and this again is succeeded by a fourth zone, 120 to 150 miles distant, in which two sounds are again heard.

Let us return to the naval review at Cherbourg on July 18, 1900, which threw further light on the problem. About 10 p.m. a sham fight took place between two portions of the French fleet, including altogether 43 vessels, of which 13 were among the largest battleships then existing. The night was very still, hardly a breath of wind could be felt, and the sea was absolutely calm. The reports were heard along the English coast from Devonshire to Sussex. From Torquay to Bognor the air-vibrations were so strong as to shake the houses; and for three or four days afterwards many English newspapers contained reports of supposed earthquake-shocks. The sounds were heard at about equal distances in both directions along the coast; towards the north-west, at Budleigh Salterton, Sidmouth and Torquay (101 miles

* Great as is this distance, it is small compared with those (2014 and 2968 miles) to which the Krakatoa eruption of 1883 was heard.

from Cherbourg), Paignton (102 miles), Dawlish and Exmouth (104 miles); towards the north-east, at Lancing (100 miles), Brighton (104 miles), and near Henfield (107 miles). With two exceptions all the places at which the sound was heard are within a mile or two of the coast-line. Some of them are on the south coast of the Isle of Wight, none in that part of Hampshire shielded from Cherbourg by the high ground of the island. It is evident that the sound-waves almost failed to penetrate the air more than a few yards above the level of the sea and the low-lying ground of the coast.

It is of some importance to notice how the sound changed in character with increasing distance from Cherbourg. At St Catherine's Point (65 miles) and Bonchurch (68 miles), in the Isle of Wight, the sound was described as like that of heavy guns. At Bournemouth and Muddiford (74 miles), in Hampshire, there was a continual rumbling noise interspersed with heavier booms. These prominent reports were unnoticed at more distant places, such as Lancing, Torquay, and Paignton, there being at these places merely a deep, monotonous, throbbing noise, the pulsations recurring with regularity and great rapidity, like the quick beating of a big drum far away. At these great distances the vibrations were heard by some observers, while they were inaudible to others; the latter spoke of a throbbing sensation in the air and appeared to feel the sound rather than to hear it. It would seem that the sound-vibrations became gradually inaudible not so much from diminishing intensity as from increasing period, as if they had become too slow to produce the sensation of sound. That their strength was still considerable is evident, for persons at Seaton, in Devon (97 miles) and Lancing (100 miles) felt the walls vibrating against their hands; and windows rattled at these and all the places mentioned above. The latter effect was also noticed at Plymouth (123 miles) and Menheniot, near Liskeard (136 miles), where not the slightest sound was heard. Of the same character is the evidence of a correspondent of 'The Times' (Oct. 22, 1915), who observed the effects of the gun-firing in Flanders about a hundred miles away. 'It is difficult to say,' he remarks, 'whether one really hears them [the guns] with one's ears or whether

one feels them. It is not, at this distance, a definite sound so much as a jarring and throbbing of the air.'


From the above instances, which might be extended almost indefinitely, it is clear that the wind is an important factor in the propagation of sound-waves by the atmosphere. If the air be still, or practically still, as during the Cherbourg review, the sound is heard at equal distances in directions which are inclined to one another at an angle of 110° . If the wind be a light one, the sound may be heard twice as far with the wind as against it. With a fresh or fairly strong breeze, the sound of gun-firing may be heard for 139 miles in the direction of the wind, while against the wind it seems deadened within a few miles. This effect of the wind is commonly ascribed to the fact that it carries the sound-waves with it. This no doubt it does, but not to the extent required, as may be shown by a simple arithmetical test. If we suppose the wind to be blowing steadily with the great velocity of 60 miles an hour, or 88 feet per second, and the velocity to be the same at all heights above the ground, then, taking the velocity of sound at 1100 feet per second, it follows that the distances to which sound would be audible in the directions with and against the wind must be as 1188 to 1012. In other words, if the sound were carried 100 miles with the wind, it would be audible for 85 miles in the opposite direction. Or, to put the matter rather differently, we may find what the velocity of the wind would have to be in order that the sound of an explosion may be heard for 168 miles with the wind and only 16 miles against it. The result is more than 600 miles an hour, a velocity which is of course several times greater than the highest velocity recorded anywhere upon the globe.

This explanation, then, being out of the question, we have next to consider, as Sir G. G. Stokes did in 1857 and Prof. Osborne Reynolds in 1874,* what effect would be

* Sir G. G. Stokes: 'On the effect of wind on the intensity of sound': Brit. Assoc. Rep., 1857, pt. ii., pp. 22-23; O. Reynolds, 'Papers on Mechanical and Physical Subjects,' vol. i., 1900, pp. 89-106 (reprinted from Roy. Soc. Proc., 1874).

produced by variations in the wind's velocity with the height above the ground. There can be no doubt that such variations exist. The movement of the lowest layer of the air is retarded by various obstacles and by friction with the ground, and that of each successive layer by friction with the one below it. Over a level meadow, for instance, the velocity at the height of one foot above the ground is only half that at a height of eight feet. If we suppose the velocity of sound to be 1100 feet per second and that of wind 10 feet per second at the surface and 20 feet per second at a height of eight feet, it is clear that the velocity of the sound-wave against the wind would be 1090 feet per second at the surface and 1080 feet per second at eight feet above the ground. The effect of this difference on the portion of a wave-front which is vertical at starting or at any later moment is shown in Fig. 1. In this

FIG. 1.




diagram, the sound-wave is supposed to advance from left to right and the wind in the opposite direction. The lines represent the positions of the wave-front at successive equal intervals of time.* The result is evidently an upward tilting of the wave-front, so that it would, after travelling for one second against the wind, be inclined at an angle of more than 45° to the vertical. As sound-waves always travel in a direction perpendicular to their front, it follows that, almost immediately after starting the sound-waves in the direction against the wind begin to proceed along an upward course, and the only sound heard along the ground is that due to

* The object of both diagrams is merely to illustrate the tilting of a vertical wave-front due to variation of wind-velocity with altitude; and, in order to show this in small diagrams, it is necessary to use a different scale for the velocities of the sound-wave and the wind.

the slight spreading of the lower portions of the waves. Thus, the comparative inaudibility of sound-vibrations in the direction from which the wind comes is due not so much to any enfeeblement in the vibrations as to their being lifted over the heads of observers on the surface of the ground.

If the wind be travelling in the same direction as the sound, the actual velocity of the sound-wave on the same suppositions would be 1110 feet per second on the ground and 1120 feet per second at eight feet above it. In Fig. 2,



the sound-wave is again supposed to travel from left to right, and the wind is now supposed to be in the same direction. The lines indicate the positions of the wave-front at successive equal intervals of time, on the same scale as in Fig. 1. The result is thus to tilt a wave-front that was initially vertical in a downward direction; and also to bring sound-waves that started on an upward course after a time towards the ground. The propagation of sound-waves to a great distance with the wind is therefore mainly due to the fact that sound-waves, that would otherwise be lost in the upper air, are deflected downwards to observers on the ground.

The explanation of the curious anomaly noticed during the funeral procession of 1901 will now be obvious. In the neighbourhood of Spithead, the sound-waves were first lifted by contrary winds over the heads of observers at the level of the ground. Afterwards, by favourable winds, they were brought down to that level, so as to be distinctly audible to persons stationed at distances of from 50 to 139 miles.

Variations in wind-velocity, however, are not the only cause of the anomalies described above, and they furnish no explanation of the distant propagation of the reports

of the firing at Cherbourg in 1900. The variations in temperature here come into play. It is well known that the velocity of sound in air does not depend on the actual barometric pressure at the time, but varies distinctly with the temperature. With a rise of 1° C. in the temperature, the velocity of sound increases by about two feet per second. Now, during the day the temperature of the air usually decreases with increasing height above the ground; and thus, in all directions from the origin, the sound-waves tend to rise above the ground, just as they do with a contrary wind. This is one of the reasons, but not the only one, why sounds of given intensity are less audible at a distance on a hot summer's day than at other times. If, however, the temperature were to increase with the height above the ground—and this is known to occur at sea shortly after sunset—the effect would be the same as with a favouring wind; but, the cooling of the air being confined to a thin layer, the sound-waves, as during the Cherbourg review, would be audible to great distances in the immediate neighbourhood of the sea-level.

The variation in the wind-velocity and temperature with the height above the ground is of the simplest possible character in the cases here considered. With such variations there can, as Mr S. Fujiwara has shown,* be no silent regions and no repetitions of the sound. A more complicated law of variation is, however, conceivable. The velocity of the wind, for instance, may increase with the height up to a certain point and then decrease. Under such conditions, it may be proved that regions or islands of silence must exist, and that the sound-waves may reach a distant station on the earth's surface by two or even three paths of different lengths, so that a brief sound, like that of the Asama-yama explosions, may be heard twice or thrice at one place.†

* 'On the abnormal propagation of sound wave in the atmosphere': *Bull. of the Centr. Meteor. Obs. of Japan*, vol. 2, 1912, pp. 1-143.

† Since this article was written, an important paper by Dr E. van Everdingen has been published. He describes several cases of recent gun-firing heard to great distances in Holland, in one instance to 174 miles. In some cases described by him, there is evidence of the existence of a silent region, which he attributes partly to variations in wind-velocity, partly to changes in composition which are assumed to occur in the upper atmosphere.

There remains to be considered an incident closely connected with the subject of this paper. On Jan. 24, 1915, a Sunday morning, there was a running fight in the North Sea between the First Battle-Cruiser Squadron under Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty and the German cruisers 'Derfflinger,' 'Seydlitz,' 'Moltke,' and 'Blücher,' and other minor vessels. The 'Blücher,' as is well known, was sunk during this engagement. The position of the vessels during the action has not yet been made public, but they must have been some distance from the shore before our ships came within range of the enemy, for, while the sound of the firing was heard near the Lincolnshire coast, nothing but a 'soughing in the ear' was observed about one hundred miles farther inland at Rippleth, near Ripon. During the battle, from about 10 to 11.30 a.m., there was much agitation among the pheasants in various parts of the north of England. According to the parish-clerk at Saxby in Lincolnshire, 'There be rare goings on in the North Sea the morn; . . . the pheasants is all over the place with their fuss;' and his remark was made before the news of the battle arrived. Similar observations were made in various parts of Yorkshire, at Lowther near Penrith, and even at places in Cumberland which are probably 200 or 250 miles from the scene of the firing. There can be little doubt as to the close connexion between the gun-firing and the disturbance of the pheasants, for, in woods near Burgh-le-Marsh in Lincolnshire, the firing and the crowing of the pheasants were heard together.

In what way are pheasants affected by the distant gun-firing? Do they actually hear sounds which are too deep or too faint to produce any effect on the human ear? Or is it that they are in some way susceptible to the evanescent air-vibrations or are alarmed by movements due to those vibrations?

We know, indeed, very little about the varying capacity of the human ear for appreciating the low roll of distant gun-firing. We know still less about the powers of birds and animals for hearing such vibrations. The only evidence with which I am acquainted is their behaviour during earthquakes. For instance, during the Hereford earthquake of 1896, pheasants crowed at a distance of 111 miles to the north-west of the origin; the

sound was heard to a distance of 170 miles in the same direction. During the Doncaster earthquake of 1905, the farthest place at which pheasants were affected is 38 miles from the origin; the sound was heard on an average for 62 miles from that place. The evidence is not quite conclusive, for pheasants are not so uniformly distributed as human beings over the country. So far as it goes, however, it seems to show that the pheasant's ear is less sensitive than our own to very deep sounds.

On the other hand, it must be remembered that even human beings are affected by sound-waves in other ways than through the ear. When there is a loud report close at hand we instinctively wink. It is the reflex action of the eyelids to protect the eyeballs from injury when the air-waves suddenly impinge upon them. It is possible, indeed, that pheasants never hear the report of guns at all, however close they may be, and that it is merely the resulting air-vibrations striking on their bodies that alarms them. On the whole, however, it seems more probable that the air-waves act only indirectly on the birds. We have seen that the reports of the guns during the Cherbourg review were heard for 107 miles, but that for 30 miles farther the air-vibrations were strong enough to make windows shake and rattle. In the same way, far beyond the Lincolnshire woods in which the guns were heard on Jan. 24, inaudible waves would speed their way across the country. During their passage low trees and undergrowth would suddenly sway and quiver. The birds resting on them would be alarmed by the abrupt though slight disturbance, and would rise with the excited cries which they utter when somewhat similar movements are caused by the passage of earthquake waves.

CHARLES DAVISON.

Art. 13.—THE COURSE OF THE WAR ON LAND.

BOTH in the various theatres of operations, and in the field of politics connected with the war, the past three months have been marked by notable events. The period has been one of exceptional activity on the part of the enemy, which seems to denote a desperate effort to attain a favourable decision during the current campaigning season. As was expected, for reasons given in the last article, the Germans have continued to devote their energies to the western theatre of war. The Austrians have massed a considerable force in the Trentino for the invasion of Italy. The bulk of the Turkish army has been transferred from the Near East and from Syria to oppose the Russian and British forces in Armenia and Mesopotamia; and the Bulgarians, by seizing the Rupel Pass, and by hostile demonstrations at other points in Macedonia, have caused General Sarraill some embarrassment, and created fresh friction between the Greek and the Allied Governments. The abortive insurrection in Ireland and the naval adventure in the North Sea, though outside the strict limits of our subject, must be mentioned incidentally as forming part of a comprehensive scheme for weakening the Allies by land and sea, and for keeping their forces dispersed, by which the Germans hoped to facilitate the attainment of their main purpose.

But the Allies, on their side, have not been idle. The Russians had devoted themselves to the reorganisation of their arrangements for the supply of men and munitions for the army, with a success which enabled General Polivanoff, the War Minister, to declare, on Feb. 8, that a permanent reserve of a million and a half young recruits had been assured, and that the munition crisis no longer existed. There was reason to hope that they would be able to take the offensive when climatic and other conditions should be favourable, a hope which recent events seem to have justified. The expansion of the British army, and the calling-in of some troops which had become superfluous in other regions, had enabled Sir Douglas Haig to occupy the entire line from Ypres to the Somme, thereby releasing a large force to augment the French reserves, and to assist in the operations about Verdun. This extension of the British front in France,

in addition to our commitments in other parts of the world, made the question of providing drafts for the maintenance of our armies even more urgent than before, and appears to have caused the Government at length to recognise the inadequacy of the quasi-voluntary system on which they had relied.

After the Government's first proposal to introduce compulsion by instalments had been unhesitatingly rejected, Parliament passed, in April last, with trifling opposition, the Act imposing liability to military service on all men of military age. This remarkable event marks an epoch in the history of the nation; and the willingness with which the obligation to serve was generally accepted, by proclaiming our determination to win the war, has afforded much encouragement to our Allies and caused our enemies some disquietude. The insignificance of the small but noisy clique which organised the campaign against conscription, and scorned no artifice to mislead and divide the nation on the subject, has been made manifest to the world. The military authorities have been relieved from the load of anxiety which oppressed them for more than a year. They can now rely on obtaining recruits, when needed, in numbers calculated to ensure an adequate supply of drafts, and to enable the training to be conducted on a uniform and progressive system, conducing both to economy and to the best results. Although the recruits will not be ready to take their places in the fighting line for some months, the new measure promises to save the army from the decline which threatened to sap its strength before the end of the present year.

The Russo-Turkish campaign in Armenia has developed much as was anticipated. The Russian right wing, advancing along the Black Sea coast, defeated the Turks on the Kara Dere on April 14, and by a rapid pursuit occupied Trebizond four days later. A portion of the defeated Turks fell back to a position barring the road which, branching at Gumushkaneh (40 miles south of Trebizond), leads to Erzingan and Erzerum. The remainder continued their march to Baiburt (60 miles W.N.W. of Erzerum), where the Erzerum road crosses the Chorokh valley, and formed a useful addition to

the force opposing the Russians in that region. About the same time the expected Turkish reinforcements appeared in strength between Erzerum and Erzingan, with the result that for several weeks there was severe fighting in this region, the battle swaying to and fro without decisive result. Ultimately the Russians were thrown on the defensive both in the Kara Su and Chorokh valleys; and, while Erzerum was never seriously menaced, they were prevented from opening up the road to Trebizond, which would have been of great value as a new line of supply. While these events were proceeding in the north, the Russian left wing continued its southward and westward progress from the neighbourhood of Bitlis towards Mosul (the ancient Nineveh) and Diarbekr; and engagements were fought on both lines with favourable results, till, about the middle of May, the Turks received an accession of strength which enabled them to stem the Russian advance in this quarter also.

The situation thus established has not changed materially. So far as can be ascertained from the meagre reports, General Yudenitch is on the defensive on a front which may be roughly described as passing, from Trebizond, some forty or fifty miles west of Erzerum and Mush to a point a few miles south of Bitlis. The Turks, by means of reinforcements brought from Gallipoli and Syria, have established something like an equilibrium of forces, which, so far as can be foreseen, is not likely to be disturbed in the near future. For their army, in view of the difficulty of obtaining guns and equipment, has probably reached its utmost development; while the principal combatants are fully occupied in more important theatres of war.

As we pass from Armenia to Mesopotamia the operations of the Russian forces in Persia attract notice. At the middle of May a detachment made a dramatic appearance at Rowanduz, eighty miles east of Mosul, having crossed the Perso-Turkish frontier after fighting an action with a body of Turks and Kurdish auxiliaries at Suj Bulak, south of Lake Urnmish; and shortly afterwards the occupation of Sardasht and Bana was announced, Persian towns in close proximity to the frontier some distance further south. To casual observers

these incidents seemed to presage an advance against Mosul on a broad front which would link up with General Yudenitch's left flank, and gave rise to visions of a hurried retreat of Khalil Pasha's army from Mesopotamia in order to escape being isolated through the loss of its line of communication by the Baghdad railway and the Tigris valley. But the Turks were strong in the Mosul district, while General Baratoff had his hands full in other quarters. A series of engagements fought towards the end of May in the neighbourhood of Sardasht marked the close of what can have been no more than an intrepid and somewhat adventurous demonstration in aid of the British forces in Mesopotamia. Further actions have taken place about Rowanduz and Sardasht, but the general situation has not changed.

It was one hundred and fifty miles further south, between Kermanshah and Baghdad, that the Russians made their principal effort to relieve the tension on the Tigris. After a couple of months' delay at Karind, about forty-five miles west of Kermanshah, during which he put his communications in order and accumulated supplies, General Baratoff, on May 4, began a remarkable advance westward to Khanikin, and arrived within sight of that place six days later, having fought two engagements and traversed the sixty miles of formidable defile which penetrates the mountain barrier between the Karind valley and the plain of Baghdad. The Turks, however, were strongly posted in front of Khanikin, having been reinforced by troops set free by the fall of Kut; and after an indecisive battle on May 22, which the enemy claimed as a victory, General Baratoff was obliged to fall back on the defensive.

The events which culminated in the surrender of Kut are too familiar to need a long discussion. General Gorringe's successful attack on the Umm-al-Hanna and Falahiyah positions on April 5, and his failure at Sanna-i-yat on April 9; the Turkish counter-attack on the right bank of the Tigris on the night of April 17-18, which forced the 3rd Division back from the advanced position which threatened to enfilade the enemy's lines on the opposite bank; the second attack on Sanna-i-yat on April 23, when a brigade of the 13th Division carried the

first and second lines, and part of a composite British battalion, which led the assault, penetrated the third line, but failed to maintain the ground won owing to lack of support—these episodes will not soon be forgotten. Nearly 17,000 lbs. weight of food was dropped from aeroplanes within the Kut defences between April 11 and 29; and attempts were made to send supplies by vessels which failed to reach their destination. After a gallant and resolute defence maintained for 143 days, General Townshend surrendered on April 29. The remnant of his original force, to the number of 2970 British troops and about 6000 Indian troops and followers, had subsisted for a fortnight on a daily ration of four ounces of flour and a piece of horseflesh, and were on the verge of starvation.

Various opinions have been expressed regarding this disaster to our arms. Of the conduct of the beleaguered troops there is no question. As the late Lord Kitchener observed in the House of Lords, 'General Townshend and his troops will have the satisfaction of knowing that . . . they did all that was humanly possible, and that their surrender reflects no discredit on themselves, or on the record of the British and Indian armies.' We may also accept his statement that 'to the adverse elements alone was due the denial of success' to the relieving force. In the House of Commons Mr Asquith referred to the surrender as a 'deplorable incident, but not one of serious military significance.' Some writers in the press made light of the matter, and put forward the opinion that the unfortunate expedition, by containing large Turkish forces, was a useful contribution to the Allied cause, cheaply purchased at the price. It is well to make the best of such misfortunes at the moment; but at this distance of time one may take a saner view, and recognise that, for the time being at any rate, the expedition has proved a costly failure. That such is really the official view may fairly be concluded from the anxiety shown by the various authorities concerned in the initiation and direction of the advance on Baghdad to rid themselves of responsibility at each other's expense. No definite judgment on the question of responsibility can be formed until all the facts of the case are disclosed in the official correspondence which the Government has

promised to publish. All that is known at present is that the magnitude of the task was greatly underestimated, either through faulty information or want of foresight; and that in respect of numbers, drafts for the replacement of casualties, transport, hospital and medical equipment and services, the force employed was, in consequence, lamentably inadequate.

Discussions which took place in the press and in Parliament, on the question of responsibility for the advance on Baghdad having been attempted with insufficient forces, resulted in the issue, on May 30, of a White Paper which contains information of great military interest concerning the situation as it appeared at the time to the two principal commanders on the spot. On Oct. 3, 1915, General Townshend stated his views in a telegram addressed to Army Headquarters, Mesopotamia, from which it appears that, until the battle of Kut (Sept. 29, 1915), the intention had been to occupy the strategical position of Kut, which commands the northern end of the Shatt-el-Hai, the water-way between the Tigris and the Euphrates at Nasirieh. After the battle General Townshend hoped to follow on the heels of the defeated Turks, and to seize Baghdad. Reports brought in by aviators, however, showed that this project must be abandoned. The Turks, after a precipitate retreat, had rallied in a strong position near Ctesiphon, and were likely to be reinforced. The Tigris, having fallen, had become unnavigable by laden ships.

'Should it,' he said, 'not be considered politically advisable by the Government to occupy Baghdad at present on account of the doubtful situation at the Dardanelles and the possibility of our small forces being driven out of Baghdad by stronger forces from Anatolia, which would compel us to retire down a long line of communication teeming with Arabs at present more or less hostile, . . . then I consider that on all military grounds we should consolidate our position at Kut. If, however, the Government should desire to occupy Baghdad, then, unless great risk is to be run, it is in my opinion absolutely necessary that the advance from Kut by road should be carried out methodically by two divisions or one army corps, or by one division supported closely by another complete division, exclusive of garrison and line of communication troops.'

In reply to an enquiry by the India Office, Sir John Nixon, who was Commander-in-Chief at the time of the operations in question, stated, in a letter dated April 11, 1916, that, on the receipt of General Townshend's telegram, he recognised that the question of an advance on Baghdad was in abeyance. About the same time, however, he was informed that 'another division would almost certainly be sent,' and he communicated this information to General Townshend. He continued to bring up such reinforcements as were available in the country, and in due course placed another infantry brigade, two cavalry regiments, and a horse battery at the disposal of General Townshend, whose original force consisted of 'his own division (the 6th), four or five squadrons, three 18-pounder batteries, and four heavy guns.* A garrison was also provided for Kut. On Oct. 24 he heard of the decision to send two divisions from France. As General Townshend made no further representation, General Nixon concluded that he was satisfied with the arrangements.

General Townshend was also called upon for a statement, which was included in the White Paper. It amounted to a confirmation of the views expressed in his telegram of Oct. 3, together with his reasons for not having continued to press them on the Commander-in-Chief, and a declaration of his readiness to run the risk which he had brought to his superior's notice if he should be ordered to advance. Referring to his telegram of Oct. 3, he observed, 'I consider this pointed out the risk sufficiently, and that it was all, in my opinion, that a subordinate commander could do.' The statement also contains the information that the British battalions of the 6th division 'were reduced to half their strength; and besides this the drafts to replace casualties at the battle of Kut consisted of raw recruits from India.'

* Assuming that all units were up to strength (which, as will be seen later, was not the case) General Townshend's original force, reckoning combatants only, comprised 10,148 infantry, 974 cavalry, and 52 guns, including 4 heavy and 12 mountain guns. It is not, however, clear whether the '4 or 5 squadrons' and the three 18-pounder batteries were additional to the divisional cavalry and artillery, or not; and it is likely that the mountain guns (which normally form part of the divisional artillery) were not taken to Mesopotamia, where they would be practically useless. The additional troops would comprise, at full strength, 3,091 infantry, 986 cavalry, and 6 guns.

It is evident that there was a misunderstanding between General Townshend and his Chief, to which the unfortunate issue of the enterprise may be in some degree attributed. The former considered himself bound by the well-understood official relations which exist between subordinate and superior, while the latter thought that they might be relaxed in view of the personal relations which existed between the two. 'We are personal friends,' General Nixon wrote; 'and I cannot but think that, had not his opinion been modified by the information concerning the sending of reinforcements, he would have found no obstacle in communicating with me.' It is, however, conceivable that General Townshend may, if anything, have been deterred from reiterating his views by the fear of presuming on his private relations with his superior. His attitude will probably be adjudged to have been correct; for it is obvious that, in the interests of discipline, personal intimacy should not affect the recognised official relations between superior and subordinate. It may be doubted, in the light of subsequent events, whether the occupation of Baghdad could have been effected by the force for which General Townshend had stipulated, though the consequences of failure would probably have been less serious. Had the two divisions arrived from France in time to support the advance, things might have happened differently; but General Townshend started on his adventure long before they were in a position to help.*

Since the capitulation of Kut, little has been heard of the proceedings in Mesopotamia. A Cossack detachment dispatched by General Baratoff rode into General Lake's headquarters on May 22. General Gorrings's troops on the left bank of the Tigris have been engaged in pushing their trenches closer to the Turkish position at Sanna-i-yat, while those on the right bank were reported on June 16 to have established themselves at Iman Mansura, within four or five miles of Kut.

Before leaving the subject of the campaigns against the Turks, the Arab rising in the Yemen merits a passing

* They were, of course, the 3rd and 13th divisions, which subsequently formed the relieving force, starting from Ali Gherbi on Jan. 4, 1916.

reference. On June 21 it was reported from Cairo that the Grand Shereef of Mecca, supported by the tribes of Central and Western Arabia, had raised the standard of revolt against Turkish rule. Military operations had begun on June 9. The communications with the Hedjaz had been seized; Mecca, Jeddah, and Taif had been occupied, the Turkish garrisons surrendering; and siege had been laid to Medina. Although the Arabs of the Yemen have, on other occasions, shown their impatience of Ottoman rule, this new outbreak is specially significant at the present juncture; for it not only promises to increase the embarrassment of the Turks, but furnishes a fresh proof of the futility of the hope, cherished by Germany, that the Turkish alliance might be utilised to promote a *jehad*.

Turning now to the principal theatres of war, we find that the period of relative tranquillity which, during the latter part of March, seemed to betoken the approaching exhaustion of the German offensive at Verdun, came to an end before the close of the month. By April 9 the French had evacuated Malancourt and Béthincourt, which, besides being commanded by the enemy's positions, formed a salient exposed to enveloping attack. The new line, situated on the higher ground bordering the right bank of the Forges brook, had only just been occupied when it was involved in a general engagement, extending from Avocourt to Cumières, which lasted four days. Seven German divisions are said to have been employed, of which four had recently been brought from other parts of the western front. The results were not great, the chief being to give the enemy a footing on the northern slopes of the Mort Homme. After this great effort the Germans remained comparatively inactive for some time, during which our Allies recovered most of the ground they had lost. The general bombardment continued; but such infantry attacks as took place were easily repulsed. The semi-official review issued at Paris on April 27 stated that there was every reason to believe that the battle of Verdun was, in the military sense, ended.

This forecast, however, proved fallacious. The Germans soon resumed the offensive on a methodical system,

designed to wear down the resistance of the French, and to capture their positions piecemeal. From time to time a limited portion of the front was selected for attack, and subjected to violent bombardment, prolonged for a day or more. When the guns were thought to have done their work, a tentative attack was made by a small body of troops, after the manner of a reconnaissance in force, to ascertain the results of the bombardment. If the artillery preparation proved to be satisfactory, the real attack was launched forthwith; if not, the reconnoitring force withdrew, and the bombardment was resumed. Next day we read in the newspaper that an attack had been easily repulsed.* The exact limits of the advance appear to have been defined before the delivery of the real attack; and, as soon as they were reached, the troops proceeded to dig themselves in, and to prepare for the inevitable counter-attack, before which they were often forced to recede. A portion of the front having been pushed forward in this way, the same method was applied to an adjoining section; and thus, by slow degrees, the whole line was advanced. The total gain, as measured on the map, does not amount to much, but the actual results have to be judged by the importance of the positions captured.

The Germans first set themselves to capture the twin heights known as Hill 304 and the Mort Homme, west and east, respectively, of the stream which flows from Esnes to join the Forges brook at Béthincourt. A redoubt in the Avocourt wood, which flanks the western slopes of Hill 304, has also been the objective of numerous unsuccessful attacks. The exact situation at the time of writing (June 25) is not known; but the French appear to hold the summit of Hill 304, while the Germans have gained possession of the crest of the Mort Homme, and of the village of Cumières.

* Similar accounts may have been noticed in the Berlin reports, indicating that (as might be expected) the French employed similar tactics when they planned an attack. The German tactics have been described in articles which appeared in the 'Morning Post,' by M. Henri Bidou, whose account seems to be borne out by the official statements when read between the lines. According to M. Bidou, this system has been used by the Germans since the commencement of the battle on Feb. 21. This would help to account for the regularity of the advance, for which I sought an explanation when discussing the subject in the April number.

While the enemy were devoting themselves chiefly to the capture of these dominating positions on the left bank of the Meuse, our Allies were engaged in improving their general position on the eastern heights by means of local attacks at various points between the Côte de Poivre and Vaux. But on several occasions the Germans turned their attention to the right bank, in order, apparently, to check the French progress when it threatened the security of their main positions. Thus on March 31, April 17, and May 7 there were engagements of some importance in the region east and west of Douaumont Fort. Ultimately the French took the offensive in force on May 22, carried the German trenches on a front of two kilometres, and recaptured part of the fort. Heavy fighting ensued, in the course of which the enemy, having brought up two divisions of the 1st Bavarian Army Corps from the British front, reoccupied the fort, and made progress at other points. About this time the enemy had possessed themselves of the Mort Homme position; and, having already engaged a considerable force in the battle about Douaumont, they appear to have decided to suspend their operations on the left bank, and to follow up their success on the eastern heights. They occupied Damloup on June 2, and, having captured Fort Vaux five days later, began to press forward towards Fleury and the Souville height, but made little progress in face of the French counter-attacks, till, on June 23 and 24, a violent offensive on a front of about three miles, in which over six divisions were employed, reached the village of Fleury, where they gained a footing in the outskirts. They are here within three and a half miles of Verdun.

Space only admits of a brief allusion to events on the British front, where there has been incessant activity of a minor nature in the form of mining, raids, aerial combats, and artillery actions of varying intensity. On three occasions the Germans took the offensive on a larger scale. An attack on May 21 penetrated our first line trenches on the Vimy heights on a front of 1500 yards. On June 2 a more formidable assault captured 3000 yards of the position south-east of Zillebeke, to a depth, in some places, of 700 yards; but the ground was recovered by the Canadians on June 13. In the third attack the

enemy seized a trench in the ruins of Hooze. These fitful efforts, which at the time gave rise to anticipations of a new battle of Ypres, were probably no more than demonstrations, intended to keep the British armies on the defensive. Minor attacks were also made at various periods in Champagne and at other points on the French front, with the object, apparently, of preventing the local reserves from being utilised to reinforce the army at Verdun.

Little need be said about the Austrian offensive on the Trentino frontier, which, although it seemed at first to threaten the main lines of communication, through Verona and Padua, of the Italian army on the Isonzo, appears, at the time of writing, to have reached its limit.* An increase of activity on the part of the Austrians became noticeable towards the end of March; and from that time onward numerous minor engagements took place at various points between the Chiese and the Isonzo, in which the enemy were the aggressors. These were referred to at the time in one of the Italian communiqués as 'spectacular actions' intended 'to seek easy successes.' It is now plain that they were of more serious import, having been designed to divert attention from the preparations which were in progress for an advance in the area between the Adige and the Brenta. In this region, according to a semi-official statement issued at Rome on May 24, eighteen divisions and a large number of batteries were secretly assembled under the command of the Archduke Eugene. On May 15 the storm burst, after a bombardment of 'unprecedented intensity and violence.' The nature of the ground had obliged the Italians to establish their advanced positions in localities within the effective range of the enemy's heavy artillery, which soon made them untenable; and, being heavily outnumbered, our Allies were obliged ultimately to fall back beyond Arsiero and Astiago, which were occupied by the Austrians on May 31. Our Allies' defence, meanwhile, had been more successful on the flanks, their main

* The strategical and tactical aspects of the Austro-Italian frontier were discussed in the 'Q. R.' for July 1915 (No. 445). For a map see that no., p. 278.

positions in the Val Lagarina (Adige) and Val Sugana (Brenta) being maintained; and the gradual reinforcement of their army in the centre soon placed it on terms of equality with the enemy, who have made little further progress.

It is no discredit to the Italians that they were found unprepared to meet the onset of the formidable force which had been assembled in secrecy behind the screen of the mountains. The defence of a mountain frontier is necessarily organised on the cordon system, which is proverbially weak. The security of each section depends less on the troops actually present than on the rapid transport of reserves to the scene of action. Therein lies the difficulty; for in mountainous country, with few and indifferent roads, movement is necessarily slow, especially in the case of heavy artillery, for which it is difficult to find suitable positions that are at all accessible. When, as in the present instance, the attack is made on a wide front, in great force, the problem of bringing up adequate reinforcements assumes alarming proportions.

If the Italians were unprepared for the Archduke's attack from the Trentino, the Austrians were quite as much surprised by the Russian move in Volhynia and Galicia, where General Brusiloff's group of armies took the offensive, on June 4, along the entire front between the Pripet and the Roumanian frontier. The German General Staff, when they acquiesced in the enterprise against Italy, were no doubt satisfied that the Russians, from lack of munitions, would not be ready to undertake serious operations for some time. The weakening of the Austrian army on the Eastern front, by the transfer of troops to the Trentino, gave our Russian Allies an opportunity which they were not slow to seize. Hindenburg's armies north of the Pripet, having been similarly depleted to provide troops for Verdun, were not in a position to render effective aid.

The Eastern front is divided into two separate areas of operations by the Pinsk Marshes, which extend for many miles on either side of the Pripet, their southern limit being roughly defined by the Cholm—Kovel—Rovno railway. Within this region the movement of large forces, except in an unusually dry summer, is

impracticable. The railway which follows the course of the Goryn northwards from Rovno, being held by the Russians, gives them an advantage over the enemy, whose lateral communications lie west of the marshes, through Brest Litovsk. Our Allies could, therefore, operate either north of the Pripet against the Germans, or south of that river against the Austrians, their inner flank being in either case protected to some extent by the marshes, the presence of which, as an obstacle to the transport of troops and material from one side to the other, would inconvenience them less than it would the enemy.

An offensive south of the Pripet offered several obvious advantages. The Austrians are in every way the weaker enemy. The operations would more directly threaten the enemy's territory, Brusiloff's armies being within, or near, the Galician frontier, while those in the north are far from East Prussia. A victory in the south would influence the attitude of the Balkan States more than one gained in the remoter north, and the invasion of hostile territory more than the mere recovery of a lost province. These are probably among the considerations which led our Allies to attack south of the Pinsk Marshes.

The chief scenes of action have lain on the flanks of the advance. By a brilliant onset General Kaledine's troops overthrew the Austrians in the region west of Rovno, driving them in confusion towards Lutsk, which was occupied on June 6. The capture of the Rojitché bridgehead, and of Dubno, followed a day or two later; and the advance was continued to the Stochod on a front of some forty miles, stretching southwards beyond Lokatchi. In the centre, General Sakharoff approached the frontier near Brody; and Bothmer's army was driven back behind the Strypa. On the left the Russians, having captured Zaleszyki on June 11, crossed the Dniester, and, moving towards the Pruth, threatened to cut off the garrison of Czernowitz, with the result that this strongly fortified *point d'appui* of the Austro-German flank fell to General Letchitsky's frontal attack on June 17. Pflanzer-Baltin's defeated army fell back hurriedly towards the Carpathians and the Roumanian frontier south-west of Czernowitz. In the course of

the first fortnight the Russians captured over 170,000 prisoners and 198 guns, besides other material of war.

The Germans were not long in realising the seriousness of the situation. Hindenburg despatched a couple of divisions from his meagre reserves to reinforce Linsingen's army group between the Pripet and the Galician frontier; and troops were set in motion from the western front, which began to make their appearance on June 15. Desperate fighting developed about that time on the Styr near Kolki, and in the quadrilateral Gorochow—Rojitche—Kovel—Vladimir Volynsky, which has continued down to the time of writing (June 25). The anxiety of the Germans to save Kovel from falling into the hands of our Allies is easily understood, for this place forms the centre of the organisation for the defence of Volhynia. From it roads and railways radiate to Czartorysk and Rojitché on the Styr, and to Lemberg, the centre of the Galician railway system.* Being also connected with Brest Litovsk, Warsaw, and Ivangorod, great centres of communication between northern and southern Russia, and the railway systems of Germany and Austria, Kovel may be considered to form an almost indispensable link in the enemy's system of defence. Hence it was one of the chief objectives in the Russian plan of operations.

The operations in the Bukowina appear no less important than those in Volhynia, for, while the latter threaten to cut off the Austrian armies from the German, and to outflank Eastern Galicia on the north, the former, by depriving the Austrians of the protection provided by the neutral territory of Roumania, and placing their right flank *en l'air*, threaten to upset their whole system of defence. The advance up the valley of the Pruth towards Kolomea and Stanislau enjoys, moreover, a greater immunity from flank attack than the offensive in Volhynia; assuming that the Russians, as appears to be their design, occupy the passages of the Dniester on the right, and the Carpathian passes on the left.

The general situation is at the moment uncertain. The check to General Brusiloff's advance may be only a temporary phase, due to the intervention of the German

* A broad-gauge railway is understood to have been constructed, last summer, between Vladimir Volynsky and Sokal.

reinforcements, or it may mean the end of a diversion undertaken to relieve the pressure at Verdun and in Venetia, although the reserves of ammunition were, as in January and March, insufficient to enable our Allies to follow up their initial successes. The Germans continue their attacks on the heights of the Meuse, as though heedless of the events in Russia. The Crown Prince's offensive, however, was the chief item in their programme for the spring campaign, and, having been widely advertised, is not likely to be lightly abandoned. The capture of Verdun would be a useful counterpoise to the defeats of the Austrians in Russia, and the failure of their enterprise in Italy. How the situation in France may be affected by the depletion of the German reserves to feed the battle at Verdun, and to meet the unforeseen demands on the eastern front, only the future can tell. These, and other things at present obscure, may have become clear before this article appears.

As we go to press the first news has been received of a Franco-British offensive on an extensive front in France, north and south of the Somme. As is usual, the German front-line trenches, which had been rendered untenable by artillery bombardment, have been occupied without much difficulty on the whole front attacked, some 25 miles in extent. The merely topographical gains are, however, of far less importance than the effect which the coordinated operations in France, Russia, and Italy are likely to have on the plans of the German Higher Command and the *moral* of the German and Austrian armies. It is reported on good authority that eight German divisions were recently sent from the western to the eastern front to oppose the Russian advance; and the Archduke's reserves in the Trentino have been depleted for the same purpose. The enemy's resources are insufficient simultaneously to protect the vital centre at Kövel, and to oppose Letchitsky, whose progress in south-eastern Galicia threatens to make Bothmer's position on the Strypa untenable. This obviously enforced disregard of the menacing situation on the Austro-German right flank is significant of the strain to which the enemy is being subjected on all fronts, in consequence of the close accord now established between the Allies.

W. P. BLOOD.

Art. 14.—THE IRISH REBELLION.

To many people in England the recent outbreak in Ireland has come as a bolt from the blue. They had fondly imagined that, whatever else the war had done, it had at any rate settled the Irish question; that the patriotic speech made by Mr Redmond in August 1914 had shown that the Nationalists were heartily loyal to the Empire; that the fact of the Ulstermen having remained quiet when the Home Rule Bill became law proved that their objection to it was calming down; that the number of men from all parts of Ireland who had enlisted during the war made it clear that Ireland deserved and would be content with 'the moderate amount of self-government' provided by the Act; and that Northerners and Southerners, who had fought side by side in the defence of the Empire, would never again engage in internecine strife. Events have now shown how false these views were. In order, however, to arrive at a true conception of the present state of affairs, it is necessary to trace the steady growth of anarchy and disloyalty during the last few years, and to show how it has been fostered by the course taken by Mr Birrell and other members of the Government. It may then be possible to offer some suggestions as to the future.

In the first place it must be remembered, as Unionists living in Ireland had realised all along, that there was no inherent improbability in the idea that a section of the Nationalists might seek aid from Germany in order to obtain the independence of Ireland. It is true that many of their leaders had advocated the plan of remaining quiet until Home Rule had come into force and then using it as a lever towards separation. Thus Mr Devlin had stated in America that, when they were equipped with the comparative freedom of Home Rule, the time would come for Irishmen to operate by whatever means they might think best to destroy the last link that binds them to England. But these leaders had said repeatedly that the principles of the Nationalists of to-day are the same as those of Wolfe Tone; amongst their popular heroes none (with the possible exception of the 'Manchester Martyrs') are so highly revered as he is; one of their most important gatherings is the annual pilgrimage

to his grave, at which vast crowds assemble and speeches are made urging the rising generation to follow in his steps. It was when Ireland possessed a Parliament with wider powers than those which are to be given to the body set up by the Home Rule Act, that Wolfe Tone organised a French invasion, in order (as he expressed it) to break the connexion with England and to assert the independence of his country. If he were alive now, would he not turn to Germany?

The Nationalist leaders all this time foresaw the probability of a war between England and Germany, and formed their plans accordingly. In 1909 a party of delegates from the Hibernian Order in America visited Ireland on the invitation of Mr Redmond, and were received with rapturous greetings by all the Nationalist party. At the meeting held in New York before they started, one of the delegates stated that the Irish in America had made a compact with the Germans there; and that he wished the English to understand clearly that, in the event of war with Germany, the Irish and Germans in America would be united in opposing them. Amongst Irish orators, few have had so much influence as the late Major M'Bride. He had formed an Irish Brigade to fight against England in the Boer War; and the Dublin Corporation had rewarded him by appointing him to a well-paid municipal office. His words came with all the more force, as he was not only the ex-leader of the Irish Brigade but was also understood to be the exponent of the views of the Dublin Corporation—one of the leading Nationalist bodies in Ireland. In 1909, when speaking at a Nationalist gathering, he said:

'I appeal to you most earnestly to do all in your power to prevent your countrymen from entering the degraded British Army. If you prevent 500 men from enlisting you do nearly as good work as if you shot 500 men on the field of battle; and you are making the way smoother for the approaching conquest of England by Germany.'

In 1906, when Mr Asquith's party came into power, Ireland was peaceful, and its prosperity was increasing by leaps and bounds. But in that country, however quiet things may appear, there is always a certain amount of political agitation going on beneath the surface. The

'Sinn Fein' Society was already in operation. It is said that in its conception it was literary and idealistic; but the idea that lay at the root of it was that there should be a real divorce between England and Ireland—the name 'Sinn Fein' (which means 'Ourselves Alone') points in that direction; and there is reason to believe that even then it had (as most Irish societies do) become political, and was in touch with the Clan-na-Gael, the Irish Republican Brotherhood, and other advanced societies in America. The new Government, against the warnings of the police but in fulfilment of a pledge previously given to the Nationalists, allowed the Crimes Act to lapse; consequently, arms were imported largely, and the number of outrages with firearms in Connaught increased rapidly. In 1910 the National Boy Scouts Brigade, which was really a training-corps for young rebels, was established. The next year the Sinn Fein convention was held in Dublin; and soon afterwards it was ascertained that money was pouring in from America for revolutionary purposes, and that the extreme party had resolved not to be satisfied with anything which would leave 'a single vestige of British rule in Ireland.' Then the Ulstermen, realising what Home Rule would inevitably lead to, resolved if necessary to oppose it by force, and formed their Volunteer Army. The Volunteers were not guilty of any breach of the peace; while cattle-driving and other outrages were rampant in Connaught, Belfast remained orderly. And, though the Ulstermen were preparing for civil war if necessary, they earnestly hoped that the danger might be averted and the Union maintained by peaceful means. When the war broke out, they did not hesitate for a moment as to the line they should take. In two days, 3000 Ulster Volunteers enlisted. Mr Asquith, seeing that the patriotism of Ulster was so firm that it might be traded on, broke his solemn promise and advised the King to sign the Home Rule Bill. When announcing this, however, he added:

'On behalf of the Government I may say that we all recognise that in the atmosphere which the great patriotic spirit has created in the country, the employment of force of any kind for what is called the coercion of Ulster is an absolutely unthinkable thing, so far as I and my colleagues are concerned; we would never countenance or consider it.'

Shocked though the Ulstermen were at Mr Asquith's betrayal, their patriotism never wavered. Sir E. Carson went to Ulster and delivered a series of impassioned addresses, urging his followers to join the army. The number of Ulster Volunteers who had enlisted rose to 16,000. The Nationalists looked on. Mr Sweetman, one of their leaders, issued a manifesto, in which he said,

'It delights Nationalists to see young West Britons rushing to join Kitchener's Army. Let them go and fight for England and get killed. Nationalists will stay at home.'

Soon, however, they changed their tone, and began to deride the Ulstermen. Orators and writers, down to the moment when the Ulster Division started for France, continually sneered at them as cowards, who would never dare to face the Germans; but, as soon as they were out of the way, the Nationalists started an agitation, demanding that Home Rule should come into operation at once.

Meanwhile, amongst the Nationalists events had moved rapidly. In November 1913 the Irish Volunteers were formed; Prof. MacNeill, who (with Sir Roger Casement and Mr P. H. Pearse) was associated with the movement from the first, has said that it owed its origin to the Gaelic League and the Gaelic Athletic Association. It is not easy to explain the exact position which the Volunteers at first took up. They declared that they were a non-political body, but had come together because it was right that every country should have an army of its own. They were established as a counterblast to the Ulster Force, and to strengthen the hands of Mr Redmond; but some of the leaders disclaimed the idea of attacking Ulster, as that (they said) would be fighting on the side of England in support of the miserable shadow of autonomy contained in the Home Rule Bill. It is clear, however, that they were from the first intended to be a permanent body, formed with the object of securing the independence of Ireland. At an inaugural meeting held at the Mansion House in Dublin in May 1914, Mr Padraic Colum said that without 100,000 men behind the Irish Parliament, it would be a very ineffective thing; but with that force, Ireland would be a free nation in ten years. And at a meeting of the Tyrone Volunteers, Dr McCarton said

that Ireland had one enemy—England; and they must concentrate their efforts against that enemy if they wished to see a free and independent Ireland.

Mr Redmond was placed in a difficulty. He could not suppress the movement; he saw that an independent army might become a more important force than the politicians; yet it was illogical for him to pose as content with the Home Rule settlement and at the same time to be at the head of a force which the Act declared to be illegal. (At a later time that difficulty was avoided by his representing that some sentences in Mr Asquith's Dublin speech implied that the Amending Act would empower the Irish Government to have an army.) However, he and his followers persuaded the Provisional Governing body of the Volunteers to alter their constitution and place themselves under the Nationalist leaders. The minority refused to do so; hence by September 1914 the Nationalist Army had split into two—the National (Redmondite) Volunteers, and the Irish (Anti-Redmondite) Volunteers. Besides these, there was also the Dublin Citizen Army, which had arisen after the strike of 1913; but they practically coalesced with the Irish Volunteers.

But Mr Redmond's difficulties did not end with this secession. Trouble arose amongst his supporters. His famous speech in Parliament (Aug. 4, 1914) was a masterpiece of ingenuity. He won applause in England by his declaration that his Volunteers would unite with the Ulstermen in defending Ireland; but he took care not to hint that any of them would join the Imperial forces and serve abroad. Nevertheless the idea got about that he wished them to enlist; and there were loud murmurs even amongst his most devoted followers. So he cleverly steered a middle course. On several occasions he spoke in favour of recruiting, and his words were triumphantly quoted in English Radical papers; but those papers never alluded to the fact that his remarks were usually inserted in speeches the main object of which was to point out the importance of organising the Volunteers as a permanent body.

After Mr Redmond's speech in Parliament, a number of Irishmen who were not his political followers joined the National Volunteers, thinking that the force would

become a valuable aid to the Empire. But they soon found themselves grievously out of place and had to retire, since the Volunteers, though anxious that the War Office should pay, equip and train them, had no idea of placing themselves under its orders. It is difficult to form an estimate of the relative strength of the two Volunteer Forces. It was constantly changing, by defections from one to the other; and on several occasions one body succeeded in capturing the rifles of their opponents. It seems, however, that the National Volunteers declined in number; while the Irish Volunteers (at first a much smaller body) steadily increased.

As the war progressed, the language used by the advanced section of the Nationalists became stronger. The 'Irish Volunteer,' which continued to be the official organ of that force, in its issue of Nov. 7, 1914, contained the following words:

'Our only safety, our only hope of National development and National honour, lies in cutting ourselves free from the last tie that binds us to English Imperialism. Our only path to the glorious and happy Ireland of our aspirations lies through the downfall of the British Empire. And, with De Wet in arms again on his old ground, with German cannon commanding the narrow seas, with German submarines picking off their victims in the Straits of Dover, with the religious centres of Indian and Egyptian Mohammedanism thrilling to the cry of a Holy War against the oppressor, . . . with Belgium growing increasingly disgusted at England's desertion, with France uplifted by the German offer to restore French Lorraine, the downfall of the Pirate Empire may not be so far off as a pessimist would suppose. Let us be ready to play our part.'

About the same time a lecture was delivered at the National University College in Dublin on 'The Medical Profession in time of War.' But each mention of the Kaiser was greeted with such hearty cheering from the students, and the name of Lord Kitchener called forth such prolonged hooting, that the Unionists present felt obliged to leave the hall. In the same month, the annual Commemoration of the Manchester Martyrs took place at Cork. It was celebrated with great pomp, and included a procession, a service at the Roman Catholic

Cathedral, and a meeting in the City Hall, at which the principal orator (Major M'Bride) said:

'We will not tolerate the interference of England or any other foreign country in our affairs. This war has nothing to do with Irishmen; they should stay at home. Let Englishmen do their own fighting and get killed and be damned if they wish. . . . Ireland has only one foe; and that is England. The Boer flag has fallen from our hands at present, but we hope in the near future to take it up in our own island and never let it drop until we have swept every vestige of the Empire to Hell.'

The dangerous character of the movement did not consist in words only. Early in 1915 the Police ascertained that money was coming in freely not only from America but also from Germany. At Easter 1915 Mr Redmond held a great review of his Volunteers in Dublin. It was a striking sight, though perhaps not for the reason that its promoters intended. At the time when the Ulster Division was preparing to start for France, but the 16th Division—the 'Irish Brigade' as it was called—was kept back because its numbers were not complete, there were gathered together some 20,000 young men who positively refused to join the Army or even to place themselves under the authority of the War Office for home defence. And Mr Redmond, when addressing them, did not venture to refer to the subject of recruiting except in a few passing remarks. In fact, whilst the Unionists throughout Ireland were straining every nerve for the cause of the Empire, the policy of the moderate Nationalists was, so far as possible, to ignore the war altogether. Their position was well expressed in Mr Redmond's paper, the 'National Volunteer,' for Jan. 2, 1915:

'Whilst the whole face of Europe is darkened by the tragic incidents that mark the Titanic struggle between the mighty Powers, Ireland stands out in confident expectancy, awaiting her enfranchisement.'

The anti-recruiting agitation (which had been in existence for several years) now became more violent. Placards were posted on walls and leaflets distributed broadcast, denouncing the British Army and anyone who joined it. Anti-recruiting meetings were held openly. It was impossible for the Crown to take proceedings on

a serious charge under the Defence of the Realm Act, because, by the Amending Act, accused persons had the right of demanding trial by jury, and it was soon found that, however clear the evidence might be, no jury would convict. The utmost that could be done was to bring some lighter charge which might be dealt with by a magistrate. Yet even then a difficulty arose, in consequence of the fact that the Government had, during the last ten years, appointed to the Magisterial Bench men of no local standing and practically of no principle. When a charge was brought at Cork last February, it was found that one of the Justices on the Bench had a few days previously stated in public that, so long as they were bound up with 'that accursed Empire,' they would be on the verge of starvation. It is needless to add that the charge was dismissed, the Resident Magistrate dissenting. When some leaders of the Irish Volunteers were ordered by the military authorities to leave Ireland and reside for a time in England, a monster meeting was held at the Mansion House in Dublin to protest against this 'banishment'; and something like a riot broke out in the streets. Even if a man was sent to jail for a short time, he was on his return hailed as a patriot and a martyr. Amongst those thus sentenced were the late F. Sheehy Skeffington. Imitating the suffragettes, he refused to take food, and was at once released under the 'Cat and Mouse Act.' He ostentatiously violated all the provisions of that Act; the Government submitted tamely. He then went on an anti-British lecturing tour in America; on his return last January a meeting was held in his honour, at which he said:

'The Germans in America were not much in touch with the Irish before the war, but now they have profited so much from Irish advice and assistance that their opinion of the Irish is very high. The Irish in America, as far as they are organised and articulate, are entirely pro-German, and are acting in close union with the Germans. One of the leading men in opposition to the Anglo-French loan was Jeremiah O'Leary, a man who has done much to wipe away the stain that has recently come on the name of O'Leary.'

(This, of course, was in reference to Lieutenant O'Leary, V.C.) He concluded by expressing the hope that Ireland

would before long become a cooperative Commonwealth, in which the best elements of American and German civilisation would be blended. The audience (says the 'Irish Volunteer') might have been composed of Irish-Americans, their sentiments were so anti-British; at one time a voice cried out, 'Gott strafe England,' and the sentiment was loudly applauded.

One thing which all Nationalists have steadily and successfully opposed is anything in the nature of conscription. When Ulster was ready and anxious to bear the same burden as Great Britain, meetings were being held all over the South, at which resolutions were passed pledging all present to resist conscription by force. In October 1915 it was feared that the Conscription Act might include Ireland. Every berth in every steamer leaving Ireland for America was taken for weeks in advance. Some young men, unable to obtain passages, crossed to Liverpool, intending to embark there. The companies refused to take them; they returned defeated. Dr O'Dwyer, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Limerick, wrote an indignant letter protesting against the insults to which they had been subjected by a brutal English mob, and pointing out that they were acting within their rights, as the war was England's and not Ireland's, and the cause was one for which Connaught peasants did not care a pin. The Bishop's attitude was formally approved by the Limerick Corporation and other Nationalist bodies.

With one section of the Party hostile and another indifferent, it was natural that recruiting in the South and West should be limited. A vigorous recruiting campaign was started by Lord Wimborne, in which all parties were urged to participate. Innumerable meetings were held; but those who attended them noticed that they lacked the fervour of Sir E. Carson's Ulster meetings. In January last the returns were published, and showed the following figures:

Province.	Population.	Recruits since Aug. 1914.
Ulster . . .	1,581,696	49,760
Leinster . . .	1,162,044	27,458
Munster . . .	1,035,495	14,190
Connaught . .	610,984	3,598
	4,390,219	95,006

Ulster had, therefore, supplied more recruits than all the rest of Ireland; next came Leinster, where there is a large Unionist minority; Connaught, which is practically entirely Nationalist, had sent hardly any. Mr Redmond at once pointed out that of the Ulster recruits 13,635 were Roman Catholics. Taking his figures as correct, they show that three-eighths of the total number of recruits were Ulster Protestants; and, although he did not refer to the fact, it is well known that many Protestants from the South had also enlisted—the 10th Division alone contains 8500. Hence we arrive at the remarkable fact that fully half the Irish recruits are Protestants. Religious and political divisions in Ireland follow the same lines so closely, that it is safe to say, therefore, that half the recruits have been Unionists. Yet the figures are being used as an argument for Home Rule!

As the income-tax rose, the advanced section of the Nationalists urged with increasing vehemence that Ireland should not be compelled to bear any additional taxation caused by the war. In January last, a monster meeting was held in the City Hall, Cork, to protest against employers applying economic conscription to their employees, and to discuss the question of taxation. A number of priests and local politicians were on the platform. The Rev. M. O'Flanagan, in the course of a long speech in which he derided the British farce at the Dardanelles and the wild-goose chase at Baghdad, and said that, if the Germans were to invade Ireland, they would be no worse than the English, expressed a hope that Ireland would be an independent country in alliance with Germany; adding that 'unless England altered a great deal, Ireland would be an enemy on that day, and her harbours might become submarine bases from which they could rush out and destroy the commerce of England, and starve that country in a few months.' This sentiment was greeted with enthusiastic applause.

When matters had come to this pass, thoughtful men realised that an outbreak was imminent, and implored the Government to take precautions; but their warnings were treated with contempt. Down to the moment of the outbreak, the Government continued the policy of endeavouring to satisfy the demands of the Nationalists.

An instance of this occurred in connexion with the Gaelic Athletic Association, one of the most powerful of the Societies which work for the 'de-Anglicising of Ireland.' Any one who joins the British Army, or plays, or even is a spectator at, any 'foreign game,' such as Rugby football, is expelled. When the tax on amusements was proposed, the Association resolved not to pay it. As their official organ said :

'The tax will be resolutely opposed on solid business grounds as well as from the inherent distaste of its members to act as a tax-collecting agency for any foreign government, now or at any future time. . . . Let the dirty work be done by those who require the toll.'

A deputation accordingly waited on Mr McKenna, who at once added a clause to the Bill exempting from the payment of the tax any gatherings held for the purpose of reviving national pastimes. Hence, if some young men at Belfast hold a football match under Rugby rules, the tax will be imposed; but at the matches for Gaelic football, which are held every Sunday throughout the country, nothing will be paid to the 'foreign Government.'

Throughout the winter and spring, preparations for a rising went on openly and without disguise. Newspapers which preached treason were sold in the shops and streets. Some of these papers showed marked ability; many of the writers were University professors and teachers at High Schools. Here are some typical extracts :

'To the spirit fostered and spread and strengthened by such organisations as the Gaelic League, Sinn Féin, the Gaelic Athletic Association, the Irish Volunteers, Cumann na mBann, the Citizen Army, and Na Fianna Eireann—the spirit of '98, the spirit of Young Ireland, the spirit of Fenianism, Ireland owes her salvation during the past year; and the least return Ireland can make, now that she is once more swinging back to her true attitude towards the ancient and the ONLY enemy, is to plant their banner in every corner of her "four green fields" and ask all her children to take their place in the Army of Freedom, of which the societies I have named are so many regiments. Thus will she make ready for the big and final fight that is sure to come—sooner, perhaps, than many of us think.'—'Fianna,' October 1915.

'The Fenians and the Fenian faith incarcerated in Allen, Larkin and O'Brien [the Manchester Martyrs] were of a fighting and revolutionary epoch. They can only be commemorated by another fighting and revolutionary generation. That generation we have with us to-day. For we have the material, the men and stuff of war. We have the manhood of Ireland armed and drilled and disciplined. . . . The Fenians of 1865 wanted no more. We have more than they had, for we have much, and that of first and prime importance, which they had not.'—'Nationality,' Nov. 27, 1915. —

'How can we Irish, who love Ireland, read the story of those who died for Ireland and not ask ourselves why it was they risked their lives, why it was they died. And thus we come to the old eternal truth, that, though individuals may prosper, Ireland can never prosper tied to England. Till she is free, morally and physically, a nation of slaves must deteriorate, till their lands are deserts, their towns ruined, their people exiles or tricksters, and placehunters to a foreign government.'—'Fianna,' November 1915.

The 'Irish Volunteer' every week filled its columns with instructions to the members of that force, pointing out how houses at cross-roads and other important points should be held. Regular parades took place in Dublin, at which advice was given as to the seizing of prominent buildings. The Volunteers even organised Sunday marches to the mountains, so that every man might know the exact route to take, should the rising fail. On St Patrick's Day, Prof. MacNeill held an inspection of his troops in College Green, at which many of the men ostentatiously carried service rifles, which must have been obtained from the military by some unlawful means. At Cork it had been proposed to hold a procession on that day which was to be of a non-political character; but, when it was suggested that some soldiers quartered there should take part in it, the idea was rejected with scorn, one member of the committee saying that the British army in Ireland was simply an army of occupation, and that it would be as natural for the Belgians to invite the German invaders to join them in celebrating a Belgian festival. In the same city an organiser of the Irish Volunteers was caught in the act of distributing pro-German literature, but was acquitted by the magistrates in the face of the clearest evidence. At Sligo a

torchlight procession was held in honour of some men who had been charged under the Defence of the Realm Act; and similar occurrences took place all over Nationalist Ireland. It was a matter of common knowledge at the time that many of the officials in the Post Office and other public offices were members of Sinn Fein, and could not be relied on in the event of a rising. But it will never be known how far the members of other Nationalist societies cooperated with the movement; certainly many persons not actually members of Sinn Fein sympathised with it.

It may be asked, How could a man in Mr Birrell's position be so blind to the signs of the times? The answer is that his policy, ever since he became Chief Secretary, has been strictly consistent. He resided in London, only paying occasional visits to Dublin and making a few motor-tours through some parts of Ireland; and he prided himself on being an 'incorrigible optimist'—which meant that he shut his eyes to the facts and pretended that all was going well, whatever the reality might be. When he was appointed, matters were quiet; but under his feeble rule, the West soon began to drift into anarchy. Cattle-driving—a form of persecution hitherto unknown—became rampant; by 1909 no less than 335 people were suffering the tortures of boycotting; the agrarian outrages in 1911 amounted to 351. For any one who drew attention to this state of affairs, he had nothing but sneers and gibes; when things were at their worst, he told his English constituents that Ireland was the happiest country in the world. The outbreak of the war brought no change either to the condition of the country, or to his policy. In November 1914 a cattle-drive occurred in the King's County—the thirteenth that had taken place in the district within two years. The mob was armed with crowbars; and several policemen, who were endeavouring to protect the cattle, were severely injured. Six men were arrested and convicted, but were immediately released by Lord Aberdeen, acting (one must assume) on the advice of Mr Birrell.

It was not likely that such a man would pay attention to the warnings of loyal citizens as to the progress of disaffection, or would care to investigate matters for himself. He preferred to listen to Mr Redmond and Mr

Dillon, who advised him to do nothing. If he had even made enquiries into the state of feeling in the National University (his own favourite institution, with which, as Mr Redmond has said, his name will be for ever associated) his eyes might have been opened.

There have been certain points of resemblance between nearly all Irish Rebellions. Hatred not only of England but of every sort of government, the love of excitement, class jealousies and personal feuds, the romantic ideas of a few dreamy enthusiasts, who do not know exactly what they want, and the poverty of a much larger number whose one object is gain—these have usually been amongst the causes which have brought rebellion about. But, sooner or later in the course of its development, it has settled down on the one great line of cleavage which marks Irish politics—religion. In every rebellion, too, foreign aid has been looked for, and at the critical moment has failed. So it was in the time of Philip II of Spain, in 1641, and in 1798. But the rebellion which the recent outbreak most closely resembles was Emmet's rising in 1803. This was only natural, as in several points it was an imitation of it, and Emmet is one of the most popular of Nationalist heroes. Portraits of him are amongst the commonest ornaments in cottages, and biographies of him are studied in the schools. In his time the leaders were literary men; a large part of the country was well organised; French aid had been promised, and was expected daily. But, when the French did not come, the delegates from several counties drew back, knowing that a rising without them was hopeless; in the actual outbreak the Dublin men were only supported by a few others from neighbouring counties. They started out to seize the Castle, and perhaps might have succeeded had not some of them stopped on the way to loot the shops. So, too, in 1916, it is evident that a general rising had been planned to take place the moment the Germans should land; the simultaneous risings in Dublin, Galway, Louth and Wexford prove this. That some of the leaders drew back does not show that they had changed their views, but only that they considered the moment inopportune when they saw that their foreign friends were not coming. To flatter oneself with the idea that those who

actually took part in the rebellion had no sympathisers is as insane as it was to believe that a rising was improbable.

The evidence given before the recent Commission has now appeared in the Press. It is instructive, if melancholy reading. No one studying it can fail to observe that most of the statements made by Mr Birrell are practically answered by the other witnesses. Thus he mentions as one cause of the recent disturbances the hatred of the British connexion which has prevailed in Ireland for centuries. But to this Sir M. O'Connell replies that it was not that, but the neglect of all warnings by Mr Birrell and his Government, and their refusal to take steps to stop sedition and disloyalty, which has brought about the present state of things, at any rate in his part of the country. Another cause which Mr Birrell gives for the disaffection is the unexpected prolongation of the war. If that is so, the prospect is alarming. Are we to understand that under Home Rule, Ireland will always be ready to join the enemy in a European war if England is not immediately successful? That was a danger which Pitt fully realised in 1800; but he considered it a strong argument for the Union. Of course Mr Birrell attacks the Ulster movement vehemently, and represents it as one of the principal causes of the present disasters; but other witnesses refer to the weakness shown by the Government in connexion with the Dublin strikes long before that; they point out that the Larkinite conspiracy was not a genuine Labour movement, but was hostile to law and order, and that the action of the Government in releasing Larkin when he was convicted of embezzlement, and sacrificing the police to political clamour, had a disastrous effect on the country. Mr Birrell complains that although he had full reports about Ireland generally, supplied by the Royal Irish Constabulary, he knew little of what was going on in Dublin, which was outside their jurisdiction. But the Chief Commissioner of the Dublin Police shows that everything of a political character had to be referred to the Chief Secretary's Department, and accurate reports were regularly sent in. Mr Birrell justifies his inactivity by saying that Mr Redmond assured him that the Sinn

Feiners were negligible, and that Mr Dillon also was in favour of non-intervention. Witnesses both from the military and the police complain that their warnings and recommendations were unheeded, as Mr Birrell preferred to be guided by the Nationalist leaders.

The plain truth is that the blame for the lamentable occurrences of Easter Week must rest on the late Government, and, to a limited extent, on the Coalition which took office a year ago. As has already been said in these columns, it was a grave misfortune for the country, as well as for the reputation of the Unionist leaders, that they took office without making conditions, and including in those conditions the firmer government of Ireland, in circumstances which were bound to enhance the dangers already existing in that country. It is an old saying that England's troubles are Ireland's opportunity; but the Government ignored this and other lessons of history. As it laughed at the Ulster Covenant till that bond was on the point of issuing in rebellion, as they laughed at 'the German menace' and derided those who called attention to it until the menace passed into war, so they laughed at the Sinn Feiners till they actually rebelled. The 'Laughing Government' will go down to posterity as the shortest-sighted set of politicians who ever ruled this country. But the chief blame for what has happened must rest upon the person who was immediately responsible for the conduct of Irish affairs, that is, upon Mr Birrell. He cannot, and to do him justice does not, attempt to divest himself of that responsibility by throwing the blame on his colleagues or his superior—though they must share it with him—for, if he had disagreed with their policy, it was always open to him to resign. In his apology to the House of Commons, he confessed that he had been mistaken and misled. We know by whom he was misled; the question is whether he can rightly claim forgiveness for being mistaken. He threw himself on the mercy of the House; and the House, always generous to penitents, accepted his apology; in fact, the leaders who spoke after him were quite in a melting mood. We confess we think they were wrong.

There are errors of judgment, committed, it may be, under the stress of circumstances requiring immediate

decision—like that of Admiral Byng—which no just man would now desire to punish. There are others, involving deliberate neglect of duty, of which no just man, out of an impulse of generosity, ought to acquit a statesman charged with the highest interests of the country. Mr Birrell has trifled with the government of Ireland, and therefore with the interests of the Empire, for nine long years. He pleads that his eyes were not open; but whose fault is that? We are all, no doubt, more or less blind to what is going on about us; but wilful blindness—blindness due to preconceived opinions, which no evidence, either of current events or of past history, is allowed to disprove—this, in a statesman, it is hard to condone. In a sterner, less mealy-mouthed and sentimental generation, Mr Birrell's 'mistake' would not have been condoned. The first duty of a Government that is a Government is, not only to put down, but also to guard against sedition. Yet sedition not only raised its head in Ireland, as we have shown above, nearly two years ago, but has stalked about the land, open and unashamed, ever since. It grew daily stronger through immunity, till it was encouraged by the inaction of the Government to deal us a stab in the back in the very crisis of our struggle for national existence.

The mischievous consequences of the rebellion, bad enough on the surface, are by no means yet perceived in their full extent. We do not know what they may be. We cannot say what effect they will have on the unity and stability of government in this country, and consequently upon our share in the war. We do know that hundreds of valuable lives have been needlessly sacrificed, and millions of pounds' worth of property destroyed. The one excuse for the policy which the Government has pursued in Ireland during the last two years has been that only by doing nothing could an outbreak be prevented. And now the folly of that cowardly policy has been displayed in the eyes of all the world by the very occurrence which our rulers pretended to avoid. What the enemy thinks of it does not, perhaps, very much matter; but what of our allies and the neutral countries? In the latter, at all events, not only has our capacity for government been gravely discredited, but sympathy for our cause has been seriously diminished.

In the United States, the importance of whose good opinion, in the present conjuncture both of American and of European affairs, cannot be exaggerated, not only have Irish and German-American forces become linked up as they never were before, but the feelings of those most friendly to us have been shocked, first by the ineptitude which allowed the rebellion to take place, and then by the executions which, however necessary—and they were the least penalty that could be exacted—have been widely, if wrongly, condemned even in the pro-Ally press. And all this is, to speak frankly, the fault primarily of Mr Birrell. Men have been impeached in former days for less. The Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the causes of the rebellion makes no secret of the conclusions which the evidence laid before them obliged the Commissioners to form upon the question of Mr Birrell's guilt. That the House of Commons should have passed it over without a word of reprobation is strange indeed. We should take it for a proof that our moral fibre was lamentably weakened, but for one consideration. Mr Birrell and the late Government are not alone to blame; the majority of the House have for many years not only condoned but applauded the refusal of the late Chief Secretary to govern Ireland.

But let us pass on to the question, what is now to be done. It is true that the rising has now been put down. But none but an 'incorrigible optimist' can regard the present state of Ireland with anything but alarm. Mr Redmond has boldly said that Sinn Feinism is dead; but the opinion of a man who early in this year advised Mr Birrell that it was negligible, and who said that the police force in the West should be reduced by a half, may be taken for what it is worth. It was only the failure to land arms in Kerry that prevented a rising from taking place in Clare. The people in the country districts of Galway took advantage of the temporary absence of the police during the rebellion to indulge in cattle-driving on an extensive scale. There is no evidence that those who sympathised with the movement have changed their views, or that the influence of the other societies which have been working in connexion with Sinn Fein has been in any way weakened. It is a significant fact that the

Corporation of Cork has unanimously passed a resolution referring to 'the Irish Martyrs shot in Ireland'; but another resolution, referring to the brave Irishmen who perished in the recent naval battle, lapsed for want of a quorum. When a meeting of the Irish Parliamentary party was held in Dublin to consider Mr Lloyd George's scheme, a resolution was carried unanimously, demanding that all persons undergoing penal servitude in connexion with the recent rising should be treated as prisoners of war. And each Sunday, when Requiems are sung at Roman Catholic churches in Dublin for those who lost their lives in the rebellion, crowds assemble outside the buildings after the service, waving Republican flags, cheering for the Irish Republic, and singing the favourite Nationalist hymn :

'And though they sleep in dungeons deep,
Or flee, outlawed and banned,
We love them yet; can we forget
The Felons of our land?'

Incidents like these are more significant than statements made by partisans.

The vital question now is, what is to be done next? No one, except a few English Radicals, has advocated the immediate putting into force of the Home Rule Act in its entirety. We may dismiss the idea as, for many reasons, impracticable. We come next to the exclusion plan—in fact, to Mr Lloyd George's proposal. As it is still uncertain how far it will be generally accepted, it is in one sense of little use to examine it at present. The Northern Unionists, though believing it to be bad for the Empire, for Ireland, and for Ulster, have patriotically decided that they will not actively oppose it if the Government resolve to introduce it; but, whether the scheme to which they have reluctantly assented is really the one which Mr Lloyd George intends, seems uncertain. A majority of the Ulster Nationalists have, under the strong pressure of Mr Devlin, accepted the principle of exclusion; but a minority exceeding one-third of the convention refused assent, and a large number of delegates did not attend at all. The Nationalists of the rest of Ireland have now given their sanction to the

scheme, but with plain indications that they regard it as only a half-way house and refuse to take the exclusion of Ulster as final. It is certainly unfortunate that the only solution which the Government can suggest is one which all parties in Ireland regard with aversion. And the more the plan is looked into, the greater the difficulties appear. The existing Act must be altered, as arrangements must be made for the government of Ulster, quite as elaborate as those provided by the Act for the rest of the country. Moreover, the Home Rule Act leaves it uncertain whether the Imperial Parliament will be able to levy taxes in Ireland or not. Will England consent to waive all contributions from Ireland, or will the Parliament at Westminster attempt under its doubtful powers to levy taxes against the wish of the Dublin Parliament? If it does, can it be called Home Rule?

The fact is that any scheme for fundamentally altering the constitution by a measure passed hurriedly during a European war must be fraught with incalculable difficulty and danger. Mr Asquith asserts that Castle Government has broken down; but in reality, for some years there has been no Castle or any other Government in Ireland. What has broken down has been Mr Birrell's policy of doing nothing, on the advice of his Nationalist friends. We fail to see any sufficient reason for the course which Mr Asquith, exchanging his customary dilatoriness for undue haste, adopted immediately after the Dublin rising was suppressed. He was apparently under the impression that the situation was entirely changed by the rebellion. The rebellion made no change in the situation except in so far as it opened the eyes of Mr Birrell and Mr Asquith, and made the reasons against granting Home Rule at this time more obvious than before. Nor is it easy to understand why the Prime Minister should have rushed over to Ireland to ascertain, by personal contact, the opinions of prominent Nationalists and Unionists, which he might have ascertained at any time during the last five years. We presume that, having no policy of his own, he went to find one. So far, moreover, we are in the dark as to the exact circumstances in which Mr Lloyd George was commissioned to draw up an arrangement. It is indeed asserted that

he had no such commission—that he was merely a mediator, not a plenipotentiary. It is still uncertain which he was. There is also a fundamental difference between Mr Redmond and Sir E. Carson as to the nature of the suggestions made. The indecent and imprudent haste with which the whole scheme of Mr Lloyd George's mission was started has already produced a sinister crop of misunderstandings.

But, whatever may be in dispute about the mission itself, one thing is clear. There was absolutely no need that it should have started at all. There was no need to change the system of government in Ireland. On the contrary, there were most potent reasons for making no change at this juncture. To do so establishes a fatal precedent. It is the bounden duty of a Government, especially in times like the present, to make no terms with rebellion. But Mr Asquith, by practically pledging his Government to grant, let us say, half the rebels' demand, has not only condoned their crime, but given an immense incentive to rebellion in future. He has even gone far towards stultifying the executions of the leaders; for, if this great concession was to be made, should they have paid the penalty of their lives for demanding a little more? He has enabled their partisans to say, 'Look what the Martyrs have done! They have obtained in a week of civil war what the Moderates failed to accomplish in many years.' It has over and over again occurred in Ireland that what peaceful agitation could not win has been conceded to violence and crime; but never has the pernicious lesson been more flagrantly impressed on the national mind than on the present occasion. It is *pessimi exempli* indeed; and it has already begun to tell. Mr Asquith congratulated the country on the fact that, for the first time in Irish history, nine-tenths of the population were out of sympathy with the rebels. The statement was a very rash one when made; it is the opposite of truth now. The Sinn Fein movement has received an enormous impulse; such authority as Mr Redmond possessed has been hopelessly undermined; the hostile forces, stunned for the moment, have more than recovered their lost ground; the whole country, if not actually seething with revolt, is agitated and expectant.

Is it not the height of folly to hand over the government of three-fourths of Ireland to a population in this state of mind? We agree entirely with the five Peers who, in a letter published in the papers on June 24, deprecated this course. What safeguard have we against the extremists gaining the upper hand in the new Irish Parliament, and using their power in a manner hostile to this country? The ways in which such a majority might injure Great Britain are many and so obvious that there is no need to insist on them. One in particular has already been pointed out. Is our fleet in future to regard Irish harbours as belonging to a friendly, a neutral, or a hostile country? What security shall we have against these harbours being used as bases for German submarines, or against the neighbouring seas being strewn with bombs laid by Irish fishermen? Nor are we to consider ourselves alone. We have a sacred duty to our allies. What opinion will they conceive of an arrangement which, so far as common sense and all the signs of the times indicate, is all but certain to cause us grave embarrassment, and possibly worse, at a moment when all our forces should be thrown into the scale on behalf of the common cause. Mr Asquith's hasty indiscretions have so far prejudiced the situation that it is doubtless difficult to draw back. But the only possible justification for a new settlement is that it should be by universal consent. Such a consent has clearly not been attained. Here, then, is a way of escape from the *impasse* into which the Government have wantonly thrust themselves. Let them boldly state that, as Irishmen are not agreed, the only course open to them is to continue a firm government, on present lines, until the advent of peace makes the way clearer for a final settlement. In any case, we feel bound to deprecate, with all the force of conviction that can attach to any forecast of political consequences, the suicidal step of granting Home Rule, at this juncture, to Nationalist, hostile, and rebellious Ireland.

Art. 15.—THE ORGANISATION OF THE EMPIRE.

1. *The Problem of the Commonwealth.* Preface by L. Curtis. Macmillan, 1916.
2. *The Empire on the Anvil: being suggestions and data for the future government of the British Empire.* By W. Basil Worsfold. Smith, Elder, 1916.
3. *Imperial Unity and the Dominions.* By Arthur B. Keith. Clarendon Press, 1916.

THE organisation of the Empire is regarded from different points of view and desired for different and sometimes antagonistic reasons by the peoples of its several parts. The Englishman, who lives in England, hopes for a lightening of his heavy taxes, when the Dominions shall bear their full share of the common burden of Imperial defence; while the citizens of the Dominions, on their side, think more of exercising some control over the Empire's foreign policy, which determines the issue of peace or war, than of calculating the responsibilities which this would bring in its train. A third section of the inhabitants, both of Great Britain and the Dominions—although it is diminishing in numbers and importance—either from indifference or because they disbelieve in the possibility of closer union upon terms which would be just to all portions of the Empire, are content with the existing loose relationship between its parts, and deprecate as dangerous all attempts to formulate a legal bond. A fourth section which, like Aaron's rod, may swallow up the others, refuses to admit that the Union of the Empire should be regarded as a question of profit and loss or depend upon a nice speculation as to the balance of gain. Lord Milner has expressed the ideals of this school in many passages of his collected speeches. 'Imperial Unity,' he says in one place, 'is not a question of shifting burdens but of developing new centres of strength. . . . I believe that, as the self-governing Dominions grow in power, they will feel a stronger desire to share in the responsibilities and the glory of Empire.' It is a high merit of Mr Curtis and Mr Worsfold, whose books are now under notice, that they approach the problem of Imperial Organisation from all these differing points of view, and that, having each taken part under Lord

Milner in the making of the Union of South Africa, they can appreciate its many difficulties.

Mr Curtis describes his 'Problem of the Commonwealth'* as 'an answer to the question, "How a British subject in the Dominions can acquire the same control of foreign policy as one domiciled in the British Isles?"' The makers of the Australian Commonwealth had in mind the same idea, when they adopted as one of the resolutions upon which their Constitution Act was founded, a statement that the contemplated Federal Union was designed 'to enlarge the powers of self-government of the people of Australia.' Such a conception involves a high ideal of citizenship, for which the world may not be ripe; and therefore Mr Curtis, in his earlier chapters, appeals to history to prove that the sphere of patriotism has in fact extended with each expansion of British power. The loss of the American Colonies caused a temporary check, and in the opinion of contemporaries destroyed the Empire. A new idea, however—than which none of greater importance has appeared in the field of politics since Edward I, borrowing from the Church, applied the principle of representation to his 'Model Parliament'—saved the Empire from its anticipated dissolution. It became recognised gradually that the method of Empire was to distinguish between the local and general interest of the communities which compose it; and that, while the former may be put under the absolute control of local authorities, the latter are the concern of all the communities whose interests they affect. For Mr Curtis and his colleagues of 'The Round Table,' holding this view, the problem of Empire is to separate the local interests of Great Britain, the Dominions and the Colonies from the general, and to provide a machinery for a joint control of the latter, without interfering with local independence in respect of the former. Had this conception of local autonomy combined with association for common purposes been

* Mr Curtis uses the word 'Commonwealth' to express the conception of a Government which is controlled by the public opinion of its citizens, as opposed to the Eastern theocratic State. Its fundamental notion is that 'Society is at its best when it is able and free to adapt its own structure to conditions as they change, in accordance with its own experience of those conditions.'

grasped in the 18th century, the United States of America might be sharing with the British Empire to-day a common responsibility for the general peace of the world. The extension of the United States from the 13 original States to the 49 which now compose the Union is itself an example and a proof of the possibility and the wisdom of extending over a wide area the powers and burdens of a Commonwealth. Australia is not less like England, nor do its interests diverge further from those of the United Kingdom, than California is unlike New York or the interests of Missouri diverge from those of Pennsylvania. It is idle, however, to deplore the past. Enough if we recognise, with Mr Curtis, that 'the British Empire, as at present established, cannot endure unless it can realise its own character as a Commonwealth in time, by extending the burden and control of its supreme functions to every community which it recognises as fit for responsible government.'

The two-branched policy of local independence and joint responsibility for affairs of common interest, the recommendation of which is the theme of Mr Curtis and Mr Worsfold's volumes, has not yet been put in practice in its entirety. The theory of local autonomy has been applied with logical completeness; but no constitutional machinery has been devised for the cooperation of the Dominions, either *inter se* or with Great Britain, in respect of their external affairs. Temporary expedients, such as the Imperial Conference, have been improvised for the interchange of views between Prime Ministers; but there is no constitutional organ which can express with authority the voice of the Empire as a whole. The spirit of cooperation is strong; but, in the words of Sir George Foster,* 'it has not been mobilised so as to face the problems of Empire, trade, communications, defence and foreign policy, not by temporary expedients but with method, plans and foresight.' This restatement by a Canadian Minister of the historic policy of the Tory Party may be compared with Disraeli's utterance on the same subject in 1872:

'I do not object,' he said, 'to Colonial self-government; I cannot conceive how our distant Colonies can have their

* Interview in 'The Times,' June 11, 1916.

affairs administered except by self-government; but self-government, in my opinion, ought to have been conceded as part of a great policy of Imperial consolidation.'*

Such views made no appeal to the then dominant middle class, who were inclined rather to agree with Cobden that the 'Colonies were as great a burden as the National Debt, of which we shall be glad if any foreign country will relieve us.'† In the same spirit, Lord Dufferin, on his appointment as Governor-General of Canada, was advised by Robert Lowe to bring about the independence of that Dominion; and Lord Blachford, who as Permanent Under-Secretary of the Colonial Office presided over the destinies of the Empire for eleven years, declared in 1891 that no one but a fool could contemplate any other future for the Colonies than separation, which it had always been his policy to encourage and facilitate.

Until Prof. Keith's volumes on 'Responsible Government in the Dominions,' of which his present work may be regarded as a continuation, revealed to the *profanum vulgus* the secrets of the Colonial Office, few even of those who were directly concerned realised with what logical completeness this policy had been applied. Governors have been stripped of every attribute of the Prerogative except the power of granting a dissolution and of refusing assent to certain classes of Bills, which are designated in his instructions, such as Bills affecting the currency, or divorce, or treaty obligations, or 'any Bill of an extraordinary nature and importance, whereby the prerogative of the Crown, or the rights and privileges of British subjects not residing in the State, or the trade or shipping of the United Kingdom and its Dependencies may be prejudiced.'‡ Nominally a Governor is Commander-in-Chief of the local forces, but he cannot move a soldier without the consent of his Ministers, who alone can give direction to the military authorities; nor could he refuse to confirm the sentence of a Court-Martial except on the same advice. As representing the King, he is the fountain of honour; but it is doubtful

* Quoted from Sichel's 'Disraeli,' pp. 205-6.

† Cobden's 'Political Writings,' pp. 242-3. Edit. 1886.

‡ Instructions to the Governor of New South Wales, Oct. 29, 1900.

whether he can recommend anyone as a fitting recipient of His Majesty's favour of whom his Ministers disapprove. Certainly the latter could require him to forward their remonstrance to the Colonial Office. Nominally the Governor exercises the prerogative of mercy; but it has long been settled that, in exercising this, he acts as Governor-in-Council.

While the powers of a Governor, as representative of the Crown, have diminished, those of the Legislature have increased; so that, although in theory the Imperial Parliament can legislate for all the Empire, so tender is it of Dominion sentiment, that even such measures as the Copyright or the Patents Acts are only binding on a Dominion which expresses its assent; and, manifest as would be the convenience of an Imperial Commercial Code, the local Legislatures seldom adopt even such measures as the Partnership Act or the Bills of Exchange Act without laying traps for the unwary by textual variations from the British original. Yet, unlimited as is the control of the Dominion Legislatures over their internal affairs—even over such debatable matters as tariffs, immigration, waste-lands and trade—they still lack the chief attribute of independence, viz. a voice in the issues of peace or war. No Dominion Parliament has any extra-territorial jurisdiction, unless this be conferred on it expressly—as the Supreme Court of New South Wales, for example, has been given cognisance over crimes committed on British ships by British subjects in Otaihiti or any other island in the Pacific which is not subject to England or to any European power (9 Geo. IV, c. 83, s. 4).*

Prof. Keith gives an interesting review of the futile attempts of Canada, Australia and New Zealand to escape from this limitation of their powers, either by asserting in vain their right to annex unoccupied territories or by attempting to impose their shipping

* Prof. Keith does not notice this exceptional instance of extra-territorial jurisdiction, under which a case of piracy was tried in Sydney in 1891. The Agents-General for the Australian States are appointed usually by a Commission and not under an Act of Parliament. Their position is that of Ministers accredited to the British Government, and is, as Prof. Keith points out, quite distinct from that of the Agents-General for the Canadian Provinces, who have no direct official relations with the Imperial Government.

regulations upon British and foreign vessels. Measures to effect these objects have always been vetoed by the Sovereign. Prof. Keith himself would remove all legal restrictions on the powers of Dominion Parliaments to regulate over-sea shipping, and would leave the extent to which this should be exercised to be settled by agreements with the British Government. In the same spirit he advises that the right of the Imperial Ministry to control the legislation of the Dominions by exercising the power of reservation or disallowance should be formally abandoned; while for a constructive policy he suggests that there should be one final Court of Appeal for the Empire, that representatives of the Dominion Governments should attend (as plenipotentiaries) all International Conferences, and that Ministers of the Dominions should visit England frequently, and if possible appoint one of their number to reside continuously in London, in order that they may be kept in closer touch with foreign policy. The defence of the Empire he would organise on an Imperial, and not, as at present, on a local basis. The programme is not ambitious, but it is not proposed as final. Prof. Keith sees clearly enough that 'Short of a federation of some kind, even if only for defence and foreign policy, there is no way [for the Dominions] to keep in touch with foreign affairs'; but he fails (we think) to realise that such a change cannot be effected through the Imperial Conference, but only by direct popular action. The merit of Prof. Keith's contribution to the problem is his careful analysis of the precedents on which the present Constitutional Law of the Empire has been established. His work has been rightly called 'a monument of legal and technical erudition.' It will remain for a long time an indispensable text-book on the formal aspect of Imperial relations, and, as such, will be often quoted in the Debates of an Imperial Convention.

To the school of Mr Curtis and Mr Worsfold, the problem of Imperial organisation is how to confer this fuller power of self-government upon the people of the Dominions without either diminishing their local independence or depriving them of the status of British citizenship. Agreement as to details cannot be expected;

but a great stride has been made towards some solution by the general recognition since the war that the people themselves are best judges of their needs; and that the only method of discovering and of satisfying the requirements of the Empire as a whole is the summoning, without delay, of a representative Constituent Convention to determine what organic changes are required, and, if agreement can be reached on this, to frame a new Imperial Constitution. The method of selecting the representatives, which will be the affair of each Dominion or Colony, is not a matter of importance, if only it be recognised as an essential condition of success that any constitution which the Convention may succeed in framing shall be submitted for acceptance or rejection to a popular vote. Thus the essential condition to success will be preserved, namely, that the people of the Empire should have the first and the last word in determining their new Constitution—the first by choosing the representatives who frame it, the last by voting on its acceptance or rejection. In the meantime, the work immediately to hand is to familiarise the public with the nature of the problem.

Thus, Mr Worsfold's excursion into the history of the Imperial Federation League (1884-1893) is a useful reminder that a faithful remnant never bowed the knee to the idol of Imperial disintegration. It is idle to enquire now into the causes of the failure of this well-meaning League. Let us rather follow Mr Worsfold's summary of the steps by which, through its posthumous influence, the formal recognition of Imperial Unity has been approaching definiteness. He names:

(1) The change in the style of the self-governing oversea British communities from 'Colonies' to 'Dominions' (1907, incorporated into the King's title in 1910).

(2) The development of the Colonial Conference (convened at irregular intervals) into the periodic (quadrennial) Imperial Conference, with (a) certain changes in the composition of the Conference itself, and (b) the constitution of the Dominions Division of the Colonial Office (1907).

(3) The constitution of the Council, afterwards the Committee, of Imperial Defence (1895 and 1904), and the admission (in principle) of Dominion representatives to participation in its proceedings (1913).

(4) The increased cooperation of the Dominions in the defence of the Empire by (a) voluntary contribution (in kind or money) to the Navy, and (b) the enlargement and better organisation of the local (land) forces.

(5) The improvement and cheapening of inter-Imperial communications of all kinds.

(6) Increased uniformity of legislation (e.g.) in respect of copyrights, patents and trade marks; the appointment of Dominion Judges to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council; and the appointment of Trade Commissioners (representing the Imperial Government in the Dominions).

In the second portion of his book, Mr Worsfold, greatly daring, but fulfilling the promise of his sub-title, puts forward 'suggestions for the future government of the British Empire,' and adds, as the data for these, a summary of the six Federal Constitutions now in operation. He proposes alternative schemes—the first 'a half-way house,' the second, a Supreme Imperial Parliament. Both proposals offend against the fundamental postulates of Mr Curtis's argument—that only those peoples whose minds play freely around the constitution of society, that is to say, who treat law as made for man, and therefore do not regard the framework of society as divinely ordained or permit it to cramp social habits or methods, are fitted to be members of a free Commonwealth—by including in each scheme representation of theocratic India; a proposal which, however it may be recommended, will never be accepted by the democracy of the Dominions. Mr Worsfold suggests elaborate safeguards against the swamping of the white representation by the coloured races; but no ingenuity is likely to overcome objections which are founded upon racial instinct. Either the representation of India must be surrounded with so many limitations as to be illusory, or the affairs of the Empire may be controlled by a block-vote of men who despise our national habits and are as unwilling as ourselves that we and they should inter-marry. Yet it is well that the admission of our coloured subjects to a share in the Government of the Empire should be carefully considered. It is one of the most thorny questions with which a Constitutional Convention of the Empire will be called upon to deal.

Mr Worsfold's 'half-way house' is an enlargement of
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the Imperial Conference and the Defence Committee, by the admission to each of representatives of India and a provision for the attendance of representatives of the Dominions at meetings of the Committee. He suggests also a Dominion Council of Representatives, to sit in London and to be charged with the duty of adjusting the amounts required for the annual cost of Imperial services, to which the Dominions shall have first agreed to contribute for a period of ten years proportionately to their population. This Council is to have the power of voting or withholding these contributions, after hearing statements from British Ministers and calling for such information from official sources as they may require.

'There are those,' Sir Charles Lucas has said in this connexion, 'who possess a "half-way house" mind,' among whom, with undue self-depreciation, he would count himself. When the struggle for Federal Union raged in Australia, men even so clear-sighted as Sir Samuel Griffith advocated a limited Union for purposes of defence and trade. It is the supreme merit of Sir Henry Parkes that, at first standing almost alone, he never wavered in his advocacy of 'a complete legislature and executive Government suited to perform the grandest and highest functions of a nation.'

'The great question,' he said on one occasion, 'is whether the time has not yet arisen for the creation on the Australian Continent of an Australian Parliament as distinguished from a local Parliament, and an Australian Government as distinguished from a local Government. This means a distinct Executive and a distinct Parliamentary power; a Government for the whole of Australia. And it means a Parliament of two houses—a House of Commons and a Senate which would legislate on these great subjects. The Government and Parliament of New South Wales would be just as effective as now in all local matters, and so would the Parliaments of the other Colonies. I have no fear but that the Australian Parliament would rise to a just conception of the necessities of the case. . . . The thing will have to be done: and to put it off will only make the difficulties greater which stand in the way.'*

* Speech of Sir Henry Parkes, Oct. 24, 1889. See 'The Making of the Australian Commonwealth. A Stage in the Growth of the Empire,' by B. R. Wise.

To enter upon a contest in this spirit almost ensures victory. If men strive for perfection, they are likely to achieve the utmost which is possible. 'Half-way houses' may be useful when the traveller loses strength; but it is best to assume at first that he is equal to a reasonable journey.

The great new factor in the Imperial problem is the war, which has precipitated the Dominions at one bound into the family of European nations and thus involved them in the Empire's foreign policy, which hitherto has been the responsibility of the British Parliament alone. 'If I had stayed in Scotland,' said Mr Andrew Fisher, the High Commissioner of the Australian Commonwealth,

'I should have been able to heckle my Member on questions of Imperial Policy and to vote for or against him on that ground. I went to Australia. I have been Prime Minister. But all the time I have had no say whatever about Imperial Policy—no say whatever. Now that can't go on. There must be some change' ('The Times,' Jan. 31, 1916).

Yet Mr Fisher is one of those for whom, as a member of the Imperial Conference, the *arcana imperii* were laid bare, but as to an honoured visitor, not as to a coadjutor with joint responsibility. Sir R. Borden and Sir Clifford Sifton, speaking for Canada, were more precise.

'When Great Britain,' said Sir Robert (Dec. 15, 1912), 'no longer assumes sole responsibility for defence upon the high seas, she can no longer undertake to assume sole responsibility for, and sole control of, foreign policy, which is closely, vitally and constantly associated with that defence in which the Dominions participate.'

Sir Clifford Sifton was equally emphatic (Jan. 25, 1915):

'Bound by no constitution, bound by no rule of law, equity or obligation, Canada has decided as a nation to make war. . . . We have placed ourselves in opposition to the great World-powers. . . . It will no longer do for Canadians to say that they are not fully and absolutely able to conduct their own business. . . . We shall not be allowed to put ourselves in the position of a minor. The nations will say, If you can levy armies to make war, you can attend to your own business, and we will not be referred to the head of the Empire; we want you to answer our questions directly.'

If this be the true voice of the Dominions, Mr Curtis is right in thinking that compromises and 'half-way' houses are ruled out at one stroke. Development of the Imperial Conference, a revised composition of the Judicial Committee, Dominion Members in the British Parliament or even in the Cabinet—these are mere evasions of the real difficulty, because none of these expedients really enables the people of the Dominions to share with the people of Great Britain in the ultimate responsibility for foreign policy. Therefore they do not touch the essence of the demand of Mr Fisher or Sir Robert Borden. What the Dominions want—if Mr Fisher and Sir Robert Borden represent their views—is a share in the sovereignty of the Empire, which is at present divided between the King, the House of Lords and the House of Commons, and rests ultimately with the British electorate. Stated in this form, the problem, as Mr Curtis reminds us, is not complicated:

'The Imperial Parliament must represent the people of the Dominions as well as of the British Isles and be chosen by the electors of the Dominions as well as by those of the United Kingdom; and the exclusive power of voting the supplies on which the naval and military forces of the Empire depend, must be withdrawn from the House of Commons and conferred on an Imperial Parliament.'

No lesser constitutional change will complete the traditional policy of England towards the Dominions, or 'mobilise' (to repeat Sir G. Foster's phrase) all the forces of the Empire upon the side of peace. Internal independence is not enough; we must also 'enlarge the powers of self-government of the people of the Dominions' by giving them a voice in the ultimate issues of peace and war. The alternative is separation, the Dominions providing for their own defence by land and sea, like independent Powers. Then they would be open always to the aggression of hungry enemies; and the blood of their peoples would have been shed in this war in vain. Since 1914 such an alternative has become unthinkable.

Nor is the suggestion of Mr Jebb, whose insight into Imperial problems has cleared away many misconceptions,* that the Dominions should bind themselves to the

* See his 'Studies in Colonial Nationalism,' a work of great importance.

United Kingdom only by the obligation of treaties, any more practicable, now that the war has shown us the essential homogeneity of all portions of the Empire. The obligations of a treaty can never keep pace with changing circumstances, the influence of which cannot be foreseen; nor would such an uncertain tie satisfy the claim of the Dominions, or secure them in the enjoyment of that larger citizenship which is the completion of their internal independence. The essential point is the continuous control of foreign policy, which cannot be secured by the intermittent assertion of treaty obligations, but only by a Parliament and an Executive which rest upon the authority of all the self-governing British peoples. Such a body, in Mr Curtis' words,

'must be vested with control of foreign policy, because that is the way in which nations express themselves to other nations. They must decide what the naval and military force of the whole Empire is to be and how it is to be trained and distributed, because foreign policy without the backing of an adequate army and navy is a negligible thing, and the authority that decides upon foreign policy must itself be able to provide the necessary strength by sea and land. They must have the power of taxation for these Imperial purposes, because only in this way will they be able to guarantee that the Navy and Army of the Empire shall be kept at the essential pitch; and they must govern the Dependencies and India, because the welfare of these peoples is one of the most essential of Imperial interests and duties.'

Foreign Policy, being linked with defence, and defence implying taxation, and taxation without representation being abhorrent to the British mind, it follows that to give a voice in foreign policy to the Dominions involves the creation of a supreme representative body competent to levy taxes. Thus Foreign Policy, National Defence and an Imperial Parliament become three aspects of the same question. Once concede that the final responsibility for their foreign affairs shall be shared by the electors of the Dominions with the electors of Great Britain, it follows that we must create a sovereign legislature for the matters which concern the Empire as a whole, while leaving to the subordinate legislatures of its various portions, including the legislatures of Great

Britain, the fullest control of their internal affairs. These are the principles. The difficulties begin with the discussion of the details.

First, is it certain that the peoples of the Empire will desire this change when they realise the responsibilities which it involves? The old relationship, it is contended, has served well and been equal to the strain of war. Place the Empire 'on the anvil' if you will, but do not hammer it until it break! Remember rather the warning of Sir Charles Lucas, 'Friendly hammering' with good intent may produce the opposite result to what was intended. It may be no more than beating the air; it may even be actively harmful if the strokes are misdirected.' No one would suggest that such considerations should be ignored. Undoubtedly the old policy of independence in isolation has worked well, and, in so far as it relates to internal affairs, could hardly be bettered; but this will not be adequate to meet the new conditions created by the war, which have driven the Dominions, it may be despite themselves, into a new political channel. The situation contemplated by Mr Deakin in 1908 would seem to have arisen and to call for action.

'The circumstances of the world are being transformed. . . . We are confronted by a constantly changing situation, which must be met, if we wish to preserve our consistency, by a constantly changing attitude, adapted to the new circumstances. If the world move and we stand still, we none the less, by our action, take the responsibility of a decisive course.'

These last words contain the whole argument for action. If the world move and we stand still, our inaction becomes decisive action. Again Mr Deakin warns us:

'Either we must believe that Empire and Unity are only possible by maintaining our present fragmentary and isolated conditions, which give relations of good-fellowship so long as amity continues; or we must believe that our condition is unstable, untrustworthy and unpermanent, and that it requires to be replaced, gradually but surely, by a more complete organisation of England and her daughter communities.'

The peoples of Great Britain and the Dominions must decide—for no Ministers or High Commissioners or

* 'XIXth Century and Afterwards': June, 1916.

Colonial Offices can decide on their behalf—whether they prefer this policy or its alternative, a policy of drift. It is certain that there will be division of opinion.

An extensive political system—although preferable to a small community, as a defence against foreign aggression—is not so favourable a ground for social or political experiments; and of all systems of government the Federal is the most complex and unwieldy. The inevitable disputes as to the limits of Federal and State powers—inevitable because no human intelligence can draw a line of demarcation between all the unforeseen activities of growing communities—and the uncertainties of judicial interpretation, make legislation difficult and often disappoint the expectations of the legislator. Therefore an extension of their self-governing powers probably will not gain support from those who, in their ardour for reform, ignore the warnings of history, and believe that the close of this war will inaugurate a new era of universal peace. All who do not recognise that the world is about to enter on a new era of organisation for the purpose of preventing war, will be content to leave things as they are. Moreover, the conditions and habits of centuries will be ranged against a change. The claims of a wider British citizenship do not appeal, for example, to the French Canadian, who has an ingrained dread of becoming involved in European conflicts; nor is it certain that the English voter will be willing to share his hereditary supremacy with the voters of the Dominions, or acquiesce in the division—which would probably follow—of his ancient Parliament into four (or five if Ireland be divided) subordinate local legislatures. Certainly no external authority and no conference of eminent statesmen can impose these changes on the peoples of the Empire; but these must recognise for themselves the necessity for Imperial organisation, remembering that in the field of politics there is never any question of the absolutely best, but that the choice is always between two or more courses, of which it is the part of wisdom to choose the most promising. If this spirit prevail, the recognition of differences becomes a step towards agreement.

Therefore let the peoples of the Empire, in such manner as each pleases, choose delegates to a Convention to determine, first, if closer union be desirable, and, if

this be affirmed, to frame an Imperial Constitution for acceptance or rejection by the peoples whom they represent. The task will not be easy. The constitution of the new Imperial Parliament—whether it shall consist of one chamber or of two, how each is to be constituted, and what shall be the number of its members; the nature and elements of an Imperial Electorate; the composition of the Imperial Executive; the nature of the Imperial Franchise; the sources of an Imperial Revenue and the method of raising it; the distribution of the burdens of common defence; the relations of the new Parliament to the Crown Colonies and the Dependencies; the distribution of political power among the component parts of the Empire; and every other question which is involved in the creation and exercise of Sovereign Power—all these will have to be discussed from many points of view and will create difficulties which may appear insuperable. Yet every people which has joined a Federal Union or framed a written constitution—the United States, Canada, Australia, South Africa, Switzerland and the German Empire—has overcome similar obstacles; and, although the Imperial Problem has its peculiar difficulties, in that the federating communities are not of equal status, and that union will involve the surrender of Great Britain of her existing sovereignty, we need not on this account despair of the political genius of our race.

Most political problems have more than one solution; and the last word upon any has not yet been spoken. The Convention might even reject the purely British device of responsible government, or conclude that the party system was unsuited to an Imperial Parliament. Still, it might be possible to obtain an efficient and popular Executive. Mr Worsfold's account of the Swiss Executive is much in point in this connexion. These, however, are matters which the Convention will determine according to its wisdom, because they lie within the competence of statesmen to decide in this way or that. Mr Curtis, with great wisdom, has limited his enquiry to points which no statesman can alter, because they are inherent in the nature of things.

'No statesman (he says) can make one Executive responsible to two different legislatures or electorates. No statesman

can divorce the conduct of foreign affairs from defence, or either from the control of dependencies containing one-fifth of the human race. No statesman can render Ministers responsible to taxpayers without making these taxpayers severally liable to the Ministers for these taxes. These are conditions which no convention can alter. . . . They are the inexorable conditions of extending responsible government to British subjects beyond the British Isles without disrupting the Commonwealth.'

Nevertheless Mr Curtis, not quite consistently with the opinion he expresses here, proposes that the taxes levied by the Imperial Parliament shall be collected in the Dominions by Imperial officers, following in this respect the practice by the Australian Commonwealth. The alternative is that the collection of taxes should be the concern of the local authority. The choice between these alternatives is clearly one of those matters which may be left to the determination of the Imperial Convention. On the one side is the infraction of local authority; on the other, the risk of weakening unduly the Central Executive and putting it in the power of a recalcitrant State to refuse its contribution to the common fund. Such a refusal would necessitate either secession or coercion; but this is a standing difficulty in all federations. It would be better to run that risk, which is a very remote one, than to adopt a measure which would violate one of Mr Curtis' fundamental principles, and constantly irritate local feeling.

Events have marched rapidly since Mr Curtis penned these words. The Constituent Convention, which he and Mr Worsfold advocate, is to be summoned, so we are told by Mr Asquith, 'soon after the peace,' and will discuss the whole range of our Imperial relations. This is good news to those who feared, from Mr Lloyd George's first utterance on this subject, that the primary purpose of the Convention was the adjustment of Irish relations. This, indeed, is involved in the larger question; but to permit the election, or selection, of delegates to the Convention to turn upon Irish issues would rather create strife than tend towards union.

The date of the proposed Convention is of much importance. Australia certainly will insist on being represented by elected delegates; and provision for their

election must be made by Act of Parliament in each of the six States. It took two years to assemble the Convention which framed the Constitution for the Commonwealth; and it is not likely that the machinery for securing the election of delegates to the Convention, which Mr Asquith proposes to summon, would be in operation in less than six months. Also, in addition to Parliamentary delays, time must be allowed to candidates to present their views. Probably the Australian Delegates could not reach London for a year after the signing of peace, when other problems would be occupying public attention. Thus, the golden opportunity might be lost, when interest and sentiment alike are impelling the peoples of the Empire to a closer Union. This danger would be averted if formal notice of the intention to summon a Convention were given without delay, in order that the preliminary arrangements might be put in hand. Australian experience would suggest another warning: viz. that the Convention be not too small. It should include all shades of local opinion; and its members should be numerous enough to explain and recommend to all the electors of their several States any constitution which the Convention may frame. A small assembly lacks the general support which prevents the formation of groups; and division into committees and sub-committees soon overcomes what may seem at first to be the insurmountable difficulty of unwieldy numbers. A Convention of 600 members would not be too large to give expression to the views of all parts of the Empire. The essential matter, however, is the summoning of a Convention which will satisfy both the suspicious and the unfriendly that 'there is no manœuvring either to avoid a settlement or to make one behind the backs of the electorate.' Mr Asquith's statement is at all events a great step forward. Let it only be acted upon, without vacillation or reserve, and more progress will have been made towards Imperial Unity during the last two months than during the last thirty years.

Art. 16.—THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND.

IN his fascinating book 'Rasplata,' or 'The Reckoning,' Commander Semenoff told us of the Russian fleet's long and slow voyage to the culminating battle of Tsushima. It took twenty-two months for the German High Seas Fleet to make a start on May 31 last; and it was back again—or what was left of it—by the next morning. The reason for this proceeding was given in advance by its former chief, Grand Admiral von Köster, in a lecture delivered at Kiel early in February 1915. He pointed out that, if Germany lost ship for ship, she would be left without a fleet, and her coast would be seriously menaced by invasion. Whatever, then, may have been 'the enterprise directed north,' it is certain that the German Admiral was resolved to keep his fleet 'in being.'

Sensitiveness to criticism from a public which has been taught to expect much from the Navy is probably responsible for the attempts of the Germans to conceal their losses. There is always, however, an aftermath of evidence, for, apart from what is gleaned by neutral travellers, a battle may rage near some great fishing-ground; and survivors, picked up from lost vessels, find their way to neutral countries. In this way certain facts have come to light, in addition to those drawn from German official sources. The first official wireless, circulated all over the world, gave only the battleship 'Pommern' and the new cruiser 'Wiesbaden' as lost, and the cruiser 'Frauenlob' and some torpedo-boats as 'not yet returned to port.' Later the new cruiser 'Elbing' was added; and finally the battle-cruiser 'Lützow' and the new cruiser 'Rostock.' The loss of the two last ships was only given out on June 8, when the Reichstag had adjourned until Sept. 26, having voted a credit of 600,000,000*l.* the previous day; and after it was said in Hamburg that these ships, as well as the battleship 'Westphalen,' had been lost. It is still asserted that only five torpedo-boats failed to return, a statement which may be contrasted with that of Admiral Beatty, when he told his crews that the Germans had lost 'destroyers so numerous that we have not managed to count them.' This speech is confirmed by the three survivors of V48 landed at Aarhus. 'They said that

the German losses were colossal, and they believed that twenty torpedo-boats were destroyed. The survivors, however, refused to give any further information.' The enemy officially acknowledge the loss of ~~one~~ battleship, one battle-cruiser, four cruisers and five destroyers—eleven in all. We acknowledge the loss of three battle-cruisers, three armoured cruisers, one destroyer leader and seven destroyers—fourteen in all. We estimate that the Germans lost three battleships, one battle-cruiser, five light cruisers, six destroyers, and one submarine. It is also believed that one battleship and one battle-cruiser, together with three destroyers, were so severely damaged that it is doubtful if they could reach port. This tale is more in keeping with the sober utterance of the Director of the Navy Department in the Reichstag, Rear-Admiral Hebbinghaus, who said that 'some of the German ships have been considerably damaged, but the greater portion of the fleet had returned to harbour.'

With every sympathy for the Admiralty, we decline to believe that Admiral Jellicoe's telegraphic report, received on the Friday afternoon (June 2), bore much resemblance to the statement issued in the last editions of the evening papers. The second communication, made about midnight, showed a sense of perspective which was lacking in the first. We recall how, in the darkest period of the war, the Prime Minister appealed for unlimited patience and a proper sense of perspective. As for the latter, the appeal must be re-addressed to the Admiralty; and, as for our patience, it was strained to the breaking-point when Mr Churchill was brought in to sit in judgment on the report of the country's trusted Admiral, and to publish his criticism through the Press Bureau. One is tempted to apply to the Admiralty, on that Friday when it issued its statements, Pepys' own description of it on the occasion of the Dutch raid in the Medway: 'This put us at the Board into a tosse.' It is fairly obvious that the German wireless would have itself given the Admiralty a hint of the truth, if they had not been in a panicky mood, when 'Imagination frames events unknown In wild fantastic shapes of hideous ruin.' The German report began by stating the objective as an 'enterprise directed north.' The fact was patent, that it had been

stopped less than a hundred miles from its starting-point. The subsequent part of the message suggested the next point to make, namely that the German fleet had been driven back to its refuge; and it was equally certain that our fleet was still scouring the open sea from which it had driven the enemy. A few hours later, the Admiralty announced these facts.

While the preponderance of the Allied Navies is something like three to one, the relative loss is a minor point. Even here, however, very different language might have been employed, though, since the Admiralty refuse to allow the first telegram they received to be seen, one cannot tell whether they could have gone quite as far as Beatty did in his subsequent speech to his men, saying, 'You can take it from me now that the damage that we inflicted on the Germans was far greater than that which they inflicted on us.' It is, however, in connexion with Russia that the greatest opportunity for announcing important results was lost. 'An enterprise directed north' implies an attempt to strike at the munitions route to Archangel. A battle forced at some hazard, inflicting great damage on the German fleet, sensibly improves the position of the Russian Baltic fleet, and lessens the aid which the sea can render to Hindenburg's army. It shows a great lack of imagination to have missed such an opportunity of making a reassuring statement.

We must remember that Germany has to provide for a triple demand in the Baltic during the summer months, viz. (a) the Gulf of Riga operations; (b) the blockade of the Sound; (c) the safeguarding of transports to Libau, and of merchant ships to Sweden. Now the wastage of Germany's fast small cruisers was notorious; it has been accelerated by the recent action. With some of their battle-cruisers sunk and others badly damaged, they have little to oppose to the four great 'Borodinos' of 27 knots' speed, armed with 14-inch guns, two of which are certainly completed or nearing completion. It was only by battle-cruisers that Great Britain was able to interfere with the 'enterprise' of the German battle-cruisers. One can easily conceive operations which two 'Borodinos' could carry through, if no German battle-cruisers were on guard, which would revolutionise

the whole position in the Baltic to Germany's permanent disadvantage.

Apart from the above-mentioned results, we have much reason for satisfaction. The effect of Mr Churchill's alarmist naval speech on March 7, 1916, has been dispelled, not by discussion in the House of Commons, but by the failure of his imaginary guns and ships to materialise. He himself has now recognised this. 'There are no surprises or unforeseen features,' he says in his Press Bureau statement on June 4, 1916. 'An accurate measure can be taken of the strength of the enemy; and his definite inferiority is freed from any element of uncertainty.' The tactical methods of the new German admiral have been disclosed. Once more it is seen that our best defence is to hit the enemy and keep on hitting him as fast and as hard as possible, though care must be taken not to expose ammunition which may be exploded by enemy fire and cause disaster to the ship.

It was a considerable achievement to have thwarted the German plans by bringing the High Seas Fleet to action. Could not this have enabled the Admiralty to have covered Beatty until his return home? It is absolutely essential to the command in war, that a General or an Admiral should feel that the men behind him in Whitehall will not permit his prestige to be tarnished. 'You must defend Paris to the end,' said M. Millerand to General Gallieni. 'Take all the initiative and all the responsibility. I cover you.' It was the shabbiest of cover that the Board of Admiralty gave to the country's trusted sailors.

Mr Balfour has begged the public not 'to discuss the details of this battle' until the Commander-in-Chief's despatch appears. Even if we had the will to refuse, we have not the means, for only fragmentary and contradictory accounts have been published—the fitful observations of men busy about their own duties, catching glimpses through the smoke of a battle fought on a foggy evening into the middle watch of the night. For Beatty's despatch on the comparatively small fight of Jan. 24, 1915, we had to wait 38 days. For official reports of the earlier action on Aug. 27, 1914, we waited 57 days,

because the Admiralty wished to date its announcement on Trafalgar Day. For the despatches concerning the bombardment of the Dardanelles forts, we have already waited sixteen months.

Formerly, an Admiral wrote his own despatch, and it was a real human document. Nowadays, letters, telegrams and individuals pass to and fro; and the final product is liable to be toned down into what Whitehall considers a harmonious picture suited to Parliament, press and public. Mr Balfour's predecessor claimed the right to edit the despatches after they had been received. We are not sanguine, therefore, of obtaining a complete and coherent picture of the battle even when the ban on criticism is removed; and probably for a generation to come it will occupy the critic and the historian, as official and private documents gradually come to light.

The action of a leader of tactical insight and prudent courage can never be decided on the lines of mere material weighed in the balance, as we played our war-games during peace. Nelson, who is known chiefly for his more daring feats, could be very cautious when circumstances dictated it, as Mr H. W. Wilson has shown by some useful letters in 'The Times.' If Beatty were by nature rash and impetuous, as his critics alleged, he would have acted very differently in the Battle of the Bight on Aug. 27, 1914. He did not risk his important units until the need was urgent, and, with a cruiser at his mercy, he did not pursue. 'Our destroyers (he said) had reported the presence of floating mines to the eastward, and I considered it inadvisable to pursue her. It was also essential that the squadrons should remain concentrated, and I accordingly ordered a withdrawal.' That was the act of a man whose sense of proportion tells him when risks are not worth running.

Very different were the circumstances of the Dogger Bank fight on Jan. 24, 1915. It is now known that the Admiralty made an incorrect statement in saying that the action was broken off because the squadron had 'reached an area where dangers from German submarines and mines prevented further pursuit.' The action was broken off 70 miles W.N.W. of Heligoland; and Beatty's official despatch merely states that, on the disablement of his ship, he boarded the 'Attack' and 'proceeded at

utmost speed to rejoin the squadron, and met them at noon retiring N.N.W.' We believe that, but for the unfortunate accident which removed his directing power, at least two of the battle-cruisers which fought on that occasion would have been missing on May 31. This consideration is not weakened by the fact that, owing to the perfection of the German sighting arrangements, the calibration, and the elevation of from 25° to 28° given to the guns for long-range firing, the loss of two battle-cruisers was inflicted on us in the very early stages of the fighting. These were not surprises for us. All the naval fights in this war have shown that very remarkable ranges were attained by all descriptions of German guns, and that the spread of their salvos was markedly less than our own. This knowledge could only have heightened Beatty's desire on Jan. 24, 1915, having got them under the guns of a superior force and on the run, to eliminate them then and there lest he should meet them at a later stage on less advantageous terms.

To the naval tactician, the pursuit is almost as important as any stage of the battle, for he knows the miracles a dockyard can perform if the vessel reaches sanctuary. In the Battle of the Dogger Bank the pursuit, as we have seen, was prematurely stopped. The Battle of Jutland gave a new opportunity in which pursuit would depend on the Grand Fleet. Again the object was to fight as far from the German refuge as possible and to bring the maximum concentration to bear. This consideration is reinforced by a knowledge of the fact that the Germans used inferior coal, which is such that their destroyers were unlikely to be able to maintain full speed for four hours. Everything, then, points to the anxiety of British sailors to coax the Germans north for the sake of the subsequent pursuit. This would only be second in their thoughts to the desire to bring the maximum concentration to bear. Concerning the latter, the official reports ought to tell us why so many battle-cruisers were away from Admiral Beatty's command, whether in dock or coaling or for other reasons; whether it was a mere coincidence that the Germans chose that day; and why as much as sixty miles separated our two fleets.

To establish a charge of rashness against Beatty, a

critic would have to prove (1) that he needlessly increased the distance between himself and his reinforcements by precipitating the action; (2) that he deterred the enemy from going further north, or induced them to retreat, by the same procedure. Neither of these counts has been established. No admiral would neglect a certainty of reinforcement, but he might have to fight in order to give it time to come up. Fast battleships cannot overtake fast battle-cruisers; and so Evan-Thomas was unable to assist Beatty before von Scheer's battle-fleet was sighted. All this was certainly in Beatty's mind. A reinforcement nowadays is of vital importance, for the simple reason that the days of the 'Revenge,' when one vessel stood up to fifty, are over. We cannot, like the noble English at Cressy, entertain our enemy with half our forces while 'another half stand laughing by, all out of work and cold for action.' With the terrible destruction wrought by modern guns, the advantage of 6 over 5 may soon be eliminated. The moment the proportion becomes 10 to 5, other conditions being equal, the risks to the weaker force are not 10 to 5 but more like 40 or 50 to 5. Hence, a reinforcement is of even greater importance than when Nelson made so much of it.

Beatty's conviction, when von Scheer's battleships hove in sight, can hardly have been simply that here was an opportunity of rendering a great service to Russia in the Baltic. He must have had other considerations in his mind. 'The enterprise directed north' had not disclosed itself. It was bound to be based on the battle-cruisers, or the fast new cruisers, such as the 'Elbing,' 'Wiesbaden' and 'Frankfurt,' or both together. He felt bound to keep touch with and damage such a menacing combination, even though they enjoyed the protection of a great battle-fleet. The loss of another ship like the 'Invincible' was as nothing to the damage that could be done if those ships broke out into the Atlantic and thence into the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. Nor was it merely a menace to trade, it was one also to the navy; for, all over the world, slow and old warships, ships that were condemned for sale by the famous 'stroke of the pen'—Mr Balfour will recall the phrase—in 1904, are doing splendid work because of the protecting barrier of fast modern ships that blockade Germany's fleet. Old

battleships, which were put aside for sale and which it was announced would never again hoist the pennant, have steamed thousands of miles and rendered manifold services. Their efficiency and use entirely depend on the watch kept by modern craft on the North Sea. But what of that watch itself, if it once broke down because a sailor refused to take risks? Are we not painfully familiar with the loss of service in twenty ships searching for a single raider?

It should be borne in mind that, though none of the essential facts have yet been revealed, it is quite possible for such tactics to be employed by a 25-knot fleet (which Beatty possessed throughout) as to keep them in action with only a portion of the enemy fleet, now reduced to 19 knots by their slower ships. While crossing the bow, say, of the leading enemy ship at 9000 yards, his rear ship might be 12,000 yards from the sixth ship in the enemy's line, leaving the remaining ships in that line at unsuitably high ranges if the conditions were really those of low visibility. Even after the loss of the 'Indefatigable' and 'Queen Mary,' four of his remaining ships would be armed with 15-inch, three with 13½-inch, and one with 12-inch guns, as against 12-inch and 11-inch in the German van. The operation in question would require great skill and courage, and involve establishing a moral effect by gun-fire, since the defensive qualities of his ships in armour had necessarily been sacrificed to obtain the speed.* The use of the gun, then, must compensate for the deficiency of armour, while speed gives the favourable position. Beatty appears to have employed the manoeuvre of 'crossing the T.' This means leading the ships across the enemy's van, concentrating fire on his leading ships, and forcing him to turn or be enfiladed by the British line; and the object would be to make the inevitable turn one that would facilitate the subsequent action of the Grand Fleet. The mere alteration of course forced on the enemy is also highly unfavourable to aiming. The operation is one undoubtedly feasible with

* Some idea of the necessary diminution of armour for the sake of speed may be gathered from the fact that the weight of the engines has to be increased by 30 per cent. in order to get 27 instead of 21 knots out of a 30,000 ton ship.

a six-knot advantage of speed. The unexpectedly daring character of the manœuvre is not the least of its recommendations. If the enemy had expected these tactics at this stage of the fight, he would not have stationed his fast but weakly-armoured battle-cruisers in the van, but would have kept them in the rear of the battleships; nor would he have exposed to loss the very ships on which he probably depended for the success of his ulterior purpose, 'the enterprise directed north.'

We have not dealt consecutively with the battle because it is impossible to give a connected account until the despatches are published, but a few remarks may be made on its opening phase when we incurred our first heavy losses. The Germans adopted Togo's tactics in concentrating salvos on single ships, tactics which have been preached again and again to the text, 'Fight neither with great nor with small, save only with the King of Israel.' We hope that, so far as the first thirty minutes of the action are concerned, some proof may be forthcoming that the 'Hindenburg' was present and armed with 15-inch guns, otherwise it will be on record that 28 (or 24 according to the bearing) 11-inch and 16 12-inch guns eliminated from a British squadron, carrying 32 13½-inch and 16 12-inch guns, one-fourth of the larger and one-half of the smaller guns mentioned in half an hour. It may be that a similar fate befell one of the German battle-cruisers before the arrival of the battleships; but, if so, the point has not been made in the published accounts. In any case, we have here a fresh proof of the need of that margin of safety which the Navy possesses simply because public opinion resolutely fought the Liberal policy of reduction of armaments; and we should bear in mind that the alliance with France and Italy has enabled us to bring into home waters four battle-cruisers and four of our largest armoured cruisers, which were in the Mediterranean at the beginning of the war and prior thereto, while the 'Australia' has also been brought from the Pacific.

If a certain anxiety is caused by this lesson, it is associated with a far greater gain of confidence when one studies the moral rather than the material factors. The superiority of the British *personnel* was never

better shown than by the fact that not only was the Admiral resolute in face of his severe losses, but the British gunnery improved while the German gunnery appears to have gone to pieces as soon as the four fast British battleships, under Evan-Thomas, got into action. This is not merely a testimony to the courage of the men but a proof of their faith in the leader. His losses were sustained in no dare-devil action. There is nothing to show that, in the subsequent period when the four 'Barhams' or later when the three 'Invincibles' joined, and the whole High Seas fleet was kept in play while waiting for the Grand Fleet under Jellicoe, any undue risk was run. The net result was that the Grand Fleet was able to come into action, if only for a short time.

How the High Seas Fleet escaped its clutches we do not know. The Admiralty communication says it was due to 'low visibility and mist.' It may be so, but we confess to being a little tired of Admiralty communications blaming the weather. It is alien to the spirit of the sailor. When the three Cressys were sunk, because they were unaccompanied by destroyers, the blame was put on the weather, just as was the case when the 'Hampshire' went down with Kitchener on board. The Dardanelles failure was a long-drawn tale about the weather. We had from the India Office something in the same vein about the relief which never got to Kut. After the Scarborough bombardment, the German armoured ships escaped because of the 'low visibility and mist.' In no circumstances is one allowed to blame an administrative act or defect, such as the failure to provide Zeppelin scouts—of which the Germans appear to have made considerable use—or sufficient high fuel-endurance destroyers; but the clerk of the weather is fair game. Let us say plainly that the sea in all its aspects is always the ally of the best-trained and best-equipped navy.

The only discussion about naval preparations that we have had during the war was over the Zeppelins, partly because they are so big that they cannot escape attention, and because they have been very attentive to us. Mr Churchill's excuse for abandoning the intention to build them is that Parliament would not have given the money to build as many as Germany. Over two years

at the Admiralty failed to teach him the meaning of co-ordination of effort, and to show him that a few Zeppelins, basing their efforts on our superior fleets and squadrons afloat, and returning to their protection when outnumbered, would have been able to render our fleet most valuable assistance, though Germany might possess three or four times as many. We could have hampered the enemy's freedom of action by Zeppelins, possibly on May 31 as well, if we had only possessed a few of them.

We have done our best to obey Mr Balfour's counsel in this preliminary survey, and we await the despatches as to the battle itself. We have found cause for great satisfaction, but none for boasting; for the time has not yet come when we can relax in any way our preparedness, and what we already know has confirmed the belief of all our best gunners, that we have still something to learn in the art of gunnery on the material side. We have fought a foe who in this battle proved himself not only a brave but a skilful fighter. It is doubtful if this could have been said of the brave French sailors in our last great maritime war, for the skill had departed with the Royalist officers. Neither Tsushima nor Lissa can show the requisite conditions of fairly matched *personnel*; and one has to travel back to the time of Rodney for such battles between fleets. But the country knows that its Navy has proved itself a sure and safe defence; and its satisfaction is sweetened by the thought that the force which defeated the enterprise of the enemy was an imperial fleet in which the gift ships of New Zealand and the Malay States lay in the line of battle.

POSTSCRIPT.—As we go to press, Admiral Jellicoe's despatch has appeared. To begin with, it forms a complete vindication of Sir David Beatty, who 'once again showed his fine qualities of gallant leadership, firm determination, and correct strategic insight.' His manœuvre of forcing the enemy van to turn redressed those unfavourable conditions of light to which his ships were at first exposed. The use of a seaplane to obtain intelligence, and its return within 22 minutes with valuable information, is very suggestive, especially when we hear that it got within 3000 yards of the enemy's screen of light cruisers, and descended to a height of

900 feet so as to be below the clouds. No Zeppelin could have performed this feat, because at that height she would have offered far too easy a target. On the other hand, during the night, while our Grand Fleet lay between the enemy and Heligoland, a Zeppelin was observed at about 4 a.m. Our position was thus made known to the enemy; and to this fact he probably owes his escape. If the British fleet had possessed airships, his free use of them would, as we have suggested, been much hampered, while we should have had a good chance of discovering the enemy fleet.

The use of destroyers by both sides so soon (in a daylight action) as 27 minutes after its commencement is a noticeable feature. The attack of the British destroyers frustrated a similar attempt by the Germans, while our own was pressed home by seven destroyers in two groups, of which one came into action with the German battleships even before they had come to the support of their cruisers. We appear, both then and later, to have scored successes with the torpedo, whereas the only torpedoed ship on our side was the battleship 'Marlborough,' which subsequently fired fourteen salvos and then returned safely to port. Two other features deserve special mention, viz. the splendid work of the engine-room staffs, who brought the ships into action at record speeds, and so gained invaluable time; and the dash and determination of the destroyer flotillas. As to the gunnery, we may quote two noteworthy extracts, in one of which, dealing with the earlier part of the action, we read that 'our fire began to tell, the accuracy and rapidity of the enemy depreciating considerably'; while in the other, referring to the intermittent battleship action late in the day, the Admiral says that the enemy were 'constantly hit,' while his return fire 'was not effective, and the damage caused to our ships was insignificant.'

CARLYON BELLAIRS.

